This paper intends to lead with one of the most famous sentences of the Parmenides’ poem Peri physeos: “[...] are the same thinking and being”. The proposal is to bring some considerations of Jacques Lacan and of Martin Heidegger that concern also this sentence, and then to achieve one interpretation that includes both considerations. Those considerations seem to be in contraction in the beginning, but, when we look forward, we see that they both criticize the modern way of thinking to talk about one distinguished experience that fundamentally the Greek poem introduces: the thinking – noein – as existing in the mood of the being; that is einai. We develop the notion that this experience can show the destiny to who seeks it.

The author wishes to show that in Parmenides’ approach, the Aristotelian division of being and the truth still do not exist: being as presence or an object in general, individual or universal, material or mental, and the truth as the value of the judgment, because for the Eleatic word ‘to eon’ only means the truth. This word is the name of the truth as a transcendent nature (resp. essence) in general. In his poem Parmenides, for whom the truth is the only Being, praises and describes the existence of the truth (identified with what truly is or with pure being par excellence) in opposition to the multitude of opinions (appearances of the truth and being). Parmenides’ poem is the testimony and account of experience (of existence) of the truth as Being itself, and the experience of its normative force as transcendent nature. This Parmenidean ‘aletheism’ allows us to understand how Plato’s theory of eternal truths ever appeared (ideas, or forms as norms and paradigms of nature, cognition and action), as well as the importance of Parmenides himself for Neo-platonism.

1. There is a commonly held endoxon that idealism did not exist and could not exist before Plato, since the «Presocratics» did not yet distinguish between the material and the ideal etc. This preconception is based on the misleading conception of «Presocratics» as physicalists and the simplistic evolutionist scheme of Aristotle’s Metaph. A. In fact, religious and idealist metaphysics are attested in different archaic traditions before Plato, whereas «simple» physical theories of elements of the Milesian type did not exist before the 6th century B.C. scientific revolution. 2. Those who deny the existence of idealism in Greek philosophy commonly refer to Myles F. Burnyeat (see, “Idealism and Greek philosophy: What Descartes saw and Berkeley missed” in: The Philosophical Review, Vol.91, No1, 1982, 3-40). We will argue against this article on the following grounds: a) it is based on a selective and incomplete data from early Greek philosophy, b) Burnyeat understands by «idealism» subjective idealism and anti-realism. But Greek idealism as a rule is a form of objective idealism and has nothing to do with anti-realism. The two basic forms are: dualstic idealism (Pythagoreans, Plato) and monistic idealism (Parmenides, Neoplatonists). 3. We will argue against modern naturalist interpretations of the Pythagorean first principles by Huffmann and others. Both in the table of opposites (58 Α5 DK) and in Philolaus (44 B1) πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον (ἄπειρα καὶ περαίνοντα) denote self-subsistent mathematical essences, ‘out of which’ (cf. ἐξ ἀπείρων etc.) physical bodies (cf. φύσις – ibid.) are composed. It is impossible to interpret “the limit and the unlimited” (or “limiters and unlimiteds”) as physical bodies themselves or as properties of physical bodies. 4. We will argue for the Pythagorean (not «Orphic») origin of the 5th centu-ry graffiti on bones’ plates from Olbia. According to this early table of oppo-site, the body is ψεῦδος, i.e., an illusion. 5. The Zeller-Burnet interpretation of Parmenides B3 (taking τὸ αὐτό as subject) is grammatically impossible. The fragment states the identity of νοεῖν καὶ εἶναι, i.e., affirms mental nature of Being.6.The basic opposition of Parmenides’ Aletheia (being vs. non-being) exactly corresponds to the basic opposition of doxa (light vs. darkness). Light is the active and thinking element, night is the «heavy», dense, corporeal substance. Sine light corresponds to Being, night (i.e., body) corresponds to non-Being. The philosophy of Parmenides is a radical form of immaterialism and idealistic monism.

