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121. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk Roman Ingarden: Forty Years Later
122. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Roberto Poli Spheres of Being and the Network of Ontological Dependencies
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Ontological categories form a network of ties of dependence. In this regard, the richest source of distinctions consists in the medieval discussion on the divisions of being. After a preliminary examination of some of those divisions, the paper pays attention to Roman Ingarden’s criteria for classifying the various types of ontological dependence. The following are the main conclusions that can be drawn from this exercise. Ingarden suggests that (1) the most general principles framing the categories of particulars are based on couples of mutually opposed principles; (2) the most general among these couples of principles appear to be based on three different types of modalities; (3) subsequent couples of opposed principles do not seem to require the introduction of further types of modalities, and (4) the overall typology shows that there are three spheres of being, respectively composed of ideal entities, real entities and intentional entities as contents of psychological acts.
123. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Nancy Billias Ingarden and Badiou: A Meeting at the Crossroads
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In its examination of the intersection of ethics and ontology, Roman Ingarden’s philosophy bears a striking resemblance to the thought of the contemporaryFrench philosopher Alain Badiou. Though no formal influence is claimed, this paper explores several ways in which Badiou’s theory of the event and existential agency is foreshadowed in the writings of Ingarden. In so doing, the author suggests the continued importance of this unjustly neglected philosopher for contemporary thinking on questions of value.
124. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Reiner Matzker Reality, Mediality and Ideality—Roman Ingarden as Perceived in Thoughts, Letters and Memories
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With great sympathy for Roman Ingarden and his work, Edith Stein edited his book project The Literary Work Of Art. In the letters she exchanges with him shereflects on relationship between reality and ideality: she writes that those who do not see the world as a reality must be fools. The political events in the 1930s had an impact on phenomenology. While Edmund Husserl dissociates himself from his protégé Martin Heidegger with regard to the content of his philosophy as well as with regard to his ideology, Edith Stein distances herself more and more from the phenomenological method, seeing it as removed from reality, and she eventually become a Carmelite nun. Roman Ingarden, on the other hand, reconsiders interpreting phenomenology as aesthetic theory. Literature and film are being re-analysed in terms of phenomenological mediality and as factors of human communication.
125. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Daniel von Wachter Roman Ingarden’s Theory of Causation Revised
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This article presents Roman Ingarden’s theory of causation, as developed in volume III of The Controversy about the Existence of the World, and defends analternative which uses some important insights of Ingarden. It rejects Ingarden’s claim that a cause is simultaneous with its effect and that a cause necessitates its effect. It uses Ingarden’s notion of ‘inclinations’ and accepts Ingarden’s claim that an event cannot necessitate a later event.
126. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
J. M. Fritzman Hegel’s Philosophy—in Putnam’s Vat?
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Using Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, this article argues that interpretations which assert that Hegel’s philosophy, or some portion of it, develops inan entirely a priori manner are incoherent. An alternative reading is then articulated.
127. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Niklas Möller Thick Concepts and Practice
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Thick concepts provide a focal point for several important issues in ethical theory. Separatists argue that the descriptive and evaluative elements of a thick concept can be separated out. Non-separatists deny this and claim that there are no descriptive boundaries delimiting a thick concept. A common strategy for both camps in the debate has been an appeal to armchair intuitions of various everyday thick concepts. My alternative strategy consists in a closer study of the professional practice of risk analysis. As a well-developed practice, it provides substantial material for analysis. Moreover, its central concepts of risk and safety are typically seen as scientific concepts fitting the separatist analysis. Still, I argue that there are several evaluative aspects in risk and safety ascription that are hard to account for on a separatist analysis. I consider three separatist strategies, and conclude that they all fail. The result is a corroboration of the general non-separatist thesis put forward by theorists such as John McDowell and Bernard Williams.
128. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Elżbieta Łukasiewicz Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction: Locke’s, Reid’s, or None?
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In the present paper we shall first focus on Locke’s and Reid’s understanding of primary and secondary qualities, as these two approaches mark the main dividing line in interpreting this distinction. Next, we will consider some modern approaches to the distinction and try to answer the question of whether, from theperspective of what we know about perception of sensory qualities, Locke’s ontological interpretation or Reid’s epistemological approach to the distinction are tenable ideas. Finally, we will concentrate on the relation between language and qualities of objects and, on the basis of some adjectival systems in the world’s languages, see how languages render, or code, certain distinctions and qualities apparently obvious to our cognition.
129. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Jerzy Gołosz Science, Metaphysics, and Scientific Realism
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The paper can be logically divided into two parts. In the first part I distinguish two kinds of metaphysics: basic metaphysics, which affects scientific theories, and a second kind, which is an effect of interpretations of these theories. I try to show the strong mutual relations between metaphysics and science and to point out that the basic metaphysics of science is based on realistic assumptions. In the second part of my paper I suggest that we should consider the basic metaphysics of science and its realistic foundations in order to better understand scientific realism and to properly resolve the debate around it. The methodology of Imre Lakatos is applied in the paper.
130. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Jörgen Sjögren Indispensability, the Testing of Mathematical Theories, and Provisional Realism
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Mathematical concepts are explications, in Carnap’s sense, of vague or otherwise unclear concepts; mathematical theories have an empirical and a deductivecomponent. From this perspective, I argue that the empirical component of a mathematical theory may be tested together with the fruitfulness of its explications.Using these ideas, I furthermore give an argument for mathematical realism, based on the indispensability argument combined with a weakened version of confirmational holism
131. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Maciej Sendłak Modal Meinongianism, Russell’s Paradox, and the Language/Metalanguage Distinction
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The subject of my article is the principle of characterization–the most controversial principle of Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, I would like to show that Russell’s well-known objection to Meinong’s Theory of Objects can be reformulated against a new modal interpretation of Meinongianism that is presented mostly by Graham Priest. Secondly, I would like to propose a strategy which gives uncontroversial restriction to the principle of characterization and which makes it possible to avoid Russell’s argument. The strategy is based on the distinction between object language and metalanguage, and it applies to modal Meinongianism as well as to other so-called Meinongian theories.
132. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Graham Priest Three Heresies in Logic and Metaphysics
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This paper concerns three heterodox views in logic and metaphysics: dialetheism (the view that some contradictions are true), noneism (the view that some objects do not exist), and the non-transitivity of numerical identity. It explains each of the views, some of their features and applications, and some of the relationships between them.
133. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Anna Pietryga Graham Priest and his P-Scheme
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The works by Graham Priest that I'm most familiar with are those of the 1980’s. I understand they belong to the logical part of his writing, as presented by the organizers of the “Towards Graham Priest” meeting at Szczecin University on 20 June, 2012. Myself, I read Priest’s works to be imprecise, to say the least. Thelack of precision is to be traced particularly in his interpretations of Alfred Tarski’s heritage. This applies to Tarski’s main points, namely: semantically closedlanguages, the T-scheme, and the appreciation of natural language. The strange thing about it is that Priest does not mind other people expressing views opposite to his own, but admits he cannot determine which contradictions are true and gives only vague indications about how to judge the criticisms.
134. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Adriana Schetz “Is This a Dagger which I See before Me?” On Objects and Contents of Contradictory Perceptions
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The paper is an attempt to answer the question: what kind of philosophical theory of perception may warrant the claim that one can perceive contradictions, that is, undergo visual or other experiences with contradictory contents? Apparently, the conception of perceptual experience endorsed by Graham Priest makes it intelligible that one can truly experience contradictions. Moreover, as we try to argue, Priest’s insistence that one can perceive contradictions is to some extent defensible on the ground of a version of direct realism which identifies content of perception with its object, and underlines holistic character of perceptual experience.
135. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Graham Priest Replies
136. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska Paraconsistent vs. Contextual Solutions to Sorites
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In my paper I argue that a successful theory of vagueness should be able to account for faultless (aka permissible) disagreement concerning borderline cases.Firstly, I claim that out of the traditional (semantic, noncontextual) conceptions of vagueness the best equipped to account for faultless disagreement areparaconsistent solutions (such as Hyde’s subvaluationism and Priest’s dialetheism). One worry concerning dialetheism is that it seems to allow not only for faultless disagreements between different speakers, but also for such ‘disagreements’ between the given speaker and himself. Another worry, at least for some people, is that subvaluationism and dialetheism account for faultless disagreements by allowing contradictions. Next, I go on to argue that contextual conceptions, which are free from this latter worry, are equally well able to account for such disagreements. To this aim I offer a new account of the usage of personal taste predicates and suggest that we model the usage of all vague predicates on them. The idea is that in clear cases “a is F” means “a is F simpliciter”, whereas in borderline cases it means “a is F-to-me”. Since the boundary between borderline and nonborderline cases depends on context, my solution weds content-contextualism with truth-contextualism.
137. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Adam R Thompson Debt relief: On Haji's Reason's Debt to Freedom
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Ishtiyaque Haji develops and supports the view that alternative possibilities are a requirement on many morally-relevant facets of our lives. I argue that the main argument he offers for his view fails due primarily to two things. First, Haji employs a Jackson-type case to support a claim that such cases fail to support. Second, Haji offers no reason to think that we must understand the 'can' in certain of his important principles as alethic. These troubles vex the insightful support Haji offers for his many, wide-ranging conclusions.
138. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Piotr Warzoszczak Remarks on Graham Priest’s Views on Transworld Identity
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In Towards Non-Being Graham Priest proposes an informative criterion of identity across possible worlds. Roughly, the criterion says that whenever two objects satisfy the very same qualitative characteristics in every possible world they are identical. But Priest also maintains that there are qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds. It is argued in the paper that for this reason he should allow the existence of two numerically different but qualitatively identical objects, and that is in tension with the criterion of transworld identity he has proposed. Thus Priest should reject either his criterion of transworld identity, or the thesis of possibleexistence of qualitatively indiscernible worlds.
139. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Ishtiyaque Haji No Debt Relief in Sight: Reply to Thompson
140. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 9 > Issue: 1
Stephen K. McLeod Two Philosophies of Need
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Instrumentalists about need believe that all needs are instrumental, i.e., ontologically dependent upon ends, goals, or purposes. Absolutists view some needs as non-instrumental. The aims of this article are: clearly to characterize the instrumentalism/absolutism debate that is of concern (mainly §1); to establish that both positions have recent and current adherents (mainly §1); to bring what is, in comparison with prior literature, a relatively high level of precision to the debate, employing some hitherto neglected, but important, insights (passim); to show, on grounds not previously to the fore in the literature, that insofar as instrumentalism’s advocates have provided arguments for the position, these are unsound (§2); to argue against instrumentalism using a new dilemma concerning whether ‘end’, ‘goal’, and ‘purpose’ are interpreted in a mentalistic manner (§3); to elucidate the implications of the needs/need-satisfiers and preconditions/means distinctions for the debate (§4).