Displaying: 141-160 of 537 documents

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141. Chôra: Volume > 3/4
Irene Caiazzo Sur la distinction sénéchienne idea/idos au XIIᵉ siècle
142. Chôra: Volume > 3/4
Dominique Poirel Les statuts de l'image chez Hugues de Saint-Victor
143. Chôra: Volume > 3/4
Meryem Sebti Intellection, imagination et aperception de soi dans le Livre du résultat (Kitāb al-Taḥsῑl) de Bahmanyār Ibn al-Marzūbān
144. Chôra: Volume > 3/4
Annie Yacob Les incidences de la camera oscura sur la peinture de Léonard de Vinci
145. Chôra: Volume > 3/4
Gérard Sondag Jean de Damas et Jean Duns Scot sur l'infinité de l'essence divine
146. Chôra: Volume > 3/4
Graziella Federici-Vescovini Image et représentation optique: Blaise de Parme et Léon-Baptiste Alberti
147. Chôra: Volume > 3/4
Kim Sang Ong-Van-Cung Les raisons d'agir sont-elles des représentations? Thomas d'Aquin et la philosophie de l'action
148. Chôra: Volume > 3/4
Alexander Baumgarten Possibilité et passivité dans la théorie aristotélicienne de l.intellect
149. Chôra: Volume > 3/4
Christophe Grellard Sicut specula sine macula. La perception et son objet chez Nicolas d'Autrécourt
150. Chôra: Volume > 3/4
151. Chôra: Volume > 3/4
Max Lejbowicz Optique instrumentale et iconographie
152. Chôra: Volume > 5
Radu Bercea L'errore delle religioni pagane
153. Chôra: Volume > 5
Annick Charles-Saget Le Moi et son Visage. Visage et Lumière selon Plotin
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For Plotinus, the human face is that part of the body where the light of intelligibility can be shown through in the best way. It is why the face is beautiful, and, for this reason, it can be compared to the most beautiful things of the world. The stars, for example. But an issue raises immediately: when the face is compared to things of beauty, is not the actual meaning of the human face that could be lost? This question can be thought again in the Christian world, and also, thanks to Emmanuel Levinas, in the contemporary philosophy.
154. Chôra: Volume > 5
Andrei Cornea Paradoxe du Mal et «ressemblances de famille»
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Paradox of the Evil and "Family Ressemblances". The paper tackles the problem of Matter and evil in Plotinus. monistic metaphysics, especially in theperspective of the following aparent inconsistency: if there is no other principle but the Good, then the Good creates the Matter which is the absolute evil. Itfollows that the Good is bad, according to a certain axiom of Proclus, which states that the creator is to a higher degree all what the creature is. The authorshows that, despite what Proclus and then many modern critics believed, Plotinus is consistent within his system. He relies on the axiom that the creature is not all what the creator is, i.e. that the creator also gives what he has not. Therefore, the One gives the Intellect multiplicity and thought which He is deprived of and also gives the Matter the evil which He is also deprived of. The paper also shows that Plotinus developed a logic of ontological procession which is not Aristotelian. This logic does not work by formind classes, but chains of partially intransitive ressemblances. So, the Intellect ressembles the One (the Good), the Soul ressembles the Intellect and the Matter ressembles the Soul; yet the Matter resembles the One no more. Yet, the unity of the world is assured, because of the continuity of the chain. The extreme terms are contrary, though not in the Aristotelian sense of sharing in the same genus. A certain similarty with Wittgenstein's logic of "family resemblances" is striking, which means that not only Wittgenstein, but Plotinus also went beyond the Platonic-Aristotelian Vulgata, even while he was sticking to its linguage.