Anaxagoras philosophy has been traditionally analyzed from the concept “homeomeries”. This concept is only a part of a bigger topic which can be found in his doctrine almost in a tacit way. That is infinity. But, why did Anaxagoras include this concept in his doctrine? The explanation given in this paper is that Anaxagoras propounded infinity as a way to preserve the Eleatic legacy without denying reality. In fact, infinity helps to keep the most radical ideas of Parmenides (no generation, no destruction and no changes) and, at the same time, to explain reality from itself, it means, accepting that these events are in reality and are not an appearance. For this reason, Anaxagoras theory has infinity as an important concept and from this concept, his doctrine will be explained in this paper.

The matter of difference appears at the moment in human thought, inaugurates debate and philosophical discussion in Western tradition, and becomes a significant and culminant point in the history of philosophy. From its origin the philosophical discourse lives on this perplexity, although it searches from its very origin to think identity as identity in the sinuosity of real differences, and in the power of its linguistic game, it assumes a position, which is essentially based on a logocentric illusion. It is about a position which expresses itself for being, against nothing, for synchrony against diachrony, and for sameness against alterity. Concerning this, it is not possible here not to inquire about this position towards multiplicity, in which reason tries to unite it in a whole. Would this not mean in the origin of philosophy itself a limitation and insecurity of what is rational? Would this attitude not reveal a symptom of weakness and an incipient decline, whose destiny is fulfilled along the Western tradition? Historically, and in spite of the most varied solutions and vicissitudes presented to this problem, it is possible to observe that the attempt to direct philosophical thought to totality continually prevails.

Uno de los fragmentos de Heráclito que más ha llamado la atención es el que proclama que la naturaleza tiende a ocultarse, φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ. Su aparente ambigüedad ha sido objeto de múltiples in-terpretaciones que en muchas ocasiones se han alejado del contexto cultural y lingüístico en que Heráclito formuló esta conocida frase. Por ello resulta de gran interés recurrir al pasaje de la Odisea X 302-306, en el que aparece la palabra φύσις por vez primera en lengua griega, cuando el dios Hermes muestra a Odiseo la naturaleza oculta de la planta moly. De estos versos se extrae la conclusión de que, en un principio, la noción de φύσις estaba vinculada al mundo vegetal y una de sus principales características: que las plantas presentan una parte visible y llamativa, la flor, y otra oscura e invisible, la raíz, a la que, sin embargo, las primeras deben su existencia. Asimismo, la observación del ciclo de la naturaleza demuestra que son muchos los vegetales que como la vid o el trigo ‘desaparecen’ en invierno para volver a aparecer con renovada fuerza en primavera. De esta sencilla observación se constata que, fiel a su estilo, Heráclito expresó una obviedad de un modo tan solemne que, paradójicamente, su interpretación ha acabado convirtiéndose en un reto para la tradición hermenéutica.

There is probably no doubt that Hesiod is one of the important ancient Greek personalities still known today. From my point of view, Hesiod is not only the first European philosopher who reflected on the beginning of the world in the Theogony or about a few ethical questions in the Works and days, but also the first who thought about the human being and his unique features from a political standpoint. For this purpose I will consider six different politico-anthropological identities of human beings: eris (good and bad strife), dikê (justice and injustice), ergon (work), oikos (home), philia (friendship) and godliness. As far as I can see, no one has argued until today that a political anthropology exists in Hesiod’s Works and days. We can´t find a classical philosophical construction in the text, but what we can find is the consideration of some basic categories, words and themes of a political anthropology that are – as it seems – firstly discussed by Hesiod.

When contemporary scholars study the first Greek (and European) thinkers, their most current attitude is to concentrate on their ontological and epistemological theories, paying little or no attention at all to their ethical or political positions. It is true that ethical and political ideas cover a minor part of the fragments we possess. Moreover, they often take up a peculiar form, which has been characterized as “non-philosophical”, because it isn’t deductive, empirical or clearly founded on rational arguments: they resemble rather some common sense advice offered by the elderly members of a community. But are these precepts indeed to be taken so lightly? In my paper, I intend to make an analysis that hasn’t been undertaken up to now, to my knowledge, of this particular form of ethical and political ideas destined to help people to achieve concretely a life as good as possible, in order to prove that: a) these concepts are founded on a philosophical method equivalent to the one result-ing in the cosmological theories of the archaic period; b) their form, inspired by the oracles, is chosen deliberately in order to astound, to help memorization in a largely oral cultural environment, and to encourage the personal activity of rational interpretation, which may lead to multiple results, underlining the liberty of thought. I shall finally cite some representative examples of the eth-ical and political maxims attributed to the “Seven sages” (of which Thales), to Pythagoras and to Democritus, to illustrate this particular link between theory, and practice at the origins of the European philosophy.

