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101. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Luis Rosa Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis
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In this paper, I offer two counterexamples to the so-called ‘Uniqueness Thesis.’ As one of these examples rely on the thesis that it is possible for a justified beliefto be based on an inconsistent body of evidence, I also offer reasons for this further thesis. On the assumption that doxastic justification entails propositional justification, the counterexamples seem to work.
102. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Gabriel Târziu Quantum vs. Classical Logic: The Revisionist Approach
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Quantum logic can be understood in two ways: as a study of the algebraic structures that appear in the context of the Hilbert space formalism of quantummechanics; or as representing a non-classical logic in conflict with classical logic. My aim in this paper is to analyze the possibility to sustain, at least in principle, a revisionist approach to quantum logic, i.e. a position according to which quantum logic is ‘the real logic’ which should be adopted instead of classical logic.
103. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Michael J. Shaffer Moorean Sentences and the Norm of Assertion
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In this paper Timothy Williamson’s argument that the knowledge norm of assertion is the best explanation of the unassertability of Morrean sentences ischallenged and an alternative account of the norm of assertion is defended.
104. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Rachael Briggs, Daniel Nolan Epistemic Dispositions: Reply to Turri and Bronner
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We reply to recent papers by John Turri and Ben Bronner, who criticise the dispositionalised Nozickian tracking account we discuss in “Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know.” We argue that the account we suggested can handle the problems raised by Turri and Bronner. In the course of responding to Turri and Bronner’s objections, we draw three general lessons for theories of epistemic dispositions: that epistemic dispositions are to some extent extrinsic, that epistemic dispositions can have manifestation conditions concerning circumstances where their bearers fail to exist, and that contrast is relevant to disposition attributions.
105. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
John Turri Preempting Paradox
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Charlie Pelling has recently argued that two leading accounts of the norm of assertion, the truth account and a version of the knowledge account, invite paradoxand so must be false. Pelling’s arguments assume that an isolated utterance of the sentence “This assertion is improper” counts as making an assertion. I argue that this assumption is questionable.
106. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Christopher Bobier The Conciliatory View and the Charge of Wholesale Skepticism
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If I reasonably think that you and I enjoy the same evidence as well as virtues and vices, then we are epistemic peers. What does rationality require of usshould we disagree? According to the conciliatory view, I should become less confident in my belief upon finding out that you, whom I take to be my peer, disagree with me. Question: Does the conciliatory view lead to wholesale skepticism regarding areas of life where disagreement is rampant? After all, people focusing on the same arguments and possessing the same virtues commonly disagree over religion, politics, ethics, philosophy and other areas. David Christensen and Adam Elga have responded that conciliationism does not lead to wholesale skepticism. I argue that Christensen and Elga cannot avoid the charge of wholesale skepticism. But I also argue that if they could avoid skepticism, then the conciliatory view would become irrelevant since it would not inform us as to what rationality requires of us in every-day disagreement. Thus either way the conciliatory view is saddled with unintuitive consequences.
107. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Mark McBride Saving Sosa’s Safety
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My purpose in this paper is to (begin to) defend safety as a necessary condition on knowledge. First, I introduce Ernest Sosa’s (1999) safety condition. Second,I set up and grapple with Juan Comesaña’s recent putative counterexample to safety as a necessary condition on knowledge; Comesaña’s case forces us to consider Sosa’s updated (2002) safety condition. From such grappling a principled modification to Sosa’s (2002) safety condition emerges. Safety is safe from this, and like, attacks.
108. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Michael J. Raven Subjectivism is Pointless
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Epistemic objectivists and epistemic subjectivists might agree that inquiry pursues epistemic virtues (truth, knowledge, reason, or rationality) while disagreeingover their objectivity. Objectivists will evaluate this disagreement in terms of the epistemic virtues objectively construed, while subjectivists will not. This raises arhetorical problem: objectivists will fault subjectivism for lacking some objective epistemic virtue, whereas subjectivists, by rejecting objectivity, won’t see this as a fault. My goal is to end this impasse by offering a new solution to the rhetorical problem. My strategy is to identify a common-ground virtue valuable to objectivists and subjectivists but unavailable to subjectivism. The virtue is usefulness. Subjectivism can be useful only if it relies upon the very objective epistemic virtues it rejects; so it cannot be useful. Whether or not subjectivism has any objective epistemic virtues, it may be rejected as pointless.
109. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Joshua A. Smith, Adam C. Podlaskowski Infinitism and Agents Like Us: Reply to Turri
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In a recent paper, “Infinitism and Epistemic Normativity,” we have problematized the relationship between infinitism and epistemic normativity.Responding to our criticisms, John Turri has offered a defense of infinitism. In this paper, we argue that Turri’s defense fails, leaving infinitism vulnerable to the originally raised objections.
110. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Travis Timmerman The Persistent Problem of the Lottery Paradox: And its Unwelcome Consequences for Contextualism
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This paper attempts to show that contextualism cannot adequately handle all versions of ‘The Lottery Paradox.” Although the application of contextualist rules ismeant to vindicate the intuitive distinction between cases of knowledge and nonknowledge, it fails to do so when applied to certain versions of “The Lottery Paradox.” In making my argument, I first briefly explain why this issue should be of central importance for contextualism. I then review Lewis’ contextualism before offering my argument that the lottery paradox persists on all contextualist accounts. Although I argue that the contextualist does not fare well, hope nevertheless remains. For, on Lewis’ behalf, I offer what I take to be the best solution for the contextualist and argue that once this solution is adopted, contextualism will be in a better position to handle the lottery paradox than any other substantive epistemological theory.
111. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Michele Palmira On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition for Epistemic Peerage
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A popular definition of epistemic peerage maintains that two subjects are epistemic peers if and only if they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtuesand share the same evidence about the targeted issue. In this paper I shall take up the challenge of defending the necessity of the evidential equality condition for a definition of epistemic peerage from criticisms that can be elicited from the literature on peer disagreement. The paper discusses two definitions that drop this condition and argues that they yield implausible verdicts about the instantiation of the epistemic peerage relation.
112. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Jimmy Alfonso Licon The Counterpart Argument for Modal Scepticism
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Surely, it is possible that you believe falsely about this-or-that modal matter. In light of the various ways the world could be arranged, it is plausible thatthere is a nearby possible world, which would be almost identical to the actual world, if it were actualized, where you and your modal counterpart disagree over modal belief p. You might be tempted to think that your modal belief is true, while hers is not. It is not clear why this is so; after all, you would each have the same evidence, cognitive abilities etc., if you were both actualized. This point generalizes to all of your modal beliefs, this seems to strongly imply that the probability that you have true modal beliefs appears inscrutable. Thus, you have some reason to withhold belief, on modal matters.
113. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Avram Hiller Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief
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Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’sbelief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-falseassumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that NEFA, even given Klein’s refinement, is subject to counterexample: a doxastic agent may possess knowledge despite having an essential false assumption. Advocates of NEFA could simply reject the intuition that the example is a case of knowledge. However, if the example is interpreted as not being a case of knowledge, then it can be used as a potential counterexample against both safety and sensitivity views of knowledge. I also provide a further case which, I claim, is problematic for all of the accounts just mentioned. I then propose, briefly, an alternative account of knowledge which handles all these cases appropriately.
114. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Dinu Moscal Logique et grammaire dans la définition du verbe copulatif
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Our objective in this paper is to clearly highlight the linguistic status of the copulative verb, especially with regard to the copula verb to be, with an eye on tracingthe influences of Logic on its approach as a syntactic entity and also on emphasizing the details that led to an eclectic definition. This epistemological approach aims at placing an emphasis on the subject of the diachronic and interdisciplinary copulative verb, in order to observe the way in which the conclusions from the level of the logical approach were transferred to the one of the linguistic approach and also to avoid the misuse of a series of concepts that were established either in a different domain or in the same domain, but at a different level. The main emphasis falls on defining the linguistic predicate through the grammatical tense.
115. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Shin Sakuragi Propositional Memory and Knowledge
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According to the epistemic theory of propositional memory, to remember that p is simply to retain the knowledge that p. Despite the apparent plausibility of thistheory, many putative counterexamples have been raised against it. In this paper, I argue that no clear-cut counterexample to the claim can be proposed since any such attempt is confronted with an insurmountable problem. If there is to be a clear-cut counterexample to the claim, it must be either a case in which one does not believe that p though he remembers that p, or a case in which one remembers that p but his belief that p is somehow unwarranted. I examine a number of putative counterexamples of both types, and show that in neither way can we describe a clear-cut case in which one remembers that p while not knowing that p.
116. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Thomas Kroedel The Permissibility Solution to the Lottery Paradox – Reply to Littlejohn
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According to the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox, the paradox can be solved if we conceive of epistemic justification as a species of permissibility.Clayton Littlejohn has objected that the permissibility solution draws on a sufficient condition for permissible belief that has implausible consequences and that the solution conflicts with our lack of knowledge that a given lottery ticket will lose. The paper defends the permissibility solution against Littlejohn’s objections.
117. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Clayton Littlejohn Don’t Know, Don’t Believe: Reply to Kroedel
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In recent work, Thomas Kroedel has proposed a novel solution to the lottery paradox. As he sees it, we are permitted/justified in believing some lotterypropositions, but we are not permitted/justified in believing them all. I criticize this proposal on two fronts. First, I think that if we had the right to add some lottery beliefs to our belief set, we would not have any decisive reason to stop adding more. Suggestions to the contrary run into the wrong kind of reason problem. Reflection on the preface paradox suggests as much. Second, while I agree with Kroedel that permissions do not agglomerate, I do not think that this fact can help us solve the lottery paradox. First, I do not think we have any good reason to think that we’re permitted to believe any lottery propositions. Second, I do not see any good reason to think that epistemic permissions do not agglomerate.
118. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Charlie Pelling Paradoxical Assertions: A Reply to Turri
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In earlier work, I have argued that the self-referential assertion that “this assertion is improper” is paradoxical for the truth account of assertion, the view onwhich an assertion is proper if and only if it is true. In a recent paper in this journal, John Turri has suggested a response to the paradox: one might simply deny that in uttering “this assertion is improper” one makes a genuine assertion. In this paper, I argue that this ‘no assertion’ response does not dissolve the paradox in the way Turri suggests.
119. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Tebben Peer Disagreement and the Limits Of Coherent Error Attribution
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I argue that, in an important range of cases, judging that one disagrees with an epistemic peer requires attributing, either to one's peer or to oneself, a failure ofrationality. There are limits, however, to how much irrationality one can coherently attribute, either to oneself or to another. I argue that these limitations on the coherent attribution of rational error put constraints on permissible responses to peer disagreement. In particular, they provide reason to respond to one-off disagreements with a single peer by maintaining one's beliefs, and they provide reason to moderate one's beliefs when faced with repeated disagreement, or disagreement with multiple peers. Finally, I argue that, though peer disagreement is rare, the occasions on which it does occur tend to be especially important, and the kind of response supported here is correspondingly important. In particular, how leading researchers spend their time and effort depends, in part, on how they respond to peer disagreement. And only a response of the kind supported here strikes the right balance between allowing individual researchers to freely pursue what seems to them to be worthwhile projects, and requiring that they pursue those research projects that the community of experts as a whole believes to be likely to yield significant results.
120. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Tomas Bogardus Foley's Self-Trust and Religious Disagreement
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In this paper, I’ll look at the implications of Richard Foley’s epistemology for two different kinds of religious disagreement. First, there are those occasions onwhich a stranger testifies to me that she holds disagreeing religious beliefs. Typically, I’m dismissive of such religious disagreement, and I bet you are too. Richard Foley gives reasons to think that we need not be at all conciliatory in the face of stranger disagreement, but I’ll explain why his reasons are insufficient. After that, I’ll look at those types of religious disagreement that occur between epistemic peers . Foley has argued for a conciliatory position. I worry that his position leads to what some in the literature have called “spinelessness.” I also worry that his view is self-defeating, and vulnerable to some apparent counterexamples. I’ll end the paper by sketching my own, non-Foleyan, solution to those problems.