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161. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
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162. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Virginia Yoldi Anatomía del amor: Historia natural de la monogamia, el adulterio y el divorcio
163. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Luis Fariñas del Cerro, Antonio Frias Delgado Condicionales y no monotonía
164. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Giancarlo Taddei Elmi Informazione ’elettrica’ e società: Dal diritto dell’informatica alla societa “informatica”
165. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Ignacio Ayestaran Handbook of Science and Technology Studies
166. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
C. Ulises Moulines Realismos e instrumentalismos: respuesta a Zamora Bonilla
167. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Carlos Minguez Sobre el valor de las matemáticas: Juan Luis Vives y el Prefacio de Osiander
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This paper analyses some aspects in Osiander’s (1498-1552) “Preface” to De Revolutionibus (1543) by Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1453) and the “Preface Letter” also by Copernicus to the Pope Paul III (1468-1549). The reading is carried out from the intellectual framework where the works are written, taking as a reference De Disciplinis (1531) by Juan Luis Vives (1492-1538), whose pedagogical thought had great influence on the 16th century. This paper points at the coincidence of attitudes as to the function of Mathematics, and therefore, of Astronomy, for both a purely probabilistic assessment of theastronomical hypotheses, and the overcoming of the instrumentality of the calculations by means of their practical use. This last channel, promoted by a sceptic academicism which was already present in the first half of the 16th century, contributes to a better understanding of the reality of the progressive acceptation of a new structure of the world. Vives has very frequently been talked of as the clear antecedent of the great masters of thought of the modern culture, but his style and the dynamics of his thought -totally Humanist- are very different from those of Copernicus and Osiander, and thus, this paper aims to analyse his cultural context and his reflections about himself.
168. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Jesús Padilla Gálvez Heinrich Gomperz, Karl Popper und die österreichische Philosophie
169. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Cristina Lafont Dilemas en torno a la verdad
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This article argues for an intermediate standpoint concerning the theory of truth which finds an equilibrium between realist an epistemic conceptions of truth. At the same time it is accepted that truth is a notion with an ultimate realist sense, but it is made clear that this intuitive sense does only have a non-trivial (i.e. non-“disquotational”), reading if the function of “truth” is seen from within the epistemic framework of our practices of belief-formation (i.e. of confirmation and revision). Following the realist line one can reconstruct the unconditional validity attributed to the intuitive concept of truth out of its internal relation with the concept of “reality”; this in turn makes clear that the epistemic strategy of extracting this uncoditionality from an emphatic concept of perfect, infallible knowledge is more than weak. This is because only preserving the decisive function of truth as a corrective, as a fallibilist reserve (incompatible therefore with any concept of “infallible” knowledge) one can see how truth relates to cognitive learning processes. On the other hand, the strategy of this paper shows thus how this is possible avoiding the bad alternative of metaphysical realism and relativism.
170. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Luis Fariñas del Cerro, Antonio Frias Delgado Razonamiento no monótono: un breve panorama
171. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Dov M. Gabbay A General Theory of Structured Consequence Relations
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There are several areas in logic where the monotonicity of the consequence relation fails to hold. Roughly these are the traditional non-monotonic systems arising in Artificial Intelligence (such as defeasible logics, circumscription, defaults, ete), numerical non-monotonic systems (probabilistic systems, fuzzy logics, belief functions), resource logics (also called substructural logics such as relevance logic, linear logic, Lambek calculus), and the logic of theory change (also called belief revision, see Alchourron, Gärdenfors, Makinson [2224]). We are seeking a common axiomatic and semantical approach to the notion of consequence whieh can be specialised to any of the above areas. This paper introduces the notions of structured consequence relation, shift operators and structural connectives, and shows an intrinsic connection between the above areas.
172. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Instrucciones técnicas para la preparación de los trabajos / Technical instructions for preparation of manuscripts
173. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Juan Carlos López San Joaquín Languages of the Mind: Essays on Mental Representation
174. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
José Miguel Sagüillo Validez y semantica representacional
175. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Luis Vega Demostraciones clásicas
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Let’s agree in calling “classical demonstration” a deduction that enables us to know the rational necessity that something is the case and cannot be otherwise. I propose to take seriously actual instances of this notion, e.g. some mathematical proofs, and explore certain discoursive and epistemic implications of their existence. Then I will look at questions about characterizing, rigorizing and acknowledging this kind of conclusive proof. Finally, some remarks on the meaning of Provability Logic in this context will be made.
176. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Javier Echeverria A la memoria de Miguel Sánchez-Mazas
177. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
José Antonio Méndez Sanz, José Antonio López Cerezo Thinking through Technology: The Path between Engineering and Philosophy
178. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Jesús Mosterín Los límites de la ciencia
179. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
John Corcoran Information Recovery Problems
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An information recovery problem is the problem of constructing a proposition containing the information dropped in going from a given premise to a given conclusion that folIows. The proposition(s) to beconstructed can be required to satisfy other conditions as well, e.g. being independent of the conclusion, or being “informationally unconnected” with the conclusion, or some other condition dictated by the context. This paper discusses various types of such problems, it presents techniques and principles useful in solving them, and it develops algorithmic methods for certain classes of such problems. The results are then applied to classical number theory, in particular, to questions concerning possible refinements of the 1931 Gödel Axiom Set, e.g. whether any of its axioms can be analyzed into “informational atoms”. Two propositions are “informationally unconnected” [with each other] if no informative (nontautological) consequence of one also follows from the other. A proposition is an “informational atom” if it is informative but no information can be dropped from it without rendering it uninformative (tautological). Presentation, employment, and investigation of these two new concepts are prominent features of this paper.
180. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Juan José Goiriena de Gandarias Homenaje al Profesor D. Miguel Sánchez-Mazas