Displaying: 101-120 of 360 documents

0.065 sec

101. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Claudio Rozzoni Chi scrive? Chi legge? Il chiasma fra autore e lettore a partire dalle Recherches sur L’usage littéraire du langage
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The recent publication of Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage, the preparatory notes for Merleau-Ponty’s “Monday course” at the Collège de France in 1953, provides further evidence of the turning points of the French philosopher’s reflections during this period. This course, on the style of expression in the work of Stendhal and Valery, is interesting in that it truly reveals to us a unique perspective on the questions that, on the one hand, are related to research made during the previous period at the Sorbonne; and that, on the other hand, find a new echo, a new development in the course on “The Philosophy of Proust” given by Merleau-Ponty in the following year, also at the Collège of France. The problem of the intersubjectivity of the work of art in particular finds a crucial complement in this course. Starting from the work on literary language, this offers a path toward thinking the chiasm between author and reader in an unprecedented way that avoids falling back into the fruitless opposition between two poles: one represented by a purely subjective point of view, with its solipsistic excesses, and one that tries to take into account the communication between two subjects, author and reader in this case, by thinking them as an “already given” unity before the gesture of writing and the experience of reading.
102. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
103. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Stefano Micali Il giudizio riflettente estetico nella Critica del Giudizio. Una ripresa fenomenologica
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this essay, the author intends to show the reasons for the interest on the Critique of Judgment, and especially to aesthetic judgment of taste within thephenomenological context. The study is divided into four sections: at first the concept of aesthetic reflective judgment will be introduced, highlighting the crucial role it assumes within the Kantian critical project as a whole (I). In a second step the specificity of the judgment of taste will be studied with particular attention on its character of Zweckmässigkeit and its universal voice (II). In the third section it will be shown how the judgment of taste introduces a new paradigmatic articulation of the relationship between feeling and thinking, which is further explained through a critical comparison with the interpretations of Jean-Francois Lyotard and Marc Richir (III) of aesthetic judgment. In the last and more extended section, the affinity of the disinterested character of the judgment of taste with the phenomenological attitude will be at the center of the research (IV).
104. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
105. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Faustino Fabbianelli Dalla “riflessione radicale” alla “superriflessione”. La fenomenologia di Merleau-Ponty tra Hegel e Schelling
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this essay, I intend to show the evolution that the thought of Merleau-Ponty undergoes from the Phenomenology of Perception to The Visible and the Invisible. I do so by employing the Merleau-Pontyian notions of “radical reflection” and “hyper-reflection,” which I will consider as expressions of two alternative ways of resolving the task of philosophy: to highlight, in the first case, the immediate relation between the subject and the world, in the second case, the chiasm between the thinking and the Being of the world. There are three main stages to my reasoning: 1) to show the conceptual differences that obtain between the first Merleau-Pontyian phenomenology and the Hegelian philosophy; 2) to illustrate the insufficiency, recognized ex post by Merleau-Ponty himself, of the existential analyses contained in the Phenomenology of Perception; 3) to identify the concept that allows him to formulate a new ontology, and to go beyond the Hegelian dialectic, in the “nature” which is spoken of in the positive philosophy of the late Schelling.
106. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Leonard Lawlor Presentazione
107. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Mauro Carbone, Federico Leoni, Ted Toadvine Nota dei Direttori
108. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Rita Messori In Punta di Parole: Figura e Metafora in Maurice Merleau-Ponty e Paul Ricoeur
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
La recente pubblicazione delle note di corso Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage sono una conferma del ruolo giocato dal linguaggio poetico in Merleau-Ponty in quell’ambizioso e incompiuto progetto perseguito dal 1951 Sur la phénoménologie du langage. La convinzione che il linguaggio sia la questione cruciale per la fenomenologia avvicina le ricerche di Merleau-Ponty a quelle che Ricoeur svilupperà negli anni Settanta: è nella parola, nel discorso pronunciato, che avviene non solo il rapporto tra soggetti, ma anche quello con le cose. Per entrambi i filosofi la Lebenswelt è una sorta di terra promessa della fenomenologia; un mondo che ci è dato cogliere soltanto in modo mediato. E a rappresentare una forma di mediazione esemplare è la figura retorica della metafora, negazione di ogni tentazione di presa diretta, di trasparenza del linguaggio stesso: nella parola metaforica, non riducibile alla dimensione nominale, viene delineata una ontologia “indiretta” o “abbozzata”. Tecnica stilistica da Merleau-Ponty, a differenza di Ricoeur, più praticata che teorizzata, la metafora poetica, o viva, realizza lo snodo tra pre-categoriale e categoriale, tra mondo sensibile e mondo dell’espressione, tra logos muto e logos pronunciato. Riprendendo l’analogia individuata da Valéry tra danza e linguaggio letterario, Merleau-Ponty traccia una teoria della figura come espressione degli ordini di senso percepiti che può trasfigurare il linguaggio ordinario; teoria molto vicina a quella ricoeuriana di “figurazione” che nel mondo della vita si radica per poi tornarvi.La publication récente des notes du cours Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage confirment le rôle joué par le langage poétique chez Merleau-Ponty dans le projet ambitieux et inachevé qu’il engage à partir de 1951 dans l’essai Sur la phénoménologie du langage. La conviction que le langage est la question cruciale pour la phénoménologie rapproche les recherches de Merleau-Ponty de celles que Ricoeur développera dans les années 1970 : c’est dans les mots, dans le discours prononcé, qu’advient non seulement les relations entre sujets, mais aussi nos rapports avec les choses. Pour les deux philosophes, la Lebenswelt est une sorte de terre promise pour la phénoménologie ; un monde qu’on ne peut saisir que de manière indirecte. Et c’est la figure de la métaphore qui représente une forme de médiation exemplaire, comme négation de toute tentative de prise directe, de transparence du langage lui-même. Dans l’expression métaphorique, non réductible à la dimension nominale, une ontologie « indirecte » ou « ébauchée » est esquissée. Technique stylistique chez Merleau-Ponty, plus pratiquée que théorisée à la différence de Ricoeur, la métaphore poétique, ou vivante, réalise la jonction entre le précatégorial et le catégorial, entre le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression, entre logos muet et logos proféré. Reprenant l’analogie de Valéry entre danse et langage littéraire, Merleau-Ponty trace une théorie de la figure comme expression des ordres de la perception qui peut transfigurer le langage ordinaire ; une théorie très proche de celle de Ricoeur de la « figuration » qui, enracinée dans le monde de la vie, y retourne ensuite.The recent publication of the lecture notes Research on the Literary Use of Language confirms the role played by poetic language in Merleau-Ponty’s ambitious and unfinished project that began in his 1951 essay “On the Phenomenology of Language.” The conviction that language is the crucial question for phenomenology in Merleau-Ponty’s work nears the research Paul Ricoeur would develop in the 1970’s: it is in words, in expressed discourse, that we encounter not only relations among subjects, but also our relation to things. For the two philosophers, the Lebenswelt is a sort of promised land for phenomenology, a world that we can grasp only indirectly. And, it is the figure of the metaphor that represents an exemplary form of mediation, as a negation of every attempt toward a direct grasp, of the transparency of language in itself. In the metaphorical expression, which is not reducible to a nominal dimension, an “indirect” or “outlined” ontology is sketched out. In the stylistic technique of Merleau-Ponty, more practiced than theoretical unlike Ricoeur, the poetic or living metaphor constitutes a junction between the pre-categorical and the categorical, between the sensible world and the world of expression, between silent logos and pronounced logos. Referring to Valery’s analogy between dance and literary language, Merleau-Ponty traces a theory of the figure as expression in the orders of perception that can transfigure ordinary language, a theory very similar to that of Ricoeur’s “figuration” which, rooted in the world of life, subsequently returns to it.
109. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Lamberto Colombo Metafisica ed Esperienza in Ricoeur e Merleau-Ponty
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Partendo dalle definizioni che Ricoeur e Merleau-Ponty assegnano al concetto di filosofi a, è mia intenzione mostrare come non una metafisica tradizionalmente intesa, quanto un ideale metafisico insito in una teoria filosofica della conoscenza appaia e sia necessario ai fini dell’investigazione dell’esperienza (tratto che accomuna le analisi dei due filosofi presi in questione). Ritengo che la dialettica tra trascendenza ed immanenza della verità nella storia, nonostante le diverse declinazioni dovute agli interessi dei due pensatori, possa contribuire a rendere un’immagine unitaria e, a più riprese, interdipendente di Ricoeur da Merleau-Ponty e di quest’ultimo alla luce della revisione ermeneutica operata all’interno della fenomenologia dal filosofo di Valence.En partant des définitions que Ricoeur et Merleau-Ponty donnent du concept de philosophie, c’est mon intention de montrer comment non pas une métaphysique au sens traditionnel, mais un idéal métaphysique logé dans une théorie philosophique de la connaissance apparaît et est nécessaire dans la perspective d’une investigation de l’expérience (un trait qui rapproche les analyses des deux philosophes considérés). Je soutiens que la dialectique entre transcendance et immanence de la vérité dans l’histoire, quelles que soient les différentes déclinaisons qu’elle connaît dans les intérêts des deux penseurs, peut contribuer à donner une image unitaire et, à plusieurs reprises, à montrer une interdépendance de Ricoeur à l’égard de Merleau-Ponty et de ce dernier à l’égard de la révision herméneutique opérée à l’intérieur de la phénoménologie par le philosophe de Valence.By starting from the definitions that Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty give to the concept of philosophy, I intend to show how a metaphysical ideal lodged in a philosophical theory of knowledge, and not a metaphysics in the traditional sense, appears and is necessary when viewed from the perspective of experience (a characteristic which brings the two philosophers under consideration closer together). I hold that the dialectic between transcendence and immanence of the truth in history, despite the difference of interest in how it is developed by the two thinkers, can contribute to the formation of an unified image and, in several ways, to showing an interdependence of Ricoeur in relation to Merleau-Ponty and of Merleau-Ponty in relation to the hermeneutical revision effected within phenomenology by the philosopher from Valence.
110. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
111. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Federico Leoni Presentazione
112. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Federico Leoni Introduzione. Un altro inconscio
113. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
Jennifer McWeeny Introduzione. Il corpo del nostro tempo
114. Chiasmi International: Volume > 18
115. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Ted Toadvine Presentazione
116. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Emmanuel Alloa, Judith Revel Introduzione
117. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Marie-Eve Morin Introduzione
118. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Rajiv Kaushik Introduzione
119. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Prisca Amoroso, Gianluca De Fazio Dall’arca Terra allo Spielraum: Natura, corpo, spontaneità
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Il saggio muove da una ricostruzione storico-concettuale dell’interpretazione merleau-pontyana del manoscritto di Husserl Rovesciamento della dottrina copernicana nell’interpretazione della corrente visione del mondo, con cui Merleau-Ponty è in dialogo sin dalla Fenomenologia della percezione, per ripercorrere gli sviluppi del tema della Terra nell’avanzare della riflessione merleau-pontyana sul corpo-proprio, sull’organismo vivente, sulla dimensione carnale dell’essere. La proposta di un ritorno alla Terra, intesa come Boden irriducibile dell’esperienza, trova infatti il suo risvolto ontologico nell’idea di Spielraum, che già Husserl definiva come “ambito di possibilità”, e che in Merleau-Ponty assume il senso di un margine di gioco sempre aperto nella carne. Boden e Spielraum, non a caso tematizzati da Merleau-Ponty in due corsi paralleli tenuti al Collège de France nell’anno 1959-1960, permettono una rivalutazione del vivente secondo un modello che, contro il riduzionismo