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101. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 2
Stefaan E. Cuypers Stefaan E. Cuypers
The Curious Sensations of Pain, Hunger and Thirst: Reliabilism in the Second Part of Descartes’ Sixth Meditation
Osobliwość Takich Doznań, Jak Ból, Głód I Pragnienie

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This paper discusses the epistemic status of bodily sensations—especially the sensations of pain, hunger and thirst—in the second part of Descartes’ Sixth Meditation. It is argued that this part is an integral component of Descartes overall purely epistemological project in the Meditations. Surprisingly perhaps, in contrast with his standardly taken infallible, internalist and foundationalist position, Descartes adopts a fallibilist, externalist and reliabilist position as regards the knowledge and beliefs based on bodily sensations. The argument for this conclusion is justified by an analysis of both the criterion of nature’s teachings and the concept of true errors of nature in terms of Wilfrid Sellars’ distinction between the logical space of reasons and the empirical space of causes.
102. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 2
Przemysław Gut Przemysław Gut
The Epistemic Significance of Current Clear and Distinct Perceptions in Descartes’ Epistemology
Znaczenie Epistemiczne Aktualnie Jasnych i Wyraźnych Ujęć w Epistemologii Kartezjusza

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In this article, I discuss the epistemic role that Descartes believed was played in knowledge construction by current clear and distinct perceptions (the ideas or propositions which appear most evident to us when we are attending to them). In recent literature, we can find two interpretations about the epistemic status and function of current clear and distinct perceptions in Descartes’ epistemology. The first may be called the psychological, the second normative. The latter states that current clear and distinct perceptions are utterly immune to all doubt, even before God’s existence is proven and the general rule of truth is established. Thus, their certainty is for Descartes not merely psychological, but normative. I endorse the normative interpretation for a number of what I believe to be cogent reasons. However, there are also some difficulties with it. Therefore, after presenting positive arguments for the interpretation (sections I–IV) I discuss the difficulties of textual and substantive nature that the normative interpretation needs to address if it is to be upheld (sections V–VI).
103. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 2
Murray Miles Murray Miles
The Three Faces of the Cogito: Descartes (and Aristotle) on Knowledge of First Principles
Descartes (i Arystoteles) o Poznaniu Pierwszych Zasad

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With the systematic aim of clarifying the phenomenon sometimes described as “the intellectual apprehension of first principles,” Descartes’ first principle par excellence is interpreted before the historical backcloth of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. To begin with, three “faces” of the cogito are distinguished: (1) the proto-cogito (“I think”), (2) the cogito proper (“I think, therefore I am”), and (3) the cogito principle (“Whatever thinks, is”). There follows a detailed (though inevitably somewhat conjectural) reconstruction of the transition of the mind from (1) via (3) to (2) and back again to (3). What emerges is, surprisingly, a non-circular, non-logical, and ultimately non-mysterious process by which first principles implicitly contained in a complex intuition are gradually rendered explicit (and, if abstract, grasped in their abstract universality). This process bears a striking family resemblance to that intuitive induction (“grasping the universal in the particular”) which Aristotle scholars have distinguished from empirical forms of induction.
104. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 2
Adam Grzeliński Adam Grzeliński
The Cartesianism and Anti-Cartesianism of Locke’s Concept of Personal Identity
Kartezjanizm i Antykartezjanizm Locke’Owskiej Koncepcji Tożsamości Osobowej

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This article focuses on the relationship between the conceptions of personal identity presented by Descartes and by Locke. Contrary to common readings, I claim that the difference between them cannot be reduced to a simple contrast between rational substantialism and genetic empiricism. Locke does not resign from the substantialist position but delimits the two spheres: natural cognition with its foundation in experience and philosophical speculations, in which he tries to present a rational interpretation of religious dogmas which is consistent with his epistemological programme. Locke’s criticism is directed against the Cartesian notion of a thinking thing as a substance independent of the body and his description of the differentiation of experience and his depiction of human subjectivity is expanded in relation to Cartesian philosophy: personal identity gains explication at four complementary levels: psychological, biological, socio-legal, and religious.
105. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 2
Krzysztof Wawrzonkowski Krzysztof Wawrzonkowski
Thomas Hobbes’s Elements of Law and His Third Objections to Descartes’s Meditations
Elementy Prawa Thomasa Hobbesa a Jego Zarzuty Trzecie do Medytacji Kartezjusza

