Displaying: 101-120 of 483 documents

0.074 sec

101. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Jakub Gomułka Gramatyka w dobie sporu o podstawy matematyki. Esej o drugiej filozofii Wittgensteina: [Grammar in the Age of the Dispute over the Foundations of Mathematics: an Essay on Wittgenstein’s Second Philosophy]
102. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Nicole A. Vincent Responsibility: distinguishing virtue from capacity
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Garrath Williams claims that truly responsible people must possess a “capacity … to respond [appropriately] to normative demands” (2008, p. 462). However, there are people whom we would normally praise for their responsibility despite the fact that they do not yet possess such a capacity (e.g. consistently well-behaved young children), and others who have such capacity but who are still patentlyirresponsible (e.g. some badly-behaved adults). Thus, I argue that to qualify for the accolade “a responsible person” one need not possess such a capacity, but only to be earnestly willing to do the right thing and to have a history that testifies to this willingness. Although we may have good reasons to prefer to have such a capacity ourselves, and to associate ourselves with others who have it, at a conceptual level I do not think that such considerations support the claim that having this capacity is a necessary condition of being a responsible person in the virtue sense.
103. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Scott Wilson Ethics and Qualities of Life
104. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Paul Horwich Kripke’s Paradox of Meaning
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper argues that deflationism about truth enables us to resolve the notorious problem of intentionality—the problem (forcibly articulated by Kripke) of explaining how intrinsically dead signs, whether material or mental, are able to reach into the world and pick out specific collections of things.
105. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Sarah M. Roe The Attenuated Ramblings of a Madman: Feyerabend’s anarchy examined
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The slogan ‘anything goes’ first appears in Paul Feyerabend’s book Against Method at the end of the first chapter. Since that time, philosophical literature has been peppered with criticism and cries of outrage towards Feyerabend’s call for anarchy. Many have speculated on what exactly was meant by the slogan and even more philosophers and scientists have quickly discarded Feyerabend’s antidote as the obvious ramblings of a madman.In this essay, I will argue that Paul Feyerabend does not promote complete anarchy, contrary to his critics. Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that Feyerabend promotes methodological and theoretical pluralism, and does not call for total chaos. First, I will briefly outline the overwhelmingly cynical yet popular reading of Feyerabend’s anarchical ideas. Unlike other contemporary perspectives, I willthen argue for what I believe to be a much more fair reading of his anarchy as a prescription for the scientific discipline. I will conclude with postulating an overarching and interesting possibility, namely that Feyerabend’s call for anarchy is an attempt to distance philosophy from the scientific domain.
106. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Kordula Świętorzecka Sformalizowana ontologia orientacji klasycznej [Formalized Ontology inspired by Classical Philosophy]
107. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Miłowit Kuniński Jerzy Wacław Perzanowski (1943-2009)
108. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Ruth Weintraub The Doomsday Argument Revisited (a Stop in the Shooting-Room Included)
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Leslie’s doomsday argument purports to show that the likelihood of the human race perishing soon is greater than we think. The probability we attach to it, based on our estimate of the chance of various calamities which might bring extinction about (a nuclear holocaust, an ecological disaster, etc.), should be adjusted as follows. If the human race were to survive for a long time, we, livingnow, would be atypical. So our living now increases the probability that the human race will end shortly. In this paper, I criticize some attempts to rebut the argument, and present my own. To facilitate the analysis, I consider a structurally similar problem, the “ShootingRoom.”
109. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Jan Woleński Time Change and Imaginary Numbers. From Hamilton to Einstein in Search for Understanding of the Imaginary Numbers
110. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Krzysztof Brzechczyn Leszek Nowak (1943-2009)
111. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Christopher Norris Badiou on Set Theory, Ontology and Truth: mathematics as a guide to metaphysics (Part Two)
112. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Michael Potts Against Bioethics
113. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Matthew Mosdell The Philosophy of Philosophy
114. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Adam R. Thompson The Four Category Ontology
115. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Magdalena Środa Barbara Skarga (1919-2009)
116. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Attila Tanyi Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, and the Possibility of Vindication: Lessons from Moore and Parfit
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA), the other is Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection (TO). I show that naturalists might be able to avoid both objections if they can vindicate the reduction proposed. This, however, leads to further conditions whose fulfillment is necessary for the success of the vindication. I deal with one such condition, which I borrow from Peter Railton and Mark Schroeder:the demand that naturalist reductions must be tolerably revisionist. In the remainder of the paper I argue that the most influential versions of the Model are intolerably revisionist. The first problem concerns the picture of reasons that many recent formulations of the Model advocate. By using an objection from Michael Bedke, I show that on this interpretation obvious reasons won’t be accounted for by the Model. The second problem concerns the idealization that is also often part of the Model. Invoking an argument of Connie Rosati’s, I show that the best form of idealization, the ideal advisor account, is inadequate. Hence, though not the knock down arguments they were intended to be, OQA and TO do pose a serious threat to the Model.
117. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
José Ruiz Fernández Wittgenstein’s phenomenology and Wittgenstein’s phenomenological relevance
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
After interpreting some of the passages in which Wittgenstein refers to phenomenology, this paper tries to clarify why Wittgenstein came to conclude that his work had to be ultimately understood in terms of phenomenology. Secondly, the paper discusses the phenomenological relevance of some of Wittgenstein’s views on language.
118. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Alex Orenstein Ontological Arguments
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
There are good reasons for being dissatisfied with standard criticisms of the various arguments, all of which are referred to as being “The Ontological Argument”. While refutation by logical analogy is compelling, it merely teaches us that something is amiss. It does not specify the exact nature of the flaw. The first part of this paper examines and rejects several well-known attempts at refuting and clarifying the argument(s). The second part attempts to provide a principled uniform account of what is wrong by treating the arguments as resting on definitions. Then, by bringing to bear Ajdukiewicz’s exhaustive classification of definitions, we arrive at a unified account of the flaw common to such arguments. In effect we have an explication of the dictum that one cannot define into existence.
119. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Błażej Skrzypulec Rodzaje naturalne. Rozważania z filozofii języka [Natural Kinds from the Point of View of the Philosophy of Language]
120. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Marek Przychodzeń Traktat o wolności [Treatise on Freedom]