meccanicista, privilegi la spontaneità e la contingenza, e aprono allo sviluppo dell’ontologia porosa che il filosofo andrà proponendo negli ultimi anni. Ricostruendo la funzione della riflessione sulla corporeità e sul rapporto del vivente al mondo-ambiente in questa maturazione, si argomenterà che la critica che Merleau-Ponty muove al dualismo empirismo-idealismo trovi nell’idea di Terra un momento chiave, che contribuisce ad orientarla in direzione di una filosofia della carne. Questo passaggio riconfigura la Natura stessa, pensata non già come un originario, ma in quanto ambito di possibilità processuale e transindividuale, come quel quasi-oggetto, come lo definiva, ancora, Husserl, che presenta un’irriducibile resistenza ad un pensiero di sorvolo, proprio in quanto è condizione del pensiero stesso e ancoraggio della vita tutta.This essay begins with a historico-conceptual reconstruction of the Merleau-Pontian interpretation of Husserl’s manuscript, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,” with which Merleau-Ponty is in dialogue from Phenomenology of Perception onward, and revisits the development of the theme of the Earth in the progression of Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on le corps propre, the living organism, and the carnal dimension of being. The proposal for a return to the Earth, taken as irreducible Boden of experience, indeed finds its ontological reverse side in the idea of Spielraum, which Husserl already defined as a “milieu of possibilities,” and which in Merleau-Ponty takes on the sense of a margin of play always open in the flesh. Boden and Spielraum, two notions that Merleau-Ponty does not thematize by chance in the two parallel courses given at the Collège de France over the years 1959-1960, enable a reassessment of the living being according to a model that, against mechanistic reductionism, privileges spontaneity and contingency, and opens to the development of the porous ontology that the philosopher would propose in his final years. Reconstructing the function of reflection on corporeality, and on the relationship of the living being with its milieu in the process, it will be argued that the criticism directed by Merleau-Ponty against the dualism of empiricism-idealism finds in the idea of the Earth a key moment that contributes to orienting him in the direction of a philosophy of the flesh. This passage reconfigures Nature itself, no longer conceived of as an originating, but as a milieu of processual and transindividual possibilities, like that quasi-object, as Husserl again defined it, that presents an irreducible resistance against high-altitude thinking, precisely as the condition of thought itself and the anchorage of all life.Cet essai commence avec une reconstruction historico-conceptuelle de l’interprétation merleau-pontienne du manuscrit de Husserl, Renversement de la doctrine copernicienne, avec lequel Merleau-Ponty est en dialogue depuis la Phénoménologie de la perception, et revisite les développement du thème de la Terre dans la progression de la réflexion merleau-pontienne sur le corps propre, sur l’organisme vivant, sur la dimension charnelle de l’être. La proposition d’un retour à la Terre, prise comme Boden irréductible de l’expérience, trouve en effet son envers ontologique dans l’idée de Spielraum, que Husserl déjà définissait comme « milieu de possibilités » et qui chez Merleau-Ponty prend le sens d’une marge de jeu toujours ouverte dans la chair. Boden et Spielraum, deux notions que Merleau-Ponty ne thématise pas par hasard dans les deux cours parallèles donnés au Collège de France au cours de l’année 1959-1960, permettent une réévaluation du vivant selon un modèle qui, contre le réductionnisme mécaniste, privilégie la spontanéité et la contingence, et ouvrent au développement de l’ontologie poreuse que le philosophe allait proposer dans les dernières années. Reconstruisant la fonction de la réflexion sur la corporéité et sur le rapport du vivant avec son milieu dans ce processus, on argumentera que la critique dirigée par Merleau-Ponty contre le dualisme empirisme-idéalisme trouve dans l’idée de la Terre un moment clé qui contribue à l’orienter en direction d’une philosophie de la chair. Ce passage reconfigure la Nature elle-même, pensée non pas déjà comme un originaire, mais en tant que milieu de possibilités processuelles et transindividuelles, en tant que quasi-objet, comme le définissait, encore, Husserl qui offrait une résistance irréductible contre une pensée de survol, précisément en tant que condition de la pensée elle-même et ancrage de toute la vie.