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In this article I endeavour to present the axis of the dispute between Hobbes and Descartes on the ground of Meditation, and its most important moments. I focus primarily on the analysis of the most important accusations made by Hobbes and the reconstruction of some of his views, which at the time could only be found in The Elements of Law, Nature, and Politics. This work was the first major and coherent attempt to speak out on cognitive-theory and social issues; I strive to defend the thesis that understanding the content of Objections requires knowledge of this work. The mature form of the work shows that the Englishman already had his views well thought-out and could feel quite confident in formulating from their perspective critical remarks on Descartes’s philosophy, to which, it seems, he may have owed quite a lot.
106. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 2
Amy M. Schmitter Amy M. Schmitter
Cartesian Social Epistemology?: Contemporary Social Epistemology and Early Modern Philosophy
Kartezjańska Epistemologia Społeczna?

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Many contemporary social epistemologists take themselves to be combatting an individualist approach to knowledge typified by Descartes. Although I agree that Descartes presents an individualist picture of scientific knowledge, he does allow some practical roles for reliance on the testimony and beliefs of others. More importantly, however, his reasons for committing to individualism raise important issues for social epistemology, particularly about how reliance on mere testimony can propagate prejudices and inhibit genuine understanding. The implications of his views are worked out more fully by some of his immediate successors; I examine how François Poulain de la Barre, and (briefly) Mary Astell analyze the social conditions for epistemic agency in a Cartesian vein.
107. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Dariusz Łukasiewicz Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Divine Providence and Chance in the World
Opatrzność Boża a Przypadek w Świecie

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The aim of the paper is to defend two theses: first, that the existence of chance events is compatible with God’s existence, and second, that chance might be part of divine providence. In what follows, the conjunction of the two is called “the compatibility thesis”; as will be argued, the thesis is grounded in contemporary science and in the concept of an omnipotent God, the creator of the universe. The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the historical background and doctrinal basis of the concept of divine providence. Section three discusses the argument from chance for the non-existence of God and its critique. Section four is concerned with possible models of God’s action in the world where chance events occur. Finally, section five elaborates on the idea of God and His perfection—omnipotence, omniscience, benevolence, and sovereign will.
108. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
William Hasker William Hasker
How to Make a World
Jak Stworzyć Świat

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This paper investigates two modalities in which a complex task can be accomplished, here termed meticulous control and purposeful randomness. The paper considers which of these better describes the divine creation of the universe, as we know that creation through science. The paper also considers the bearing of this question on views about divine providence, including Łukasiewicz’s “open probabilistic theism.”
109. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Jean-Baptiste Guillon Jean-Baptiste Guillon
Divine Providence: Fine-Grained, Coarse-Grained, or Something in Between?
Boża Opatrzność

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Dariusz Łukasiewicz has investigated in depth the “Argument from Chance” which argues that the data revealing chance in the world are incompatible with Divine Providence. Łukasiewicz agrees that these data undermine the traditional model of Providence—a fine-grained model in which every single detail is controlled by God—but maintains that they are not incompatible with a coarse-grained model—in which God leaves to chance many aspects of history (including some horrendous evils). Furthermore, Łukasiewicz provides independent reasons to prefer this coarse-grained model. Even though I agree that a maximally fine-grained model is undermined by the scientific data, I argue that this is no sufficient reason to adopt a model as coarse-grained as Łukasiewicz’s. I propose a model of intermediate level of fine-grainedness which could avoid the drawbacks of both extremes, and seems to me to provide a more traditional approach to the problem of evil.
110. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Thomas P. Flint Thomas P. Flint
Providence, Chance, Divine Causation, and Molinism: A Reply to Łukasiewicz
Opatrzność, Przypadek, Boska Przyczynowość I Molinizm

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Dariusz Łukasiewicz’s “Divine Providence and Chance in the World” attempts to show that the strong traditional understanding of providence is no longer tenable, especially for one who adopts the current scientific picture of the world. In its place, Łukasiewicz suggests, we need to adopt a view of providence which allows for genuine chance events not controlled by God. I argue that he has not made his case on the need for the traditional view to be abandoned. I then examine two directions a Christian might go so as to accommodate most of the attractive elements of Łukasiewicz’s revisionary account without succumbing to the philosophical and theological defects his position exhibits.
111. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Peter Forrest Peter Forrest
Chance or Agency?: A Response to “Divine Providence and Chance in the World”
Przypadek Czy Sprawczość?

