Narrow search


By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:


Displaying: 121-140 of 216 documents

0.287 sec

121. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Christopher Tollefsen Suffering, Enhancement, and Human Goods
122. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Gerard V. Bradley Constitutional and Other Persons
123. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Joseph Boyle The New Regime of Marriage Law: Its Significance for Catholic Life
124. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Siobhan Nash-Marshall Free Will, Evil, and Saint Augustine
125. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Derek S. Jeffreys The Person as Cosmic Mediator: The Philosophical Vision of W. Norris Clarke, SJ
126. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
R. Mary Hayden Lemmons Love and the Metaphysics of Being: Aquinas, Clarke, and Wojtyla
127. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
John F. Crosby The Thomistic Personalism of Norris Clarke, SJ
128. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
David B. Burrell Using Aquinas to Rescue Analogical Understanding
129. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
John F. Boyle St. Thomas Aquinas on Creation, Procession, and the Preposition per
130. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Philip Rolnick Persons Divine and Human: an Analogical Conception
131. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Steven A. Long Thoughts on Analogy and Relation
132. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
Iulian Apostolescu Editor’s Notes: Husserl’s Phenomenological Time and Time- Consciousness
133. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
Nicolas de Warren Augustine and Husserl on Time and Memory
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper explores the relationship between Augustine’s and Husserl’s conceptions of time, consciousness, and memory. Although Husserl claims to provide a phenomenological understanding of the paradox of time so famously formulated by Augustine in his Confessions, this paper explores the apparent similarities between Augustine’s concept of distentio animi and the Husserlian concept of inner time-consciousness against their more profound differences. At stake in this confrontation between Augustine and Husserl is a fundamental divergence in the sense of time as the movement of transcendence in immanence. Within this discussion, the contrast between speaking time (rhetoric) and seeing time (perception), time and eternity, and contrasting notions of the past and future are explored.
134. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
Horacio M. R. Banega Husserl’s Diagrams and Models of Immanent Temporality
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The aim of this article is to clarify how Husserl applies his formal ontology to the constitution of immanent temporality. By doing so, my objective is to unravel the relationships between the phases of this temporality that make up a unit—that is, the relationship between protentions and retentions and a proto-impression that gives rise to the temporal moment “now” in an experience of the immanent consciousness. In connection with this reconstruction, I will attempt to clarify Husserl’s definition of time as a “one-dimensional orthoid multiplicity,” the roots of which lie in Riemann’s work. I interpret Husserl’s description as a model for the description of the phenomenon of time. Its nature as a model seems to unfold with the problem of the time diagram. Which diagram best represents the constitution of immanent temporality? Larrabee has discussed this issue, and I propose that the best interpretation of the diagram is to consider it as applying to a spherical surface rather than a flat one. This interpretation allows us to account for the multiple relationships among presentations, memories, and other presentifications in an empirically appropriate manner while at the same time providing us with another vision of Husserl’s consciousness, which allows us to reconsider the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity.
135. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
Luis Niel Time, Reduction, and Intentionality
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Based on some reflections found on Husserl’s C-manuscripts, the article focuses on the methodical path toward the disclosure of what I call the “primal-intentional-tension” (PIT)—namely, the differential relation between the I and the Not-I, at the most fundamental level of the constitution of time. In order to reach this essential structure of experience, I address the method of the reduction and its radicalization. I argue: first, that intentionality is for Husserl not only act-intentionality, since there are also other intentional modes, such as the stream-intentionality; second, that the reduction is the leading method to the discovery of the operating and unthematic transcendental dimension of experience as well as to the disclosure of the multiple phenomenological dimensions and, by means of a radicalization, of the living present as primal-mode of transcendental life; third, that the reduction to the most fundamental level is an analytic and abstractive “deconstruction” (Abbau) of the concrete transcendental life of the living present; fourth, that the primal-phenomenal dimension shows itself as a PIT between the I (primal-I) and the Not-I (the primal-temporalization of primal-hyle) as the most intimate strangeness in me; and, fifth, I finally show that this PIT might be understood as a primal-difference in the originality of my experience.
136. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
John B. Brough Some Reflections on Time and the Ego in Husserl’s Late Texts on Time-Consciousness