120. Chiasmi International: Volume > 19
Elena De Silvestri L’apparizione del nibbio: una lettura del fantasma tra Freud e Merleau-Ponty
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In Un ricordo d’infanzia di Leonardo da Vinci Freud delinea un profilo della personalità di Leonardo a partire da un fantasma del suo passato, da un ricordo in cui egli rinviene “la sintesi” della sua intera vita. Nella parte finale de Il dubbio di Cézanne Merleau-Ponty recupera questa stessa analisi freudiana, per farne emergere, più che una contestazione o una critica, un vettore eccentrico: se il fantasma del nibbio – come Merleau-Ponty lo definisce – può rappresentare il monogramma della vita e del passato di Leonardo, è unicamente in quanto ne esibisce la “ripresa creatrice”. A partire da quest’idea di un continuo scambio tra presente e passato, in cui si offre la possibilità stessa di un avvenire creativo, è possibile pensare ad una differente lettura del concetto psicoanalitico di fantasma. Esso fa parte di quelle realtà immaginarie che Merleau-Ponty, nell’ultima fase del suo pensiero, descriverà come inerenti alla struttura stessa del reale, e che testimoniano, a un tempo, di un momento essenziale nel processo di soggettivazione. Attraverso la lettura merleau-pontiana la nozione di fantasma sembra quindi sottrarsi ad ogni deriva deterministica, per configurarsi piuttosto come l’effetto di una risonanza in cui “fedeltà all’infanzia” e “ripresa creatrice” convergono senza contraddizione.In Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, Freud outlined a profile of the personality of Leonardo starting from a fantasy of his past, a memory in which he found “the synthesis” of his entire life. In the last part of “Cézanne’s Doubt,” Merleau-Ponty takes up this same Freudian analysis in order to bring to light, rather than a challenge or a criticism, an eccentric vector: if the fantasy of the vulture – as defined by Merleau-Ponty – can represent the monogram of the life and the past of Leonardo, it is precisely insofar as it manifests “creative revival.” From this idea of a continuous exchange between present and past, in which the very possibility of a creative future arises, it is possible to conceive of a different reading of the psychoanalytic concept of fantasy. The latter makes up part of those imaginary realities that Merleau-Ponty, in the last phase of his thought, will describe as inherent in the very structure of the real, and which testify, at the same time, to an essential moment of the process of subjectivation. Through Merleau-Ponty’s reading, the notion of fantasy seems to evade any deterministic derivation, instead configuring itself as the effect of a resonance in which “fidelity to childhood” and “creative revival” converge without contradiction. Dans Un souvenir d’enfance de Léonard de Vinci, Freud décrit un profil de la personnalité de Léonard à partir d’un fantasme de son passé, d’un souvenir dans lequel il trouve « la synthèse » de sa vie entière. Dans la dernière partie du Doute de Cézanne, Merleau-Ponty reprend cette même analyse freudienne pour en faire émerger, plutôt qu’une contestation ou une critique, un vecteur excentrique : si le fantasme du vautour – comme le définit Merleau-Ponty – peut représenter le monogramme de la vie et du passé de Léonard, c’est uniquement en tant qu’il en manifeste la « reprise créatrice ». À partir de cette idée d’un échange continu entre présent et passé, dans lequel s’offre la possibilité même d’un avenir créatif, il est possible de penser à une lecture différente du concept psychanalytique de fantasme. Ce dernier fait partie de ces réalités imaginaires que Merleau-Ponty, dans la dernière phase de sa pensée, décrira comme inhérentes à la structure même du réel et qui témoignent d’un moment essentiel du processus de subjectivation. À travers la lecture merleau-pontienne, la notion de fantasme semble en effet se soustraire à toute dérive déterministe pour se configurer plutôt comme l’effet d’une résonance dans laquelle la « fidélité à l’enfance » et la « reprise créatrice » convergent sans contradiction.