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Dariusz Łukasiewicz distinguishes six concepts of chance, some (C3, C5, C6) but not others (C1, C2, C4) compatible with human freedom in the robust (“libertarian”) sense. In this paper, I argue in two ways that theists should reject ontological chance (C1) and rely instead on irreducible agency when considering events that are providentially not predestined by God. My arguments depend on a univocal understanding of the assertions that God is a loving agent and that, at their best, human beings are loving agents. Implicit in Łukasiewicz’s paper, is the objection that this an improper anthropomorphism. I am an unashamed anthropomorphist and will defend univocity.
112. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Jeffrey Koperski Jeffrey Koperski
Divine Action and the Laws of Nature: A Reply to Łukasiewicz
Działanie Boga a Prawa Przyrody

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This reply to Łukasiewicz’s “Divine Providence and Chance in the World” argues for three conclusions. First, what he calls “epistemic deism” faces challenges from physics that are not widely recognized. Second, if theists in favor of the fine-tuning design argument are wrong, then so are most physicists, who believe that fine-tuning requires an explanation. Third, not all laws of nature are conditional in the way that Łukasiewicz believes. Fortunately, the distinction between laws and non-nomic information provides a way to expand his model of divine action.
113. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Stanisław Judycki Stanisław Judycki
God’s Insurmountable Will and the Mystery of the Freedom of Created Beings: Comments on the book Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek by Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Nieprzezwyciężona Wola Boga I Tajemnica Wolności Stworzonych Bytów

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This article is a commentary on Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek by Dariusz Łukasiewicz. The main thesis is that freedom in the sense of a non-causal free-act generator does not exist. We will experience freedom, true freedom, only in eternal life, and it will become real only when our individual essence is revealed to us. Eternal life will consist, among other things, in being able to see how all our actions flow from our individual essence
114. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Ryszard Kleszcz Ryszard Kleszcz
Chance and Divine Providence: Methodological Notes with Pascal in the Background
Przypadek I Opatrzność Boża

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According to the author of this paper, the analytical philosophy of religion should not be closed to other spheres of culture and ignore or disregard the achievements of others, both past and contemporary philosophical currents. An analytical philosopher, including an analytical philosopher of religion, can therefore seek inspiration also outside the sphere of analytical philosophy. At the same time, this does not mean that an analytical philosopher is to disregard natural sciences or not to care about the precision of language and the right arguments. The concern for linguistic precision and the application of appropriate argumentation are crucial for the identity of the analytical philosophy. This article, taking into account the indicated metaphilosophical attitude, is devoted to a critical discussion about some of the problems raised by Professor Dariusz Łukasiewicz, in his outstanding work in the field of philosophy of religion published in Polish as Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek. Studium z analitycznej filozofii religii.
115. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Ireneusz Ziemiński Ireneusz Ziemiński
Is God (Perfectly) Good?: Remarks on Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek by Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Czy Bóg Jest (Doskonale) Dobry?

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The main problem of Dariusz Łukasiewicz’ book is the problem of God’s goodness, especially the question if God is perfectly good (also in moral sense). If He is perfectly good, He should always do what is best in the given circumstances, or—if there is no possibility of doing good—choose the least evil given two or more alternatives. In the paper I argue that God’s perfect goodness could not be justified neither a priori, nor a posteriori. A priori arguments are not conclusive ones because it is not possible to infer moral goodness from such ontological features as simplicity, necessity or infinity. Moral goodness also does not derive from almightiness or omniscience. Quite contrary, almightiness (and omniscience) may even be obstacles to moral goodness; for if God knows everything what is logically possible to know and can do anything that is logically possible to do, then not only should He know evil, but also should be able to do it. A posteriori arguments are not conclusive because of horrendous evil in the world, especially in the nature; after all, there is a natural and inescapable cruelty in nature, a result of the fact that some species are food for other species. Therefore, if God indeed created the world, He cannot have been sensitive to the suffering of the creatures he brought to life, especially that there is a lot of pointless evil in the world we currently inhabit.
116. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Ryszard Mordarski Ryszard Mordarski
Probabilistic Theism and the Classical Doctrine of Actus Purus
Teizm Probabilistyczny a Tradycyjna Doktryna

