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Displaying: 101-120 of 162 documents

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101. Eco-ethica: Volume > 6
Gilbert Vincent Du sentiment d ’indignation au sens de la justice: Apports de la pensée de Paul Ricœur
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Chez Paul Ricoeur, on découvre une appréciation de l’indignation, dont la valeur tient d’abord à la nature, celle d’un authentique sentiment. Certes, ce derniern’est pas raison. Pourtant, Ricoeur Ta amplement montré, les raisons d’agir se nourrissent de motifs, et ceux-ci ont généralement la couleur, voire la chaleur, de nos sentiments. - Parce qu’il la considère comme l’expression du « sentiment d’injustice », il tient l’indignation pour l’entrée, déjà réflexive, dans le monde éthique. À ses yeux, cette expérience est décisive pour tout enfant et elle reste fondamentale pour l’adulte, dont les capacités critiques lui doivent beaucoup, même si, souvent, ces dernières contribuent à leur tour à en redéfinir les premières cibles. - Ricoeur n’a pas manqué de mettre un accent tout particulier sur la tradition prophétique biblique dans lequel il arrive que l’indignation contre l’injustice devienne accusation et condamnation irrémédiable contre l’injuste, à savoir Israël lui-même ! Mais que penser de « la colère de Dieu » ? Quant à lui, Ricoeur nous invite, tout à la fois, à justifier l’indignation, éthiquement, mais à en limiter la portée ontologique et théologique.
102. Eco-ethica: Volume > 6
Bernard Reber Le quasi-réalisme de Dworkin et la responsabilité de juger: Hercule face au roi Salomon
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Dworkin invented a fictional character: Hercules. Super-judge he has the capacity to reveal the hidden structure of judgments. In his famous judgment Solomon’s wisdom is recognized as divine. It is no longer sufficient for a secularized philosophical reflection. However, Dworkin’s Hercules is endowed with a capacity of unconventional coherence, which allows him to overcome the judge’s instinct. It is somehow in the position of a god. Salomon, who is called wise, has undoubtedly invented an unexpected resolution in his judgment, which is tested here in the light of the richness of the meaning of responsibility. For Salomon, as for Dworkin, responsibility is a rock. - This chapter examines in-depth his latest book, Justice for Hedgehogs, from a moral realism perspective, in order to critically analyse his narrow conception of moral realism and the various opponents of this meta-ethical theory as powerful as it is diverse.
103. Eco-ethica: Volume > 6
Bengt Kristensson Uggla A Just Allotment of Memory and a Just Distance: Paul Ricoeur on Memory and Justice
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This article elaborates upon how memory and justice are connected within the philosophical project of Paul Ricoeur, and thus it aims to explore the broader context and meaning of his intriguing term “a just allotment of memory.” First, the concept of justice will be contextualized within the framework of Ricceur’s philosophical anthropology in general, and second, more specifically, with respect to his "little ethics.” Thereafter, issues relating to the manner in which memory generates questions of justice, and, indeed, why memory needs history in order to be just, will be explored. Finally, some crucial questions about the limits of justice, and the challenges associated with the presence of justice and injustices in limit-situations will briefly be raised.
104. Eco-ethica: Volume > 6
Peter McCormick Just Persons
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Ethics has to do basically with what and who acting persons are. Persons however act variously. Some persons are basically individualists. They characteristically act as if they are as wholly independent as possible from other persons. Other persons are collectivists. They act as if they are as much a dependent part of some larger community of persons as possible. - Accordingly, one cardinal issue for any philosophical ethics like eco-ethics is whether almost all persons are, fundamentally, independent entities. That is, are almost all persons independent entities, or are almost all persons dependent ones? - The idea I try to pursue here briefly is that, fundamentally, persons are neither independent nor dependent entities but interdependent ones. They are so in the senses of not being essentially prior to, or ontologically more basic than, or having their ontological identity apart from other persons.
