Stoic philosophy and, above all, one sentence of Epictetus (55- 135), still is very important as a philosophical inquiry and a happy way of life. Albert Ellis’ wrote about his rational emotive therapy (RET) in the 20th century that he borrowed from philosophy: especially from the Stoics. My claim is that I restore the philosophy in his method. The A(ctivating situation) - B(elief) - C(onsequences) refer to the sentence of the stoic Epictetus: Things themselves or other people (A) don’t hurt (C) us; it is how we view (B) these things. The insight (D) follows another sentence of Epictetus: happiness and freedom begin with a clear understanding of one principle: some things are within our control, and some things are not. Keep your attention focused entirely on what you can do, and accept all other things. To distinguish between the one and the other, philosophy can help you, and practicing this is, is the true art of living. It is a misunderstanding that Stoic philosophy makes passive, because it concerns only the acceptance of what you cannot change. It makes you active, concerning the things that are under your control.

Pierre Gassend, or, as he is widely known, Gassendi, was a French materialist philosopher, physicist, astronomer, theologian and Catholic priest. He was the son of Antoine Gassend2 and Françoise Fabry, and was born on January 22nd in 1592 in Champtercier, a village of Provence, and died on October 24th in 1655 in Paris. He received his first education in the cities Digne and Riez and by the age of twelve (1604) he began his initiation to Catholicism. He belonged to the Franciscan Order.3 The continuation of his formal education was supported by the Catholic Church as an aspect of his preparation for priesthood.4 He studied Aristotelian philosophy and Catholic theology for the next eight years (1604-1611) at the College of Aix in Provence. Pierre Gassendi is typically remembered for introducing the ancient atomic philosophy of Epicurus in 17th century European thought. Gassendi aspired to articulate a new philosophy of nature, in order to replace Aristotelianism, which had been prominent in the context of scholastic thought for centuries, and had constituted the foundation of physics as well as moral philosophy. Gassendi was a priest and an ardent follower of the new scientific methodology of empiricism and of experimental trial. He devoted his life’s work to bringing together the Christian doctrines with the principles of the new science. Gassendi, along with Francis Bacon and Descartes, was one of the most significant figures who exerted influence on the development of science and mechanistic philosophy in the second half of the 17th century, especially in England. His views can be seen throughout the summary of Francois Bernier (1678/84), a work that emphasizes the atomic views, and materialistic tendencies, of philosophical thought. Gassendi’s adapted Epicurean philosophy spread to Britain with Opera Omnia and the Abregé of Bernier, and also due to Walter Charleton, who published a modified English translation of parts of Animadversiones in 1648. There was also a group of enthusiastic empiricists, who belonged to the circle of Newcastle, as well as a small Epicurean club whose members were among others Kenelm Digby and Nathaniel Highmore. All of the above saw a deep and pervasive influence of Gassendi’s views on British thought. His influence is seen in the writings of major thinkers, such as Boyle, Locke, Hobbes, Newton, Hume, Reid, and in the early works of Leibniz. The multi-dimensional personality of Gassendi, as a pastor, humanist and physical philosopher, accords with a moral and the physical universe in which the Creator God of the Christian faith holds a prominent role. He has been characterized by many researchers as the founder of mechanical philosophy, and as the successor of humanistic historiography. He was a defender of atomic theory, which was flourishing in the second half of 17th century, and also inspired Locke, one of the major proponents of moral theory. Gassendi’s contribution in moral philosophy is unexceptionable; his notions of freedom and pleasure formed the basis of the liberal tradition of late 17th and 18th centuries.

This paper will discuss the insertion of the Stoic dialectic or, more exactly, the differentiation between the signifier and signified of Stoic language theory, regarding the hermeneutics of words in the Roman Law. The development and expansion of Roman territories allowed the jurists to be in close contact with the Hellenistic philosophical systems, which represented a moment of historic cleavage whose consequences have been reflecting in the contemporary world: the juridical thinking, previously characterized by excessive rigor, started realizing its fallibility, becoming epistemologically more sophisticated and open to interconnecting with knowledge produced by other cultures. The juridical argument of Romans reached its peak of efficacy on the threshold of practicality and rationality inherited from the Greeks, however, without losing its original characteristics of simplicity and concision.