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Dariusz Łukasiewicz’s probabilistic theism arises from a non-classical understanding of the nature of God, especially the attributes of simplicity and omnipotence. The redefinition of these attributes in terms of modern analytical philosophy means that probabilistic theism is closer to open theism than to classical theism. However, an extremely important merit of this approach is the development of a comprehensive scientific component for open theism (which is built on biblical foundations), which means that probabilistic theism enables the extension of open theism to the perspective of modern natural sciences. The fundamental meaning of probabilistic theism is not so much the reconciliation of the occurrence of accidental events with the theory of providence, but rather it gives the possibility of open theism to enter into theistic debates among contemporary scientists, not only philosophers and theologians. Without this, open theism remains within a narrow theological perspective, interesting only to Christian theologians or scientists professing the Christian worldview.
117. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Błażej Gębura Błażej Gębura
On the Epistemology of Chance
O Epistemologii Przypadku

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Probabilistic theism according to Dariusz Łukaszewicz is a theism which ennobles the concept of chance and explains the role which chance plays in the context of Divine Providence. An epistemologist can, however, be interested in a much more basic issue and ask whether our beliefs concerning chance can be called knowledge. This article is divided into three parts. In the first one I discuss selected ways of justifying knowledge of chance, namely common sense justification, pragmatic justification, empirical justification, and a priori justification, as well as concluding that we possess tychical knowledge in reference to non-intentional chance (C2), epistemic chance (C3), probabilistic chance (C5), and causal chance (C6). In the second part I undertake the problem of skepticism in the problem of chance and I suggest that a significant role in the discussion with tychical skepticism is played by the standards of rationality. In the third section I refer to the concept of composite chance discussed by Łukasiewicz, and I claim that (i) we do not possess knowledge of composite chance as understood by Łukasiewicz, and that (ii) this fact should not be treated as a reason in favor of tychical skepticism.
118. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Marian Grabowski Marian Grabowski
Is Probabilistic Theism a Tenable Idea?: Critical Remarks on Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek by Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Czy Można Obronić Teizm Probabilistyczny?

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The article contains an evaluation of a fragment from the book Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek, written by Dariusz Łukasiewicz.
119. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Jacek Wojtysiak Jacek Wojtysiak
God and Chance
Bóg i Przypadek

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In the present paper, I analyse six concepts of a chance event (as defined by Dariusz Łukasiewicz) and also propose a definition of the term “random event.” Rejecting the existence of entirely causeless events, I discuss the relationship between random events and God. The view I formulate is based on three principles: the principle of simultaneous concurrence, the principle of complementarity, and the principle of middle knowledge (inspired by Luis de Molina). In adopting these three principles, I can reconcile the existence of God conceived in a classical manner, as Creator and Lord of all events, with the existence of random events. The model I propose provides an alternative to the conceptions offered by different currents of (more or less) revisionist (open) theism, including Łukasiewicz’s probabilistic theism.
120. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Dariusz Łukasiewicz Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Divine Providence and Chance in the World: Replies
Opatrzność Boża a Przypadek w Świecie: Odpowiedzi

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In the paper, I reply to the objections contained in the other papers in this issue raised against my conception of providence and chance presented in the opening article and the book from 2014. I argue that the existence of variously understood random events (chance) does not imply the thesis that God, the Creator of the world is not interested in the fate of individual creatures, including human beings. The reason why God can permit random events to occur is God’s will to create a relatively autonomous world that has the ability to self-develop and self-create. In such a world, there may be pointless evil for which God is not directly responsible.