African-American/Africana philosophy has made a name for itself as a critical perspective on the inadequacies of European philosophical thought. While this polemical mode has certainly contributed to the questioning of and debates over the universalism of white philosophy, it has nonetheless left Africana philosophy dependent on these criticisms to justify its existence as “philosophical.” This practice has the effect of not only distracting Black philosophers from understanding the thought of their ancestors, but formulates the practice of Africana philosophy as “racial therapy” for whites. By making the goal of Africana philosophy the transformation of the white racist to the white non-racist, Africana philosophy takes up a decidedly political (integrationist) agenda. Making this agenda the guiding ethos of Africana philosophical praxis censors both the Africana thinkers available to study and the interpretation of the figures deemed “fit” for study. Thus I conclude a culturalogic approach is the best way to delineate between the political and methodological in Africana philosophy.

The “Occupy Wall Street!” movement has stimulated a long listing of other candidates for radical “occupation.” In this paper, I suggest the occupation of liberalism itself. I argue for a constructive engagement of radicals with liberalism in order to retrieve it for a radical egalitarian agenda. My premise is that the foundational values of liberalism have a radical potential that has not historically been realized, given the way the dominant varieties of liberalism have developed. Ten reasons standardly given as to why such a retrieval cannot be carried out are examined and shown to be fallacious.

Alison Jaggar, in her treatment of feminist discourse ethics, expresses worries about using “idealized and imaginary communities” as elucidatory tools for discursive ethics. In response, this paper presents the history of 924 Gilman (an all-ages punk rock collective in the San Francisco Bay area) as a case study of a non-imagined and real discursive community. While the example of 924 Gilman, with its overtly feminist agenda and democratic ethos, bolsters Jaggar’s claims about the need for “closed communities” within discourse ethics, it also challenges some of her basic assumptions and raises important pragmatic and theoretical criticisms against discourse ethics.

Derrick Darby’s book Rights, Race, and Recognition defends the seemingly startling thesis that all rights, moral as well as legal, are dependent upon social recognition. So there are no “natural” rights independent of social practices, and subordinated groups in oppressive societies (such as blacks under white supremacy) do not have rights. Darby appeals to intersubjectivist constructivism to make his meta-ethical case, but in this critique, I argue that he conflates, or at least fails to consistently distinguish, two radically different varieties of constructivism: idealized intersubjectivist constructivism, which is objectivist, and non-idealized conventionalist constructivism, which is relativist. In neither case, then, can Darby establish the shocking thesis that white supremacy objectively takes away blacks’ moral standing.

Using the work of Richard Wright and personal interviews to portray racial interactions in the Jim Crow South, I illustrate how law enforcement used racial and sexual assaults to maintain black subordination. Jim Crow racism constituted a caste system in which one’s race was determined, not primarily by how one looked, but by one’s ancestry. I review and reject Oliver Cox’s thesis that caste did not exist in the Jim Crow South, and cite continuing examples of physical and sexual assaults against individuals based on racial, gender, and caste differences.