La diferenciación entre entidades observables e inobservables y su diversa caracterización ontológica es una de las cuestiones principales relacionadas con la comprensión del papel y alcance de las teorías científicas con las que analizamos y explicamos el mundo. Una gran parte de la teorización que la filosofía de la ciencia ha llevado a cabo sobre estas cuestiones se debe a la inevitable participación de entidades demasiado pequeñas (o grandes) para ser apreciadas por los sentidos humanos en casi todas las teorías fundamentales de la mayoría de las ciencias. El objetivo de esta ponencia es señalar el papel que este tipo de entidades tiene en la teoría del conocimiento propia de la filosofía de Epicuro, expuesta en la Carta a Heródoto. Para ello, trataremos de poner en relación este tipo de entidades con la tercera de las clases de validación del conocimiento, la no-refutación (οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις), que la teoría epicúrea distingue, a la luz del esquema de los modos de conocimiento que Sexto Empírico ofrece en HP, II, 97-99.

Epicurus observed nature with the aim to achieve serenity and a blissful life. This article discusses current knowledge, regarding the human brain in comparison to Epicurus’ understanding of human nature. The human brain actually consists of three interconnected brains that arose during evolution: the ‘reptilian brain’ (instincts), the ‘mammalian brain’ (emotions) and ‘the primate brain’ (cognitive functions). The philosopher emphasized on the fact that the basic needs of humans lay in instincts, and he determined the purpose of human life on emotional grounds and considered prudence as the supreme agent of selection of physical needs and of satisfaction and preserva-tion of emotional balance through virtue and friendship.

El presente trabajo es un intento por mostrar la importancia del oráculo délfico “transmuta la moneda”, dictado a Diógenes de Sínope y que servirá de fundamento a la llamada escuela cínica. Primero, se plantean las siguientes preguntas, ¿Qué quiere decir el oráculo referido al filósofo griego Diógenes? ¿Qué implica este revaluar la moneda? Y, finalmente, siguiendo el oráculo al igual que en la antigua Grecia ¿Existe hoy la posibilidad de esta filosofía cínica? Para dar respuesta a estas interrogantes, se establecen algunos rasgos importantes del cinismo antiguo y, sobre todo, se realiza un marcado énfasis en la practicidad vital del cinismo, para concluir que hoy, resulta menester la aparición, como en la antigua época helenística, de nuevos cínicos capaces de construir una ética práctica, vitalista y pensante.

In relation with Aristotle’s quotation, this paper takes a view over imaginary of polis, civilization and citizen in Classical Athens and the anecdotes of Diogenes the Cynic gives us a contrast with this imaginary about social and political concepts. The paper assumes that Diogenes performs in public, space the negation of the social practices which defines the human being.

Η στωική θεωρία περί των αρετών αποτέλεσε την πιο ολοκληρωμένη και συστηματική προσπάθεια συγκρότησης ενός ερμηνευτικού προτύπου για όλες τις λειτουργίες και τις ιδιότητες που σχετίζονταν με την ψυχολογία του ανθρώπου κατά την εμπλοκή του στις καταστάσεις του κοινωνικοπολιτικού βίου. Στη στωική διανόηση η σωστή ερμηνεία των συγκεκριμένων λειτουργιών και ιδιοτήτων συνδέεται με μία εκτεταμένη προσπάθεια παιδαγωγικής παρέμβασης στα διάφορα στάδια της ψυχολογικής και της νοητικής ωρίμασης του ανθρώπου. Η παιδαγωγική αυτή προσπάθεια είχε ως κύριο στόχο αφενός τη θέσπιση κριτηρίων για τον τρόπο αξιολόγησης των καταστάσεων του βίου και της έλλογης δράσης και αφετέρου την επίτευξη της ατομικής και της κοινωνικής ευδαιμονίας. Στο παρόν άρθρο θα επιχειρήσουμε να παρουσιάσουμε τα κυριότερα σημεία της στωικής θεωρίας περί των αρετών αναφορικώς προς: α) τη φύση και τη λειτουργία των αρετών ως γνώσεων και έξεων που δύνανται σταδιακά να εξελιχθούν σε επιστήμες και διαθέσεις της ψυχής του ανθρώπου, και β) την κατηγοριοποίηση των αρετών κατά την ορθόδοξη παράδοση της αρχαίας στοάς καθώς και το ειδικό περιεχόμενο και τη λειτουργία των αρετών που υπάγονται σε διάφορες γενικές κατηγορίες.

