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1. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Jacek Wojtysiak On the Principle of Sufficient Reason
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The aim of this paper is to defend the ontological Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR-O). I analyse various versions of this principle and various ways of justifying it. Then I attempt to challenge some counterexamples allegedly refuting a universal application of the PSR-O. There are standard and non-standard versions of the PSR-O. The PSR-Ostand can only be valid if there are no chains of contingent reasons and outcomes with first modules, i.e. all chains are actually infinite. However, there are serious arguments against this possibility. The necessary condition of the PSR-Onon-stand is the existence of a necessary substance: that substance would be a direct reason of certain contingent states of affairs obtaining in its domain, and those states of affairs would then be indirect reasons for all other contingent states of affairs and things. There are two advantages of the PSR-Onon-stand: a nomological unity of the world and explanatory simplicity.
2. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk, Jan Woleński Editorial
3. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Peter Simons Abstraction, Structure, and Substitution: Lambda and its Philosophical Significance
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λ-calculi are of interest to logicians and computer scientists but have largely escaped philosophical commentary, perhaps because they appear narrowly technical or uncontroversial or both. I argue that even within logic λ-expressions need to be understood correctly, as functors signifying functions in intension within a categorical or typed language. λ-expressions are not names but pure viable binders generating functors, and as such they are of use in giving explicit definitions. But λ is applicable outside logic and computer science, anywhere where the notions of complex whole, substitution, abstraction and structure make sense. To illustrate this, two domains are considered. One is somewhat frivolous: the study of flags; the other is very serious: manufacturing engineering. In each case we can employ λ-abstraction to describe substitutions within a structure, and in the latter case there is even a practical need for such a notation.
4. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Bartosz Gostkowski Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again
5. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Jan Woleński Two Critical Contributions to the Problem of Truth and Meaning
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This paper critically discusses two points concerning some recent views about the concept of truth. Firstly, contrary to Davidson, it shows that meaning of sentences cannot be explicated by T-equivalences. In particular, “is true” is an extensional predicate, but “means that” an intensional one. Secondly, the minimalist account of truth does not provide a satisfactory analysis of the concept of falsity. In this respect, minimalism does not satisfy Russell’s claim that any adequate truth-theory must be a theory of falsity as well.
6. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Susan Haack The Legitimacy of Metaphysics: Kant’s Legacy to Peirce, and Peirce’s to Philosophy Today
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Part of Kant’s legacy to Peirce was a lasting conviction that metaphysics is not irredeemable, but can and should be set “on the secure path of a science”. However, Peirce’s “scientific metaphysics”, unlike Kant’s, uses the method of science, i.e., of experience and reasoning; but requires close attention to experience of the most familiar kind rather than the recherché experience needed by the special sciences. This distinctively plausible reconception of what a genuinely scientific metaphysics would be is part of Peirce’s legacy to philosophy today, enabling us to steer clear of both apriorism and of scientism - the Scylla and Charybdis of recent metaphysics.
7. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Paweł Rojek If Tropes
8. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Janusz Salamon Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion
9. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Jan Hauska Dispositions and Meinongian Objects
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Questions concerning casual involvement of empirican properties have recently given rise to a lively philosophical controversy known as the debate about dispositions. I begin with a description of the focal points of the debate: the issue of the viability of the conditional analysis of dispostions, the question of whether or not they ultimately constitute a distinct kind of properties, the conundrum concerning their causal efficacy, and finally the bold suggestion that all properties are dispositional. Along the way I sketch current theories of the anture of dispositions. Then I draw a fuller picture of dispositionalism, i.e. of the family of positions united by embracing the ontological distinctness of dispositions and their causal efficacy. I conclude by defending dispositionalism against the objection, raised by David Armstrong, that it is committed to the existence of Meinongian objects.
10. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Paweł Łuków What is the Problem of Freedom of the Will?
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I argue in the paper that the problem of freedom has been misconstrued. There is no one problem of freedom but many problems concerning individual agents’ responsiveness to principles and reasons. The problem of free will results from attempts to incorporate the notion of freedom, which belongs to the order of guiding action, into a determinist framework of explanation. My view could be seen as compatibilist because it denies the existence of a fundamental conflict between freedom and determinism. However, since libertarian accounts of local indeterminism are pointless on my view, it cannot be easily place with the compatibilism/libertarianism distinction. Instead of entering the hopelessly unproductive metaphysical debates about freedom and determinism, I propose to turn attention to the domain of ethics. Problems of freedom are questions about the deliberative processes that terminate in action and about reasons and principles on which they are based. To say that an action is free is not to claim that it is independent from causal determination; rather, it is to say that it has been decided upon.
11. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Francesco Coniglione The Place of Polish Scientific Philosophy in the European Context
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Scientific philosophy is a sui generis project and it is not possible to assimilate it into analytic philosophy tout court, nor, a fortiori, into the philosophy of science. Scientific philosophy was practised during the early stage of the Vienna Circle before the influence of Wittgenstein’s thought became decisive. Afterwards, there was a quick transition to philosophy intended as subsidary to science, as a mere classification of meaning, coming, in the end, to its liquidation with Carnap’s logical syntax. Different was the path of the Lvov-Warsaw School, which remained committed to Brentano’s original programme and never abandoned the idea of the possibility of scientific philosophy. Decisive, here, was the absence of Wittgenstein’s influence and the utter irrelevance of that of Mach. It is in Poland that at the present days it has its strongest roots and there we find considerable trends of thought inspired by it.
12. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Piotr K. Szałek Mind and World: with a New Introduction by the Author
13. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Jan Woleński Notes on Books
14. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Dale Jacquette Denying The Liar
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The liar paradox is standardly supposed to arise from three conditions: classical bivalent truth value semantics, the Tarskian truth schema, and the formal constructability of a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. Standard solutions to the paradox, beginning most notably with Tarski, try to forestall the paradox by rejecting or weakening one or more of these three conditions. It is argued that all efforts to avoid the liar paradox by watering down any of the three assumptions suffers serious disadvantages that are at least as undesirable as the liar paradox itself. Instead, a new solution is proposed that admits that if the liar sentence is true then it is false, in the first paradox dilemma horn, but denies that the liar sentence is true, but asserting instead that it is false, and refuting the second paradox dilemma horn according to which it is supposed to follow that if the liar sentence is false then it is true. The reasoning for the second paradox dilemma horn is flawed, in that is not only not supported by but actually contradicted by the Tarskian truth schema. We could only infer the second dilemma horn if it were to clasically follow from the assumption that the liar sentence is false, and from the three liar paradox conditions, that therefore it is false that the liar sentence is false. This entire sentence can be shown to be false on the basis of the standard truth schema, thus blocking the paradox. Alternative formulations of the liar sentence are discussed, and the formal proofs and counterproofs for the two paradox dilemma horns, are considered along with the further philosophical implications of maintaining a resolute stance that the liar sentence is simply false.
15. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Gerald Harrison Libertarian Free Will and the Erosion Argument
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Libertarians make indeterminism a requirement of free will. But many argue that indeterminism is destructive of free will because it reduces an agent’s control. This paper argues that such concerns are misguided. Indeterminism, at least as it is located by plausible Libertarian views, poses no threat to an agent’s control, nor does it pose any other kind of threat.
16. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Robert Poczobut Filozofia Umysłu. Dyskusja z naturalistycznymi teoriami umysłu: (Philosophy of Mind. The Debate with the Naturalistic Conceptions of Mind)
17. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Władysław Stróżewski Human Being and Values
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The axiological structure of man is by its nature defined by its relation to values. Its main task consists in their “implementation.” In this sense, the axiological structure has a teleological character. Its most important determining factor is the attitude of its subjects, man, towards values, or, to be more precise, towards the choice of values and their realisation within oneself. The arguments present a proposition of a multi-aspect stude of man in the context of values. It is remarkable that so far this background has not been taken into consideration, or at least not satisfactorily enough, in attempts aiming at explaining the essence of personality. Yet it does seem that what we call “man’s axiological structure” significantly affects an individual’s personality, and possibily constitutes it.
18. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Monika Piotrowska The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability
19. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Thomas Nys Full of Hope and Fear: The Liberalism of Isaiah Berlin Revisited
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In this paper I argue that Isaiah Berlin’s theory of freedom should not be interpreted in a reductive sense. The distinction between negative and positive freedom, as different concepts and possibly conflicting values, truly holds (thereby excluding reductive interpretations that claim there is only one concept of freedom). Moreover, Berlin’s theory as a whole leaves room for both a comprehensive liberalism which advocates autonomy, critical reflection and personal judgement, as well as a liberalism of fear which defends a minimal level of decency and modesty aims at a modus vivendi. I think Berlin’s liberalism is one of hope and fear.
20. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Marek Rembierz Epistemologia - poznanie, prawda, wiedza, realizm: (Epistemology. Cognition. Truth. Knowledge. Realism.)