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21. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Beatrice Nunold Landscape as a Topology of Being and Appearance
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Our reality constitutes itself as being one of pictures. Landscape is a product of aesthetic reflection as well as the perception of reality and virtual reality of the first order (VR 1). Pictorial representation of a landscape is virtual reality of the second order (VR 2). A picture is a structure of relations with a specific topology or an interrelationship. A picture is set in relation. Topology relates to relational similarities and differences as well as their transfer into other interrelationships, other topologies. The differences between nature, landscape (VR 1), metaphor of landscape and pictorial representation of landscape, etc. (VR 2) describe a change of the interrelationship. These changes happen in a physical-psychic-mental production of reality. We are involved in the events of particular relationships of the picture. The Topology of Being and Appearance reflects the inconspicuous similarities of relations and proportions in the relationship of the world in association with our physical-psychic-mental existential orientation in the world.
22. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Elga Freiberga The Problem of Affects in Aesthetics: Burke, Lyotard and Ranciere
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I was more excited by Jacques Ranciere’s idea about aesthetics being, in his opinion, a special way of thinking (mode de pensee) that works of art provoke and that tends to show what they are like as art objects. Aesthetics then (following this intention) would not be viewed as a discipline akin to art theory that wouldexamine the structure of the work of art, its peculiarities, conditions of arising, et cetera, all that attests either to its objectivity or subjectivity. Ranciere underscores the special (in the style of Hegel and Romanticist philosophy) regime of thinking about art where the idea is not yet an idea, but is what is not yet being thought. In spite of the fact that Ranciere’s declarations refer to S. Freud’s theory of the unconscious that, in his opinion, is closely linked with the way of artistic thinking and possibly can be expressed in no other way but through the medium of artistic thinking. The same way refers to the basic concepts of Freud’s psychoanalysis including also the unconscious and the ideas on complexes, especially on the Oedipus complex. It is interesting that Ranciere compares the framework ofthe dramatic nature of Oedipus’ fate with the basic fluctuations of aesthetics and art and namely – just like Oedipus is also the one who experiences everything absolutely and is completely expressed in action so the character of aesthetics and art is hidden in the contradictions between activities and sufferings or action and passions. This theme just like the question of the extreme poles of understanding aesthetics – pleasure and pain is comparable with the question of the determination of aesthetics and also art that grasps human experience in figural bodily shapes because that is the way of discerning the thought that is not yet being thought, but is hidden in bodily or animated figures. This tradition or historical regime, I think, is not to be discovered as a rectilinear trajectory; it manifests itself in a contradictory and sporadic way, frequently as an interlude between crucial conclusions and an essential interest pointing towards the ambivalence of art that referring to the words of the early modernist poet Charles Baudelaire: “I am the wound and the knife” would mark these relationships between action and its effect that could also attest to the painful birth of the thought in the not thought yet or else the negative character of aistheton.
23. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
David Brubaker The Beauty of Literati Strokes: Shi Tao, Merleau-Ponty and Communion with Nature
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How is the painter’s body related to the process of making a beautiful brush stroke? Those interested in this question will benefit from Jianping Gao’s findings, in The Expressive Act in Chinese Painting, a book that presents the aesthetic ideas of Chinese literati painters and art critics. Gao’s assigns five features to the actual practice of painting that results in the making of brush strokes that literati audiences would call “naturally beautiful.” These five are the interaction of idea and body, the concentration on paper, the suspension of the perception of natural objects, the emergence of a “pure self”, and the intersection of self with nature. I begin with the practice of concentration on paper and find that the literati painter observes the whole of the visible paper. After that, I introduce Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s late writings on the flesh of the body that belongs to the working painter. By developing the idea of an innate, interior whole of visibility, which persists through fleeting perceptions and Gestalts, Merleau-Ponty offers us a way to describe the individual painter’s innate corporeality, the transformation of thepainter, and intimate contact with nature. With Merleau-Ponty’s term “flesh of the body,” I return to interpret the five features of the literati process of making naturally beautiful strokes. I conclude that the literati writings help to reshape present-day aesthetics, and I note the philosophical language for a non-physical corporeality helps us appreciate the ideas of Chinese literati painters.
24. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Sun-Ah Kang Pictorial Metaphor
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In this paper, I argue that, first, there is a non-verbal metaphor, specifically pictorial metaphor, second, there are differences between verbal and non‐verbal metaphor but their differences are not as big as some people expect. Theorists who argue for visual/pictorial metaphor have used some analogy withverbal metaphor in order to justify their position. This approach itself is not wrong but sometimes their analogy goes to the wrong direction. I introduce two theorists, Noel Carroll and Richard Wollheim, who have a theory of visual metaphor and make an analogy with verbal metaphor. Their theories doom to fail because their analogy with verbal metaphor based on misunderstanding about verbal metaphor. Verbal metaphor is not to pair two objects belongs to unrelated realms, as pictorial metaphor is not recognize two different aspect alternatively, aspect seeing. Of course, paring two unrelated objects and aspect seeing may trigger off metaphor, but metaphor is not only about these two objects but also related to whole picture, sentence, discourse, or phrase and these things bringus to a pretense context in which metaphorical elements works and we are engaging in order to appreciate metaphor. When we see the metaphor in a whole picture, we enhance our understanding not only about visual metaphor but also verbal metaphor. Their differences lies in the way they get their primary meaning, but beyond it, there is no fundamental difference as metaphors between them.
25. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Bambang Sugiharto Nomadic Aesthetics: The Aftermath of the End of Art
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Visual arts have undergone significant changes in their character, identities, structures, And perceptions of what it means to be an artist. Arts have been ‘dematerialized’, so to say. This, in turn, creates a dilemma’: on the one hand, art turns into philosophy or mere strategy of representation; on the other, art becomes anything, with its pluralistic, pragmatic and multicultural characters. Corollary to this is that now art can hardly be judged, and hence, art criticismdisappears. Today art bears the character of pop-products : traumatic, nostalgic, transgressive, and nomadic. In such a cultural plight, however, art is not without significance. While the exclusive ‘world of Art’ seems to dissolve, its significant relation with broader life is resolved.
26. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Yi Wang, Fu Xiaowei Is the Unity of Goodness and Beauty the Feature of the Confucian Aesthetics?
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Carroll denies that the spectator of fiction film commonly has empathy with the characters. He argues that the spectator typically emotes to the events in the film from his position as observer, and that this context gives asymmetrical reactions in spectator and character. According to Carroll, empathy is unlikely to occur. Theproblem with this argument is that if the differences between spectator and character that Carroll points to exclude empathy, it would also exclude empathy in real life. Furthermore, Carroll merely shows that the spectator cannot only feel as the character feels. This does however not entail that empathy cannot be one part of the spectator’s response as observer. This paper thus argues that Carroll fails to show that empathy is an unlikely spectator response.
27. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Michael Wreen Three Arguments against Intentionalism in Interpretation
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Some philosophers identify the meaning of a work of art with what the artist intended the work to mean. Other philosophers think that although an artist’s intentions don’t fully determine a work’s meaning, they are a partial determinate of it. Last, there are philosophers who think that an artist’s intentions have no bearing on a work’s meaning. This paper is an examination of several arguments for the last of these three positions. In particular, it is a critical examination of three arguments advanced by Monroe Beardsley in his earlier writings in aesthetics.
28. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Yrjö Sepänmaa Being the Centre of the World
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Aesthetics is about sensations, experiences and emotions – but also about the rational mind that guides them. At the centre lies the feeling, sensing and thinking individual. The world unfolds from within oneself. No matter how remote a spot one chooses, it becomes the centre of the world; everyone travels with his own centre of the world, inevitably. He is, I am, the centrepoint.
29. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Sixto J. Castro The Eschatological Character of Contemporary Art Theory: A Metaxological Essay
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Along 19th and 20th centuries, art became a sort of new religion, sometimes coexisting peacefully with the institutional one, sometimes trying to provide what the institutional religion was not able to provide any more. Nowadays, art has adopted many of the solutions, topics and theories that theology has handled since it was born. Arthur C. Danto treats art as a reality whose history is over (and so, a escathological reality) and also as a metaxological (metaxy=between) reality dwelling between two realms. Thus, we cannot decide by pure perceptive means whether something is art or not. This consideration has important consequences for art theory.
30. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 1
Alec Gordon The Philosophical Poetics of Counter-World, Anti-World, and Ideal World: Some Reflections
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What might the project be of lyric poetry in late global capitalism in the early years of the new millennium which acknowledges both a post-romantic and modernist lineage, and which faces the critical challenge of postmodernist theorizing? This paper endeavors to respond to this question forwarding the Adorno-inspired viewpoint that the praxes of individual lyric poems reveal orientations of affirmation or negation be they intended or not. The thesis is stated that the “arguments” of modern poets are creative litigations posing counter-worlds, constituting anti-worlds, and projecting ideal worlds. The philosophical anthropology that informs this thesis focuses on the homo duplex conception of man as a double being—as a unique human individual and as members of thehuman species socialized into the social life-world. Thus a counterworld privileges the human subject in society as homo externus, whereas an anti-world centers on the human subject as homo internus opposed, at odds, or turned away from the external social life-world. These reflections finally concentrate on Northrop Frye’s idea of a “third order of experience” that, in his words, contrasts with “an existing world and a world which may not exist but is pointed toby the articulate orders of experience . . . this world is frequently called… an unborn world, a world that never quite enters existence.”
31. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Hahn Hsu Moral Reasons
32. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Ruben Apressyan Whether there is the Golden Rule in Aristotle’s Ethics?
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In the context of his advanced theory of ethics Aristotle like later Kant seems considering the Golden Rule as trivial and not bound to be articulated. It is possible that Aristotle did not feel necessity to mention the Golden Rule, because the very Golden Rule was spread out in his ethics. Though he did not use the formula ofthe Golden Rule in his texts, he often expressed his understanding of virtuous character and virtuous relations using intellective constructions evidently relevant to the Golden Rule. The analysis of Aristotle’s reasoning on shame, social intercourse and, mainly, friendship shows that his ethics is saturated with the content andspirit of the Golden Rule, including such features agent’s initiative, activity, commitment and thus her/his responsibility for establishing relations, their potential reversibility, mutuality, and universalizability.
33. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Makoto Suzuki “They Ought to Do This, But They Can’t”: The Two Senses of “Ought”
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We tend to think every ought statement implies that an actual agent can comply. However, our uses of “ought” suggest that some ought statements fail to have this implication: it is possible that the actual agent ought to do something she has no chance of accomplishing even if she intends to do so. Rather they imply that if the agent and her circumstances were defect-free, she could and would perform the prescribed action. There are two types of evaluation for ought statements. One type of evaluation addresses the question of what to do given the agent’s peculiar capacity and condition. The point of this evaluation is giving personalized action guidance, and so recommends only what the actual agent can do under the actual condition. Another type of evaluation addresses a different question, that of what to do as a type of agents. The point of this evaluation is the coordination of individuals by selecting a shared norm for them: the standard that prescribes all of them to perform the same action and classifies for all of them the same traits as defect. This is why it endorses the ought statements that some actual agents cannot comply with, but that a normal agent could and would do so under normal conditions.
34. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
M. Lorenz Moises J. Festin Rediscovering the Sense of Pleasure in Morality
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Pleasure has always been an important issue in morality. And although ethical systems tend to focus the discussion on human action, this agreeable sentiment has remained a recurrent question in moral philosophy. In this paper, I go back to Aristotle’s treatment of pleasure in his writings, particularly in the Nicomachean Ethics. I will argue that the distinction he draws between bodily pleasures and those of the mind represents an important point not only in understanding eudaimonia but also in situating the very nature of ethical debates today. I will try to show how Aristotle’s distinction among pleasure matches up with his differentiation between energeia and kinésis as well as with the distinction between praxis and poiésis, and how these differentiations have enabled Aristotle toevade the pitfall of hedonism.
35. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Halla Kim The Method of Transition in Kant’s Groundwork
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This paper is an attempt to understand the main characteristics of the three transitions that Kant makes in his Groundwork in view of his professed purpose of grounding pure moral philosophy. In particular, I show that the method of transition is devised as a way in which Kant can secure the a priori basis of morality in his campaign against naturalism in ethics.
36. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Godwin Azenabor The Golden Rule Principle in African Ethics and Kant’s Categorical Imperative: A Comparative Study on the Foundation of Morality
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This research attempts to throw light on and show the fundamental similarities and differences between the African and Western ethical conceptions by examining the foundation of ethics and morality in the two systems, using the Golden rule principle in African ethics and Kant’s categorical imperative in Western ethics as tools of comparative analysis. The African indigenous ethics revolves round the “Golden Rule Principle” as the ultimate moral principle. This principle states that “Do unto others what you want them to do unto you”. This principle compares favourably with Immanuel Kant’s whose main thrust is found in his “Categorical Imperative”, with the injunction for us to “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” The categorical imperative becomes for Kant, the principle of universalizability, which according to Kant, is categorical and must be equally binding on everyone. This idea of Kant, we argue, compares with the “Golden Rule Principle”. Both are rationalistic and social but the limitations of Kant which we hope to point out, make it quite insufficient as the foundation of morality. The Africans’ which is more humanistic describes morality and is better served. The main difference between the two ethical systems lies in the fact that whereas the “golden rule” starts from the self and considers the consequences on the first before others, the universalizability principle on the other hand considers the consequences on others first before self.
37. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Francesco Belfiore In Search of an Objective Moral Good
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The moral good, being the end that human beings ought to pursue, cannot be defined without referring to what human beings, as ontological entities, actually are. According to my conception, human mind (or spirit or person) is a triadic entity made of intellect, sensitiveness, and power which, through their outward or selfish activity (directed to the external objects), produce ideas, sentiments, and actions, whereas through their inward or moral activity (directed to mind itself), produce moral thoughts, moral feelings, and moral acts, respectively. Moral thoughts allow us to understand that mind is an evolving entity, and that mind evolution consists of the development of intellect (knowledge), sensitiveness (sensitivity of the soul), and power (health/wealth/social status), through which mind continuously transcends itself. Moreover, moral thoughts give us the cognitive awareness that mind evolution, entailing changes into ever better states, is the objective human good, thus creating the ground moral principle. On the other hand, moral feelings enable human beings to feel that mind evolution is morally desirable or valuable, thus founding the moral values. The moral acts perform the good deeds under the guidance of the moral norms, which arise fromthe convergence of moral principles and moral values. The ground moral norm prescribes the promotion of mind evolution. The moral agent should help others until they reach the evolutionallowing condition, that is, the condition that allows the helped person to develop his own mind, thus fulfilling his moral duty toward himself. The conception of the moral good as consisting of mind evolution allows us to give ethics an ontological basis.
38. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Jeffrey Benjamin White Good Will and the Conscience in Kant’s Ethical Theory
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The compass point of Kantian ethics is Kant’s categorical imperative. The compass point of Kantian ethics directs persons to ends of actions. It directs to ends the attainment of which can be universally prescribed. It directs away from those which can not. Most reviews of the demands of the categorical imperative tend torest in an assay of rationality and its demands. I think that this is a mistake. I think that on Kant’s mature view, the conscience, and so the categorical imperative, have nothing necessarily to do with rationality at all. The following work develops this position.
39. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Harald Stelzer Challenging Cultural Relativism From a Critical-Rationalist Ethical Perspective
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This paper is based on the assumption that critical rationalism represents a middle position between absolutist and relativistic positions because it rejects all attempts of ultimate justification as well as basic relativistic claims. Even though the critical-rationalist problem-solving-approach based on the method of trial and error leads to an acknowledgment of the plurality of theories and moral standards, it must not be confused with relativism. The relativistic claims of the incommensurability of cultures and the equality of all views of the world and all moral systems can be challenged by two basic critical‐rationalist arguments:(1) Popper’s critique of ‚the myth of the framework’; (2) the criticalrationalist conception of different levels of rationality (Albert, Agassi and Jarvie). In ethics moral standards and norms can be interpreted from a critical‐rationalist perspective as undogmatic suggestions for the regulation of social behaviour and as attempts to answer different problems, resulting from social life. This allows for the comparison of different moral standards, norms, practices and institutions with reference to the underlying problem situation and the search for culturally overlapping moral standards.
40. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Matthias Fritsch Deconstructing Ought Implies Can
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The present paper aims to view three ways of thinking time by Emmanuel Levinas. We distinguish existential, historical, and eschatological time demonstrating how they are connected with his central notion of responsibility toward the Other. The following analysis reorders and interprets what Levinas has said in response of Martin Heidegger’s and Hegel’s position. The text does not make any other claims but aims to offer a possible reading and exegesis of Levinas’s philosophy and open a further discussion on these topics.