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101. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Irene Pinto Pardelha La Magie Émotionnelle: Aperçu d’une phénoménologie des émotions chez Merleau-Ponty
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Emotional MagicSketch of a phenomenology of emotions in Merleau-PontyHaving more phenomenological and anthropological contours than ontological, this article tries to draw the guidelines of a phenomenology of emotions based on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. In a perspective sometimes very close to Sartre, we wish to stress, in the emotional experience, the conditions of facticity and transcendence in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. If the subject lets itself be seduced by the affective category of the environment, it is only the subject as a phenomenal body that possesses the conditions through which it is able to retrieve itself.La magia emozionaleAbbozzo di una fenomenologia delle emozioni in Merleau-PontyCon contorni più fenomenologici e antropologici che propriamente ontologici, questo articolo intende tracciare le linee principali di una fenomenologia delle emozioni nell’ambito della Fenomenologia della percezione di Merleau-Ponty. Seguendo una linea di riflessione a tratti molto prossima al Sartre di Idee per una teoria delle emozioni, è nostra intenzione porre in rilievo, a partire dall’analisi dell’esperienza emozionale, il pensiero merleau-pontiano riguardo alle condizioni di fatticità e trascendenza. Se, da un lato, il soggetto si lascia affascinare dalle categorie affettive dell’ambiente circostante, dall’altro, soltanto il soggetto stesso, in quanto corpo fenomenico, è in grado di recuperare se stesso.
102. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Gilles Deleuze Cours Vincennes – Saint Denis (20/01/1987)
103. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Pierre Montebello Deleuze, Une Anti-Phénoménologie ?
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Deleuze. An Anti-Phenomenology?Deleuze played Bergson off against Merleau-Ponty, but for what reasons? What is the meaning of this anachronistic return to Bergson, against the grain of phenomenological history? There was, in Deleuze, an underground debate with phenomenology, a debate that never became explicit, but that took place on common grounds which, for him, were a question of re-appropriation: the transcendental, time, and art. On all of these subjects, Deleuze invoked Bergson’s authority against phenomenology, as if Bergson allowed us to measure anew this real field, independently from consciousness, in its quadruple dimension: immanent, ontological, cosmological, and temporal. Art and flesh will be the ultimate figures of this struggle where finitude and infinitude confront one another, and where inverted possible worlds draw themselves: a world that mirrors man and a world in which “man is absent.”Deleuze, un’anti-fenomenologia?Deleuze ha ‘giocato’ Bergson contro Merleau-Ponty. Ma per quali ragioni? Qual è il senso di questo ‘inattuale’ ritorno a Bergson, contro il ‘vento della storia’ della fenomenologia? C’è stato in Deleuze un dibattito sotterraneo con la fenomenologia, un dibattito che non è mai stato veramente esplicito, ma che si è svolto su territori communi che si trattava, per lui, di tornare a far propri: il trascendentale, il tempo, l’arte. Su ciascuno di questi temi, Deleuze ha invocato la tutela di Bergson contro la fenomenologia, come se Bergson permettesse di percorrere di nuovo questo campo reale, indipendentemente dalla coscienza, nella sua quadruplice dimensione: immanente, ontologica, cosmologica, temporale. L’arte e la carne saranno le ultime figure di questa lotta in cui s’affrontano la finitudine e l’infinitudine, e in cui si delineano mondi possibili di segno rovesciato: un mondo che si ripecchia nell’uomo e un mondo «in assenza dell’uomo».
104. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Pierre Rodrigo « Chair » Et « Figure » Chez Merleau-Ponty Et Deleuze
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“Flesh” and “Figure” in Merleau-Ponty and DeleuzeGilles Deleuze points out, in his work on Francis Bacon, that “the phenomenological hypothesis is perhaps insufficient because it invokes only the lived body. But the lived body is still very little in relation to a more profound and almost unlivable Power.” The present study fi rst seeks to specify what is this intensive Power of a life carried out at the limit of the unlivable. This leads to an analysis of Deleuze’s notion of Figure. Thus, we come back to the explicitly anti-phenomenological position of Deleuze, in other words, to his will, which he constantly reaffirms, to liberate philosophy – by following the path opened by Bergson – from the ruinous presupposition of a merely human measure of appearing, which would still be the presupposition of phenomenology. In particular, we are asking ourselves if Merleau-Ponty’s notions of “being in depth” and of “pregnancy” do not escape from Deleuze’s critique, and if it is also substantiated that Deleuze was able to assert that phenomenology “erects as a norm ‘natural perception’ and its conditions.” It is the confrontation of Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty’s theses on art and the world, which finally allows us to put forward an answer.“Carne” e “Figura” in Merleau-Ponty e DeleuzeGilles Deleuze fa notare, nella sua opera su Francis Bacon, che «l’ipotesi fenomenologica è forse insufficiente, in quanto si rifà solamente al corpo vissuto.Ma il corpo vissuto è ancora poca cosa rispetto ad una Potenza più profonda e quasi invivibile». Il saggio presente cerca innanzitutto di precisare che cosa sia questa Potenza intensiva di una vita portata al limite dell’invivibile. Questo condurrà in un secondo momento ad un’analisi della nozione deleuziana di Figura.Il saggio ritorna quindi sulla posizione esplicitamente anti-fenomenologica di Deleuze, in altri termini sulla sua volontà, incessantemente riaffermata, di liberarela fi losofi a, nel solco di Bergson, dal pericolo di una misura semplicemente umana dell’apparire, premessa che a suo giudizio starebbe ancora al fondo del progetto della fenomenologia. Ci chiederemo, in particolare, se le nozioni merleau-pontiane di “essere della profondità” e di “pregnanza” non sfuggano alla critica di Deleuze, al di là del fatto quest’ultimo abbia affermato che la fenomenologia “erige a norma la ‘percezione naturale’ e le sue condizioni”. È il confronto tra le tesi di Deleuze e di Merleau-Ponty sull’arte ed il mondo che permetterà, in ultima analisi, di avanzare una risposta a questo insieme di interrogativi.
105. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Claudio Rozzoni Une Courte Note Sur Le Pli: « Une histoire comme celle de Merleau-Ponty »
106. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Annabelle Dufourcq Nietzsche et Merleau-Ponty: Profondeur des images et pensées de l’éternel retour
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Nietzsche and Merleau-PontyDepth of Images and the Thought of the Eternal ReturnHere, we analyze the reasons for which it is possible to establish a connection between Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty – a connection claimed by Merleau-Ponty – based on a “metaphysics” of the Dionysian and the Apollonian. All existence rests upon a cruel and violent depth; and the surface of the “real,” individualities and distinct ideas, is in fact solely constituted by Apollonian images. We show how Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty surmount the nihilism necessarily induced by this fi rst thesis by affirming the richness of images and their power of inspiration as well as the eternal recurrence of the world of appearances. In a world of images, salvation belongs to those who will know how to recognize images as such in any being and in any idea. No preexisting meaning confines us; each instant must be creative and the maximum amount of meaning will be exalted at the heart of a vivified imagination. But how can we, simultaneously, produce simple images, love and desire their subsequent destruction as well as be a creative genius, instituting and teaching? What is exactly our relationship to the Dionysian depth and to past images? Nietzsche’s position on this matter is ambiguous and, to a certain extent, double. Two tendencies coexist in his thought. On the one hand, we have an exhortation for rupture, for absolutely free creation as well as a condemnation of modern culture which has been invaded and ossified by the bric-a-brac of historical meaning. On the other hand, we have the claim for a heritage, the reference to the models of monumental history and the invocation of an inspiration drawn from nature and the elements. Merleau-Ponty’s solution to escape nihilism avoids such a duality and endeavors to reconcile our status of inheritors and our responsibility as creators. In Nietzsche’s steps, but by founding a renewed doctrine of eternal recurrence, Merleau-Ponty shows us how to become, by one and the same movement, superficial and profound.Nietzsche e Merleau-PontyProfondità delle immagini e pensieri dell’eterno ritornoSi analizzano qui le ragioni per le quali è possibile stabilire un avvicinamento tra Nietzsche e Merleau-Ponty, avvicinamento rivendicato da