Displaying: 1-20 of 247 documents

0.294 sec

1. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 25
Shih Chaohwei, Peter Singer Animal Welfare: A Buddhist-Utilitarian Dialogue
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This piece is an edited transcript of a dialogue between Professor Shih Chaohwei of Hsuan Chuang University in Taiwan and Professor Peter Singer of Princeton University in the United States and the University of Melbourne in Australia. The dialogue features considerations of various points of interaction between the Buddhist and utilitarian perspectives on animals. We hope that this conversation can serve to open a dialogue between seemingly very different philosophical traditions with regards to the treatment of animals.
2. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 25
Lynnea Shuck, Jonathan Perez-Reyzin Editors' Introduction
3. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 25
Christine M. Korsgaard Animals: Ethics, Agency, Culture: Introduction
4. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 25
Catherine Wilson Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon: An Alternative to Panpsychism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Reversing centuries of methodological caution and skepticism, philosophers have begun to explore the possibility that experience in some form is widely distributed in the universe. It has been proposed that consciousness may pertain to machines, rocks, elementary particles, and perhaps the universe itself. This paper shows why philosophers have good reason to suppose that experiences are widely distributed in living nature, including worms and insects, but why panpsychism extending to non-living nature is an implausible doctrine.
5. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 25
Kristin Andrews Do Apes Attribute Beliefs to Predict Behavior?: A Mengzian Social Intelligence Hypothesis
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
I defend a Mengzian version of the Social Intelligence Hypothesis, according to which humans think about one another’s beliefs and desires—and reasons for action—in order to solve our social living problems through cooperation, rather than through competition and deception, as the more familiar Machiavellian version has it. Given this framework, and a corresponding view about the function of belief attribution, I argue that while apes need not attribute propositional attitudes to pass the “false belief task,” we should not conclude that apes may be behaviorists. Rather, the Mengzian Social Intelligence Hypothesis perspective offers another interpretation of ape behavior, intermediate between behaviorist and propositional attitude schemas. I argue that the false belief task can be solved by individuals who have an agency schema which takes others to be minded beings who have goals, emotions, and perceptions, but who fail to consider propositional attitudes or reasons for behavior. I then argue that a true test of belief attribution in great apes would be one that shows they seek explanations in terms of reasons for behavior. However, no such test yet exists.
6. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 25
Clare Palmer Should We Offer Assistance to Both Wild and Domesticated Animals?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper, I consider whether we should offer assistance to both wild and domesticated animals when they are suffering. I argue that we may have different obligations to assist wild and domesticated animals because they have different morally-relevant relationships with us. I explain how different approaches to animal ethics, which, for simplicity, I call capacity-oriented and context-oriented, address questions about animal assistance differently. I then defend a broadly context-oriented approach, on which we have special obligations to assist animals that we have made vulnerable to or dependent on us. This means that we should normally help suffering domesticated animals, but that we lack general obligations to assist wild animals, since we are not responsible for their vulnerability. However, we may have special obligations to help wild animals where we have made them vulnerable to or dependent on us (by habitat destruction or by captivity, for instance). I consider some obvious difficulties with this context-oriented approach, and I conclude by looking more closely at the question whether we should intervene, if we could do so successfully, to reduce wild animal suffering by reducing predation.
7. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 25
Alan Wayne, Lori Gruen Entangled Empathy: An Interview with Lori Gruen
8. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 25
Michael Allen Fox The Ideology of Meat-Eating
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
A network of beliefs and values (an ideology) underlies much of our behavior. While meat-eaters may not acknowledge that they have an ideology, I argue that they do by attempting to identify and deconstruct its elements. I also include numerous historical and philosophical observations about the origins of meat-eaters’ ideology. Explaining and examining ideologies may encourage discussion about a particular area of life (for example, dietary choice) and stimulate change in relation to it. Both adherents to vegetarian/vegan approaches and meat-eaters who wish to become less dependent on animal food sources (for ethical and environmental reasons) can benefit from the broader understanding that such an analysis provides.
9. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 25
Jeff Sebo The Moral Problem of Other Minds
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper I ask how we should treat other beings in cases of uncertainty about sentience. I evaluate three options: (1) an incautionary principle that permits us to treat other beings as non-sentient, (2) a precautionary principle that requires us to treat other beings as sentient, and (3) an expected value principle that requires us to multiply our subjective probability that other beings are sentient by the amount of moral value they would have if they were. I then draw three conclusions. First, the precautionary and expected value principles are more plausible than the incautionary principle. Second, if we accept a precautionary or expected value principle, then we morally ought to treat many beings as having at least partial moral status. Third, if we morally ought to treat many beings as having at least partial moral status, then morality involves more cluelessness and demandingness than we might have thought.
10. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 25
Nicolas Delon Animal Agency, Captivity, and Meaning
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Can animals be agents? Do they want to be free? Can they have meaningful lives? If so, should we change the way we treat them? This paper offers an account of animal agency and of two continuums: between human and nonhuman agency, and between wildness and captivity. It describes how human activities impede on animals’ freedom and argues that, in doing so, we deprive many animals of opportunities to exercise their agency in ways that can give meaning to their lives.
11. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 25
Deborah Cao Wild Game Changer: Regarding Animals in Chinese Culture
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
For the last two decades, the world has seen the rise of China. With its rise, unfortunately, has come the fall, retreat, and demise of some animals and animal species. China is often singled out for special attention in terms of animal destruction and endangerment. With an increasingly globalized economy and world, we now have a globalized wildlife crisis. This essay focuses on the exploitation of wild animals in China. It argues that the plight of wildlife in China stems from an underlying position in Chinese culture that animals are instruments for human benefits, and such an instrumentalist approach has always dominated the Chinese landscape. This is the case despite the fact that animals and humans are considered to be organically connected in the moral universe in Chinese traditional philosophy in contrast to the segregated approach to humans and non-humans in Western philosophical traditions. It is suggested that to achieve substantive progress in the protection of wildlife and other animals in China, a fundamental change of thinking and acting toward animals by the Chinese to recognize the intrinsic value of animals would be imperative.
12. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 25
Dale Jamieson Animal Agency
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The rise of physicalism and naturalism, the development of cognitive science, and the explosion and popularization of knowledge about animal behavior has brought us to see that most of the properties that were once thought to distinguish humans from other animals are shared with other animals. Many people now see properties that are morally relevant to how it is permissible to treat animals, such as sentience, as widely distributed. Agency, however, is one area in which the retreat from human uniqueness is halting. In this essay I suggest that we should feel the same pressure to bring together accounts of human and animal agency that we feel with respect to sentience and other such characteristics. I go on to diagnose the resistance, and briefly sketch how things might look if we were to see agency as continuous.
13. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Taimur Aziz, Seyyed Hossein Nasr On Tradition, Metaphysics, and Modernity
14. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Martin Bernstein Introduction
15. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Juliet Floyd Positive Pragmatic Pluralism
16. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Yemima Ben-Menahem Hilary Putnam: Philosophy with a Human Face
17. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Geoffrey Hellman Hilary Putnam’s Contributions to Mathematics, Logic, and the Philosophy Thereof
18. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Gary Ebbs Putnam on Methods of Inquiry
19. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Emily Fox-Penner, Aaron Suduiko Editor's Introduction
20. The Harvard Review of Philosophy: Volume > 24
Paul Franks Hilary Putnam: A Life of Wonder