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Time-consciousness made its appearance in Husserl’s thought in the first decade of the twentieth century in analyses that were notably silent on the issue of the ego. The ego itself made its debut in the Ideas in 1913, but without an account of its relationship to time. Husserl described time-consciousness, particularly what he called the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness, as perhaps the most important matter in all of phenomenology. He also came to view phenomenology as centered on the study of the ego understood as transcendental subjectivity. It was not until the last years of his life, however, in his late writings on time-consciousness collected as the C-manuscripts, that Husserl made a serious effort to work out the connections between these two themes. The point of this essay is to examine how Husserl sought to understand the relation between the ego and temporal awareness in the C-manuscripts. I will argue that in these late texts, Husserl preserves and deepens his early understanding of the absolute flow of time-consciousness but that he also attempts to show how the flow is interwoven with the ego’s constitution of itself and of the world. Time-consciousness plays a role on every level of egological constitution. At the same time, egological constitution contributes to the consciousness of time, and particularly to the constitution of the Husserlian monad, the ego understood not simply as the bare pole from which conscious acts radiate but in its full concreteness as embracing its unique individual history.
137. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
James Mensch Embodied Temporalization and the Mind-Body Problem
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
As David Chalmers notes, the “hard problem of consciousness” has two aspects. The first concerns the felt quality of experience. The contents we experience—say, the color of a book or the warmth of the sun—are not just present but felt to be so. The question is: how is this possible? What are the conscious processes involved in this? The second concerns the relation of the subjective aspect of experience to the physical processes that are at its origin. What is required, in Chalmers’s view, is an “explanatory bridge” that would link conscious processes to “the structure and dynamics of physical processes.” In this article, I first argue that Husserl’s account of temporal constitution accounts for the felt quality of experience. I then go on to show how we can see time-constituting phenomena as providing the explanatory bridge that Chalmers requires.
138. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
Michael R. Kelly Grief: Putting the Past before Us
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Grief research in philosophy agrees that one who grieves grieves over the irreversible loss of someone whom the griever loved deeply, and that someone thus factored centrally into the griever’s sense of purpose and meaning in the world. The analytic literature in general tends to focus its treatments on the paradigm case of grief as the death of a loved one. I want to restrict my account to the paradigm case because the paradigm case most persuades the mind that grief is a past-directed emotion. The phenomenological move I propose will enable us to (1) respect the paradigm case of grief and a broader but still legitimate set of grief-generating states of affairs, (2) liberate grief from the view that grief is past directed or about the past, and thus (3) account for grief in a way that separates it from its closest emotion-neighbor, sorrow, without having to rely on the affective quality of those two emotions.If the passing of the beloved causes the grief but is not what the grief is about, then we can get at the nature of grief by saying its temporal orientation is in the past (the event of the passing), but its temporal meaning is the present and future—the new significance of a world with the pervasive absence that is the world without the beloved. The no-longer of grief is a no-longer oriented by a past (that which is no longer) that is referred a present and future (that which is a no-longer understood as not now as it once was). Looking at the griever’s relation to time can tell us much about the pain and the object of grief, then. As the griever puts the past before himself with a certainty about this world “henceforth,” a look at the griever’s lived sense of the fi nality of the irreversibly lost (1) liberates grief from the tendency in the literature to be reduced to a past-directed emotion, (2) accounts for grief ’s intensity, its affective force or poignancy, and thus (3) enables us to separate grief from sorrow according to its intentionalobject in light of the temporal meaning of these emotions.
139. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
Martin Möhlmann Sharing Our Time with the Time of the World
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Studying the Bernau manuscripts, we find that because protentions are motivated by the sedimentation of retentions and retention is the retaining of fulfilled protentions, the problem of the birth of consciousness arises. I argue that the phenomenon of sleep and awakening is not fundamental enough to understand the problem of the birth of consciousness, since “far” retentions can here serve as motivations. Consciousness at its birth seems to require a pre-consciousness of hyletic unities, such as manuscript C 4 described, to provide these first motivations. I will show that this model of time-consciousness therefore already requires a rethinking of consciousness according to an open (horizontal) affection-and-action model instead of the absolute (vertical) sensation model. As such, the transcendental solidarity between objectivity of knowledge and subjectivity of experience comes to be founded in the primordial transcendence that the pre-consciousness of C 4 implies. Time-constitution at its core is already motivated by the world to constitute it and itself.
140. Quaestiones Disputatae: Volume > 7 > Issue: 1
Bernhard Obsieger Phenomenological Temporality
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper aims to clarify the structure of temporality as it is originally experienced in time-consciousness. At a pre-reflective level, time-consciousness presents us with changing or unchanging worldly objects as persisting through time. However, time-consciousness is not simply a consciousness of worldly temporal events but, rather, a consciousness of these events as they appear in our experience. Accordingly, the phenomenal time that is experienced in time-consciousness consists in a correlative unity between two different temporal series: that of the appearing objects and that of their modes of appearance. This article concludes with an analysis of the “immanent” side of phenomenal temporality. Following Husserl, I argue that appearances or experiences have the same temporal structure as worldly events, and that this isomorphism makes it possible for worldly processes of change and persistence to present themselves to us as perceptual phenomena.