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1. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
James L. Hudson Frege's Way Out
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I show that Frege's statement (In the Epilogue to his Grundgesetze der Arithmetic v. II) of a way to avoid Russell's paradox is defective, in that he presents two different methods as if they were one. One of these "ways out" is notably more plausible than the other, and is almost surely what Frege really intended. The well-known arguments of Lesniewski, Geach, and Quine that Frege's revision of his system is inadequate to avoid paradox are not affected by the ambiguity of Frede's statement. But a rectnt argument by Linsky and Schumm (Analysis 82 (1971-72), 5-7), intended as a very simple derivation of a contradiction within Frege's revised system, is valid only for the less plausible of the two versions of Frege's way out, and thus is not an effective attack on the revision that Frege intended to make.
2. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
L. Duane Willard Intrinsic Value in Dewey
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It is widely believed that John Dewey completely rejected intrinsic value. The objective of the paper is to show this belief mistaken. Several different concepts of intrinsic value have been offered by philosophers. I argue that while Dewey rejected much in these various concepts, a careful examination of his writings reveals that he still retained the view that at least some things may be worth having, doing, enjoying for their own sakes. Perhaps the major point established is that Dewey's doctrine of the means-ends continuum does not deny the possibility of intrinsic value as he conceives it. This is shown by calling attention to his discussions of ends incorporating means and of conmummatory experiences.
3. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
John B. Fisher The Concept of Structure in Freud, Levi Strauss, and Chomsky
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In this paper I attempt to help clarify the nature of structuralism as a philosophical approach by examining the way in which Freud, Lévi-Strauss and Chomsky use the concept of structure. I argue that in each of these thinkers there is an important tension between their attempts to develop, on the one hand, a theory within the framework of determinism and, on the other, to emphasize the meaningfulness of certain aspects of human behavior. I suggest that the ability of the term "structure" to refer either to a universal or a particular helps the two sides of their thinking from coming into conflict with one another, and that this is a magor reason why these figures were attracted to a structural approach.
4. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Robert C. Schultz Sidgwick on Proof in Ethics
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The objective of the paper is to provide a critical exposition of Henry Sidgwick's theory of "proof" in ethics, by means of a restatement and a critique of relevant sections of Book IV of The Methods of Ethics and an article in the 1879 volume of Mind. It is concluded that Sidgwick's thought contains two fundamental unresolved tensions. One of these relates to whether "proof" is to be treated as a normative or an empirical matter. On the one hand, Sidgwick clearly wants to offer a ground for ethics whose epistemic force would be universal; on the other, he accepts Mill's "considerations determining the mind to accept" as a definition. The second unresolved tension relates to the question whether abstract transcendent axioms or the familiar rules of common sense morality constitute the ultimate court of appeal in ethical decisionmaking.
5. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
John A. Schumaker Knowing Entails Believing
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Recently Colin Radford attempted to show primarily by examples that the entailment thesis that knowing entails believing is false. Both D. M. Armstrong and Keith Lehrer replied by suggesting, in effect, that Radford cannot justify his failure to consider unconscious belief. Here I show that neither Armstrong nor Lehrer succeeded in refuting Radford. But my exploration of their suggestion about unconscious belief leads to a complete reconstruction of Armstrong's principal example in terms of belief-constituting abilities. This reconstruction not only provides grounds for defending the entailment thesis, but also renders the thesis immune to Radford's examples and arguments.
6. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Norman Melchert Hume's Appendix on Personal Identity
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The reasons why Hume expressed dissatisfaction concerning his own account of personal identity in the Treatise are unclear. Hume himself states them obscurely, and commentators have disagreed about what exactly it was that puzzled him. I offer reasons for thinking the sources of Hume’s retraction have not yet been understood, and propose a reading of the text of the Appendix which explains why he was dissatisfied.The key to the proper understanding of this text lies in two insufficiently appreciated facts: (1) that, for Hume, thoughts are perceptions too, and (2) that the unifying of perceptions can only be done by a perception of a higher level.
7. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Robert W. Loftin Some Logical Problems in Arthur Danto's Account of Explanation
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In this paper we examine the theory of historical explanation presented by Arthur Danto in his book, Analytical Philosophy of History (1965).Our thesis is that Danto is mistaken in his assertion that a phenomenon can be covered by a general law only insofar as we produce a description of it which contains no uneliminable particular designations of it. It is possible to cover such particular statements with general laws provided one can bridge the logical gap between the two types of sentence with other statements which need not be redescriptions of the phenomenon but can be independently established premises for a deductive argument.We further show that some of the analogies which Danto attempts to make between deduction and narrative are mistaken because of errors in Danto's understanding of logical theory, specifically, Danto's notion that no predicate may appear in the conclusion of a deductive argument which is not antecedently contained in the premises and his claim that the same variable must be replaced by the same constants throughout an argument.
8. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Richard Kraut The Importance of Love in Aristotle's Ethics
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My aim is to show how Aristotle's theory of friendship supports his thesis that happiness requires virtuous activity. Ethical behavior is valuable, according to the Nicomachean Ethics, not solely because it uses reason (the immoral can use reason too), but also because it is the expression of a loving attitude towards other persons. By emphasizing this aspect of virtuous activity, I defend Aristotle against the charge that his high estimation for pure intellectual activity commits him to an unethical doctrine. I also argue that his theory of love helps explain why he considers the political life second only to the philosophical life.
9. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Henry R. West Comparing Utilitarianisms
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Act Utilitarianism and Rule Utilitarianism, in one formu lation of each, are not extensionally equivalent, that is, they do not require of an agent precisely the same behavior as is shown by Gerald Barnes in "Utilitarianisms”, Ethics 82 (197I) 56-64. As a result each theory passes and sometimes fails different utilitarian tests: the comparative consequences of universal conformity by everyone (distributively) vs. universal conformity by everyone (collectively) Barnes argues that the latter is the appropriate test. I argue that the test which AU passes is the appropriate one, since everyone, collectively, does not make moral choices. Moral choices are made by everyone individually.
10. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
James A. Martin Proving Necessity
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It is thought that a valid inference to a logically necessary conclusion must proceed from entirely necessary premises. Counter-examples show this is false. Perhaps while the truth of a necessary proposition may follow from non-necessary premises, its necessity cannot so follow. Counter-examples show this to be mistaken. Must anyone who comes to know the non-necessary premises employed in the various counter-examples have prior knowledge of the necessity of the conclusions of the counter-examples? I argue against this. It is true that, for any necessary proposition, there must be necessary premises from which it may validly be inferred; but no one need use these, or know these, or know how to use them, in order to know the necessity of any proposition.
11. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Ronald F. Perrin Freedom and the World: The Unresolved Dilemma of Kant's Ethic
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The paper argues that the issue of the Third Antinomy of Reason (the conflict between the ideas of natural and free causality) remained a central concern throughout all of Kant's ethical writings subsequent to the first Critique. In the Grundlegung, the second and third Critiques and, finally, in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft we find Kant continually refining and modifying the concept of a transcendental freedom but never arriving at a satisfactory resolution. I argue that any such resolution (such as that attempted by Professor Silber through an analysis of Kant's explication of Wille and Willkur) would not only imply the overturning of Kant's ethical philosophy but the entire Kantian system insofar as it stands astride the twin pillars of phenomenal and noumenal reality.
12. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
William H. Brenner Prime Matter and Barrington Jones
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In Philosophical Review, October 1974, Professor Jones argues that Aristotle's concept of matter is that of any individual item, such as a piece of bronze or a seed, with which a process of coming into existence begins, and which is prior (in a purely temporal sense) to the product which comes to exist. Aristotle does not try to prove the existence of some sort of "super-stuff" called "prime matter."I argue that Jones' account does not do full justice to Aristotle's analysis of change, or to the traditional notion of prime matter based on it. I criticize Jones' arguments and draw attention to a passage in which Aristotle says that matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, while in another it does not. "Matter" in the first sense refers to the determinate individual, the first term of a change; in the second sense it is the "stuff" which remains after a substantial change, the "prime matter."
13. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Richard E. Olson On Truth by Convention
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In his early essay, "Truth by Convention," W.V.O. Quine scraps a programme for a conventionalistic account of logic on finding that the very logic which he wishes to stipulate by conventional truth assignments is presupposed in the stipulation of his conventions. Recently, however, Carlo Giannoni has offered us a variant of the Quine programme which, he maintains, avoids Quine's initial pitfall by shifting the emphasis from truth assignment to the conventional stipulation of inference rules. In the following essay I argue that Quine and, hence, also Giannoni have misconceived the problem of conventionalism in their accounts and that the Giannoni reconstruction is consequently to no avail. The alternative account of Quine's initial difficulties which I offer is both incompatible with a classical conventionalism and Quine's own Duhemian conventionalism, while explaining these difficulties far more adequately than his account of them does.
14. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Hugh T. Wilder Quine's Arguments for the Interdeterminacy of Translation
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The purpose of the article is to evaluate Quine's arguments for the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. After formulation of the thesis, Quine's four main arguments are described and evaluated. The arguments are: (1) the argument from the underdeterminacy of physical theory, (2) the argument from the inscrutability of terms, (3) the argument from the conjunction of the Peircean notion of meaning and the Duhemian thesis about the interanimation of sentences, and (4-) the argument from the linguist's reliance on sets of analytical hypothesis. It is contended that none of these arguments is successful in supporting the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, and that Quine has offered no reason to believe that the degree of determinacy of translation is different from that of physical theory.
15. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Louis F. Kort What is an Apology?
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In this essay I attempt to elucidate the concept of an apology. I begin by considering the way in which apologizing is characterized by Erving Goffman; and I argue that his characterization does not suffice to distinguish the apology from many other speech acts. I then offer my own analysis, according to which (roughly) a speaker is apologizing to his hearer for something if and only if in saying what he does he is 1) expressing regret about it, 2) accepting responsibility for it, 3) acknowledging it to constitute an offense to his hearer, 4) expressing regret about it as such, and 5) making a gesture of respect to his hearer as a person with a right to be spared such mistreatment.
16. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
James W. Felt On Burying Induction
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Contrary to a popular view that induction constitutes solely a methodological problem, this essay argues that a metaphysical problem underlies the methodological in such a way that any solution of the latter implicitly assumes the solvability in principle of the former. Thus the metaphysical problem deserves to be faced rather than dismissed. It is further suggested that the general features of a solution to the metaphysical problem are exemplified in the philosophical approach of A. N. Whitehead, inasmuch as it couples both the recognition of causal derivation within the fabric of immediate sense experience and a speculative account of just how the present can thus derive from the past and the future from the present.
17. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
James L. Muyskens Life After Death: An Idle Wish or a Reasonable Hope?
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I argue that life after death (understood as personal survival of one's death) is an appropriate object of one's hope, despite the fact that it may not be an appropriate object of one's belief. That is, the hope for life after death is a reasonable hope. Whereas the belief that there is a life after death may not be a justified belief.I begin by discussing and clarifying the phenomenon of hoping and developing a logical analysis of the concept of hope. Hoping is then distinguished from both wishing and believing. Next I discuss what must obtain before we consider a hope to be a reasonable one or to be justified. Finally I demonstrate that at least one form of life after death meets the conditions for justified hope.
18. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Michael R. Neville Kant on Beauty as the Symbol of Morality
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The paper attempts to show what Kant means by his claim that "the beautiful Is the symbol of the morally good" In Section 59 of the Critique of Judgment. Part I explicates his notion of symbolism in general and includes a subsidiary explication of his notion of analogy. Part II deals with some special problems which arise when he seeks to apply that general notion of symbolism to the particular province of the beautiful. The conclusions drawn are that Kant means the following: that in the very act of appreciating a beautiful object and making judgments of taste thereon, we have some awareness of ourselves as free, supersensible beings, which awareness is analogous to our awareness of ourselves as free moral agents; that any beautiful object can, in this sense, serve as a symbolic presentation of the morally good; but that the symbolic relationship between beauty and moral goodness does not constitute an argument for morality or for the actuality of human freedom, for it rather presupposes our awareness of such, nor should it sinply be conflated with the beauty of nature bridging the noumenal and the phenomenal aspects of our selves, which is a further issue.
19. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Charles E. Jarrett On Proper Names
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The main goal of this paper is to show that in Speech Acts, two of John Searle’s arguments fail to establish his thesis that proper names have sense, or descriptive content. It is argued, by considering counterexamples, that Searle’s test for the analyticity of statements is inadequate, that the argument from the "principle of identification" is therefore mistaken, and that, because of lack of attention to the distinction between meaning and sense (descriptive content), the argument from identity statements fails to establish the conclusion. Hence the arguments based on identification and identity statements are unsuccessful.
20. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 1
Gary B. Herbert The Issue of Validity in Hobbe's Moral and Political Philosophy
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For whatever reason, scholars have recently reapproached the moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes with a renewed interest in establishing its validity. Two influential interpretations have emerged, a theistic interpretation and a concep- tualistic interpretation, the former by Howard Warrender in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, and the latter by David Gauthier in tfhe fcogic of leviathan.Both Warrender and Gauthier maintain that Hobbes's egoistic psychology invalidates his moral theory, and undertake to rescue its formal validity by regrounding the theory on his theology, on the one hand, and on his methodological (rather than metaphysical) materialism, on the other. The result in both instances is a piecemeal analysis that dissolves the political realism for which Hobbes was famous, and ignores altogether the comprehensive intentions which he so carefully expressed. Hobbes takes on the appearance of something that might be best described as a pre-Kantian Kant.