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Displaying: 101-120 of 1735 documents

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101. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Notes and News
102. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Stephen N. Dunning Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard
103. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
David Burrell David Braine’s Project: The Human Person
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The author of The Reality of Time and the Existence of God turns his critical conceptual acumen to finding an intellectually viable path between the current polarities of dualism and materialism. By considering human beings as language-using animals he can critically appraise “representational” views of concept formation, as well as show how current “research programs” which presuppose a “materialist” basis stem from an unwitting adoption of a dualist picture of mind and body. His alternative is rooted in classical thinkerslike Aquinas and responsive to the critiques of Wittgenstein, yet constructive in ways in which those critiques failed to be. This essay aims to help readers undertake a taxing inquiry by guiding them through its main theses.
104. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Brian Leftow Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion
105. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Jane Mary Trau The Greater Good Defense: An Essay on the Rationality of Faith
106. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Peter Forrest Physicalism and Classical Theism
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In this paper I compare two versions of non-eliminative physicalism (reductive physicalism and supervenience physicalism) with four of the five theses of classical theism: divine non-contingency, divine transcendence, divine simplicity, and the aseity thesis. I argue that:1. Both physicalism (either version) and classical theism require intuition-transcending identifications of some properties or possibilities.2. Among other identifications, both reductive physicalism and classical theism need to identify psychological with functional properties.3. Both reductive physicalism and classical theism have a problem with consciousness.4. Both reductive physicalists and classical theists should distinguish fine and coarse grained theories of properties.
107. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
David Basinger Pluralism and Justified Religious Belief: A Response to Gellman
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I have argued previously (in this journal) that the reality of pervasive religious pluralism obligates a believer to attempt to establish her perspective as the correct one. In a recent response, Jerome Gellman maintains that the believer who affirms a ‘religious epistemology’ is under no such obligation in that she need not subject her religious beliefs to any ‘rule of rationality’. In this paper I contend that there do exist some rules of rationality (some epistemic obligations) that must be acknowledged-and satisfied-within all epistemic systems (including all religious epistemic systems) and that for this reason Gellman’s critique of my position fails.
108. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
S. Mark Heim Orientational Pluralism in Religion
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Nicholas Rescher has advanced an account of philosophy which he calls orientational pluralism. It addresses the tension in philosophy between commitment to rational argument and the enduring lack of resolution of major issues. This article suggests that Rescher’s view can be fruitfully transposed into a discussion of religious pluralism, illuminating the status of theories about religious diversity and providing grounds both for recognizing the legitimacy of diverse religious convictions and making a consistent argument in favor of one’s own.
109. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
James S. Spiegel The Theological Orthodoxy of Berkeley’s Immaterialism
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Ever since George Berkeley first published Principles of Human Knowledge his metaphysics has been opposed by, among others, some Christian philosophers who allege that his ideas fly in the face of orthodox Christian belief. The irony is that Berkeley’s entire professional career is marked by an unwavering commitment to demonstrating the reasonableness of the Christian faith. In fact, Berkeley’s immaterialist metaphysical system can be seen as an apologetic device. In this paper, I inquire into the question whether Berkeley’s immaterialist metaphysics is congruent with the Christian scriptures. I conclude that not only are Berkeley’s principles consistent with scripture, a case can be made for the claim that certain biblical passages actually recommend his brand of immaterialism.
110. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Notes and News
111. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Karen L. Carr The Offense of Reason and the Passion of Faith: Kierkegaard and Anti-Rationalism
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This essay considers and rejects both the irrationalist and the supra-rationalist interpretations of Kierkegaard, arguing that a new category---Kierkegaard as “anti-rationalist”---is needed. The irrationalist reading overemphasizes the subjectivism of Kierkegaard’s thought, while the suprarationalist reading underemphasizes the degree of tension between human reason (as corrupted by the will’s desire to be autonomous and self-sustaining) and Christian faith. An anti-rationalist reading, I argue, is both faithful to Kierkegaard’s metaphysical and alethiological realism, on the one hand, and his emphasis on the continuing opposition between reason and faith, on the other, as manifested in the ongoing possibility of offense (reason’s rejection of the Christian message) in the life of the Christian.
112. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
James A. Keller Reported Miracles: A Critique of Hume
113. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Thomas D. D’Andrea Christian Philosophy
114. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
George F. Isham Is God Exclusively a Father?
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William Harper presents five reasons for concluding that God should be referred to exclusively in male terms. To the contrary, I argue that: (1) by devaluating the feminine gender, Harper is guilty of the same reductionist and dichotomous thinking as his protagonists, (2) Harper’s view of God is contrary to “the Biblical example,” and (3) Harper’s position rests on a number of logical confusions. I conclude that Harper’s view should be rejected by both men and women of Christian convictions.
115. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Mark L. Thomas Robert Adams and the Best Possible World
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Robert Merrihew Adams argues that it is permissible for a perfectly good moral agent to create a world less good than the best one she could create. He argues that God would exhibit the important virtue of grace in creating less than the best and that this virtue is incompatible with the merit considerations required by the standard of creating the best. In this paper I give three arguments for the compatibility of merit consideration and graciousness of God toward creation. I conclude that grace would not release a perfect agent from responsibility to create the best.
116. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Notes and News
117. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Trenton Merricks Belief Policies
118. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
David Widerker, Charlotte Katzoff Avoidability and Libertarianism: A Response to Fischer
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Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer’s contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided. Fischer has responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker’s criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker’s criticism. Here we argue that: (i) Fischer’s first response is unconvincing and undermines Molinism itself; (ii) the version of libertarianism he presents is fallacious, and (iii) even on the version of libertarianism he proposes, avoid ability remains a necessary condition for moral responsibility.
119. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Charles Taliaferro The God Who Acts
120. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann An Objection to Swinburne’s Argument for Dualism