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181. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Patrick Bondy How to Understand and Solve the Lottery Paradox
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It has been claimed that there is a lottery paradox for justification and an analogous paradox for knowledge, and that these two paradoxes should have a common solution. I argue that there is in fact no lottery paradox for knowledge, since that version of the paradox has a demonstrably false premise. The solution to the justification paradox is to deny closure of justification under conjunction. I present a principle which allows us to deny closure of justification under conjunction in certain kinds of cases, but which still allows that belief in a conjunction on the basis of justified belief in its conjuncts can often be justified.
182. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Notes to Contributors
183. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Thomas Kroedel Why Epistemic Permissions Don’t Agglomerate – Another Reply to Littlejohn
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Clayton Littlejohn claims that the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox requires an implausible principle in order to explain why epistemic permissionsdon’t agglomerate. This paper argues that an uncontentious principle suffices to explain this. It also discusses another objection of Littlejohn’s, according to which we’re not permitted to believe lottery propositions because we know that we’re not in a position to know them.
184. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Logos and Episteme. Aim and Scope
185. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Simon D'Alfonso Explicating a Standard Externalist Argument Against the KK Principle
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The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportiveexplication. In a recent paper, Samir Okasha argues that the standard externalist argument in question is fallacious. In this paper I start off with some critical discussion of Okasha’s analysis before suggesting an alternative way in which an externalist might successfully present such a case. I then further explore this issue via a look at how Fred Dretske’s externalist epistemology, one of the exemplifying accounts, can explain failure of the KK principle.
186. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Notes on the Contributors
187. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Teodor Negru Self: A Dynamic Approach
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According to the classical approach, the self was regarded as a pure unchanging spiritual entity, with a cognitive content which is the consequence of self-awareness that characterises human being. Against this classical conception, the convergence approaches of phenomenology, developmental psychology or neuroscience highlighted the fact that the self is the result of the ongoing dynamics of experiences we have as embodied agents, e.g. the dynamic coupling between the embodied agent and the world, the dynamics of the primal emotions and feelings, as well as the dynamics of neural processes. Hence, the self appears as an embodied self, embedded in a certain context having a pre-reflective character, resulting from the direct coupling of the person with the natural or social environment. In conclusion, according to the contemporary approaches, the self is a multifaceted phenomenon, which should be understood from the perspective of the various dynamic relationships mediated among body, brain, and environment.
188. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Ciprian Jeler Philippe Huneman, ed., Functions: Selection and Mechanism
189. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Cătălina-Daniela Răducu Stephen Hetherington, ed., Epistemology: The Key Thinkers
190. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Adrian Costache From Historical Change to Historical Knowledge: Directions of a New Epistemology of the Human Sciences
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The present paper endeavors to trace the sketch of a possible epistemology of the human sciences. In this sense it begins with the determination of the object ofknowledge in the human sciences through a careful examination of the reality of history and of the human world. Then, considering the peculiarity of the domain of the human sciences the paper proceeds to show that their object of knowledge is best understood as “event” in the sense of Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou. And, in the end, it circumscribes two modes of knowledge of this object of the human sciences understood as event.
191. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Robin McKenna Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Are Possibly Not Governed by the Same Epistemic Norm
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This paper focuses on Martin Montminy’s recent attempt to show that assertion and practical reasoning are necessarily governed by the same epistemic norm(“Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2013). I show that the attempt fails. I finish by considering the upshot for the recent debate concerning the connection between the epistemic norms of assertion and practical reasoning.
192. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Andrew McFarland Misfired Slingshots: A Case Study on the Confusion of Metaphysical and Semantic Considerations
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Most philosophers today will acknowledge the pitfalls of confusing metaphysical and semantic issues. Many are also familiar with the classic semi-formalargument that has come to be known as ‘the Slingshot’ and the various philosophical ends to which this argument has been deployed. The combination of the argument’s relatively simple theoretical machinery and its wide range of applications make it ripe for abuse. The slingshot was originally conceived as a semantic argument about designation; what it suggests, but does not prove, is that the closest analogue to singular term reference for any expression is that expression’s semantic extension. In order to derive more metaphysically robust conclusions, however, many classical deployments of the argument make use of several methodologically suspicious tactics. By cataloguing the more frequent abuses of the argument, we may remind ourselves of a valuable philosophical lesson.
193. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Eugen Huzum David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, eds., The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays
194. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Teodor Dima Susan Haack: Putting Philosophy to Work. Inquiry and Its Place in Culture. Essays on Science, Religion, Law, Literature, and Life
195. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Frederic Peters Consciousness Should Not Be Confused With Qualia
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The equation of consciousness with qualia, of wakeful awareness with awareness-of-cognitive content (perceptions, conceptions, emotions), while intuitivelyattractive, and formally referenced as the primary index of consciousness by many philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, nevertheless has significant difficulties specifying precisely what it is that distinguishes conscious from non-conscious cognition. Moreover, there is a surprisingly robust congruence of evidence to the contrary, supporting the notion that consciousness, as a state of reflexive awareness, is distinct from the content one is aware of, that this awareness/content amalgam is actually the product of an incorporation process of various intermittent, and constantly varying streams of content onto a pre-existing reflexively conscious state which is not reliant on these streams for its constitution as a reflexive state. Consciousness, the evidence strongly indicates, is not qualia, not the awareness of this or that perceptual, conceptual or emotional content, but reflexive, autonoetic awareness as such.
196. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Notes on the Contributors
197. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
James Filler Recovering Plato: A Platonic Virtue Epistemology
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Recently, there has been a move in contemporary epistemological philosophy toward a virtue epistemology, which sees certain character traits of the rational agent as critical in the acquisition of knowledge. This attempt to introduce virtue into epistemological investigations has, however, relied almost exclusively on anAristotelian account of virtue. In this paper, I attempt to take a new tack and examine a virtue epistemological account grounded in Platonic thought. Taking seriously the distinction between knowledge and opinion found in the Republic, I then draw upon two virtues, humility and what I call sincerity, to flesh out this account.
198. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Moti Mizrahi Phenomenal Conservatism, Justification, and Self-Defeat
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In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories thatreject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of alternatives to PC, then Huemer’s Self-Defeat argument doesn’t uniquely motivate PC.
199. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Benjamin W. McCraw Virtue Epistemology, Testimony, and Trust
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In this paper, I respond to an objection raised by Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup against virtue epistemology. In particular, they argue that the virtueepistemologist must either deny that S knows that p only if S believes that p because of S’s virtuous operation or deny intuitive cases of testimonial knowledge. Their dilemma has roots in the apparent ease by which we obtain testimonial knowledge and, thus, how the virtue epistemologist can explain such knowledge in a way that both preserves testimonial knowledge and grounds it in one’s virtues. I argue that the virtue epistemologist has a way to accomplish both tasks if we take epistemic trust to be an intellectual virtue. I briefly discuss what such trust must look like and then apply it to the dilemma at hand: showing that a key intellectual virtue plausibly operates in cases of testimonial knowledge and/or belief.
200. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
B. J. C. Madison Epistemic Internalism, Justification, and Memory
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Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tendedto reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, as it has been alleged that internalism cannot account for the possibility of the justification of beliefs stored in memory. My aim in this paper is to offer a response that explains how memory justification is possible in a way that is consistent with epistemic internalism and an awareness condition on justification. Specifically, I will explore the plausibility of various options open to internalists, including both foundationalist and non-foundationalist approaches to the structure of justification. I intend to show that despite other difficult challenges that epistemic internalism might face, memory belief poses no special problems that the resources of internalism cannot adequately address.