Aristóteles introdujo en la historia de la recepción de Anaxágoras el término ‘homeómero’. Este vocablo hace referencia a las sustancias cuyas partes son similares entre sí y también se asemejan al todo. Aunque las explicaciones del Estagirita pueden dar lugar a confusión, cabría que ese término respondiera a un aspecto auténtico de la doctrina de Anaxágoras reflejada en los fragmentos de su obra. Ahora bien, haría falta, quizá, encontrar un significado específico para ‘homeómero’ en Anaxágoras, un poco distinto del que parece poseer la palabra en Aristóteles. Para ello hace falta revisar el sentido de los dos términos implicados: ‘homoios’ y ‘moira’. Es necesario averiguar qué realidades son designadas como partes y, por consiguiente, distinguir el todo respecto del cual es apreciada su parcialidad. Además, hay que atender al tipo de semejanza que guardan entre sí esas partes y a su parecido con el todo. El autor concluye que las partes son “todas las cosas”, las cuales se parecen unas a otras y a todo el universo por estar compuestas de todas las cosas, según Anaxágoras.

Si partimos tanto de los testimonios biográficos y doxográficos como de los fragmentos que nos han llegado a modo de “citas”, debe reconoc-erse que no hay propiamente un concepto heracliteano sobre filosofía, mucho menos en el sentido imperante a partir de Platón. Lo que sí encontramos con toda seguridad son las señales de lo que caracteriza al φιλοσόφους: alguien despierto (22B 1, 17, 72a, 89, 101a), atento a la interpelación de su propia existencia (22B101 DK) y de las cosas (22B35 DK), desapropiado de sus propias creencias (22B 2 y 28a DK) y de las doctrinas u opiniones dominantes (22B74 DK) y, sin embargo, junto con todo ello, alguien resoluto a ver, escuchar, decir, y sobre todo callar. Con base en lo anterior, puede afirmarse que la filosofía en Heráclito, no es ni ciencia ni mucho menos una visión de mundo sino que ante todo, es una indagación sobre el modo de habitar en la dimensión del Ser.

