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1. ProtoSociology: Volume > 1
Gerhard Preyer Protosoziologie: Problemebenen, Foki, Rekonstruktionshypothesen
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Understanding human action is framed in a picture of the rational person. Protosociology identifies - in a hypothetical approach - generalized presuppositions (Vorverständnis) of the "objects" and "experience" of social science. Protosociology studies society (-ies) and human action from the basis of the following levels: Decentralisation and universalisation of world- picturing; Lifeworld-background and systemprocesses; Properties of structural evolution of societies; Interpersonality, structure of communicative acting and collective identity and Personality.Theorizing on these levels means mapping pictures of structural dimension of action process and the limitation of agency through culturalsocial, personal, and natural resources. So it is recognition, that no absolute disposition is given about the limitation of action and elementary social regulation, norms, and institutions. However, break-downs in these spheres can be identified.The basic-principle of Protosociology is that all creatures who have propositional attitudes and the ability to act intentionally (voluntarily) are examples of application of the standard (norm) of rationality. Hypothesizing about other persons viz. understanding their utterance and ascription of all attitudes are mediated, and given on the level of language behaviour and their utilitarized competences and abilities. The focus of mapping are such examples to whom to ascribe the procedure of any social intercourse.This level is the basis for methodical construction and reconstruction of Protosociology and the Frankfurt version of action (speech act) theory. This version starts from cognition, that the concept of meaning cannot be understood completely, independent of propositional truth, normative correctness and person as primitive concept. Beliefs, illocutionary acts (doings) and propositional structure of language (saying that ...) are fundamental features of the basic knowledge of this approach. But Protosociology does not claim that understanding social reality is committed to a sociologism or linguistic community semantic as overall viewpoint of agency, reasoning, and understanding.
2. ProtoSociology: Volume > 1
Alexander Ulfig Protosoziologie und Diskurstheorie
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For Protosociology the "Diskurs "-theory has a special significance. Validity-dimensions of speech and their evaluation in the procedure of argumentation indicate generalized presuppositions of interactive processes. These validity-dimensions can be reconstructed in lingusitic characterisations of "normative language" (P.W. Taylor). Thus it is possible to make first steps to a theory of validity. Protosociology provides a special reconstruction of argumentative speech on the level "interpersonality, structure of communicative acting and collective identity". The aim of Protosociology within a context of problems of "Diskurs"-theory would have to establish normative values for an evaluation of such validity-dimensions. A logic of "Diskurs" would have to be developed as a kind of logic of "relevance".
3. ProtoSociology: Volume > 1
Frank Siebelt Zweierlei Holismus. Überlegungen zur Interpretationstheorie D. Davidsons
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What make utterances and beliefs of other persons on the base of behaviour intelligible? D. Davidson gives us a possible answer in his analysis of the holistic nature of beliefs from the view point of radical interpretation. D. Davidsons argument is, that having propositional attitudes is a nesessary condition for understanding of (personal) utterances. In the context of his theory of radical interpretation will given an explication and a refutation of critics of the still not enough recipated thesis of D. Davidson.
4. ProtoSociology: Volume > 1
Louise Röska-Hardy Sprechen, Sprache und Handeln
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The idea that saying it are doings is a platitude among speech act theorists.In the following I argue that the assimilations of the speakers intentions, belieft and desires to the linguistic meaning of expression types in J.R. Searles influential speech act theory precludes or explaining saying truely as doings, iE. speciftcly as linguistic actions.An adequate explanation of speech acts must treat linguistic meaning of expression type and the speakers intentions, beliefs and desires as seperate, but coordinate factors in the performance and understanding of linguistic acts.
