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21. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Mehmet Hilmi Demir Stalnaker’s Hypothesis: A Critical Examination of Hájek’s Counter Argument
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According to what is known as Stalnaker’s hypothesis, the probability of a conditional statement is equal to the conditional probability of the statement’s consequent given the statement’s antecedent. Starting with David Lewis, many have attempted to show that this hypothesis cannot be true for non-trivial probability functions. These attempts, which are known as the triviality results, cannot refute the hypothesis conclusively, because the triviality results usually rest on controversial assumptions such as the closure of conditionalization. In addition to the triviality results, there is one often cited argument against Stalnaker’s hypothesis that does not seem to rest on a controversial assumption. The argument is Alan Hájek’s 1989 reductio argument, which purportedly shows that Stalnaker’s hypothesis leads to outright contradiction. In this paper, I critically evaluate Hajek’s reductio argument and show that it is not a valid argument. His argument is simply an instance of the petitio principii fallacy. On the positive side, I argue that my critical evaluation of Hajek’s argument brings us one step closer to the reconciliation of the analytical and empirical examinations of Stalnaker’s hypothesis.Literatürde Stalnaker hipotezi olarak bilinen iddiaya göre, bir şartlı önermenin olasılığı, o önermenin art bileşenin ön bileşeninine şartlı olasılığına eşittir. David Lewis’in 1976 tarihli makalesinden beri birçok felsefeci bu iddianın sadece basit ve sıradan (trivial) olasılık fonksiyonları için geçerli olduğu, diğer daha işlevli (non-trivial) olasılık fonksiyonlarına uygulanamayacağını göstermeye çalışmışlar ve bu hedef doğrultusunda birçok ispat sunmuşlardır. Ancak sıradanlık sonuçları (triviality results) olarak bilinen bu tür ispatların Stalnaker hipotezini tam olarak reddetmeye yeterli olmadığı anlaşılmıştır. Çünkü bu ispatların büyük bir çoğunluğu koşullamanın kapalılığı (closure of conditionalization) gibi tartışmalı olan varsayımlara dayanmaktadır. Literatürde tartışmalı herhangi bir varsayıma dayalı olmadığı iddia edilen ve sıklıkla gönderme yapılan bir başka argüman daha mevcuttur. Alan Hájek’in 1989 tarihli makalesinde olmayana ergi metodu ile geliştirdiği bu argüman, herhangi tartışmalı bir varsayıma dayanmadan, Stalnaker hipotezinin doğrudan çelişkiye neden olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu makalede Hájek’in argümanının geçerliliği detaylı olarak incelenmekte ve sonuçta söz konusu argümanın petitio principii çıkarsama hatasını barındırdığı ve bu sebeple de geçerli olmadığı tespit edilmektedir. Pozitif katkı olarak ise bu varılan tespitin Stalnaker hipotezinin analitik ve ampirik değerlendirmeleri arasında var olan uyuşmazlığın giderilmesinde bir adım daha ileri gitmemizi sağladığı iddia edilmektidir.
22. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Funda Neslioğlu Serin “The Strong Programme” and the Rationality Debate
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Various approaches have been made for understanding the nature of science and scientific knowledge. The social factors that played some role during the choice of scientific theories (like the theory of evolution) in the nineteenth century popularised the opinion that the scientific knowledge is the subject of a sociological research. During the ongoing discussions, one of the explanation or the justification models that was proposed is known as “the Strong Programme.” The main claim of “the Strong Programme” is that the social factors have a determining role for the choice of scientific theories, rather than the rational and universal criteria one may expect. Hence, those who were behind this view rejected all of the rational analyses made for the sciences and the scientific methods. In this paper, we try to investigate the validity of the claims of “the Strong Programme,” and to clarify whether it is possible to understand the real nature of science without any rational approach. It is argued that it would be insufficient to determine the content of the science merely by the social factors, the natural facts might be meaningful by themselves as well.Bilimin ve bilimsel bilginin doğasını açıklamak için farklı pek çok yaklaşım geliştirilmiştir. Özellikle ondokuzuncu yüzyıldaki bazı bilimsel kuramların (evrim kuramı gibi) tercihinde toplumsal etmenlerin rolünün gözlemlenmesi, bilimsel bilginin toplumbilimsel bir araştırma konusu olduğu kanısını yaygınlaştırmıştır. Bu süreçte ortaya konan açıklama ve gerekçelendirme modellerinden biri de “Strong Programme” (Güçlü Program) olarak anılandır. “Strong Programme” ın temel savı, bilimsel kuramların tercihinde sanıldığı gibi ussal ve evrensel ölçütlerin değil, toplumsal etmenlerin belirleyici olduğu yönündeydi. Dolayısıyla bu görüşü savunanlar, bilim ve bilimsel yöntem için ortaya konan tüm ussalcı çözümlemeleri reddettiler. Bu çalışmada, “Strong Programme”ın ileri sürdüğü savların haklılığı ve sanıldığı gibi usçu bir yaklaşım olmaksızın bilimin gerçek doğasını anlamanın olanaklı olup olmadığı soruşturulmaktadır. Bilimin içeriğinin bütünüyle ve sadece toplumsal etmenlerce belirlenemeyeceği, doğa olaylarının da kendi başlarına anlamlı olabileceği ileri sürülmektedir.
23. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Emrah Konuralp Attempts on Non-Reductionist Marxist Theory of the State: A Stimulating Rehearsal or a Coherent Approach?
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As an oversimplification of economic reductionism, the base/superstructure metaphor is over identified with Marxist theory of the state, and the state has been considered to be corresponding to the latter. This over identification was seen inconvenient by some Marxist theoreticians who have been looking forward to analyse the state through a non-reductionist perspective. In this article, those attempts are compared and contrasted by dividing them into two categories and by using open Marxism as the banner of a distinctive group among non-reductionists. The main theme of this article is to clarify major theses of non-reductionists and to address to the apparent tensions within themselves. Despite their points of differentiations, they share a commonality in their hostility towards ‘traditional historical materialism’ and even towards structural Marxism. The positions mentioned in this article may not be considered as a coherent and consistent non-reductionist theory of the state due to their variations within themselves; however, at least they are successful as contemporary ‘attempts’ of non-reductionist Marxist theory of the state that would pave ground to a more consistent theory. In this article, they are considered to be stimulating as they ground their unease with reductionism on appealing issues.Ekonomik indirgemeciliğin bir yalınlaştırması olan altyapı/üstyapı metaforu Marksist devlet kuramıyla aşırı özdeşleştirilmektedir ve bu bağlamda devletin üstyapıya denk düştüğü düşünülmektedir. Bu aşırı özdeşleştirme, devleti indirgemeci olmayan bir bakış açısıyla çözümlemeye çaba gösteren bazı Marksist kuramcılar tarafından uygunsuz bulunmuştur. Bu makalede, bu çabalar sınıflara ayrılarak karşılaştırılmıştır ve açık Marksizm, indirgemeci olmayan yaklaşımlar içinde farklı bir grubun etiketi olarak kullanılmıştır. Bu makalenin ana teması, indirgemeci olmayan yaklaşımların temel tezlerini ortaya koymak ve bunlar arasındaki görünür gerilimlere dikkat çekmektir. Farklılaştıkları noktalar olmasına karşın ‘geleneksel tarihsel maddecilik’ ve yapısalcı Marksizme karşı tutumları ortaktır. Bu makalede ele alınan yaklaşımlar kendi aralarındaki çeşitliliklerden ötürü açık ve tutarlı bir indirgemeci olmayan devlet kuramı olarak değerlendirilmeyebilir; ancak, bunlar en azından daha tutarlı bir indirgemeci olmayan çağdaş Marksist devlet kuramına doğru evrilecek başarılı ‘çabalar’dır. Bu makalede, bu çabalar sorunları ele almada indirgemeciliğe karşı tedirginliklerini temellendirdikleri ölçüde ufuk açıcı görülmektedir.
24. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 3
Tevfik Uyar A Secondary Tool for Demarcation Problem: Logical Fallacies
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According to Thagard, the behavior of practitioners of a field may also be used for demarcation between science and pseudoscience due to its social dimension in addition to the epistemic one. I defended the tendency of pseudoscientists to commit fallacies, and the number of fallacies they commit can be a secondary tool for demarcation problem and this tool is consistent with Thagardian approach. In this paper, I selected the astrology as the case and I revealed nine types of logical fallacies frequently committed by astrologers while introducing their field and/or defending their claims against the scientific inquiries and refutation efforts. I also argued that recognizing these fallacies may help the audience to demarcate between the scientific and the pseudoscientific arguments.Thagard’a göre sözdebilimlerin epistemolojik boyutunun yanı sıra sosyal boyutu da bulunmaktadır ve bilim ve sözdebilim ayrım probleminde bir alanın uygulayıcılarının davranışları da bir araç olarak kullanılabilir. Bu makalede sözdebilimcilerin mantıksal safsata kullanmaya olan eğilimleri ve safsataya başvurma sıklıklarının bilim-sözdebilim ayrımında kullanılabilecek ikincil bir araç olduğu savunulmaktadır. Örnek olarak astroloji sözdebilimi seçilmiş ve astrologların alanlarını tanıtırken ya da savunurken sıklıkla başvurdukları dokuz mantıksal safsataya yer verilmiştir. Ayrıca bu safsataları tanımanın bilimsel ve sözdebilimsel argümanları ayırt edebilmede yardımcı olacağı ileri sürülmüştür.
25. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Mehmet Hilmi Demir Counterfactuals and Context: A Response to Brogaard and Salerno
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According to the standard interpretation, counterfactuals fail to satisfy the following inference rules: contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism. Contrary to the standard interpretation, Brogaard and Salerno (2008) argue that counterfactuals do satisfy these inference rules when context features are kept fixed in evaluating arguments with counterfactuals. For them, the main reason behind claiming that counterfactuals fail to satisfy these inference rules is the illicit shift in context when evaluating the arguments in question. If true, Brogaard and Salerno’s claim would have a devastating effect on the counterfactuals literature because almost the entire literature is based on the assumption that counterfactuals do not satisfy those inference rules. Given its importance, Brogaard and Salerno’s claim is examined in this paper. They are right in claiming that contextual features must be kept fixed throughout the evaluation of an argument, but the rest of their claim rests on a faulty reasoning. In the paper, I show that counterfactuals do fail to satisfy contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism even when contextual features are kept fixed throughout the evaluation of an argument in the way Brogaard and Salerno require.Karşıolgusal önermelerin Lewis tarafından geliştirilen standart yorumuna göre, normal şartlı önermeler kullanıldığında geçerli olan bazı çıkarsama kuralları karşıolgusal önermeler kullanıldığında geçersiz olmaktadır. Bu çıkarsama kurallarından öne çıkanlar şunlardır: tersevirme, önbileşen güçlendirme ve varsayımsal kıyas. Brogaard ve Salerno (2008), literatürde genel kabul gören standart yorumun aksine, bu bahsi geçen çıkarsama kurallarının karşıolgusal önermeler kullanıldığında dahi geçerli olduğunu iddia etmektedirler. Brogaard ve Salerno’ya göre bu çıkarsama kurallarının kullanıldığı argümanları değerlendirirken eğer bağlama dair özellikler sabit tutulur ise bu durum açıkça görülecektir. Yani Brogaard ve Salerno'ya göre bahsi geçen çıkarsama kurallarının karşıolgusal önermeler için geçerli olmadığının düşünülmesi, argümanların değerlendirilmesinde bağlam özelliklerinin farkında olmadan değiştirilmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Brogaard ve Salerno’nun bu iddiası, eğer doğru ise, çok önemlidir. Çünkü karşıolgusal önermeler üzerine olan literatürün tümü standard yoruma ve onun doğurduğu sonuçların kabulüne dayanmaktadır. Brogaard ve Salerno’nun iddiası doğru ise bu literatürün tümü anlamsızlaşacaktır. Bu makalede Brogaard ve Salerno’nun iddiası detaylı olarak incelenmektedir. Brogaard ve Salerno’nun belirttiği gibi argümanlar değerlendirilirken bağlama dair özellikler sabit tutulmalıdır. Ancak bağlama dair özellikler sabit tutulduğunda dahi karşıolgusal önermeler bahsi geçen çıkarsama kurallarını geçersiz kılmaktadır. Yani, Brogaard ve Salerno’nun ana iddiası yanlıştır. Bu makalede bu yanlışlık gösterilmektedir.
26. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Jacek Wojtysiak On the Principle of Sufficient Reason
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The aim of this paper is to defend the ontological Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR-O). I analyse various versions of this principle and various ways of justifying it. Then I attempt to challenge some counterexamples allegedly refuting a universal application of the PSR-O. There are standard and non-standard versions of the PSR-O. The PSR-Ostand can only be valid if there are no chains of contingent reasons and outcomes with first modules, i.e. all chains are actually infinite. However, there are serious arguments against this possibility. The necessary condition of the PSR-Onon-stand is the existence of a necessary substance: that substance would be a direct reason of certain contingent states of affairs obtaining in its domain, and those states of affairs would then be indirect reasons for all other contingent states of affairs and things. There are two advantages of the PSR-Onon-stand: a nomological unity of the world and explanatory simplicity.
27. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk, Jan Woleński Editorial
28. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Peter Simons Abstraction, Structure, and Substitution: Lambda and its Philosophical Significance
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λ-calculi are of interest to logicians and computer scientists but have largely escaped philosophical commentary, perhaps because they appear narrowly technical or uncontroversial or both. I argue that even within logic λ-expressions need to be understood correctly, as functors signifying functions in intension within a categorical or typed language. λ-expressions are not names but pure viable binders generating functors, and as such they are of use in giving explicit definitions. But λ is applicable outside logic and computer science, anywhere where the notions of complex whole, substitution, abstraction and structure make sense. To illustrate this, two domains are considered. One is somewhat frivolous: the study of flags; the other is very serious: manufacturing engineering. In each case we can employ λ-abstraction to describe substitutions within a structure, and in the latter case there is even a practical need for such a notation.
29. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Bartosz Gostkowski Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again
30. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Jan Woleński Two Critical Contributions to the Problem of Truth and Meaning
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This paper critically discusses two points concerning some recent views about the concept of truth. Firstly, contrary to Davidson, it shows that meaning of sentences cannot be explicated by T-equivalences. In particular, “is true” is an extensional predicate, but “means that” an intensional one. Secondly, the minimalist account of truth does not provide a satisfactory analysis of the concept of falsity. In this respect, minimalism does not satisfy Russell’s claim that any adequate truth-theory must be a theory of falsity as well.
31. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Susan Haack The Legitimacy of Metaphysics: Kant’s Legacy to Peirce, and Peirce’s to Philosophy Today
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Part of Kant’s legacy to Peirce was a lasting conviction that metaphysics is not irredeemable, but can and should be set “on the secure path of a science”. However, Peirce’s “scientific metaphysics”, unlike Kant’s, uses the method of science, i.e., of experience and reasoning; but requires close attention to experience of the most familiar kind rather than the recherché experience needed by the special sciences. This distinctively plausible reconception of what a genuinely scientific metaphysics would be is part of Peirce’s legacy to philosophy today, enabling us to steer clear of both apriorism and of scientism - the Scylla and Charybdis of recent metaphysics.
32. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Paweł Rojek If Tropes
33. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Janusz Salamon Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion
34. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Jan Hauska Dispositions and Meinongian Objects
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Questions concerning casual involvement of empirican properties have recently given rise to a lively philosophical controversy known as the debate about dispositions. I begin with a description of the focal points of the debate: the issue of the viability of the conditional analysis of dispostions, the question of whether or not they ultimately constitute a distinct kind of properties, the conundrum concerning their causal efficacy, and finally the bold suggestion that all properties are dispositional. Along the way I sketch current theories of the anture of dispositions. Then I draw a fuller picture of dispositionalism, i.e. of the family of positions united by embracing the ontological distinctness of dispositions and their causal efficacy. I conclude by defending dispositionalism against the objection, raised by David Armstrong, that it is committed to the existence of Meinongian objects.
35. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Paweł Łuków What is the Problem of Freedom of the Will?
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I argue in the paper that the problem of freedom has been misconstrued. There is no one problem of freedom but many problems concerning individual agents’ responsiveness to principles and reasons. The problem of free will results from attempts to incorporate the notion of freedom, which belongs to the order of guiding action, into a determinist framework of explanation. My view could be seen as compatibilist because it denies the existence of a fundamental conflict between freedom and determinism. However, since libertarian accounts of local indeterminism are pointless on my view, it cannot be easily place with the compatibilism/libertarianism distinction. Instead of entering the hopelessly unproductive metaphysical debates about freedom and determinism, I propose to turn attention to the domain of ethics. Problems of freedom are questions about the deliberative processes that terminate in action and about reasons and principles on which they are based. To say that an action is free is not to claim that it is independent from causal determination; rather, it is to say that it has been decided upon.
36. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Francesco Coniglione The Place of Polish Scientific Philosophy in the European Context
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Scientific philosophy is a sui generis project and it is not possible to assimilate it into analytic philosophy tout court, nor, a fortiori, into the philosophy of science. Scientific philosophy was practised during the early stage of the Vienna Circle before the influence of Wittgenstein’s thought became decisive. Afterwards, there was a quick transition to philosophy intended as subsidary to science, as a mere classification of meaning, coming, in the end, to its liquidation with Carnap’s logical syntax. Different was the path of the Lvov-Warsaw School, which remained committed to Brentano’s original programme and never abandoned the idea of the possibility of scientific philosophy. Decisive, here, was the absence of Wittgenstein’s influence and the utter irrelevance of that of Mach. It is in Poland that at the present days it has its strongest roots and there we find considerable trends of thought inspired by it.
37. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Piotr K. Szałek Mind and World: with a New Introduction by the Author
38. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Jan Woleński Notes on Books
39. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Dale Jacquette Denying The Liar
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The liar paradox is standardly supposed to arise from three conditions: classical bivalent truth value semantics, the Tarskian truth schema, and the formal constructability of a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. Standard solutions to the paradox, beginning most notably with Tarski, try to forestall the paradox by rejecting or weakening one or more of these three conditions. It is argued that all efforts to avoid the liar paradox by watering down any of the three assumptions suffers serious disadvantages that are at least as undesirable as the liar paradox itself. Instead, a new solution is proposed that admits that if the liar sentence is true then it is false, in the first paradox dilemma horn, but denies that the liar sentence is true, but asserting instead that it is false, and refuting the second paradox dilemma horn according to which it is supposed to follow that if the liar sentence is false then it is true. The reasoning for the second paradox dilemma horn is flawed, in that is not only not supported by but actually contradicted by the Tarskian truth schema. We could only infer the second dilemma horn if it were to clasically follow from the assumption that the liar sentence is false, and from the three liar paradox conditions, that therefore it is false that the liar sentence is false. This entire sentence can be shown to be false on the basis of the standard truth schema, thus blocking the paradox. Alternative formulations of the liar sentence are discussed, and the formal proofs and counterproofs for the two paradox dilemma horns, are considered along with the further philosophical implications of maintaining a resolute stance that the liar sentence is simply false.
40. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Gerald Harrison Libertarian Free Will and the Erosion Argument
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Libertarians make indeterminism a requirement of free will. But many argue that indeterminism is destructive of free will because it reduces an agent’s control. This paper argues that such concerns are misguided. Indeterminism, at least as it is located by plausible Libertarian views, poses no threat to an agent’s control, nor does it pose any other kind of threat.