Η επικούρεια θεολογία υποστηρίζει ότι, όταν ο άνθρωπος απελευθερωθεί από τις ανησυχίες και τους φόβους του προς τους θεούς («ἄφοβον ὁ θεός») θα μπορέσει να οδηγηθεί στην ηδονή και στην αταραξία που είναι το υπέρτατο αγαθό. Ο Eπίκουρος, ενώ παραδέχεται την ύπαρξη των θεών, δεν τους φοβάται. Αντίθετα τους σέβεται και τους τοποθετεί στα μετακόσμια. Κατά το φιλόσοφο οι θεοί είναι «μακάριοι, αθάνατοι και ανθρωπόμορφοι». Δεν συμμετέχουν στα συμβεβηκότα του κόσμου, οι δε εικόνες τους προέρχονται από συνεχόμενες απορροές και η συνήθης γνώση τους προέρχεται από πρωταρχικές προλήψεις. Ο «αθάνατος μάκαρ θεός» είναι ένας αντικειμενικοποιημένος επικούρειος σοφός. Η διαδικασία ακολουθεί την εξής πορεία: δεν προσπαθεί ο θεός να γίνει άνθρωπος, αλλά ο άνθρωπος να γίνει θεός («ὁμοίωσις θεῷ»). Ο Επίκουρος στην ουσία εναντιώνεται προς τους υπάρχοντες θεούς, οι οποίοι με την αυθαίρετη παρέμβασή τους υποβαθμίζουν την ανθρώπινη ζωή και την οδηγούν στην αμάθεια και στην υποτέλεια, ενώ στην πραγματικότητα ο άνθρωπος είναι το ενεργό υποκείμενο που καταλύει τον προσωπικό φόβο. Έτσι o φιλόσοφος αντιτάσσει στο υπερβατικό στοιχείο του σύμπαντος και της θρησκείας τις ανθρωπολογικές σταθερές της αυτονομίας. Εν τέλει η θεολογία του Επικούρου καθίσταται οιονεί πόλος έλξης και αναζήτησης νοήματος, ενώ αποτελεί παράλληλα «αίρεσιν βίου».

Σκοπός του παρόντος άρθρου είναι να εστιάσει στις κύριες διαστάσεις της επικούρειας φιλοσοφίας, ώστε να μπορεί να διαγνώσει, εάν παρέχει κάποιο δίδαγμα για τη σύγχρονη κοινωνία ή όχι. Αφού μια τέτοια φιλοσοφία στην εποχή του αρχαίου φιλόσοφου δείχνει ότι δεν ήταν μονάχα μια επιστήμη, αλλά κι ένας τρόπος ζωής, θεωρείται άκρως αναγκαίο να διερευνηθεί ο τρόπος εκείνος ζωής ή η επιστήμη εκείνη κι αν πέρασε σε άλλες γενιές ή χώρες. Είχε ως τρόπος ζωής συνέχεια ή διαχρονικότητα ή όχι και τί μπόρεσε ή μπορεί να μας διδάξει σήμερα; Ως εκ τούτου δίδεται έμφαση στις θεματικές που απασχόλησαν την επικούρεια σκέψη, όπως στις επιθυμίες, στις αρετές και στον σοφό. Ο Έλληνας φιλόσοφος έδιδε μεγάλη σημασία στον σοφό, πράγμα που σημαίνει ότι διά του σώφρονος και του ενάρετου σοφού μπορεί να επιτευχθεί ο σκοπός της δικής του φιλοσοφίας καλύτερα. Έτσι, όταν γνωρίζουμε τα πλεονεκτήματα ή τις αρετές του σοφού, μας παρέχεται πολύτιμη γνώση και ικανότητα κατάλληλης ανταπόκρισης, εδραιώνοντας σταθερότητα σε εποχές που χαρακτηρίζονται από ρευστότητα και ανασφάλεια όπως ο αβέβαιος κόσμος του σήμερα. Η ρευστότητα αυτή διακρίνεται αρκετά έντονα στις μέρες μας μιας και βιώνουμε καθημερινά λεπτές και εύθραυστες διεθνείς ισορροπίες όπου η διδασκαλία για τις αρετές κυρίως του σοφού κρίνεται άκρως αναγκαία.

In the fragments of Porphyry’s On statues we find a coherent account of artistic appreciation by means of theological and metaphysical mechanisms, resolving some of the Platonic issues in Plotinus’ examination of art. He shows how divine wisdom is revealed on the level of myth and religious art, but also through philosophical contemplation. The former is through the influence of God’s powers (dynameis) by means of images akin to our perception used by the artist and grasped by the viewer. At the bottom level there comes sensation, through which imagery is conceived, but which imprints unclear (truths) by means of the sensually clear. Porphyry develops Plotinus’ analogy: we should learn to read truths about the gods from their imagery and statues as from books. We do not look at stelae as a mere matter of blocks of stone, but regard them as an expression of truth. Porphyry’s explanation of religious imagery offers us a new and modern rendition of artistic representation. The viewer uses the artist’s product in order to grasp conceptualized ideas behind the artist’s presentation, though some remain locked in a world of myth and physical representation, while others reach beyond to what art represents.

