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Displaying: 101-120 of 170 documents

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101. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 13 > Issue: 4
Lukáš Novák Tomáš Akvinský instrumentalistou v matematice?: (Kritika Sousedíkovy a Svobodovy interpretace)
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P. Sousedík and D. Svoboda, in their paper “Různá pojetí matematiky u vybraných autorů od antiky po raný novověk: Je matematika teoretická věda nebo pouhá technika?”, proposed an interpretation of Aquinas’s understanding of the nature of mathematics which the author regards as unsatisfactory. The purpose of this review article is to point out its problems and to suggest in its stead an adequate interpretation of Aquinas’s mind, on the basis of a detailed analysis of his texts. The author shows that Aquinas was by no means an instrumentalist in mathematics but considered mathematical truths to be directly applicable to “physical matter”. Such an application takes place in sciences like astronomy, harmonics or optics, which, although sometimes subsumed under mathematics broadly conceived, nevertheless form a special category qua the so-called “middle sciences” (viz. situated between mathematics and physics) and are thus no true species of mathematics. The fact that these sciences are also regarded as “arts” does not preclude their scientific character at all, since the two categories are not mutually exclusive, according to St. Thomas.
102. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 13 > Issue: 6
Lukáš Novák Doctrina de connotatis v barokně-scholastické diskusi
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In Baroque scholasticism the medieval semantic theory of connotation as a property of terms, originally elaborated by Ockham and others, received an ontological application or re-interpretation in the context of the theory of relations. The main proponent of this ontologized “doctrina de connotatis” seems to have been Suárez. Subsequently, this doctrine was severely criticised by the Jesuits Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza and Rodrigo de Arriaga, but also by the “princeps Scotistarum” Bartholomeo Mastri; whereas another Scotist, John Punch, adopted a theory of relations close to this doctrine. The fates of the original semantic theory of connotation, the ontologized “doctrina de connotatis” and the broader context of the relevant discussions (especially the new res–modus ontology established around 1600) document the complexity of the history of scholastic ideas, irreducible to any simple paradigm (like that of the realism–nominalism strife).
103. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 13 > Issue: 7
Lukáš Novák Iracionalita racionálního kompatibilismu: (Kritika studie Davida Peroutky)
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This discussion article is a critique of the theory of “rational compatibilism”, as presented in D. Peroutka’s eponymous article. The author raises the following nine objections against Peroutka’s conception: (1) Peroutka’s notion of liberty is ill-defined; (2) Peroutka’s argument “from growing probability” suffers from the confusion of logical and epistemic probability; (3) the charge of “irrationality” raised against the libertarian analysis of choice is either unsubstantiated or innocuous; (4) assigning the determining force to a final (rather than efficient) cause makes no difference with regard to freedom; (5) it is inexplicable in Peroutka’s conception why only a rational (as opposed to sensual) good can determine the will in a “compatibilist” way, i.e. without thereby compromising freedom; (6) Peroutka’s conception reduces “libertarian” situations to “perplexed” or “dilemmatic” situations, and so reduces all moral evil to evil “from ignorance”, leaving no room for evil “from weakness” and “from malice”; (7) the “asymmetry” in Peroutka’s conception (only evil acts have to be libertarian) only arises because the possibility of superrogatory acts has been ignored; (8) Peroutka’s conception turns libertarian freedom into an unjustifiable evil; and finally, (9) in his reply to Sartre Peroutka upholds Sartre’s proton pseudos: viz. the confusion of logical and deontic modality (viz. necessity and obligation). In an appendix the author shows that although Peroutka’s conception of rational compatibilism shares some points with Aquinas’s theory, as a whole it cannot be ascribed to him.
104. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Gottlob Frege Funkcia a pojem: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
105. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Peter Volek Správa z medzinárodnej konferencie Dôvera v rozum: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
106. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Blažena Švandová Aquinas’ Five Arguments in the Summa Theologiae 1a 2, 3: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
107. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Vlastimil Vohánka Plantinga a princip slábnoucí pravděpodobnosti: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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Alvin Plantinga wrote a probabilistic critique of historical arguments for the kernel of Christianity. It is based on the fact that, generally, the more complex a conjunction, the lower its probability. The paper provides elementary insights into the epistemology of Plantinga, probability calculus, and the role of this calculus in contemporary epistemology. It introduces a concept of a good argument, explains in which sense and why, according to Plantinga, no good arguments for Christianity exist, and discusses the following replies. The probability that every argument for Christianity fails can be low. Even if Christianity is less probable than its proper propositional parts, it can be still be probable, whether on the same or on some enhanced body of evidence. Finally, there have been detailed probabilistic arguments for Christianity yielding results significantly different from Plantinga’s cursory estimates.
108. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Miroslav Kuric Aristotelova teória substancie: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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Aristotle’s notion of substance presents various problems of interpretation. Many interpreters focus mainly at the notion of primary substance, especially with regard to the difference between how Aristotle defines it in Metaphysics VII and in the Categories. The present study aims at confirming mutual compatibility of these texts and touches also the problem of knowability of the primary substance. Translation: Lukáš Novák
109. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Roman Míčka Faith and Liberty. The Economic Thought of the Late Scholastics: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
110. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Ulrich G. Leinsle Locutio angelica. Die Diskussion der Engelsprache als Antizipation einer Sprechakttheorie in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
111. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Vlastimil Vohánka Mezinárodní konference Formální metody v epistemologii náboženství (Formal Methods in the Epistemology of Religion): A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
112. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Tomáš Machula Sedm lekcí o jsoucnu a o principech spekulativního rozumu: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
113. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Efrem Jindráček OP Pavel ze Soncina a italský tomismus konce xv. století: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article offers a critical biography, description and characteristic of method, fonts and doctrine of Master Paul of Soncino († 5 August 1495), friar of the Dominican Order, in particular his Acutissimae Quaestiones Metaphysicales. The life and work of this philosopher falls within the ambit of Italian Thomism of the 15th century. Between his masters we commemorate Peter Maldura of Bergamo and Dominic of Flanders. His exposition of Aristotle’s Metaphysic proceeds from a peculiar synthesis of Arabic Commentator Averroes and Thomas Aquinas. Soncinas’ work and position was frequently discussed up to the 15th century.
114. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Jiří Raclavský Projikování a abstraktní vs. Kknkrétní individua: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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Two kinds of individuals are distinguished: abstract and concrete. Whereas abstract individuals belong to our conceptual sphere, concrete individuals (i.e. particulars) individuate the world of matter. A subject inquiring the external world projects abstract individuals onto the concrete ones (i.e. pieces of matter). Our theory offers a solution to various ontological and epistemological puzzles concerned with individuals, e.g., the Ship of Theseus, Polish Logician, problems with reidentification, or proper names.
115. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Marián Kuna Engagement with Marxism. Selected writings 1953–1974: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
116. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Michal Chabada Ako sa vyjadrova' rozumne a zmysluplne Uvedenie do filozofickej metodológie: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
117. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Daniel D. Novotný Pražská konference ke 400. výroí úmrtí Maharala: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
118. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Milan Nakonečný Filozofia človeka podl'a Tomáša Akvinského Vo svetle súčasných komentárov: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
119. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Tomáš Machula Moderné teórie vysvetlenia a príčinnosti: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
120. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
David Peroutka OCD Aristotelské pojetí možného: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The genuinely Aristotelian conception of possibilia (possible non-existing entities) does not admit their own potency to coming-to-be (“objective potency”), nor, consequently, does it ascribe any kind of “weak” existence to them. Nevertheless we can (and need) admit possibilia as legitimate objects of rational discourse. In its concluding part this paper proposes a definition of the logically possible, as well as a definition of the ontologically possible (which is possible not only because its notion is noncontradictory, but also due to the existence of its potential causes).