O θάνατος αποτελούσε πάντοτε για τον άνθρωπο ένα φαινόμενο απειλητικό, που προσπαθούσε συνήθως να το αντιμετωπίσει, καταφεύγοντας είτε στη θρησκεία και τον μύθο είτε στη φιλοσοφία. Οι Έλληνες, λαός αισιόδοξος, δεν θέλησαν, εκτός ολίγων περιπτώσεων, να θεωρήσουν τον θάνατο ως το οριστικό τέλος της ζωής. Έβλεπαν το νεκρό σώμα να αφανίζεται, αλλά πίστευαν ότι η ζωή μπορεί να συνεχιστεί έξω και πέρα από αυτό. Κατ’ αρχάς πρέπει να επισημάνουμε ότι τρεις είναι οι βασικές απαντήσεις που έδωσαν οι Έλληνες μυθολόγοι και οι Προσωκρατικοί στο ακόλουθο ερώτημα: «με ποιόν τρόπο είναι δυνατόν η ζωή να εξακολουθεί να υπάρχει μετά τον θάνατο του σώματος;» Η ζωή μπορεί να συνεχιστεί κατ’ αυτούς και μετά το θάνατο, αν δεχθούμε ότι ισχύουν τα φαινόμενα της μεταμόρφωσης, της μετεμψύχωσης και του μετασχηματισμού. A)Η μεταμόρφωση: O άνθρωπος κάτω από ορισμένες προϋποθέσεις (π.χ., ανείναι ωραίος και ευνοούμενος των θεών) μπορεί να μεταμορφωθεί πεθαίνονταςσε φυτό, πουλί ή αστερισμό, διατηρώντας ένα αμυδρό ίχνος της αρχικής τουπροσωπικότητας, όπως συνέβη με τον Υάκινθο, τον Κυπάρισσο, τη Μυρσίνη,τον Νάρκισσο, την Αλκυόνη, τον Κύκνο, τους Διoσκούρους κ.λπ.B)Η μετεμψύχωση ή μετενσάρκωση: Ο θάνατος αποσυνθέτει το σώμα, αλλ’αυτό δεν σημαίνει και τον αφανισμό του ανθρώπου, γιατί αυτός δεν είναι μόνουλικό ον, εφ’ όσον αποτελείται επίσης από την αθάνατη ψυχή του, η οποίασυνεχίζει να ζει μετά τον θάνατο του σώματος, διατηρώντας την ταυτότητάτης. Αν είναι καθαρή, εισέρχεται στο θεϊκό βασίλειο και απολαμβάνει τηντέλεια μακαριότητα. Αν όμως δεν έχει καθαρθεί πλήρως, μετενσαρκώνεται,ακολουθώντας ένα κύκλο διαδοχικών γεννήσεων και θανάτων μέσα από νέεςμορφές ζωής, μέχρις ότου αποβάλει κάθε ρύπο (πάθη, κακίες κ.λπ.). Αυτόπου αποκαλούμε γέννηση είναι στην πραγματικότητα η αρχή μιας ύπαρξηςδιαφορετικής από την προηγούμενη, ενώ θάνατος είναι το τέλος μιας μορφήςπου θα τη διαδεχθεί μία άλλη (Οβιδίου, Μεταμορφώσεις, XV, 245-261). Τιςαντιλήψεις αυτές υιοθετούν κυρίως οι Ορφικοί (DK B 17, B 20), οι Πυθαγό­ρειοι (Φιλολάου, DK B 14) και ο Εμπεδοκλής (DK B 117).Γ) Ο μετασχηματισμός των στοιχείων που αποτελούν το ανθρώπινο σώμα ή ταποικίλα όντα του φυσικού κόσμου: Η θεωρία αυτή βασίζεται στην πεποίθηση ότι η ύλη από την οποία αποτελείται τόσο ο άνθρωπος όσο και όλα τα άλλα πλάσματα δεν γεννιέται ούτε χάνεται, αλλά μετασχηματίζεται, εφ’ όσον όλα τα πράγματα προέρχονται από την ένωση και το διαχωρισμό προϋπαρχόντων άφθαρτων και αμετάβλητων υλικών (δηλαδή από τα τέσσερα βασικά στοιχεία κατά τον Εμπεδοκλή (DK B 6, b 8, b 17, b 21) ή από απειροελάχιστα υλικά σωματίδια κατά τον Λεύκιππο και τον Δημόκριτο (DK Α 7, Α 10, Α 14, Α 15, Α 67). Αυτά άλλοτε ενώνονται μεταξύ τους και άλλοτε διαχωρίζονται, υπό την επίδραση κινητηρίων δυνάμεων, με αποτέλεσμα να σχηματίζονται νέα σώμα­τα, ενώ τα παλαιά αποσυντίθενται. Στη διαδικασία αυτή υπάγονται, κατά τον Δημόκριτο, και οι ανθρώπινες ψυχές, οι οποίες αποτελούνται από λεπτά, σφαι­ρικά, λεία και κινητικά άτομα που εισέρχονται στο σώμα με την αναπνοή, δια­χέονται σε όλα τα σημεία του, δίδουν τη ζωή και εκτελούν διάφορες λειτουργί­ες, όπως είναι η κίνηση, η αίσθηση και η νόηση, για να το εγκαταλείψουν την ώρα του θανάτου και να διαχυθούν στο σύμπαν, μέχρις ότου σχηματίσουν νέ­ους συνδυασμούς με τη μεταξύ τους συναρμογή (Δημοκρίτου, DK Β 1). Η με­ταμόρφωση, η μετεμψύχωση και ο μετασχηματισμός εμπεριέχονται στην ευρύ­τερη έννοια της μεταβολής, τη σημασία της οποίας επεσήμανε, μεταξύ άλλων, ένας από τους σημαντικότερους Προσωκρατικούς, ο Ηράκλειτος. Ο Εφέσιος φιλόσοφος πίστευε συγκεκριμένα ότι ο κόσμος και όλα όσα εμπεριέχονται σ’ αυτόν μεταβάλλονται αδιάκοπα, ομοιάζοντας μ’ ένα ποταμό, τα νερά του οποίου ευρίσκονται σε κατάσταση διαρκούς ροής (DK Β2, Β49a). Οι συνε­χείς αυτές μεταβολές αποτελούν στην πραγματικότητα μετασχηματισμούς του ἀειζώου πυρός, του βασικότερου στοιχείου όλων των όντων που ταυτίζεται με τον κόσμο, ο οποίος υπήρχε, υπάρχει και θα υπάρχει πάντοτε (DK Β 30, Β 90). Στο πλαίσιο των ποικίλων μετασχηματισμών το κάθε στοιχείο μεταπίπτει στο αντίθετό του, με το οποίο αποτελεί αδιάσπαστη ενότητα. Κατά συνέπεια από τη ζωή δημιουργείται ο θάνατος και από τον θάνατο η ζωή, χωρίς ποτέ να σταματά η εναλλαγή αυτή (DK Β 88).