Plotinus’ ethics is based on our inner manner of looking towards the beauty of the good soul. Civic virtues must have an existential basis which is provided through a dialectical education. The greatest happiness is achieved in a transparent and rational life. The activity of thought is concealed, and can only be seen through the psychic acts of apprehension and reflection. Plotinus’ moral ideal is a virtuous person that receives the good from the transcendent good. If we neglected the meaning of meditation for an active life, we would destroy “the existence of happiness”. Evils are produced in the soul when it is looking towards becoming which has the matter as its principle. Plotinus pays close attention to the manner in which “we” perceive. The psychic capacity of sensation is based on the capacity to understand (ἀντιληπτικὴν) impressions in the soul, which are already objects of the intellect. In this way, Plotinus introduces the notion of the personal self, or “I” and the notion of the subjectivity. His ethics estimates each individual according to his own worth, at the same time taking into account the cosmic dimension of human existence.

Plotinus’s debt to the Stoic thought is well documented. Not only was this debt a function of the general intellectual atmosphere in which Plotinus worked, but the philosopher frequently adopted and modified Stoic positions consciously and carefully. The concept of oikeiôsis / οἰκείωσις (and its cognates) plays an important role in Stoic thought. Indeed, some scholars assert that it provides the very foundations for Stoic ethics and political philosophy. In the present study, we will exam Plotinus’ use of this important concept. It shall become clear that, on account of the great differences between Neoplatonic and Stoic metaphysics, Plotinus employs the notion of oikeiôsis in manners that are very distinct from the ways in which it was deployed by various Stoic thinkers. Nevertheless, it shall also become evident that Plotinus’ appropriation of the concept of oikeiôsis accorded him a conceptual tool by which to better think problems concerning the nature of the self.

Damascius splits his Commentary of Phaedo in three parts. The last part is devoted to the eschatological myth which is also split in three parts. The descent in the Hades needs to be read together with two other platonic myths that tell about the soul destiny: Gorgias and the Republic. In such triadic conception, Damascius is in debt with Proclus who was the first in evidencing the imbrications in these three dialogues.According to Damascius, the purpose of the myth is to assign tén choristén diagogén after the souls are separated from the body thus acquiring a certain way of life embodied as the highest, intermediate or lowest perfection.Thus, this paper puts foward the hypothesis that the myth is revealed as a way of living present in the term “diagogé” in which a religious sense is hidden. That sense implies considering philosophy like an initiation in the mysteries. That will demand taking into account the reflections carried out by Damascius when he analyses the “argument of the affinity of the soul with the Ideas” of the Platonic dialogue and his consideration of the philosopher as the happiest man that has been completely identified with Dionysos.

The starting point of this paper is a proposition in Porphyry’s Sententiae. There he says, “death is of two sorts: the one is the generally recognized one involving the loosing of the body from the soul; the other is that of the philosophers, involving the soul loosing itself from the body” (9, 1-3). What is most problematic is the last passage of this sentence: «καὶ οὐ πάντως ὁ ἕτερος τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἕπεται». This can be translated as “it is not always necessary that either should follow upon the other” or “it is never the case that either should follow upon the other”. I read this line as a denial of both the natural death as a consequence of the death of philosophers and the reverse. Considering what Porphyry understands as the death of philosophers, I would like to give an insight into the Sententiae themselves, and into the fact that this work is entitled “Pathways to the intelligibles” (‘Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητά’) in the manuscripts.

The Neoplatonists have been criticized for giving forced interpretations of Plato. Can this verdict justify modern commentators’ not paying attention to the Neoplatonic views on central Platonic problems, such as the accusation of ‘moral egoism’? The issue of Platonic eros, a proposal for a modus vivendi, serves as a significant test-case in order to answer this challenge. My approach is based on Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades. The Platonic successor approaches Socrates’ relation to Alcibiades as mirroring the structure of the divine realm. From this point of view, which platonically merges ethics with metaphysics, Proclus repeatedly states that it is an essential feature of the divine lover, who patterns himself upon the god Eros, to elevate along with himself his beloved towards the intelligible Beauty. This seems to go against the Symposium, which might suggest that the lover needs his beloved, because the latter constitutes the means for the former to recollect the source of real beauty. In contrast, for Proclus the ideal loving relationship is parallel to the demiurge’s providential relation to the Receptacle, and that of the philosopher-king to his city. Hence, Proclus presents us the quintessence of the erotic way of life and responds to Plato’s critics.

