We are happy to be able to present here a Marxist critique of Bloch's philosophy of hope. Manfred Buhr is the director of the Zentralinstituts fuer Philosophie ofthe German Academy in Berlin. This essay was originally published in the Deutsche Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie, which Bloch himself edited at one time. It appeared almost simultaneously with Prinzip Hoffnung. The original title of the article is "Der religiose Ursprung und Charakter der Hoffnungsphilosophie ErnstBloch." Although published some time ago, we feel that it has more than historical interest for the collection of articles we are presenting in this issue of Philosophy Today as an "introduction" to Ernst Bloch's thought. We wish to thank the present editor of the Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie and the VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften of Berlin for their kind permission to publish this translation. Because of space limitations we have had to edit out some of the original article. At most this amounts to a few pages. We have indicated where the cutting has taken place (***** or .....) and have tried carefully to respectthe substance and continuity of Professor Buhr's essay. (Editor)

No contemporary philosopher has argued more consistenily or more convincingly for a God of becoming than Charles Hartshorne. Boehme looms largein the historical background of his dipolar theology: both classical theism, which sees God as supreme actuality and most strictly absolute, and pantheism, whichsees in God only supreme potentiality and universal relativity, are correlated in his panentheism. The ultimate contraries are united in the divine relativity,where eternal permanence and temporal process are both preserved in a tension that, logically, precedes them.Hartshorne has been reluctant to develop relationships to earlier and "simpler" representatives of his type of philosophical theology. Berdyaev, on the other hand, is ready to acknowledge Boehme as the real founder of his own philosophy of freedom. The affinity between the two stands out sharply when they explore the problem of evil, tragedy within divinity, or the Unground as Nothingness which gives rise to Something and the entire theogonic process. Berdyaev sees Boehme as one of the rare thinkers who broke with the optimistic rationalism of Western thought to construct a more spiritual philosophy of tragedy.Heidegger's revolt against Western ontology and Christian theology has certain affinities to Boehme's thought. We may point to but one aspect here, the central basic question of metaphysics, which is foolishness to Christian theology: "Why is there any being at all and not rather nothing?" This question and Heidegger's "Nothingness" have obvious connections with Boehme's question and his "Nichts." For both. Nothingness is a primordial and fundamental working. It is found in Being itself rather than outside it. It gives rise through primordial discord to Being. To be sure, Heidegger develops his dialectic far beyond anything suggested by Boehme when he interprets his Dasein as suspended in dread over das Nichts. But Heidegger's profoundly dialectical conception of Being has obvious relations to the non-Being of Boehme: Nothingness or nihilation is present in all beings and is the essence of Being itself. It is the dynamic power of Being thai gives rise to Being. Self-negation is always present in the coming-into-presence of Being. For both Boehme and Heidegger Nothingness is required for the "letting-be" of beings, for the un-concealment of Being.

The following frank comments on the subject of analysis, though they obviously represent a preliminary examination af some of the problems that emerge between philosophical analysis and phenomenology as the two major trends in contemporary philosophy, are conceived by the present author in a much broader manner than the mere confrontation of two apparently opposing schools of thought. Due to the emergent nature of these themes, some adagio, others allegro, it has been impossible to arrange them in the usual systematic manner. (This difficulty was experienced in a grander manner by Wittgenstein himself, as his remarks in Philosophical Investigations plainly show.) Whatever in these comments is "offensive" to either phenomenologist or analyst derives from the fact that this is only a preliminary study, in which the author is orienting himself and preparing for more systematic and thorough-going dialogue with sympathetic analyst friends and phenomenologist critics. (More developed thoughts and satisfactory conclusions should be reached in my forthcoming review essay on H. Khatchadourian's A Study in Critical Method, now being written for The Journal of Value Inquiry.) What is presented here to friend, foe, and general philosophical reader, is a selection of themes that have puzzled me greatly. I offer them without any of the usual excuses and with the hope that to some extent this discussion may bring philosophers together, so that we can begin to lind the common ground, on which to make our contribution to contemporary thought the more truly convincing.