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101. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Ezio Di Nucci Knowing Future Contingents
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This paper argues that we know the future by applying a recent solution of the problem of future contingents to knowledge attributions about the future. MacFarlane has put forward a version of assessment-context relativism that enables us to assign a truth value 'true' (or 'false') to future contingents such as “There Will Be A Sea Battle Tomorrow.” Here I argue that the same solution can be applied to knowledge attributions about the future by dismissing three disanalogies between the case of future contingents and the case of knowledge attributions about the future. Therefore none of the traditional conditions for knowledge can be utilized to deny that we know the future, as I argue in the last section.
102. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Brian Weatherson The Temporal Generality Problem
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The traditional generality problem for process reliabilism concerns the difficulty in identifying each belief forming process with a particular kind of process. Thatidentification is necessary since individual belief forming processes are typically of many kinds, and those kinds may vary in reliability. I raise a new kind of generality problem, one which turns on the difficulty of identifying beliefs with processes by which they were formed. This problem arises because individual beliefs may be the culmination of overlapping processes of distinct lengths, and these processes may differ in reliability. I illustrate the force of this problem with a discussion of recent work on the bootstrapping problem.
103. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Notes to Contributors
104. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Guy Axtell (More) Springs of My Discontent: A Reply to Dougherty
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A further reply to Trent Dougherty, author of Evidentialism and its Discontents, on a range of issues regarding a proper understanding of epistemic normativity and doxastic responsibility. The relative importance of synchronic and diachronic concerns with epistemic agency is discussed, both with respect to epistemology ‘proper,’ as well as in connection with broader concerns with ‘ethics of belief’ and ‘epistemology of disagreement.’
105. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Notes on the Contributors
106. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Jennifer Wilson Mulnix Rethinking the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction
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This paper offers an account of the a priori/a posteriori distinction utilizing the insights of reliabilism, focusing on the inputs to reliable belief-forming processes. Ipropose that a belief possesses a priori justification if it is the result of a reliable belief-producing process whose input is ‘non-sensory’ and the reliability of this process does not ‘causally depend’ on the reliability of a prior process taking in ‘sensory’ input. One of the interesting consequences of this account is in the treatment of introspective knowledge of one’s belief-states; it was classically considered a posteriori, but comes out a priori on this model.
107. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Robert C. Trundle Aristotle Versus Van Til And Lukasiewicz On Contradiction: Are Contradictions Irrational In Science And Theology?
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The Polish logician Jan Lukasiewicz and the American theologian Cornelius Van Til are famous for challenging Aristotle’s Principle of Contradiction.Whereas apparent contradictions such as God and physical reality being both One and Not One (Many) are accepted in terms of an idealism held by Van Til, the Principle’s violations in theology and science reflect a realism held by Lukasiewicz. Lukasiewicz is favored for explaining why the Principle’s violation may be rational for a scientific and theological realism.
108. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
John Turri Stumbling in Nozick’s Tracks
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Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan have recently proposed an improved version of Nozick’s tracking account of knowledge. I show that, despite its virtues, the new proposal suffers from three serious problems.
109. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Adrian Muraru Epistemological Perspectives in Late Antiquity – A Dialog Between Rationalism and Empiricism in the Scientific Writings
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Given the particular character of Ancient Literature, I considered it useful to approach the issue from the perspective of the Philosophy of Science: Epistemologyand the Philosophy of Science stem from the same source, and this aspect is all the more patent for Antiquity. In fact, the two perspectives that I mentioned in the subtitle, Empiricism and Rationalism, both represent epistemological choices and approaches specific to the Sciences, as well as to the Philosophy of Science, in the manner that they were practiced in Antiquity. This present study argues that Empiricism noticeably distinguishes itself from Rationalism, not merely in the philosophical works of the above-mentioned period, but also in its non-philosophical literature, especially the one pertaining to Science. Consequently, this study aims to indicate the major lines of thought in the Ancient Philosophy of Science, which reflect themselves in Epistemology in an unmediated manner.
110. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Logos & Episteme. Aims and Scope
111. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Notes on the Contributors
112. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Emma C. Gordon Is There Propositional Understanding?
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Literature in epistemology tends to suppose that there are three main types of understanding – propositional, atomistic, and objectual. By showing that all apparent instances of propositional understanding can be more plausibly explained as featuring one of several other epistemic states, this paper argues that talk of propositional understanding is unhelpful and misleading. The upshot is that epistemologists can do without the notion of propositional understanding.
113. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Notes to Contributors
114. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Michael J. Shaffer Not-Exact-Truths, Pragmatic Encroachment, and the Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning
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Recently a number of variously motivated epistemologists have argued that knowledge is closely tied to practical matters. On the one hand, radical pragmaticencroachment is the view that facts about whether an agent has knowledge depend on practical factors and this is coupled to the view that there is an important connection between knowledge and action. On the other hand, one can argue for the less radical thesis only that there is an important connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. So, defenders of both of these views endorse the view that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. This thesis has recently come under heavy fire and a number of weaker proposals have been defended. In this paper counter-examples to the knowledge norm of reasoning will be presented and it will be argued that this view – and a number of related but weaker views – cannot be sustained in the face of these counter-examples. The paper concludes with a novel proposal concerning the norm of practical reasoning that is immune to the counter-examples introduced here.
115. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Alexander R. Pruss The Badness of Being Certain of a Falsehood is at Least 1/(Log 4 − 1) Times Greater than the Value of Being Certain of a Truth
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Surprisingly precise results are provided on how much more one should disvalue being wrong than one values being right.
116. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Trent Dougherty Internalist Evidentialism and Epistemic Virtue: Re-reply to Axtell
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In this brief re-reply to Axtell, I reply to key criticisms of my previous reply and flesh out a bit my notions of the relationship between internalist evidentialism and epistemic virtue and epistemic value.
117. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Valentin Sorin Costreie Frege on Identity. The Transition from Begriffsschrift to Über Sinn und Bedeutung
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The goal of the paper is to offer an explanation why Frege has changed his Begriffsschrift account of identity to the one presented in Über Sinn und Bedeutung.The main claim of the paper is that in order to better understand Frege’s motivation for the introduction of his distinction between sense and reference, which marks his change of views, one should place this change in its original setting, namely the broader framework of Frege’s fundamental preoccupations with the foundations of arithmetic and logic. The Fregean thesis that mathematics is contentful, and its defense against formalism and psychologism, provides us an valuable interpretative key. Thus, Fregean senses are not just the mere outcome of some profound reflections on language, rather they play an important role in the articulation of Frege’s program in the foundations of arithmetic.
118. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Ettore De Monte, Antonino Tamburello The Logical Limits of Scientific Knowledge: Historical and Integrative Perspectives
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This work investigates some of the most important logical limits of scientific knowledge. We argue that scientific knowledge is based on different logicalforms and paradigms. The logical forms, which represent the rational structure of scientific knowledge, show their limits through logical antinomies. The paradigms, which represent the scientific points of view on the world, show their limits through the theoretical anomalies. When these limits arise in science and when scientists become fully and deeply aware of them, they can determine logical or paradigmatic revolutions. These are different in their respective courses, although the logical forms and the paradigms are parts of the same type of knowledge. In the end, science can avoid or can integrate its different limits. In fact, the limits of science can become new opportunities for its growth and development.
119. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Bogdan Boghițoi Evolution, Psychology, and Culture
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My goal is to clarify the type of relations one could hope can be established between psychology and the social sciences in general, on one side, and evolutionary biology, on the other. Thus, the paper analyzes one of the most remarkable contemporary attempts to forge such ties, namely that of John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, who explore the interface between the two domains and try to articulate a research methodology aimed at their better integration. Unfortunately, as I shall try to show, the position Tooby and Cosmides advance is undermined by adaptationist assumptions they don't manage to successfully defend. In doing so, my paper picks up the threads of the current adaptationism debate and seeks to draw some of the consequences it has for psychological research. Subsequently, I will attempt to generalize the chief results of my analysis, by emphasizing a few aspects of evolutionary theory I think are key for understanding its relation with human culture. On this grounds, I will argue for a position that makes social sciences autonomous in respect to evolutionary thinking, yet preserves solid ties with evolutionary thought, securing integration with the rest of science.
120. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Dale Jacquette Justification and Truth Conditions in the Concept of Knowledge
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The traditional concept of propositional knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), even when modified, typically in its justification condition, to avoid Gettier-typecounterexamples, remains subject to a variety of criticisms. The redefinition proposed here puts pressure more specifically on the concept of truth as redundant in light of and inaccessible beyond the most robust requirements of best justification. Best-J is defined as justification for believing in a proposition’s truth where there is no better countermanding justification for believing instead the proposition’s negation. A pragmatic perspective argues that truth is unnecessary and unattainable as a condition of knowledge beyond the requirement for practically attainable best justified belief. The key argument with respect to the eliminability of the truth condition in favor of a properly tailored justification condition is that there is nothing we do or can do in trying to satisfy the truth condition for knowledge beyond considering the epistemic merits of the justification that a believer accepts in coming to believe that the proposition is true.