Displaying: 101-120 of 1591 documents

0.072 sec

101. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Paul G. Muscari A Plea for Mythos
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Since of much of modern discourse, extending from cognitivism to connectionism to deconstructivism, has been greatly inclined to look at reality in relation to processes where the personal factor plays little if any causal role, the pursuit of wisdom today has become primarily identified with the logos or the pursuit of a rational account of reality and the rule governing principles behind it. Although there is not space enough to traverse all that is involved here, it will be argued in this paper that the secrets of wisdom will never be revealed if its nature is limited to a singular description of just one function of thought. What is needed if the love of wisdom is to be regained is a more dynamic and symmetrical account—one that considers the reconstructive e nature and generative e capabilities of the human mind as well as the flexibility and complexity of thought; one that realizes that the end stages of logos are only the by-product of insight obtained from more personal and emotionally charged meaning; and one that takes seriously the role of mythos in the thinking process.
102. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Our Contributors
103. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Selected Contributions on Wisdom as Published in Dialogue and Humanism (1990–1995) and Dialogue and Universalism (1995–2005)
104. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Władysław Tatarkiewicz — On Perfection (J.K.)
105. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Ray Munro Liminal Performances: Unveiling the Logos, Revealing the Mythos
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper I will attempt to show that the next step in acting methodology is to move from psychological cognition to meditative thinking—Logos, giving examples of how that Logos becomes word and is then revealed in the text, play or story—Mythos.
106. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Brian Seitz The Who Has Lost Something but Knows Where to Find It: Iroquois “Law” and the Withdrawal of the Origin
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Inspired by Nietzsche’s insistence that we exploit actual history and Foucault’s extrapolation of Nietzsche’s project, my explication of the logic of originary withdrawal is centered around an analysis of an historical account of origin; here, we turn to the image of the original lawgiver, as depicted in the Iroquois foundation narrative, the narrative that serves to constitute their political community. This analysis helps to cultivate an alternative understanding of political necessity by starting with the traces of a material discourse from the past and, more important, about the past rather than starting with theory.
107. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Dictionary of Dialogue and Universalism (Draft)
108. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Russell Ford A Fabulous Interruption: Towards a Mythic Politics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The aim of this essay is to specify the chief concern for post-Marxist political strategy as the discovery or invention of a new political logic. Beginning with Laclau and Mouffe’s influential Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, this essay extends Lyotard’s well-known diagnosis of the status of metanarratives to a consideration of the conditions for political resistance and dissent. Using concepts drawn from the work of Althusser, Nealon, and others, it reworks Laclau and Mouffe’s appropriation of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony in order to separate it from any foundational, normative political identity. In conclusion, the essay uses Bergson’s discussion of intuition and fabulation in order to begin to articulate the concepts of a democratic politics.
109. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Silvia Benso The Wisdom of Love or Negotiating Mythos and Logos with Plato and Levinas
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Inverting the sequence of the traditional terms, in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence Levinas redefines philosophy as the “wisdom of love”. Through an intertwining of Platonic motifs and Levinasian inspirations, the essay argues for a mutually regulated interplay of mythos and logos as a way to regain a sense of wisdom that remains respectful of the elements of otherness in reality-in particular, respectful of the otherness of the Third who, for Levinas, constitutes the ground for politics. That is, the interplay of mythos and logos results into a mytho-logy in which the logos directing the mythos is the voice of the other which imposes not only the preservation (ethics), but also the institutionalization (politics) of the differences, alterities and incommensurabilities that constitute reality. The consequence of this differently negotiated notion of wisdom is a reconfiguration of philosophy in terms of a mythological politics of bodily, economic testimony in the service of the Third.
110. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Editors Editorial
111. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Dorothea Olkowski The Myth of the Individual
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The fundamental liberal argument supporting the concept of “individualism” is that all individuals possess the same rights and liberties which define each citizen as an individual. Yet each individual somehow remains a person who defines her/himself as separate and distinct from all others and so who should never be considered to be a part of a concretely real group. Such a presupposition entails others. Liberalism presupposes naturalism, that human nature is fixed and knowable, as well as idealism, the belief that rational persuasion and argument are assumed to be the engines of change, and moralism, the idea that nature and reason must also provide some clues for acting. Ultimately, liberalism also implies volunteerism, the idea that social life is comprised of autonomous,intentional, and self-will actions that follow from the rules for right and wrong, which are themselves derived from reason, whose efficacy is natural. This essay argues that when women and other minorities examine the reasonable and rational public political culture, they may find that these very social structures, which are the ones they are most likely to value are also the site of their greatest oppression.
112. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Simon Glynn The Logos Mythos Deconstructed
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
One implication of Godel’s Proof is that, as Barry Barnes has observed, “For people to operate...rationally they need to have internalized some non-rational commitment to rationality”. In which case “The customary Enlightenment formula, according to which the process of demagification of the world leads necessarily from mythos to logos, seems . . .” Gadamer suggests, “. . . to be a modern prejudice”, or myth. Yet some myths are more useful than others, and therefore it may be on pragmatic grounds that, following Nietzsche’s characterization of “. . . logic and the categories of reason as means to . . . useful falsification . . .” we may wish to resist the abandonment of reason that many take to be the corollary of its deconstruction.
113. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Leonidas C. Bargeliotes, Penelope Triantou The Cognitive Role of Plato’s Use of Mythos
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The paper refers to the contribution of myth to Plato’s cognitive theory. Primarily, it is epigrammatically pointed out the existing difference between Mythos and Logos, on the one hand, and Plato’s attitude towards the myths as well as their use and incorporation into his cognitive model, on the other hand.
114. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
W. Scott Cameron The Genesis and Justification of Feminist Standpoint Theory in Hegel and Lukács
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Feminist standpoint epistemology suggests that women (or feminists) are cognitively privileged, since gender-specific forms of oppression produce insights systematically denied to men. Yet if many forms of oppression exist, what happens when they overlap? Some reject such theories as irredeemably essentialist, triumphalist, and relativist, but I argue that their original versions in Hegel and Lukács as supplemented by Sabina Lovibond generate both the strongest arguments for standpoint theories and a way through their deepest difficulties.
115. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Peter M. Schuller The Logic of Mythos in Building Civilization
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The suggestion of this paper is that we need again widely to practice and teach “the science of the soul” (rigorous metaphorical action) in order to produce the renaissance required to keep civilization going. A metaphor is not the saying of one thing while meaning another. In fact, metaphor is not limited to speech and writing. The understanding offered here is that, properly understood and employed, metaphor is a powerful and indispensable precision tool for radical improvement in thought. It is a prime guide and cause effecting leaps of mind from one axiomatic train of thought or mind set to a better, higher, and seemingly incommensurable one. It is at once a tool for teaching those insights which founded the civilization and a training regimen for strengthening rational creativity to solve new problems.
116. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3/4
Sharon M. Kaye Buridan’s Ass: Is There Wisdom in the Story?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper discusses Buridan’s Ass as a thought experiment that has been misunderstood. First, the thought experiment is presented in its traditional form and typical objections to it are discussed. Then the author argues that William of Ockham supplies the background necessary for a more meaningful formulation. Buridan’s Ass is designed to show that each individual must choose how to value the value we discover in the world and that, in so doing, we create individual preferences.
117. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 5/6
Christopher Vasillopulos How Greek Was My Nietzsche?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The thesis is that the Apollonian-Dionysian dialectic partially illuminates the dialectical relationship between the Will to Power and the Eternal Recurrence. The Apollonian-Dionysian synthesis restores the Will to Power, despite the necessities of the Eternal Recurrence, not because anything changes but because nothing can. One must succumb to the ecstasy of action, defying the paralysis of understanding while acknowledging its eternal power.
118. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 5/6
Hope K. Fitz Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Will to Power as a Kind of Elan Vital and Creative Expression
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper I argue that, for Nietzsche, the will to power is a kind of élan vital, i.e., vital impulse, force or drive. In living creatures, it is a drive to express their natures. In human beings, it is complex and must be developed in stages. The initial stages include becoming independent and striving for freedom of spirit and expression. Of the few that achieve the last stage, some will become the Übermensch or superior persons who will achieve great creative acts and in so doing enhance the capabilities of all humans. Nietzsche spoke as if he were one of the free spirits, but implicit in his writings is the idea that he is an exemplar of the Übermensch.
119. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 5/6
Steven V. Hicks, Alan Rosenberg Nietzsche and Disruptive Wisdom
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this essay, we examine certain key aspects of Nietzsche’s contribution to the ongoing debate concerning the nature and status of philosophical wisdom. We argue that, for Nietzsche, philosophical wisdom is tantamount to a “disruptive wisdom” which is expressed in a “permanent critique of ourselves” and our entire mode of existence. Philosophical wisdom, so construed, is not a matter of finding “metaphysical comfort” in consoling theories, images, or ideas; nor is it a matter of offering consolation for frustration and suffering. Instead, it is about disrupting or rupturing those prevailing “human, all too human” myths and illusions that perpetuate human frustration and suffering—especially the myths and illusions associated with what Nietzsche terms the “hitherto reigning ascetic ideal” in the West. By disturbing our “dogmatic slumber” in common-place beliefs and values, Nietzsche’s “untimely” atopic philosophers of “disruptive wisdom” evoke the promise of alternate forms of humanity: new ways of valuing the earth and our life on it, new paradigms for a way of life to be achieved in the future. Disruptive philosophers and the wisdom they impart, help liberate and inspire us to experiment with new ways of thinking and valuing, all of which contribute, as Nietzsche sees it, to the reconstituting and “fashioning of the self” as a transformed “second nature”.
120. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 15 > Issue: 5/6
Paweł Pasieka Wisdom as Epistemological Utopia and Scepticism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this essay I wish to discuss the notions of utopia, especially the notion of epistemological utopia as Leszek Kołakowski described it in one of his paper. Epistemological utopia is not tantamount to the conception of perfect and unalterable knowledge. On the contrary, in its realm there is also a place for scepticism, because scepticism is a kind of epistemological utopia but à rebours. Epistemological fundamentalism and scepticism are indeed two opposite attitudes but they finally belong to each other. Nevertheless, no one from these attitudes satisfy our epistemological theory. Bertrand Russell described similar situation in his short essay titled On optimism: we can accept at most together pessimist and optimist, never only one of them. Therefore that situation provides to the necessity of overcoming theoretical field of these two, foundational and sceptical, conceptions. In this article I use Wittgenstein’s ideas to search for a ‘new’ epistemological attitude.