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181. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 52 > Issue: 3
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192. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Notes on Recent Work
193. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 2
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194. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal: Volume > 40 > Issue: 2
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195. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 3
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196. Res Philosophica: Volume > 97 > Issue: 4
Niklaas Tepelmann A Case for Weak Safety
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Safety theorists prefer a strong version of safety over a weak version, in order to account for our intuition that we do not know lottery propositions. I argue that weak safety has advantages that can outweigh our intuitions in lottery cases. First, I argue that for the nonepistemic domain, we should adopt weak safety to account for experts’ claims about cyber security. Second, I argue that a unified account of safety is preferable. Hence, we should adopt weak safety for the epistemic domain as well. My argument can also be put as follows. It is more plausible to suppose that our intuitions about lottery cases are misguided than to suppose either that experts’ judgments about cyber security are misguided or that there are different versions of safety.