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Displaying: 181-200 of 1796 documents

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181. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 16 > Issue: 4
Elizabeth Radcliffe Religion and Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy
182. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Michael Scott Wittgenstein and Realism
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It is clear from both his writings and lectures on religion that Wittgenstein thought that there are many differences in the standards and forms of justification informing religious and scientific discourses. However, the evidence of such differences can be used to support two quite different and conflicting lines of argument. On one apparently realist argument, the differences are taken to show that religious discourse describes different kinds of fact (or offers different kinds of description) to scientific discourse; on the other seemingly antirealist argument, the differences show that religious discourse does not have a descriptive function at all. This paper evaluates these arguments both as contributions to the debate concerning religious realism and as interpretations of Wittgenstein.
183. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
James G. Hanink The Selfhood of the Human Person
184. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Eileen Sweeney The Moral Gap
185. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Thomas Williams Lying, Deception, and the Virtue of Truthfulness: A Reply to Garcia
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In “Lies and the Vices of Deception,” J. L. A. Garcia argues that lying is always immoral, since it always involves a motivation contrary to the proper discharge of a morally determinative role. I argue that Garcia fails to show (i) that anyone who fails in the sub-role of information-giver thereby fails in a morally determinative role, (ii) that the sub-role of information-giver is precisely that of “informing another truthfully,” (iii) that lying deviates from the motivation characteristic of someone with the virtue of truthfulness, and (iv) that lies always undermine the well-being of the person to whom they are told.
186. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
David Widerker Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
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In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge (G-scenario). Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type scenario also hold in a G-scenario. In reply, Icontest Hunt’s symmetry claim and also raise a worry whether, given theological fatalism, the agent’s act in a G-scenario can be deemed a free act in the libertarian sense. Finally, I offer an independent argument why in a G-scenario the agent should not regarded morally blameworthy for his act.
187. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Wes Morriston Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?: A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument
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The aim of this paper is to take a close look at some little discussed aspects of the kalam cosmological argument, with a view to deciding whether there is any reason to believe the causal principle on which it rests (“Whatever begins to exist must have a cause”), and also with a view to determining what conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the First Cause of the universe (supposing thatthere is one). I am particularly concerned with the problems that arise when it is assumed (as it often is) that that the First Cause is timeless and that it timelessly creates time. I argue that this forces the defender of the kalam argument to analyze the concept of “beginning to exist” in a way that raises series doubts about its main causal principle, and that it also undercuts the main argument for saying that the cause of the universe must be a person.
188. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Christopher Key Chapple Reflections in the Mirror of Religion
189. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Adams The Present Made Future: Karl Rahner’s Eschatological Debt to Heidegger
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It is well-known that Karl Rahner studied with Heidegger, but although there has been some recent interest in Rahner’s eschatology, it is rarely recognised how substantially Rahner’s discussion of the future draws on Heidegger’s earlier writings on time. At the same time, it is increasingly desirable to show how technical issues in theology bear upon concrete political practice in the public sphere. This article shows the extent of Rahner’s use of Heidegger and explains how Rahner’s understanding of the future relates to concrete questions of ethics and Christian self-understanding.
190. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Michael Tooley Freedom and Foreknowledge
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In her book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, Linda Zagzebski suggests that among the strongest ways of supporting the thesis that libertarian free will is incompatible with divine foreknowledge is what she refers to as the Accidental Necessity argument. Zagzebski contends, however, that at least three satisfactory responses to that argument are available.I argue that two of the proposed solutions are open to strong objections, and that the third, although it may very well handle the specific versions of the Accidental Necessity argument that Zagzebski considers, fails when confronted with a stronger version of the Accidental Necessity line of argument.
191. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Notes and News
192. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
William Lane Craig Omniscience, Tensed Facts, and Divine Eternity
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A difficulty for a view of divine eternity as timelessness is that if time is tensed, then God, in virtue of His omniscience, must know tensed facts. But tensed facts, such as It is now t, can only be known by a temporally located being.Defenders of divine atemporality may attempt to escape the force of this argument by contending either that a timeless being can know tensed facts or else that ignorance of tensed facts is compatible with divine omniscience. Kvanvig, Wierenga, and Leftow adopt both of these strategies in their various defenses of divine timelessness. Their respective solutions are analyzed in detail and shown to be untenable.Thus, if the theist holds to a tensed view of time, he should construe divine eternity in terms of omnitemporality.
193. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Séamus Murphy Analytic Theism, Hartshorne, and the Concept of God
194. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Ted A. Warfield On Freedom and Foreknowledge: A Reply to Two Critics
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William Hasker and Anthony Brueckner have critically discussed my argument for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. I reply to their commentaries.
195. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Mark D. Linville A Defense of Human Dignity
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The traditional doctrine of human dignity has fallen on hard times. It is said that that doctrine is “speciesist to the core” and “the moral effluvium of a discredited metaphysics.” Those of us who would defend the view that humans enjoy greater moral standing than nonhuman living things must answer the question, “What’s so special about humans?” In this paper, I argue that moral agency is a great-making property that confers special worth on its bearer.
196. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
John Dupré The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory
197. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Charles J. Klein On the Necessary Existence of an Object with Creative Power
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I present an argument which is related to the ontological argument which has a more plausible premise and a weaker conclusion. I assume two postulates concerning the meaning of ‘x creates y’. I then prove that the proposition possibly, something (non-vacuously) creates everything entails, in quantified S5, that there is a necessarily existing object with creative power - an object which creates all (and some) contingently existing objects in some possible world.
198. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Nicholas Everitt Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence
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In a number of places, Richard Swinburne has defended the logical possibility of perception without a body; and has inferred from this logical possibility that substance dualism is true. I challenge his defence of disembodied perception by arguing that a disembodied perceiver would not be able to distinguish between perceptions and hallucinations. I then claim that even if disembodied perception were possible, this could not be used to support substance dualism: such an inference would be either invalid or question-begging.
199. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
John Hare Creating the Kingdom of Ends
200. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Eric Reitan Does the Argument from Evil Assume a Consequentialist Morality?
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In this paper, I argue that the some of the most popular and influential formulations of the Argument from Evil (AE) assume a moral perspective that is essentially consequentialist, and would therefore be unacceptable to deontologists. Specifically, I examine formulations of the argument offered by William Rowe and Bruce Russell, both of whom explicitly assert that their formulation of AE is theoretically neutral with respect to consequentialism, and can be read in a way that is unobjectionable to deontologists. I argue that, in fact, this in not the case. Finally, I look at the implications of the consequentialist assumptions of AE for theodicies based on free will.