5. ProtoSociology: Volume > 1
Peter W. Niesen Gemeinschaft, Normativität, Praxis: Debatte zu L. Wittgensteins Regelbegriff
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This article surveys recent literature on Wittgenstein's "Rule-following considerations" most notably S. Kripke's, C. McGinn's, and G.P. Baker's and P.M.S. Hacker's contributions. I argue that the normativity requirement in rule-following is to be located not in transtemporal but interpersonal sameness of meaning, and that the community-view is false when viewed as a condition on correct rule-following, but true when viewed as providing criteria for the possibility of rule-following.
6. ProtoSociology: Volume > 1
Michael Kümmert Ökonomisches Handeln
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This research is the attempt to introduce economic acting as a relevance of Protosociology. In the first step I will try to describe economic acting in terms of speechacttheory. It will take us from illocutionary and perlocutionary acts to a useful understanding of strategic acting. It will be shown that the assumption that economy has to deal with perfect markets can not be made in a context of strategic acting.
7. ProtoSociology: Volume > 1
8. ProtoSociology: Volume > 1
Dirk Martin Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft
9. ProtoSociology: Volume > 1
Thomas M. Schmidt Nachmetaphysisches Denken
10. ProtoSociology: Volume > 1
Georg Peter Solidarität oder Objektivität
11. ProtoSociology: Volume > 1
Gerhard Preyer Kritik und Wissenschaftsgeschichte
12. ProtoSociology: Volume > 1
Wolf-Jürgen Cramm Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie
13. ProtoSociology: Volume > 1
Ralf Stoecker Bericht. D. Davidson Tagung, Bielefeld
14. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Herman Cappelen, Ernie Lepore Semantic Theory and Indirect Speech
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Much work in the philosophy of language assumes that a semantic theory T, for a language L should assign p as the semantic content of an utterance u, by A, of a sentence S in L, if and only if “A said that p” is true. This assumption is mistaken. More generally, the aim of semantics cannot be to capture the extension of English expressions such as “meaning” or “what was said”. This provides support for Davidson’s paratactic theory of indirect speech and for the view that a semantic theory should take the form of a truth-theory.
15. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Louise Röska-Hardy Language Acts and Action
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Speech act theorists agree unanimously that language or speech acts are a species of intentional action. I argue that J.R. Searle’s influential speech act theory actually precludes our explaining sayings truly as doings, i.e. as linguistic actions, because it assimilates speakers’ beliefs, desires and intentions to the linguistic meaning of expression types. An adequate explanation of speech acts as intentional performances must treat the meanings of expression types and speakers’ beliefs, desires and intentions as separate, but co-ordinate factors in the production, understanding and characterization of linguistic acts.
16. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Kirk Ludwig The Truth about Moods
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Assertoric sentences are sentences which admit of truth or falsity. Non-assertoric sentences, imperatives and interrogatives, have long been a source of difficulty for the view that a theory of truth for a natural language can serve as the core of a theory of meaning. The trouble for truth-theoretic semantics posed by non-assertoric sentences is that, prima facie, it does not make sense to say that imperatives, such as ‘Cut your hair’ or interrogatives such as ‘What time is it?’ are true or false. Thus, the vehicle for giving the meaning of a sentence by using an interpretive truth theory, the T-sentence, is apparently unavailable for non-assertoric sentences. This paper shows how to incorporate non-assertoric sentences into a theory of meaning that gives central place to an interpretive truth theory for the language, without, however, reducing the nonassertorics to assertorics or treating their utterances as semantically equivalent to one or more utterances of assertoric sentences. Four proposals for how to incorporate non-assertoric sentences into a broadly truth-theoretical semantics are reviewed. The proposals fall into two classes, those that attempt to explain the meaning of non-assertoric sentences solely by appeal to truth conditions, and those that attempt to explain the meaning of non-assertoric sentences by appeal to compliance conditions, which can be treated as one variety of fulfillment conditions for sentences of which truth conditions are another variety. The paper argues that none of the extant approaches is successful, but develops a version of the generalized fulfillment approach which avoids the difficulties of previous approaches and still exhibits a truth theory as the central component of a compositional meaning theory for all sentences of natural languages.
17. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Jeffrey King The Source(s) of Necessity
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Though virtually all philosophers agree that a sentence like ‘Every bachelor is a bachelor’ expresses a logical truth, there is some disagreement as to whether ‘Every bachelor is unmarried’ does. One way of addressing the question as to whether ‘Every bachelor is unmarried’ expresses a logical truth is to ask whether the source of the necessity of ‘Every bachelor is a bachelor’ is the same as the source of the necessity of ‘Every bachelor is unmarried’. Assuming the framework of the theory of structured propositions, the question of whether the propositions expressed by these two sentences have their necessity in the same source is addressed. The view that the source of necessity is the same in the two cases is rejected, and an alternative view is sketched.
18. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Filip Buekens The Genesis of Meaning (a Myth)
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In ‘Meaning Revisited’, a reconsideration of his famous views on meaning, H.P. Grice has put forward the thesis that natural meaning (n-meaning) might be a precursor or predecessor of non-natural meaning. In this paper, I will take up Grice’s challenge and sketch a picture of how natural meaning could give rise to nn-meaning. The relevance of Grice’s challenge is obvious for current attempts at naturalizing nn-meaning: a plausible theory of the genesis of meaning must show why nn-meaning is not an unexplicable cosmic event but a product of various ways creatures more or less like us optimize communicative behaviour and learn to reason about mental states that causally explain that behaviour.
19. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Robert Hanna Extending Direct Reference
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It is an interesting and important linguistic fact that we sometimes use singular terms — proper names or indexicals — to refer to wholly future individuals. Given this fact, and given the further fact that wholly future individuals are contingent and indeterminate, neither the “descriptivist” theory of singular reference, nor the “causal theory,” nor Gareth Evans’s “mixed” theory, nor even the “classical” direct reference theory developed by David Kaplan, can account for future singular reference. Only a semantic strategy drawn from direct reference theory is able to solve the puzzle. But in order to solve it, the very idea of direct reference must be extended by invoking two important supplementary notions: (1) “reference delivery systems,” and (2) “referential handiness or skill.” With the addition of these notions — which are updatings of some ideas sketched by Martin Heidegger in Being and Time — direct reference theory effectively accounts for the possibility of future singular reference. But just insofar as the puzzle is solvable along these lines, it follows that the theory of reference cannot be “naturalized.”
20. ProtoSociology: Volume > 10
Reinaldo Elugardo Descriptions, Indexicals and Speaker Meaning
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In his paper, “Descriptions, Indexicals, and Belief Reports: Some Dilemmas (But Not the Ones You Expect)” (Mind 104, (1995)), Stephen Schiffer presents a powerful argument against anyone who accepts a Russellian account of definite descriptions (including incomplete descriptions) and who also accepts a direct referential account of indexicals. On the one hand, the most plausible version of the Theory of Descriptions, namely, the Hidden-Indexical Theory of Descriptions, entails that a speaker who uses an incomplete description, “the F”, referentially means some description-theoretic, object-independent proposition by an utterance of a sentence of the form, “The F is G”. On the other hand, since speaker meaning supervenes on one’s psychological states, what holds for referential uses of incomplete descriptions must also hold for referential uses of indexicals and demonstatives. In other words, speakers who produce literal, referential, indexical utterances of the form, “" is G” also mean some description-theoretic proposition by their utterances. Furthermore, the Russellian has no non-arbitrary reason for preferring a direct referential account of indexicals, which he should accept, to a rival, incompatible account which treats indexicals as disguised descriptions. In my paper, I argue that the Russellian does have such a reason: the rival account cannot explain all the relevant speaker meaning facts that the direct reference theory can. I conclude the paper by defending the Russellian view that, in producing a referential utterance of “the F is G”, a speaker can mean a description-theoretic proposition and, in addition, mean an object-dependent proposition involving the speaker’s referent.