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161. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Notes on the Contributors
162. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Charlie Pelling Paradoxical Assertions: A Reply to Turri
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In earlier work, I have argued that the self-referential assertion that “this assertion is improper” is paradoxical for the truth account of assertion, the view onwhich an assertion is proper if and only if it is true. In a recent paper in this journal, John Turri has suggested a response to the paradox: one might simply deny that in uttering “this assertion is improper” one makes a genuine assertion. In this paper, I argue that this ‘no assertion’ response does not dissolve the paradox in the way Turri suggests.
163. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Tebben Peer Disagreement and the Limits Of Coherent Error Attribution
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I argue that, in an important range of cases, judging that one disagrees with an epistemic peer requires attributing, either to one's peer or to oneself, a failure ofrationality. There are limits, however, to how much irrationality one can coherently attribute, either to oneself or to another. I argue that these limitations on the coherent attribution of rational error put constraints on permissible responses to peer disagreement. In particular, they provide reason to respond to one-off disagreements with a single peer by maintaining one's beliefs, and they provide reason to moderate one's beliefs when faced with repeated disagreement, or disagreement with multiple peers. Finally, I argue that, though peer disagreement is rare, the occasions on which it does occur tend to be especially important, and the kind of response supported here is correspondingly important. In particular, how leading researchers spend their time and effort depends, in part, on how they respond to peer disagreement. And only a response of the kind supported here strikes the right balance between allowing individual researchers to freely pursue what seems to them to be worthwhile projects, and requiring that they pursue those research projects that the community of experts as a whole believes to be likely to yield significant results.
164. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Tomas Bogardus Foley's Self-Trust and Religious Disagreement
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In this paper, I’ll look at the implications of Richard Foley’s epistemology for two different kinds of religious disagreement. First, there are those occasions onwhich a stranger testifies to me that she holds disagreeing religious beliefs. Typically, I’m dismissive of such religious disagreement, and I bet you are too. Richard Foley gives reasons to think that we need not be at all conciliatory in the face of stranger disagreement, but I’ll explain why his reasons are insufficient. After that, I’ll look at those types of religious disagreement that occur between epistemic peers . Foley has argued for a conciliatory position. I worry that his position leads to what some in the literature have called “spinelessness.” I also worry that his view is self-defeating, and vulnerable to some apparent counterexamples. I’ll end the paper by sketching my own, non-Foleyan, solution to those problems.
165. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Notes to Contributors
166. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Stephen Skerry Knowledge and Persistence
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States are states, in part, because they persist through time. Knowing is one such state, and it often persists beyond the time when evidence is first apprehended. The consequences for epistemology of this persistence are explored, including what are termed ‘unearned knowledge,’ and ‘one-sided knowledge.’ Knowing that you are not dreaming is one (important) example of unearned and one-sided knowing. The author contends that arguments for scepticism and for knowing as a purley mental state are undermined when this persistence is properly understood.
167. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Fernando Broncano-Berrocal Lies and Deception: A Failed Reconciliation
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The traditional view of lying says that lying is a matter of intending to deceive others by making statements that one believes to be false. Jennifer Lackey hasrecently defended the following version of the traditional view: A lies to B just in case (i) A states that p to B, (ii) A believes that p is false and (iii) A intends to be deceptive to B in stating that p. I argue that, despite all the virtues that Lackey ascribes to her view, conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are not sufficient for lying.
168. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Logos & Episteme. Aims and Scope
169. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Natalia Grincheva Scientific Epistemology versus Indigenous Epistemology: Meanings of ‘Place’ and ‘Knowledge’ in the Epistemic Cultures
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The article is based on a synthetic comparative analysis of two different epistemic traditions and explores indigenous and scientific epistemic cultures throughclose reading and exploration of two books. The first book, Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge, written by Austrian sociologist Karin Knorr-Cetina (1999), serves as an excellent foundational material to represent scientific epistemic tradition. The second book by cultural and linguistic anthropologist Keith Basso (1996), Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language among the Western Apache, opens a wide perspective for exploration indigenous epistemic culture. Both of the books deal with questions of knowledge production and social-cultural mechanisms that surround these processes. The article seeks to explain how the differences between methodological approaches, in their distinct questions, and the variance in research subjects eventuallyleads the authors to completely dissimilar understandings of such shared notions as ‘place’ and ‘knowledge.’ Through the comparative exploration of both texts, the present analysis uncovers the meanings of these notions as articulated and presented in each of the books.
170. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Christopher Bobier In Defense of Virtue-Responsibilism
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Modest realism affirms that some of the objects of our beliefs exist independently of our beliefs. That is, there is a mind-independent world that we canepistemically access. The Cartesian skeptic claims that we can’t offer any non-question-begging arguments in favor of modest realism and therefore we are not justified in believing that modest realism is true. Reliabilists argue that the skeptic assumes an evidentialist-internalist account of justification and that a proper account of justification jettisons this. Hence, our belief in modest realism can be justified. I argue in this paper that virtue-responsibilism offers an analogous response to the Cartesian skeptic. According to the virtue-responsibilist, my belief that P is an instance of knowledge iff it maps onto reality and is the result of an act of virtue. I show that the virtueresponsibilist theory excludes evidentialist-internalism, and allows for our belief in modest realism to be justified. However, it may be objected that the virtue-responsibilist can’t offer non-question-begging reasons for thinking that the virtues are reliable. I argue that this objection fails and that we can know that the virtues are reliable by empirical study. Thus, virtue-responsibilism provides a satisfactory response to the Cartesian skeptic.
171. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Jimmy Alfonso Licon Dissecting the Suicide Machine Argument: Insights from the Hales – Licon Debate
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I assess the debate over the Suicide Machine Argument. There are several lessons to be learned from this debate. First, there is a fruitful distinction to be made,between tensed and tenseless versions of presentism, despite the temptation to suppose that presentism is a tensed theory of time. Second, once we’ve made the distinction between different kinds of presentism, it is clear that Licon’s objection protects the tenseless version of presentism from the Suicide Machine Argument; however, the argument is still effective against the tensed version. Finally, I argue that if the presentist wants to remain a card carrying presentist, in the face of the challenge posed by Hales, then she must abandon her commitment to tense.
172. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Logos and Episteme: Aims and Scope
173. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Nicolás Lo Guercio Reply to Palmira
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In “Philosophical Peer Disagreement” I argued that in order to properly account for the phenomenon of philosophical peer disagreement it is necessary to dropthe ‘same evidence’ condition from the definition of epistemic peerage. The reason is the following: different philosophical perspectives might come with different commitments concerning the evidential role of the same piece of data, and it would be wrong to deny the status of epistemic peer to someone that is acquainted with the same data, even if he does not consider it plays an evidential role. However, on “On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition For Epistemic Peerage,” Michele Palmira has developed some criticisms to these ideas. Here I defend my view from Palmira’s objections.
174. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Clayton Littlejohn Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote?
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In trying to distinguish the right kinds of reasons from the wrong, epistemologists often appeal to the connection to truth to explain why practical considerations cannot constitute reasons. The view they typically opt for is one on which only evidence can constitute a reason to believe. Brian Talbot has shown that these approaches don’t exclude the possibility that there are non-evidential reasons for belief that can justify a belief without being evidence for that belief. He thinks thatthere are indeed such reasons and that they are the right kind of reasons to justify belief. The existence of such truth promoting non-epistemic reasons is said to follow from the fact that we have an epistemic end that involves the attainment of true belief. I shall argue that there are no such reasons precisely because there is an epistemic end that has normative authority.
175. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Notes to Contributors
176. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Notes on the Contributors
177. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
William A. Brant Levelling the Analysis of Knowledge via Methodological Scepticism
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In this essay I provide one methodology that yields the level of analysis of an alleged knowledge-claim under investigation via its relations to varying gradations of scepticism. Each proposed knowledge-claim possesses a specified relationship with: (i) a globally sceptical argument; (ii) the least sceptical but successful argument that casts it into doubt; and (iii) the most sceptical yet unsuccessful argument, which is conceivably hypothesized to repudiate it but fails to do so. Yielding this specified set of relations, by means of proceeding from global scepticism to (ii) and (iii), increases the chances of identifying the highest evaluative relevancy of the levels of analysis and observation of an alleged knowledge-claim. I argue that the failure to analyse and derive a difference between (i) and (ii) with respect to an alleged knowledge-claim signifies that the claim is grounded within the theoretical framework itself, that the claim lacks specification with regard to content that is analysable via that framework, and the claim is dubious insofar as alternative theoretic frameworks may present greater relevancy to levels of observation.
178. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Anguel S. Stefanov Zeno’s Paradoxes Revisited
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My aim in this paper is to suggest a new outlook concerning the nature of Zeno’s paradoxes. The attention is directed towards the three famous paradoxes known as “Dichotomy,” “Achilles and the Tortoise,” and “The Arrow.” An analysis of the paradigmatic proposals for a solution shows that an adequate solution has not yet been reached. An answer is provided instead to the question “How Zeno’s paradoxes emerge in their quality of aporiae?,” that is to say in their quality of impasses, of problem situations without an exit, what is the original meaning of the Greek word “aporia.” It is my claim that this is the correct rational approach for solving these conceptual puzzles. In other words, I am not proposing formal solutions by criticizing and/or altering their premises assuming the continuous or discrete nature of space and time, but I try to draw the philosophical attention to the way we possess the phenomenon of motion as a result of the perception of space-time in human experience.
179. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Caroline Alexandra Mathieu The Confrontation Between Qualitative and Quantitative Researchers: A Different Article, a Daring Publication
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After reading chapter two of Russell’s In Praise of Idleness , which discusses the history of the concept of knowledge, and the article by Ranjay Gulati whocommented the wars of tribes (“Tent poles, tribalism, and boundary spanning: The rigor-relevant debate in management research”), this inspired me an image of gladiator battles between different groups in the scientific world. Inspired by Feyerabend’s concept of fairy tales, I illustrate the struggle between quantitative and qualitative researchers that I witnessed in my research career...
180. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Peter Murphy Another Blow to Knowledge from Knowledge
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A novel argument is offered against the following popular condition on inferential knowledge: a person inferentially knows a conclusion only if they know each of the claims from which they essentially inferred that conclusion. The epistemology of conditional proof reveals that we sometimes come to know conditionals by inferring them from assumptions rather than beliefs. Since knowledge requires belief, cases of knowing via conditional proof refute the popular knowledge from knowledge condition. It also suggests more radical cases against the condition and it brings to light the underrecognized category of inferential basic knowledge.