The essay examines the Stoic notion of appropriate actions (καθήκοντα), focusing on the relationship between the perfectly appropriate actions of the virtuous person (the Stoic κατορθώματα) and “intermediate appropriate actions” (καθήκοντα μέσα). I present some of the philosophical motivations behind the general Stoic theory of καθήκοντα, and argue against the common interpretation of μέσα καθήκοντα as action types that make no reference to the manner of their performance, and of κατορθώματα as μέσα καθήκοντα that are rightly performed by an agent with a virtuous disposition. Instead, I claim that the different types of καθήκοντα should be distinguished with reference to the kinds of things they aim at, rather than the manner in which they are performed. So, μέσα καθήκοντα should be understood as actions aiming at natural advantages that are indifferent, and κατορθώματα as actions aiming at the only true good, i.e., virtue. I discuss some of the advantages of the alternative view and outline the account of virtuous motivation that arises from it.

The Epicurean philosophy is based upon the theory of Democritus, who believed that everything is composed of ‘atoms’, physically but not geometrically indivisible, and lie in a void. Democritus paid a great deal of attention to the structure of the human body, the noblest part of which is considered to be the soul. These all-pervading souls - atoms perform in different functions. In this case, Epicurus and his followers believed that the soul, just like the body, was somehow material, consisting of atoms as well. The body by keeping soul-atoms together without much dispersion allows them to vibrate with the motions that generate sensations. Lucretius also describes the atomic theory in his De rerum natura and observes the materiality of the soul. At last, Epicurean “pleasure” is the greatest good, but the one and only way to attain such pleasure is living modestly and be of the limits of one’s desires. This can lead everyone to attain a state of equanimity (ataraxia) and freedom from fear of death, as well as absence of body pain (aponoia). The combination of these two states is supposed to constitute happiness in its highest form.

The study of the figure of Socrates, although infinite, is necessary not only for understanding the work of Plato and the Platonists of every time, where it is a fundamental piece, but also for the study of the so called “Socratics” and their influence during the Hellenistic period. In this paper, we will try to define these most prominent ‘tools’, “ideas” or ‘qualities’ about which we can say - without fear or ‘trembling’ - that skepticism, especially academic skepticism, was inherited by the philosophy of the historical person, Socrates. Or rather, what kind of simple connections can be set between the “gadfly” of Athens and the late skeptics? We will try to show how there are close resemblances in the core of these philosophers’ conceptions, even though their way of philosophizing leads them to different conclusions and different stances.

The Stoic theory of recurrence is founded on Stoic biological and cosmological doctrines. This paper argues that these connections are far more elaborate and well-determined than generally assumed. Evidence from the Stoic theory of the motion of pneuma is brought to bear and a rival geometric model of time is supported against the standard linear and circular models supported by Salles and Long. The new ‘torus model’ is inspired by Alexander of Aphrodisias’ inquisitive questioning of what form the peculiar motion of pneuma may possibly have and based on the evidence in which the Stoics discuss the simultaneous inward/outward motion of pneuma. A new perspective is offered as to what form this motion may take, which ultimately offers an insight into the mechanics of recurrence as also some of the long-standing paradoxes of recurrence.