Merleau-Ponty stesso, a partire dall’idea di una «metafi sica» del dionisiaco e dell’apollineo. Ogni esistenza riposa su un fondo crudele e violento, mentre la superfi cie del «reale», delle individualità e delle idee chiare e distinte è costituita unicamente di immagini apollinee. Mostraremo come Nietzsche e Merleau-Ponty sormontino il nichilismo inevitabilmente connesso a questa prima posizione, affermando la ricchezza e molteplicità di spunti racchiusi in immagini come quella dell’eterno ritorno del mondo delle apparenze. In un mondo di immagini, la salvezza appartiene a coloro che sapranno riconoscere le immagini in quanto tali, in ogni essere e in ogni idea. Nessun senso preesistente ci rinchiude, ogni istante deve essere creatore, e il massimo di senso sarà celebrato in seno a un’immaginazione vivifi cata. Ma come si può al tempo stesso produrre semplici immagini, amare e desiderare la loro distruzione ormai prossima, e proporsi di essere un genio creatore, istituire ed insegnare? Qual è il nostro rapporto con il fondo dionisiaco e con le immagini passate? La posizione di Nietzsche su questo punto è ambigua e, in una certa misura, doppia. Coesistono nel suo pensiero due tendenze: da una parte un’esortazione alla rottura, alla creazione assolutamente libera, e una condanna della cultura moderna, invasa e sclerotizzata dalle anticaglie del senso storico; dall’altra parte la rivendicazione di un’eredità, il riferimento ai modelli della storia monumentale e l’invocazione di un’ispirazione attinta alla natura e agli elementi. La soluzione che Merleau-Ponty elabora, come via di fuga dal nichilismo, evita una tale dualità e si sforza di conciliare il nostro statuto di eredi con la nostra responsabilità di creatori. Seguendo Nietzsche, ma fondando una rinnovata dottrina dell’eterno ritorno, Merleau-Ponty ci mostra come divenire, attraverso un unico movimento, superficiali e profondial tempo stesso.
107. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Danilo Saretta Verissimo Position et critique de la fonction symbolique dans les premiers travaux de Merleau-Ponty
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Position and Criticism of the Symbolic Functionin the First Works of Merleau-PontyIn this article, we propose to address the question of the symbolic function in Merleau-Ponty’s first works. More specifically, we shall be interested in the place thathe grants to this question in The Structure of Behavior, and to the way he critically takes it up in the Phenomenology of Perception. Although Merleau-Ponty hardly clarifies this himself, Merleau-Ponty’s commentators also have rarely made this problematic an object of debate. In his first work, by appropriating the semantics of the symbolic emerging from neuropsychology, Merleau-Ponty characterizes the level of organization of human corporality by means of its capacity to overcome the immediate character of lived situations. In this work, the categorical attitude appears as a new signification of organic structuration that, among the different forms of behavior, characterizes human activity. Moreover, in the chapters of the Phenomenology of Perception where Merleau-Ponty evokes the spatiality, the motility, and the expressivity of one’s own body, he abandons causal explanations of pathological phenomena which are used as if they are arguments, just as he gives up explanations copied off the symbolic function which are then associated with intellectualist analyses. These analyses delimit the notion of intentionality that Merleau-Ponty aims at developing. The notion is established on the foundation of the synergetic unity of one’s own body. Whence the importance that another theoretico-anthropological device acquires throughout the Phenomenology of Perception: the notion of the “corporeal schema”.Posizione e critica della funzione simbolicanei primi lavori di Merleau-PontyIn questo articolo ci proponiamo di affrontare la questione della funzione simbolica nei primi lavori di Merleau-Ponty. Ci interesseremo più specificamente al posto che è accordato a tale questione ne La struttura del comportamento e alla sua ripresa critica nella Fenomenologia della percezione. Poco esplicitata dal filosofo, questa problematica è altresì poco dibattuta presso i commentatori. Nel suo primo lavoro, Merleau-Ponty, appropriandosi della semantica del simbolo sorta dalla neuropsichiatria, caratterizza il livello d’organizzazione della corporeità umana mediante la sua capacità di superare il carattere immediato delle situazioni vissute. In quest’opera, l’attitudine categoriale appare come un nuovo signifi cato della ristrutturazione organica che, fra le differenti forme di comportamento, caratterizza l’attività umana. D’altronde, nei capitoli della Fenomenologia della percezione in cui Merleau-Ponty evoca la spazialità, la motricitàe l’espressività del corpo proprio, l’autore rinuncia alle spiegazioni causali dei fenomeni patologici utilizzati alla stregua di argomentazioni, così come rinuncia alla spiegazioni ricavate dalla funzione simbolica, ormai ricondotte a delle analisi di ordine intellettualistico. Tali analisi delimitano la nozione d’intenzionalità che il filosofo mira a sviluppare, e che si stabilisce in base al fondamento dell’unità simbolica del corpo proprio. Da qui l’importanza che acquista un altro dispositivo teorico-antropologico lungo tutta la Fenomenologia della percezione: la nozione di “schema corporeo”.
108. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Pierre Rodrigo Presentation
109. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Pierre Rodrigo Presentazione
110. Chiasmi International: Volume > 13
Guillaume Carron De L’Expérience À L’ « Événement »: Les enjeux de la pensée d’un « symbolisme originaire »
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From Experience to the “Event”The Stakes of the Thought of an “Originary Symbolism”This article proposes to understand the progressive conceptualization of experience as “originary symbolism.” After having examined the notions of form but also – and above all – those of categorical attitude and expression, we show that Merleau-Ponty turns toward a concept of experience that is from the start expressive. Here, the symbolic function, in Cassirer’s sense, is slowly replaced by a “symbolism” in which the diacritical, institution, and the unconscious play a fundamental role. Making use of Merleau-Ponty’s unpublished notes, particularly those in the Sensible World and the World of Expression, allows us to observe the convergence of diacritical thought, institution, and the unconscious toward one unified conception of originary symbolism. Hence, we propose an approach that departs from the traditional categories of consciousness and of evidence, and founds a theory of experience as “event”.Dall’esperienza all’ «evento»La posta in gioco del «simbolismo originario»L’articolo si propone di comprendere la progressiva concettualizzazione merleaupontyana dell’esistenza come «simbolismo originario». Dopo aver esaminato le nozioni di forma, ma anche e soprattutto di atteggiamento categoriale e di espressione, mostreremo che Maurice Merleau-Ponty si indirizza a una concezione dell’esperienza che ne fa qualcosa di immediatamente espressivo; concezione in cui la funzione simbolica, nel senso di Cassirer, viene poco a poco sostituita da un «simbolismo» in cui il diacritico, l’istituzione e l’inconscio giocano un ruolo fondamentale. Il ricorso alle Note inedite di Merleau-Ponty, e in particolare a Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression, consente appunto di osservare la convergenza dei tre concetti di diacritico, di istituzione e di inconscio, in direzione di una medesima concezione del simbolismo originario. Proponiamo quindi un approccio che si discosta dalle tradizionali categorie della coscienza e dell’evidenza, per fondare una teoria dell’esperienza come «evento».
111. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Marco Spina La rencontre avec autrui. Distance, regard et silence dans la pensée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty
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The starting point of this essay is an article of Enzo Paci, “Prospettive relazionistiche” published in Dall’esistenzialismo al relazionismo, in which the author interprets Merleau-Ponty’s project in the light of a quotation from Saint Exupery: “Man is a knot of relations, and relations alone count for man.” The problem of relations plays, in fact, a central role in all of Merleau-Ponty’s work; hence the principal objective of this essay: to reflect on the originary value of relations in the constitution of the human subject.As Merleau-Ponty himself suggests in his early reflection on affective life, everything in the human being is manifested under the form of the desire of life understood as relation. It is the affective dynamic of desire that provokes reason and configures a manner of being that, through the discovery of alterity, surpasses natural determinisms in opening us to the experience of freedom, sacrifice and love. It is by building on this originary relational constitution of existence that we re-read Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, in particular the problem of the self as relation. This makes possible a renewed approach to the human sciences with the goal of thinking our relations with others.
112. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Renaud Barbaras L’autonomie de l’apparaître
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The goal of this essay is first to emphasize the proximity of the approaches of these two philosophers starting from their common critique of Husserlian subjectivism. By basing the phenomenality of the world on a sphere of immanence constituted by lived experience, Husserl accounts for appearing [l’apparaître] starting from a certain appearing [apparaissant] and thus falls into a form of circularity, the same one that is at work when the natural attitude makes appearing rest on an objective appearing. The aim of these two authors is then to overcome this deeper and more secret version of the natural attitude by freeing the transcendence of the world from every form of objectivity and freeing the existence of the subject from every form of immanence. It is on this sole condition that the autonomy of the phenomenal field can be guaranteed. However, the dynamic approach to the subject in Patočka, which itself leads to a determination of the world as becoming, allows him to account for the chiasm that Merleau-Ponty put forward at the end of his life without managing to ground it, since he held to an insufficient characterization of existence in terms of flesh.
113. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Pierre Rodrigo Après la phénoménologie? Ontologie de la chair et métaphysique du mouvement chez Merleau-Ponty et Patočka
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Patočka discusses «the disaster of the rejection of metaphysics» by Heidegger. In this critique, he has claimed that «Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Waehlens and others» could neither be satisfied with the Heideggerian closure of the ontological sphere onto itself nor be content with Husserlian transcendentalism. In fact, there is a convergence between Patočka and Merleau-Ponty on this point, as demonstrated by a note from The Visible and the Invisible in which Merleau-Ponty affirms “I am for metaphysics” ...We show that these two thinkers have seen that phenomenology always faces, by eidetic necessity, what remains essentially irreducible for it: being. One thing toremember with Patočka, however, is that «we must not forget that the phenomenon is precisely phenomenon of being» even if «the structure of the appearing is entirely independent of the structure of beings.» But another thing is to thematize the relation between the appearing of the phenomenon and the manifestation of being. This implies that “after” phenomenological description a new type of correlation is analyzed.
114. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Christiane Bailey Le partage du monde: Husserl et la constitution des animaux comme « autres moi »
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While phenomenologists claim to have overcome solipsism, most have not pushed beyond the boundaries of individual human intersubjectivity to that of individuals of other species. Yet Husserl recognizes the existence of an interspecific intersubjectivity, an intersubjectivity beyond the limits of the species. He even goes so far as to say that we sometimes understand a companion animal better than a foreign human. However, even if he admits that many animals are capable of a life of subjective consciousness and live in a world of shared meaning, he does not consider them to be “persons” according to his strict conception that associates personhood with rationality, maturity, normality and historicity. Being a “person” in its most primordial sense – and its most decisive as the basis for political, legal and ethical conceptions – simply means being the subject of a surrounding world, of a common world and a biographical existence. Distinguishing two meanings of the concept of person allows us to recognize that animals share transcendentality; they are not simply alive but have a life that is both biographical and communal, even if they are not able to reflect on their own conscious life in order to consider their place in the chain of generations and to adopt what Husserl calls a “vocation”. The Husserlian phenomenology of anomalies allows us to recognize that animals truly come under the figure of the other, that they are alter ego subjects of a conscious life, and as such they participate fully, just as do children, the insane, and foreigners, in the co-constitution of the spiritual world.
115. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Annabelle Dufourcq La philosophie politique de Merleau-Ponty au-delà du concept de crise. L’engagement entre vertige chronique et action symbolique
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This article shows that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is traversed by a tension between an interpretation of history and existence in terms of crisis and the recognition of an insurmountable vertigo, the Heraclitean model of an eternal return of the singular and the partial, without possible synthesis. Our thesis is that the model of the crisis is marked by a classical positivism which makes it the secret ally of a conservative and anti-democratic politics. It is also an impasse in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy since it supposes a reference to an overlooking point of view that the whole of Merleau-Pontian reflection has shown to be impossible. The phenomenology of perception and ontology of the perceived world show that we have access only to a mystified consciousness and that even the world itself is undecided. The Heraclitean path must win against the interpretation in terms of crisis, but the persistence of the second path in Merleau-Ponty’swork is also explained by the extremely difficult character of the first path. The theory of chronic vertigo takes us closer to nihilism, and this is an aspect of Merleau-Pontian philosophy whose radical and highly problematic – perhaps even aporetic – character must not be underestimated. How to decide on practice and politics without absolute reference, without being able to guarantee anything? The use Merleau-Ponty makes of crucial references to Machiavelli and Marx at the heart of his political philosophy is very revealing this regard: in the first movement, this is a matter of “disarming” these philosophies, making them instruments for the disruption of action. But Merleau-Ponty’s final goal is not to return to the philosophy of contemplation, abstract ontology, but to build a new practical model: that of symbolic action, which integrates vertigo rather than surpassing it and constitutes a praxis inseparable from the enterprise of knowledge and artistic creation. We could say that it is saved by its openness to sense, but this means that it cannot rely on any positive established meaning and must find its wellspring in a ‘wild’ ability to be unceasingly decentered, to take nothing for granted, to approach our values and beliefs as foreign. This raises the question of the possibilityof the incarnation of such a model in an effective political institution.
116. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Ted Toadvine Le temps des voix animales
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Phenomenology’s attention to the theme of animality has focused not on animal life in general but rather on the animal dimension of the human and its contested relation with humanity as such. Phenomenology thereby reproduces Agamben’s “anthropological machine” by which humanity is constructed through the “inclusive exclusion” of its animality. The alternative to this “inclusive exclusion” is not, however, a return to kinship or commonality but rather an intensification of the constitutive paradox of our own inner animality, understood in terms of the anonymous, corporeal subject of perception that lives a different temporality than that of first-person consciousness. This provides us with an entirely different context for encounter with non-human others, insofar as they speak through our own voices and gaze out through our own eyes. This position is developed through a reading, first, of the proximity of Merleau-Ponty’s early work with that of Max Scheler, who paradigmatically reduces human animality to bare life. Merleau-Ponty differentiates himself from Scheler by emphasizing, in The Structure of Behavior, that life cannot be integrated into spirit without remainder. Merleau-Ponty’s later work thinks this remainder as the ineliminable gap and delay inthe auto-affection of the body and as a chiasmic exchange that anticipates Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “becoming animal.” This remainder of life within consciousness is the immemorial past of one’s own animality. It follows that our “inner animality” is neither singular nor plural but a kind of pack that speaks through the voice that I take to be mine. Furthermore, in the exchange of looks between myself and a non-human other, the crossing of glances occurs at an animal level that withdraws from my own reflective consciousness.
117. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Karel Novotný Liberté et incarnation. Esquisse des conditions de l’existence humaine selon Jan Patočka
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The idea of radical, historical freedom which Patočka, beginning in the 1930s, thought of as a movement of transcendence, cannot be comprehended without taking embodiment – the human being’s corporeal and intercorporeal anchorage in the world – into account. This said, we consider the pertinence and permanence, for both human freedom and corporality, of a moment – to all appearances marginal – that constitutes in reality more of a limit for each of these elements (including the motif of movement itself) and, as a result, allows a link to be posited between them. This moment is the confrontation of the living, embodied soul with the cold and hostile side of the world, with the otherness which is alien to life, with the periphery of nature that is bereft of sense for life and constitutes its ultimate limit. The undermining of sense that can happen in such confrontations gives rise to a vertigo deriving from the extreme form of freedom enacted in them. This makes it possible to explain the rupture between spirit and life, a certain dualism opposing life and spirit, that prompts the question: Is thisdualism not specific to European humanity as constructed and called for by Patočka?
118. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Nicolas Dittmar Simondon et Deleuze: l’intensité de l’être
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Simondon and Deleuze are the philosophers of intensity: thinking the intensity of being rather than its formal a priori is for them the path to the “true transcendental.” The true transcendental, according to these two post-Kantian philosophers, would be the conditions of real experience, which are not dictated by a reason anticipating the relation to phenomena, but by individuation. This reversal priviledges the process of openness to difference as a production of the unexpected for knowledge. To be individuated, for Simondon as for Deleuze, is to learn to overcome a certain logic of representation, based on the principle of identity, by giving precedence to singularities: the individual is not only a thinking substance cutting up the world according to its categories, but also an active nature facing the unknown. But one might ask how the individual can be identified and develop if it is constituted, at its expense, from intensive relations and experiences that it cannot synthesize in the understanding. Does individuation ultimately make sense? Simondon and Deleuze agree that consciousness is nothing without a synthesis of unification: this possibility for consciousness of unifi ng the diversity of experience, of maintaining a unity in plurality, refers to the preindividual, which defines in Simondon a field of ontological freedom, that is, of multiple individuations enriching the Self. For Deleuze, in his careful reading of Simondon, it is the place of the emission of singularities in the process of intensive individuation. In both cases, it is a question of defining a new form of subjectivity, closer to the realities of experience, of what we might call the transductive forms of sensibility.
119. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Dragoş Duicu Merleau-Ponty et Patočka face aux deux apories aristotéliciennes du temps
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This article examines how Merleau-Ponty and Patočka confront the two major difficulties of every phenomenological thinking of temporality, corresponding to the two Aristotelian aporias of time: the unity of time and the permanence of the now (or of eternity). Our goal is to show that only a radical account of movement and the structure of appearing, such as that provided by Patočka following his phenomenological renewal of Aristotle, can clarify the true status of the unity of time and of the temporal present, without falling into an excessive subjectivising thereof or an exacerbation of the transcendent pole (as happens, respectively, in Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the Invisible). As an alternative to the Merleau-Pontian chiasm, Patočka offers a rigorous thinking of the phenomenological correlation, making time appear as a sediment of movement.
120. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Jakub Čapek, Ondřej Švec Introduction