105. Eco-ethica: Volume > 6
Jacob Dahl Rendtorff Mondialisation et justice globale: Vers un esprit cosmopolite
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This article discusses the concept of globalization in relation to global justice with the aim of developing a cosmopolitan spirit as the basis for international justice. Globalization was in the beginning an economic concept but with the emergence of global problems of global poverty, environmental degradation, climate change and global social and political interdependence we need to rethink the concept of justice for the international community at a cosmopolitan level. The article considers that it is the task of political philosophy to reflect on this other concept of globalization, not only as a utopia but also as a real alternative for the global community. The dream of another globalization includes overcoming the misery of the world in the struggle for democracy and hope for cosmopolitan justice in the age of hypermodemity.
106. Eco-ethica: Volume > 6
Peter Kemp, Noriko Hashimoto Preface
107. Eco-ethica: Volume > 6
David Rasmussen From the Moral to the Political: The Question of Political Legitimacy in Non-Western Societies
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This article focuses on the problem of political legitimacy: first, by finding it to be the driving force in the Rawlsian paradigm moving from a focus on the moral to one on the political; second, with the help of a consideration of multiple- modernities theory, by arguing for a version of political liberalism freed of its western framework; and third, by applying that framework to current debates over the meaning of democracy in a Confucian context.
108. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Robert Bernasconi, Jacob Dahl Rendtorff Preface
109. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Peter Kemp, Noriko Hashimoto Editorial
110. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
The Authors / Les Auteurs
111. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Jacob Dahl Rendtorff A Real Intellectual and Philosopher of l’Engagement: In Memory of Peter Kemp
112. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Manuel B. Dy, Jr. An Ethics of Interdependence in the Doctrine of the Mean
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This paper attempts to derive an ethics of interdependence in the Chung Yung, the Doctrine of the Mean. The Doctrine of the Mean, one of the Four Books of Confucianism often paired with the Great Learning, Ta Hsueh, is considered a patchwork of at least two separate writings. While the title indicates the topic to be the Doctrine of the Mean, analogous to the Aristotelian Mean, the latter half of the treatise discusses another topic, Cheng, translated often as sincerity, truth, or reality. On closer reading, however, and emphasizing the second character Yung, meaning “practice” or “common,” one can discover the ethical implications of the treatise. The first part presents the main ideas of the treatise, and the second shows the logical movement of these ideas to come up with an ethics of interdependence: interdependence of self and others, of self and things, and of self and Heaven and Earth.
113. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Jayne Svenungsson Interdependence and the Biblical Legacy of Anthropocentrism: On Human Destructiveness and Human Responsibility
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This article engages with the biblical legacy of anthropomorphism from a contemporary perspective. First, it revisits the biblical creation myth and questions the deeply ingrained notion that what it offers is an account of ‘creation out of nothingness.’ Second, this rereading is followed by a closer look at how this particular theology was elaborated by Hans Jonas in his philosophy of life. In the final part of the paper, Jonas’s philosophy of responsibility is linked to a reflection on humanity’s unique capacity for destruction and self-destruction. Contrary to much of contemporary posthumanism, it is argued that a recognition of the interdependence between the human and the non-human worlds must never be a matter of erasing the distinction between them, since such a blurring of distinctions runs the risk of overshadowing the uniqueness of human destructiveness and thereby of undermining a serious discussion of human responsibility.
114. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Peter Kemp Les trois niveaux de l’interdépendance
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Taking as its starting-point Frédéric Worms’s Les maladies chro­nique de la Démocratie (2017), this paper shows the links between three kinds of interconnections: planetary, socio-cultural, and interpersonal. The contemporary refusal of interdependence is illustrated by an examination of three sicknesses: empiricism, racism, and ultraliberalism. It is proposed that the challenge they represent can be met by a cosmopoli­tanism inspired in part by both Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant.
115. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Sang-Hwan Kim Interdependence in the Confucian World View: From the Idea of Fengjing (Landscape)
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The Chinese counterpart of ‘landscape’ is fengjing 風景. This word is based on the three semantic elements: wind, light, and seeing. I will trace below the philosophical implications of the three key sememes of the word fengjing in the perspective of comparative philosophy. The purpose of such a task lies, on the one hand, in evoking the aesthetics of fengjing dormant in the East Asian tradition and, on the other hand, in presenting a new model of interdependence that can stimulate environment-friendly ethical imagination.
116. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Peter McCormick Ethics, the Interdependence of Persons, and Relationality
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Fundamentally, ethics may be understood as having to do with what and who acting persons are. Persons, however, act variously. Some persons are basically individualists. They characteristically act as if they are as wholly independent as possible from other persons. Other persons are collectivists. They act as if they are as much a dependent part of some larger community of persons as possible. Accordingly, one cardinal issue for any philosophical ethics is whether almost all persons are, fundamentally, independent entities. That is, are almost all persons independent entities, or are almost all persons dependent ones? The idea I pursue here briefly is that, fundamentally, persons are neither independent nor dependent entities but interdependent ones. They are so in the senses of not being essentially prior to, or not being ontologically more basic than, or not having their ontological identity apart from other persons.
117. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
David M. Rasmussen Reflections on the Nature of Populism and the Fragility of Democracy: Democracy in Crisis
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This paper takes its point of departure from a prior reflection on John Rawls’ argument for a two-stage model which shelters the political from immediate contestation. I turn to an examination of populism first from an historical and then from a normative perspective. Historically, populism can be traced to early Roman times, while from a normative point of view, as the literature shows, populism lacks a clear definition. In my view this is derived from its essentially parasitical function in relationship to democracy. In the end, populism, which claims to be grounded on the immediacy of conflict, is exposed as a remnant of a pre-democratic past which does not and cannot accommodate itself to the ‘fact of pluralism’ that characterizes our contemporary democratic situation.
118. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Noriko Hashimoto Inter-subjectivity and Inter-objectivity: Mutual and Inter-Independence in the Twenty-first Century
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The conflict between traditional ethics posed by contemporary technology is especially acute in the case of artificial intelligence. This is because the conception of nothingness or vacuum developed by both Laotse and Zuang-zi is resisted by artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence with its incorporation of inter-subjectivity and inter-objectivity cannot be a vacuum.
119. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Jacob Dahl Rendtorff Interdépendance éthique et pratiques politiques de résilience à l’âge de l’Anthropocène
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This article discusses the ethical interdependence and political practice in the age of the Anthropocene. The article presents the work on this topic by Bruno Latour in his discussions of social constructivism in relation to the political philosophy of the Anthropocene. With Latour we can perceive the emergence of a new form of geopolitics where the earth and its nature has become a field of politics. Politics has become climate change politics and the political hypermodernity is forced to integrate nature in the ethics and politics of our time. Therefore the age of the Anthropocene implies the emergence of a new form of international governance. Resilience politics in the age of the Anthropocene opens for a new responsibility for climate change that moves beyond the technological understandings of modernity because humanity is situated in the center of the earth in interdependence with nature and culture.
120. Eco-ethica: Volume > 7
Karen Joisten Homo relationalis: Der Mensch, die Anderen und das In-Bezug-sein
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Given an ethic of interdependence in the different dimensions between global and interpersonal/individual, the article focuses on the individual human being under the guiding principle of interdependencies. Apart from blocking interdependencies, primarily promoting interdependencies are exhibited. That means those that awake and promote the creative abilities, and enable individuals to introduce their original values and norms into existing moral contexts and also to change them. The thesis examines the effect of interdependencies in an inner-individual (and ultimately also in interpersonal) dimension. With respect to border cases a new and unusual value setting emerges which requires an approach that justifies a temporal dependency. Accordingly, referring to the individual, the question is: How can values and standards emerge in the moral context that differ from the established ones? How can new values be initiated in violation of prevailing values, which are regarded as first and mute values which rely on other actors and listeners who respond to and accept them?