For Seneca passions are not just bad judgments that need to be defeated. Even though he generally agrees with Chrysippus on the matter of the ontology of passions, Seneca differentiates mainly in his emphasis that passions are the reason why man leads an inauthentic, unhappy and undignified life. The Roman philosopher employs practical techniques that refer to the ordinary man, the man who rationally desires to change his merely-being into well-being. But that action requires the energetic engagement of the individual and the admittance of his particular responsibility. The role of individuality is particularly stressed, especially on the premises that man needs to make this constant and conscious effort to help himself, and to cure his own soul, often with the aid of others who share the same path. Under this prism, the treatment of passions leads to a culmination where man is not only bound to achieve his ontological excellence, but also to relieve his soul from the traumas of passions and to connect himself with the moral and existential safety that the presence of “recta ratio” guarantees. Seneca in De Ira defines passion as the result of an ‘impetus’, an horme, which lacks self-control and is closed to reason and counsel. As such, a passion makes the soul unfit to know the right and the true. In such a condition, man loses contact with the firm cognitive criteria that would allow him this knowledge and would ensure a eudaemonistic living “secundum naturam”. Although Seneca is convinced that the stoic teaching should address literally everyone in order to ameliorate one’s life and make it authentic and right, he upholds that it is better to totally exclude passions from the soul than try to control them. That gives certain gravity to the recognition that virtue, although it potentially belongs to every human being, is an absolute good, the only good that can be attained. But virtue, through this condition of emancipation from passion and of correction, is not an idealistic situation. Virtue is necessary, because only virtue can save man from leading an unhappy life, since it is the crucial prerequisite for the life of a rational and conscientious being.

In this paper, I will deal with the Chrysippean theory of co-fated events. In order to do so, in the first part, I will present Chysippus’ simile of the dog tied to a car and its fatalistic implications. In the second part, I will present the ancient critique known as lazy argument (ἀργὸς λόγος). In the end, I will propose a new interpretation of Chrysippus’s distinction of fated and co-fated events in order to re-examine how he answered this critique. This Chrysippean theory shows how relevant philosophical understanding of fate is in order to avoid fatalism, and safeguard the value of our personal efforts and practical thought.

This paper intends to discuss the relations between Stoicism and Christianity, demonstrating that the approach between both doctrines is artificial and moved by ideological purposes. Firstly, some conceptions, which tend to unify Stoicism and Christianity, will be shown. In the second part of the article, those positions are criticized, and Stoicism shall be redirected to its philosophical patterns.

This paper will show how the Stoic Chrysippus appropriated Plato’s Republic by picking up the Platonic definition of justice as ‘doing one’s own’ (ta hautou prattein) and by applying it to the Stoic concept of freedom as ‘the authority of self-action’ (exousia autopragias). I argue, based on the analysis of Plutarch’s De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1043A-B - and other related sources - that Chrysippus in his On ways of life, employed the concept of freedom and explicated it in terms of ‘autopragia’ or ‘ta hautou prattein’. He did so by showing that, given the correct understanding of freedom, not only life of leisure, but also the active life of politics can be said to lead to freedom. Chrysippus’ strategy of reading Plato’s texts will be seen as a kind of appropriation used to extract the best from them by making certain conceptual adjustments; an approach which he must have thought necessary to achieve a unified and consistent theory. Accordingly, he re-interpreted the Platonic phrase ‘ta hautou prattein’ along with terms, such as: ‘uninvolved’ (apragmōn), ‘to will’ (boulesthai), and the ‘authority’ (exousia). Chrysippus, in extracting the Stoic concept of freedom from Plato’s Republic, took particular care to overcome the introverted and escapist tendency, lurking therein by radically re-reading the Platonic texts.

The present paper draws a contrast between the notions of τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς and τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν to the effect that, according to Chrysippus, each has a different role to play and different requirements to meet, the former being especially tailored to suit the exigencies of praise and blame taken as exhortations, the latter those of desert and justice in praising and blaming as well as honoring and punishing.