155. Chôra: Volume > 5
Alfredo Storck Jean Duns Scot. La théorie du savoir
156. Chôra: Volume > 5
Patrizia Trovato La bacchetta magica di Hermes e il trono rovesciato. Il Plotino di Lev Šestov
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Plotinus represent a constant reference in all of Šestov's philosophy. For the Russian philosopher Plotinus is, on the one hand, the one who thought up thesynthesis of Greek philosophy, on the other, the one who first broke with that same tradition precisely when it was at its peak. However, Šestov does lift from the Enneadi certain passages which he marries - as if in a sort of contrapuntal rewriting exercise - to others in which Plotinus seems to contradict himself. What interests Šestov are precisely those discontinuities in the thought of the last great philosopher of old in an anti-Greek function. That of Šestov is once again a marked criticism of Rationalism as creator of an autonomous set of ethics that he judges according to an intellect which everything is subject to. Autonomousethics, affirms Šestov, is a fruit of Greek schools of thought to the extent that it shows distrust for what is mutable, unforeseen and arbitrary, of everything which, in short, is irrational, as it is not inserted in the One/All necessitating, justifying, regulating. In the alternative between Athens and Jerusalem, between the Rationalism and the Bible, Šestov opts to assume a stance, in no uncertain terms, on the side Jerusalem, taking with him the Plotinus of the awakening andheading towards a greater reality capable of overturning the throne occupied for too long by reason. That Plotinus who at a certain point was obliged to say thatin this other dimension "the intellect before God represents a reckless, ungodly apostate" (VI.9.5). That Plotinus, who ultimately, in one of those most particularmoments, realized that he was predestined for something loftier with respect to the world of evil and death.
157. Chôra: Volume > 5
Alexander Baumgarten Note liminaire
158. Chôra: Volume > 5
Daniel Mazilu La religiosité de Plotin
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The religious spirit in Plotinus. Lots of studies from last 30 years have shown similar attitudes and spiritual tendencies in early christian and neoplatonic teachings. But we could not forget that we are dealing here with two major rivals on the intellectual scene of Late Antiquity. Despite commun aspects in plotinian and gnostic doctrines, there are some strong critics in Plotinus works, most of them in Enneads II,9, that let no doubt of the distance between the gnostic and neoplatonic positions on some key issues. This article points out four aspects of the plotinian doctrine that clearly break up with some of the main christian religious attitudes. Plotinus had a positive jugement on the sensible world, he had never expressed contempt towards nature, refused any presomption on religious matters and considered the philosophy as the only way to mistical union with the One.
159. Chôra: Volume > 5
Gabriel Chindea Le nombre est-il une réalité parfaitement intelligible? Une analyse de l'intelligibilité du nombre chez Plotin
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Is the number an absolute intelligible reality? The author investigates the number and its nature in Plotinus. works trying to solve the following question: what number is considered intelligible - the number in general or the number in particular? Three answers are given over this study. Thus, if the number is generally defined as intelligible (as Plotinus sometimes does), than the number in general is an intelligible reality (a general intelligible number, therefore, exists). On the other hand, if we make a distinction between numbers (the plural) and number (the singular), it seems that, for Plotinus, only the particular number could be considered clearly intelligible, while the number as a generic reality is not so. Actually, the final solution comes out from the agreement between these two divergent theses. This agreement is based on the idea of the total number: a number that is in the same time particular and general, a number which is the object of the final part of the present study.
160. Chôra: Volume > 5
Marilena Vlad De l'unité de l'intellect à l'un absolu: Plotin critique d'Aristote
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In this article, I discuss Plotinus. critique of the peripatetic idea of the divine intellect as first principle. As I am trying to show, Plotinus accepts the unity of the intellect as self-thinking, and, even more than Aristotle, he emphasizes this unity. Yet, he insists on the necessity of a principle that is even higher and simpler than the intellect. Eventually, intellect proves to be the unity of a plurality, though it is the most unitary being. I discuss the dual nature of the intellect: both as thinking and as being, intellect is both unitary and plural. Starting from this, I analyze Plotinus' arguments of the absolute one as first principle, above intellect.