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1. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Terence Parsons A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects
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This paper explores the view that there are such things as (nonexistent) fictional objects, and that we refer to such objects when we say things like "Sherlock Holmes is a fictional detective", or "Conan Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes". A theory of such objects is developed as a special application of a Meinongian Ontology.
2. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Ronald E. Beanblossom In Defense of Thomas Reid's Use of 'Suggestion'
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Thomas Reid, the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher, was concerned with the proper use of ordinary language. P. G. Winch would have us believe that in spite of Reid's concern for observing the ordinary meaning of terms, Reid did not know the ordinary meaning of 'suggest'. Not knowing this ordinary meaning, Reid allegedly changed it in violation of his own criteria. Against this view I argue (1) Reid uses 'suggest' in a technical sense and gives reasons for doing so; (2) contrary to Winch's claim Reid does appropriately use 'suggestion' to describe perception.
3. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Keith Lehrer, Joseph Richard Remembering Without Knowing
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Memory sometimes yields knowledge and sometimes does not. It is, however, natural to suppose that i f a man remembers that p, then he knows that p and formerly knew that p. Remembering something is plausibly construed as a f o rm of knowing something which one has not forgotten and which one knew previously. We argue, to the contrary, that this thesis is false. We present four counterexamples to the thesis that support a different analysis of remembering. We propose that a person remembers that p (at t) if and only if the thought or conviction that p comes from memory (at t) when, in fact, it is true that p.
4. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
David W. Smith Meinongian Objects
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Meinong's object theory is primarily motivated by the needs of intentionality theory. I argue that Meinongian objects must be intensional entities if, as asked, they are to serve as the objects of thought in a purely object-theoretic account of intentionality. For Meinong, incomplete objects are the proper objects of thought. Complete objects are beyond our grasp; we apprehend them as best we can when we intend incomplete objects embedded in them. This yields, on a semantic plane, an account of failures or substitutivity of identity in intentional contexts. And this, I argue, forces incomplete objects to be intensional, and so therefore are complete objects.
5. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Franz Brentano Was an Reid zu Loben: Über die Philosophie von Thomas Reid. Aus dem Nachlaß
6. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Michael Hooker Descartes' Argument for the Claim that his Essence is to Think
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Two previous attempts to discern the argument Descartes intended to establish the claim that his essence is to think have failed to meet with success. I examine those arguments and offer an interpretation of my own that follows one of Descartes' strategies in the cogito passages. The suggested interpretation involves discarding every candidate that falls victim to hyperbolic doubt. However, while my strategy may have been intended by Descartes, it does not successfully yield his conclusion.
7. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Roderick M. Chisholm Individuation: Some Thomistic Questions and Answers
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The epistemological problem of individuation concerns the conditions under which we can individuate or identify particular things. I t is argued that these conditions presuppose that each of us can apprehend his own individual essence or haecceity. The metaphysical problem of individuation concerns the question: In virtue of what can it be said that two things which are counterparts of each other are two and not one? It is argued that here, too, we must appeal to the concept of an individual essence or haecceity. The views presented here seem to be in accord with those of St. Thomas Aquinas.
8. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 1
Ronald Scales On Reference and Predication
9. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 10
Douglas N. Walton On the Logical Form of Some Commonplace Action Expressions
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This paper pursues the suggestion of St. Anselm that action expressions can be parsed by saying that the agent makes a certain proposition true. Using the model syntax of Pörn and the relatedness logic of Epstein, it is shown how St. Anselm's approach can reveal the logical form of some common action locutions.
10. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 10
James G. Anderson Kant's Paralogism of Personhood
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Jonathan Bennett's two interpretations of Kant's Third Paralogism are shown to be inadequate. The Third Paralogism attempts to show that rational psychology provides an inadequate basis for the application of the concepts of "personhood" and "substance". The criteria for the application of "personhood" and "substance" must be empirical, and in the case of "personhood" they are bodily criteria. These criteria are available to each of us but only upon pains of abandoning what Bennett calls the Cartesian basis, i.e. rational psychology.
11. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 10
Friedrich Waismann The Logical Force of Expressions
12. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 10
Arnold Cusmariu Ryle's Paradox and the Concept of Exemplification
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Ryle's argument that exemplification cannot be a genuine relation is examined. A more formal version of the argument is first given. Two replies are then proposed each of which is sufficient to refute it. The first is that the argument contains a false premise, the second that the argument is invalid even i f this premise is granted. Some properties of exemplification are then pointed out. Last, it is shown that a Realist analysis of exemplification is not possible, hence that the concept must be taken as primitive.
13. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 10
Alan Zaitchik Intentionalism and Computional Psychology
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Intentionalism must be distinguished from computational psychology. The former is a mentalist-realist metatheoretical stance vis-a-vis the latter, which is a research programme devoted to the construction of informationally-characterized simulation models for human behavior, perception, cognition, etc. Intentionalism has its attractive aspects, but unfortunately it is plagued by severe conceptual difficulties. Recent attempts to justify the intentionalist interpretation of computational models, by J.A. Fodor and by C. Graves, J.J. Katz et al., fail to secure a conceptually adequate and genuinely intentional sense for the intentional idiom they employ.
14. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 10
G. James Jason Notes Toward a Formal Conversation Theory
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Dialectic, as commonly approached, is not an analytic study, as the notion is defined in the paper. Where it is analytically approached (as, for example, by Grice and Hamblin), the result is pragmatic in nature, as well as syntactic and semantic. This paper lays the foundations of a purely formal (nonpragmatic) analysis of conversations. This study is accordingly called "Conversation Theory". The key notions of "conversation", "dialogue", "conversation game", "rules of response", "epistemic community" and "channel of informations" are defined precisely, and an analysis of how these notions fit together is given. Particular attention is given to distinguishing conversation theory from standard logic. The paper concludes by analysing a few sample conversation-games, indicating areas needing further research, by pointing out the simplification inherent in the sample games.
15. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 10
Eike-Henner W. Kluge Bolzano and Frege: Some Conceptual Parallels
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Bolzano's position on logic and his theory of sentences-in-themselves and their analysis, as well as his position on existence statements and subjective representations show a striking and profound similarity to Frege's theory of thoughts, his analysis of propositions, representations and judgment, as well as his position on the nature of logic in general. Bolzano's theories on these points, therefore, may well have been seminal to the development of Frege's position.
16. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 10
John L. Mackie Kant on Personal Identity
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Kant, in the third paralogism, needs to be rescued from his commentators. His argument that the identity of one's consciousness of oneself is no proof of the numerical identity of a soul-substance, since an indistinguishable identity of consciousness could result from one subject's handing over of memories to another, is sound and complete, and does not need the supplementations offered by Strawson, Bennett and James Anderson. But a possible supplementation is that this identity of consciousness calls for explanation and is partly explained by the continuity of the central nervous system, though this continuity is not guaranteed or conceptually required by that identity.
17. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Harold Morick A Confirmation Criterion of Synonymy
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Two declarative sentences are synonymous if, and only if, the statements they can be used to make are. given certain assumptions about the truth or falsity of other statements, confirmed or disconfirmed to the same degree by the same evidence. This criterion of synonymy is Quinean in that it treats confirmation holistically. But unlike Quine's criterion of synonymy, it conforms to and explains our intuitions of sentence synonymy.
18. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Donald Davidson Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action
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The central propositional attitudes of belief, desire, and meaning are interdependent; it is therefore fruitless to analyse one or two of them in terms of the others. A method is outlined in this paper that yields a theory for interpreting speech, a measure of degree of belief, and a measure of desirability. The method combines in a novel way features of Bayesean decision theory, and a Quinean approach to radical interpretation.
19. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Augustin Riska Knowledge by Acquaintance Reconsidered
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A propositional interpretation of knowledge by acquaintance seems more promising than the nonpropositional one, endorsed by Russell. According to the propositional interpretation, to be acquainted with an object means to attend (pay attention) to individuating features of the object. For the actual, direct acquaintance with an object, a subject's perception of the object and his attending to the individuating features of it (just as the fact that these features do belonge to the object in question) are the essential factors. Proper names of objects and subject's memory images referring to objects of acquaintance may be viewed as their special individuating features (in spite of being attached to these objects "externally"). For the dispositional (non-actual) notion of acquaintance, a relativization of time must be added, together with the subject's ability to attend to the individuating features of the object under proper conditions (when the object of previous acquaintance is presented or represented to the subject). Although the conditional formulas expressing these situations contribute to the explication of the concept of knowledge by acquaintance, their truth-status remains open and contingent upon the ways of solving the problem of individuation (identification).
20. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Paul Oppenheimer, Ralf Meerbote The Certainty of Skepticism
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Carrier in a recent paper urges for consideration an argument for skepticism which is based on premises one of which in turn is to be defended by yet another principle (the "Janus Principle" of the text). We feel that the latter principle and the way Carrier wants to use it to defend his skeptical argument will find adherents, but we show that this argument rests on an interesting equivocation quite beyond repair even if we accept the "Janus Principle".