The majority of commentators, in particular those who concentrate on Plotinus’s philosophy, maintain that he, in contrast to Greek philosophy in its flourishing period, and especially in contrast to Plato as founder of political philosophy, does not pay any attention to politics and to planning a good political system as ground of ancient political philosophy. However, though Plotinus does not consider the state, the government, liberty and justice independently, and he is not a political philosopher - from this point of view - we can find some political implications in his “non-political” philosophy, and thereby design his “political philosophy”. We attempt in this article to enumerate some of the most important political implications of Plotinus’s philosophy and fit them together, so that we can offer a coherent view of his ideal politics. One of the most important and influential Platonic dialogues in political terms for the Enneads is Plato’s Laws, and in this paper we will examine some very significant passages from the Laws which Plotinus appeals to them for outlining his ideal politics.

Το Γράμμα προς Μαρκέλλαν του Πορφύριου είναι ένας προτρεπτικός λόγος για τη φιλοσοφία. Με την επιστολή αυτή παροτρύνεται η σύζυγός του Μαρκέλλα να συνεχίσει να διάγει φιλοσοφικό βίο και να ακολουθεί πιστά τις αρετές του βίου αυτού. Η συγκεκριμένη επιστολή θυμίζει έντονα το Βιβλίο Κ των Ηθικών Νiκομαχείων, όπου ο Αριστοτέλης αναφέρεται στον θεωρητικό βίο. Στην ανακοίνωσή μας θα προσπαθήσουμε να βρούμε τα κοινά στοιχεία ανάμεσα στα δυο έργα. Και οι δυο φιλόσοφοι θεωρούν το θεωρητικό βίο και την άσκηση της νοητικής δραστηριότητας κοπιαστικό έργο που απαιτεί αφοσίωση και σκληρές δοκιμασίες. Όμως μέσα από το βίο αυτό ο άνθρωπος-φιλόσοφος μπορεί να ξεπεράσει την ανθρώπινη υπόστασή του και να ανέλθει σε ένα ανώτερο επίπεδο. Η φιλοσοφία είναι τόσο για τον Αριστοτέλη όσο και για τον Πορφύριο ο μόνος δρόμος προς το θείο. Βεβαίως όλοι οι άνθρωποι δεν μπορούν να διάγουν αυτόν τον βίο, γι’ αυτό και οι δυο φιλόσοφοι διαχωρίζουν τρία είδη βίων ή νόμων και στην κορυφή βάζουν το νόμο του θεού ή το θεωρητικό βίο. Βασική ιδιότητα και για τους δυο είναι η αυτάρκεια που επιτρέπει στον φιλόσοφο να είναι ανεξάρτητος από τους άλλους ανθρώπους. Βασιζόμενοι στα παραπάνω φαίνεται πως ο Πορφύριος είχε δεχτεί και αριστοτελικές επιρροές.

With the shift from the paradigm of curing to prevention in medicine individual health risks are seen as a major new issue. Especially with the availability of individualized risk information through genetic testing and increased knowledge about the influence of individual behavior on health (health seeking behavior, preventive medicine, checkups, nutrition, sport etc.) there is a growing awareness for the risk of possible future illnesses in medicine. This paper takes the different notions of risk, that come together in a situation of risk information and shared decision making between doctor and patient, as a starting point for an in depth analysis of the different epistemic and semantic backgrounds that characterize the medical situation of risk information. So far theoretical or philosophical analyses on the concept of risk mainly focus on societal risks like climate change or financial crisis starting from sociological concepts like risk society. In this paper it will be assessed how far these approaches are helpful for a better understanding of risk in medicine; it will be taken into account the epistemic difference between knowledge of risk based on probabilities or uncertainty and causal knowledge.

Euthanasia is a “mercy killing”. More formally, it is killing of those who are incurably ill, in great pain or distress. Euthanasia can take three forms: voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary. All three kinds of euthanasia can be either active or passive. Buddhism rejects euthanasia in its voluntary and non-voluntary forms. Thus, Buddhism – that is supposed to be opposed to euthanasia – is thereby not committed to life being an absolute value to be preserved at all cost. In the case of active euthanasia, a Buddhist would say that to kill another person is simply not a skillful deed. Regarding passive euthanasia, a Buddhist would allow a patient to die by failing to introduce life preserving procedures, by stopping them once begun or by taking steps to alleviate pain which might hasten the dying process. Contrary to the case of active euthanasia, there is no Buddhist consensus on passive euthanasia, either voluntary or involuntary. Various cases of killing and even inciting to suicide are condemned in vinayapitaka as unsuitable activities for monks.