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101. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Some Remarks on Indian Theories of Truth
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This article explains precisely in what sense the Nyaya philosophers promote a correspondence theory regarding the nature of truth. It also explains how truth may be inferred from successful effort and argues that successful effort can be produced only by true awareness. While successful effort is the major test of truth, other tests of truth in the Nyaya view should be recognized as and when appropriate. Thus, that if the pervaded belongs to something, the pervader too belongs to that thing may be known to be true by the mind alone without reference to the inferential test of truth. Truth is in most cases extrinsic in the sense that truth of an awareness is determined with reference to another awareness. This does not lead to a vicious infinite regress; in some cases, as in the pervaded-pevader case or in the case there is cognition where there can be no cognition that there is cognition unless there is cognition, truth is intrinsic and may be determined without reference to another awareness.
102. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti The Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory of Negative Entities
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It is argued that efforts by Plato, Bradley, Cook Wilson, Bergson, Russell, Prabhakara, etc. to reduce negation to affirmation or negative predicates to positive predicates fail: the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of negative entities deserves serious consideration. Important evidence for negative entities comes from perception such as that there is no book on the table: this testifies to the existence of absence of the book (the negatum or what is negated) on the table (the locus of negation) as an indispensable negative entity. Such perception is not set aside by compelling counterevidence, is reliable and justifies admitting negative entities on grounds of simplicity. A negative entity presupposes awareness of the negatum and differs as the negata differ but may be the same in different loci, e.g. the same absence of the book may be on the table and the floor. Negative entities are of four kinds: prior absence (absence of a thing before origin), posterior absence (absence of a thing after cessation), absolute absence (of something in something such as absence of color in air that is forever) and difference of one thing from another thing.
103. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti The Svabhavahetu in Dharmakirti's Logic
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The concept of svabhavahetu is a major contribution of Dharmakirti to Buddhist logic. In such a case the invariable relation of pervasion between the probans and the probandum is based on identity or non-difference. This implies, according to our interpretation, that some general statements are true by virtue of meaning but are not devoid of content. This disagrees with the view of many recent philosophers who hold that statements true by virtue of meaning are devoid of content. We explain that svabhava general statements are true by virtue of meaning in the sense that the grounds for calling something by the name of the probandum are the same as some or all of those for calling something by the name of the probans. We explain how such general statements differ from general statements based on causation as also the threefold classification of svabhava general statements.
104. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti The Nyaya-Vaisesika Theory of Universals
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In the Nyaya-Vaisesika view universals are eternal and objectively real often perceptible common characters that are independent of the particulars and inseparably inherent in the latter in the sense that the latter as long as they exist remain related to the universal. Such common characters should not be confused with Platonic Ideas that are perfect exemplars graspable only by reason. It is argued that without objective common characters it is hard to account for the distinction between natural classes such as man, horse, etc. that are independent of human convention and conventional classes such as lawyers, cooks, etc. Universals are also needed to provide objective basis for causal connections whereby only things of a certain kind produce other things of a specific kind. There are universals for generic terms such as man or horse, for qualities such as color or smell, for relations such as spatial proximity, for motion such as contraction, etc. But no universal is admissible if any restrictive condition such as not leading to a vici11ous infinite regress is violated.
105. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Response to Roy W. Perrett's Review of Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: The Nyaya Dualist Tradition
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In the Nyaya view a causal condition is a non-superfluous invariable antecedent of the effect. Does this mean that causality for the Nyaya is a necessary connection as some scholars suggest? No. Invariable antecedence means that a causal condition is not the negatum of any absolute absence in the locus of the effect immediately before the latter’s origin (a causal condition is not absent where the effect arises immediately before origin). Non-superfluity means fulfilling requirements of economy three main kinds of which are economy in constitution (non-inclusion of anything redundant), economy in relation (something related directly is preferable to something related indirectly) and economy in cognitive order (being knowable in fewer steps). None of the above jointly or severally involve necessity.
106. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Some Comparisons between Frege's Logic and Navya-Nyaya Logic
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This paper has three parts. The first part explains the similarities and differences between Frege’s distinction between sense and reference needed for the possibility of true and informative identity statements and the distinction between the reference and the limitor or specifier of reference of a linguistic expression in Navya Nyaya. The second part compares Frege’s definition of number to the Navya Nyaya definition of number. The third part shows how restrictive conditions for universals in Navya Nyaya anticipates some developments in modern set theory. Thus, the condition that two universals having neither more nor less members are the same is analogous to the thesis of extensionality. Again, the condition that no universal is admissible if there is a vicious infinite regress that rules out universal-ness as a universal would also rule out the so-called Russell set of all sets which are not members of themselves.
107. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Universal Premise in Early Nyāya
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Indian logic is mainly devoted to the study of nyaya the logical structure of which is analogous to that of a categorical syllogism. In a nyaya it is inferred that since the probans (similar to the middle term) is pervaded by or never exists without the probandum (similar to the major term) and since the probans belongs to the inferential subject (similar to the minor term), the probandum belongs to the inferential subject. Many modern scholars hold that in early Indian logic a nyaya was an analogical argument from particular to particular. We disagree. Early Nyaya works say explicitly that what deviates is a pseudo-probans; this implies that a probans is non-deviant or pervaded by the probandum and thus that a universal premise stating the pervasion of the probans by the probandum is needed. Such a universal premise is also found in articulated arguments. Further, a counterargument based on mere analogy to a nyaya based on a universal connection is viewed as a pseudo-refutation.
108. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 21
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti Toward Dualism: The Nyaya-Vaisesika Way
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This paper deals with psycho-physical dualism as developed by Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers. It is argued that internal states like pleasure, desire, etc. that are directly observable only by one’s own self and not by others and thus are private are not bodily states that are directly observable by one’s own self and others and thus are public. Common experiences such as I am happy, I want this, etc. testify, in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, that desire, etc. belong to the self. The self is not only non-physical but also a permanent substance contrary to the Buddhist-Humean view that there are only fleeting internal states and no abiding self. Desire, etc. presuppose that the person who experienced something in the past remembers it now and desires it so that the agent of previous experience and later remembrance is the same continuant person.
109. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 23
Stfianeshwar Timalsina Bhartṛhari and the Daoists on Paradoxical Statements
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Rather than considering paradox in a literal sense to be unresolvable, both Bhartṛhari and the Daoists develop a distinctive hermeneutics to decipher them, always exploring an overarching meaning where the fundamental differences are contained within. The conversation on paradox escapes the boundary of paradox then, as it relates to interpreting negation, and above all, the philosophy of semantics. Being and non-being, one and many, or something being both true and false at the same time are examples found from their texts. Just as the static and dynamic domains of the Dao remain a key to address paradox in Chinese literature, the stratification of speech, wherein deeper layers of speech are capable of resolving the apparent tension found at the surface level, seems central to Bhartṛhari’s approach.
110. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 23
James Ryan The Brahmasūtra and the Commentaries of Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara
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This article examines the basic content of the Brahmasutra and compares and contrasts the commentaries of Ramanuja and Shankara on it. Firstly the issue of possible errors or interpolations in the BSis addressed. Then the full contents of the BS is surveyed briefly but with important detail. Finally, the important disagreements between the commentaries of Ramanuja and Shankara on the BSare discussed. This includes discussion of selected sutras in question.
111. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 23
Dylan Shaul Duty Without/Beyond Duty: Meta-Ethics with Derrida, Paul, and Mahāyāna Buddhism
112. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 23
B.N. Hebbar Aryan, Semitic and Sinitic: Numerical leitmotifs in the three religious super-cultures of the world
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This article brings together the Aryan Semitic and Sinitic super-cultures in a comparative light in terms of religious numerological leitmotifs. Vedic Hinduism and Zoroastrianism together with the pre-Christian religions of Indo-European Europe belong to this group. Buddhism and to a lesser extent Jainism are also part of this grouping. Judaism and Islam belong to the Semitic group. Daoism and Confucianism come under the Sinitic group. Christianity and Sikhism are hybrid religions that have one leg in the Aryan group and one leg in the Semitic group. The numbers three, six and nine are the hallmarks of Aryan culture the numbers one five and seven are expressed throughout Semitic culture and the numerals three five and eight have received their expression in Chinese culture.
113. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 23
Alok Kumar Naturalism in Religion: Eastern and Western Perspectives as Reflected in Swami Vivekananda and John Dewey's Philosophy
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It is not easy to reconcile naturalistic philosophy with religion. However, naturalism can be applied to religion in two ways-either as a methodological approach or as a world view. Two religious thinkers of early 20th century America, Swami Vivekananda, the Hindu spiritual teacher from India and John Dewey, the great American pragmatist, exemplify these two strands of religious naturalism. This paper intends to show how the adoption of a naturalistic outlook towards religion enabled each thinker to interpret their core philosophies, as diverse as Hindu Idealism and American Pragmatism, in a way that appealed to the humanism of the age, thus securing the foundations of religion rather than weakening it.
114. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 23
Kisor K. Chakrabarti Annotated Translation of Udayana's AATMATATTVAVIVEKA
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Jnanasri, a famous 10th century Buddhist philosopher, holds that internal states like cognition alone are real and that there is no external, independent physical world. He argues that one may perceive something, say, a horse, irrespective of whether there is a horse or not. Accordingly, one cannot justifiably move from cognition to the external, independent existence of the object of cognition. Udayana points out that one misperceives only something that one in the ultimate analysis has perceived before. While the previous perception may be false, it cannot be false always for then there is a vicious infinite regress. So true perceptions must also be admitted. The best explanation of true perception is that it is perceiving something where and when it is and that of false perception is that it is perception of something that is elsewhere or elsewhen or both. Thus, the Nyaya claims, the object of misperception too is external and independent of perception. Since the Nyaya position is not refuted, the above argument of Jnanasri suffers from assuming the bone of contention.
115. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 23
Barbara A. Amodio Journey Through the Cave of Heart and Breath to Oneness: Muhiyuddin Ibn 'Arabi Meets Ramanuja and Patanjali in the Sacred Aesthetic Geography of an Underground Indian Cave Temple
116. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 19
Sukharanjan Saha A Comparative Appraisal of Nyaya and Advaita Vedanta Theories of Perception
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Our aim Is to give an idea of the Nyaya and Advaita tlieories of perception and to note metapliysicai or ontological elements In them. We shall consider whether it is possible to sieve out features of the theories without such elements with a view to formulating a commonly acceptable platform for dialogue regarding a theory of perception. In recent times scholars have attempted to pick up common elements in the two theories. In our account we may, however, be allowed to use Sanskrit philosophical words in original. This is perhaps useful for philosophizing freely in a comparative setting.
117. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 19
Shashiprabha Kumar Consciousness and Cognition in Vaiśeşika Philosophy
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The paper proposes to deal with the basic issues pertaining to consciousness and cognition as expounded in the original sources of Vaiśeşika, the Nyāya perspective will also be referred to wherever relevant.
118. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 19
Payal Doctor Tatparya and Paraphrase
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In the acquisition of verbal knowledge, the Nyāya school outlines four conditions of a linguistic utterance that must be met: āsatti (temporal proximity), ākāṅkṣā (syntactic expectancy), tātparya (speaker intention), and yogyatā (semantic fitness). I will follow the traditional Nyāya view that is it one of the four necessary conditions that enable a hearer to gain verbal knowledge. The reasoning behind retaining tātparya as a condition (or cause) of verbal knowledge, is that it provides a resource with which to clarify ambiguity when contextual factors cannot. It also provides a context for a hearer so that the primary (abhidhā) or secondary (lakṣaṇā) meaning of the word, or sentence is understood. In this sense, tātparya imparts the meaning of a work. Examples such as “Bring saindhava” or “Hari” make the case for the importance of tātparya in that the meanings of these terms are ambiguous unless the context is provided or the speaker intends to mean one referent rather than another. In this paper, I present the case that tātparya is the most important component of an accurate paraphrase, and it must be retained in order to preserve the original intention of the work. In other words, tātparya should be the primary constraint of an acceptable paraphrase. As a side comment to my aim, I discuss the notion of why paraphrase only needs to be sufficiently similar to the original work.
119. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 19
David Grandy Sunyata and Self-Empty Particles
120. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 19
Kisor K. Chakrabarti An Annotated Translation of Udayana’s Atmatattvaviveka: Proof of Permanence
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As against the Buddhist view that everything is momentary Udayana argues that recognitive perception, such as that this is the same pot I saw before, provides evidence for permanence. Such recognitive perception is common experience and cannot be set aside without compelling evidence. The Buddhist objects that such experience is not reliable; even a burning flame is recognized to be the same, but it is clear from fuel consumption that it is not. Udayana agrees that in the case of a burning flame it cannot be the same flame because then it would have to have opposed features (such as being fueled by more oil before and less oil now). But there is no compelling evidence for the claim that the pot or I would have to have opposed features if enduring. The Buddhist claim that anything enduring must have opposed features such as being both capable and incapable of being productive is groundless. Such features are not opposed and may be explained as being due to availability or non-availability of auxiliary causal conditions and so on.