Narrow search

By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:

Displaying: 21-40 of 45 documents

0.256 sec

21. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 32
Marina Bykova Fichte’s Doctrine of the Self-Positing Subject
22. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 33
Michel Heijdra PhD Conference report: Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy and its Reception. Amsterdam, September 7-8, 2006
23. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 35
Dietmar H. Heidemann Fichte and the Dream Argument
24. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 35
Peter Dews Nature and Subjectivity: Fichte’s Role in the Pippin/McDowell Debate in the Light of his neo-Kantian Reception
25. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 36
Tom Rockmore Remarks on Fichte and Realism
26. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 36
Marina F. Bykova Fichte: Bildung as a True Vocation of Man
27. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 37
Liu Zhe Fichte’s Practical Self-Consciousness and Hegel’s Speculation. A Fundamental Dialogue in the Differenz-Schrift (1801)
28. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 38
Angelica Nuzzo Fichte’s Thathandlung and Gentile’s »Attualismo« – Dialectic and its Counter-Reformation
29. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 41
David W. Wood From »Fichticizing« to »Romanticizing«: Fichte and Novalis on the Activities of Philosophy and Art
30. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 43
Monica Marchetto Drive, Formative Drive, World Soul: Fichte’s Reception in the early works of A.K.A. Eschenmayer
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This article reconstructs the reception of Fichte’s philosophy in the works of the physician and philosopher A.K.A. Eschenmayer between 1796 and 1801. In 1796/97, Eschenmayer was working on his project of a metaphysics of nature which would be capable of constituting a middle term between the empirical sciences and the transcendental philosophy. In doing so, he explicitly engaged with Kant, on the one hand, and with scientists of the time, on the other hand, while the influence of Fichte is comparatively slight and less easily discerned. In 1798, however, he introduced into his studies of magnetism an explicit recognition of Fichte and a reference to the third principle of the Wissenschaftslehre. In 1799, Eschenmayer adopted a higher standpoint from which it was possible to conceive the genesis of the concepts which up to that point had been merely analysed. This change of viewpoint coincided with a deeper engagement with the works of Fichte. The analysis of the Dedukzion and of Eschenmayer’s explicit references to Fichte that is attempted in the present study leads to the conclusion that Eschenmayer not only adopted some terminology typical of Fichtean philosophy but also integrated into his deduction several theoretical elements developed by Fichte (e.g. the concept of the I as interaction with itself; the idea of intersubjectivity as a necessary condition of self-consciousness, the concept of striving). The reconstruction of the influences that Fichte exercised on Eschenmayer’s thought is fundamental to an understanding of the theoretical position of Eschenmayer and the point of view from which in 1801 he formulated his criticism of Schelling’s idea of nature as autarchic and as its own legislator.Der Beitrag rekonstruiert die Rezeption der Philosophie Fichtes in den Werken des Arztes und Philosophen A.K.A Eschenmayer aus den Jahren 1796 bis 1801. 1796/97 verfolgt Eschenmayer das Ziel, eine Naturmetaphysik zu entwickeln, die als Mittelglied zwischen den empirischen Wissenschaften und der Transzendentalphilosophie fungieren soll. Dabei setzt er sich einerseits mit Kant und andererseits mit den Wissenschaftlern seiner Zeit auseinander. Der Einfluss von Fichte auf Eschenmayer ist hingegen vergleichsweise gering und nicht leicht festzustellen. Dennoch erkennt Eschenmayer bereits in seiner Studie zum Magnetismus aus dem Jahr 1798 das Verdienst Fichtes an und verweist auf den dritten Grundsatz der Wissenschaftslehre. Im Jahr 1799 erhebt sich Eschenmayer insofern zu einem höheren Standpunkt, als er nun die Genese der Begriffe entfaltet, die er vorher bloß analysiert hatte. Diese Änderung des Standpunktes führt Eschenmayer zu einer tieferen Auseinandersetzung mit den Werken Fichtes. Die in diesem Beitrag durchgeführte Untersuchung der Passagen aus Eschenmayers Dedukzion, in denen sich explizite Verweise auf Fichte finden, hat zu dem Schluss geführt, dass Eschenmayer sich nicht nur Fichtes Terminologie zu eigen macht, sondern auch mehrere von Fichte aufgestellte Theorien in seine eigene Deduktion integriert (den Begriff des Ich als Wechselwirkung mit sich selbst, die Theorie der Intersubjektivität als notwendiger Bedingung des Selbstbewusstseins, den Begriff des Strebens). Die Rekonstruktion der Einflüsse Fichtes auf Eschenmayer ist nicht nur für ein besseres Verständnis der Philosophie Eschenmayers unentbehrlich, sondern trägt auch zum Verständnis des Standpunktes bei, von dem aus Eschenmayer im Jahre 1801 Kritik an Schellings Idee der Natur als ihrer eigenen Gesetzgeberin übt.
31. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 44
Daniel Breazeale Fichte, Skepticism, and the ‘Agrippan Trilemma'
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In his recent All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 2005), Paul Franks defends Maimonian skepticism and explicitly criticizes Fichte’s response to the same. I argue that Franks’ interpretation of Fichte’s response to skepticism is fundamentally flawed in that it ignores or misinterprets the critically important practical/moral dimension of Fichte’s response. I also challenge Franks’ interpretation of the Jena Wissenschaftslehre as a »derivation holistic monism« and argue for a more modest interpretation of the same and one more in keeping with Fichte’s appreciation of the force of philosophical skepticism and the limits of transcendental philosophizing.
32. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 44
Luc Langlois The Meaning of Life According to Fichte (1796–1800)
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In a letter to Jacobi dated August 30, 1795, Fichte writes: »What is the purpose of the speculative standpoint, and indeed of philosophy as a whole, if it does not serve life?« But the question is also: in what sense is the meaning of life founded on the meaning of freedom? What I would like to suggest here is that the Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre) Nova methodo (1796–99), probably the pinnacle of Fichte’s thought during the Jena period, should be read together with the Bestimmung, which brought this period (1800) to a close. The two works tackle head-on the question of the meaning of freedom, which directly links up with the question of the meaning of human existence, with both questions being entirely immanent to the reflection of finite consciousness on its synthetic activity.
33. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 44
George Di Giovanni The Spinozism of Fichte’s Transcendental Argument in the Lecture Notes of 1804
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In a transcendental argument, a judgement ≫S is P≪ is unpacked into the two reflective claims: ≫I say that S is P≪, and ≫What I say is indeed the case≪; and the truth of the second is made to rest on the authority of the ≫I say≪ of the first. The argument has all the features of a testimony, where the reliability of the testimony (as in juridical cases) depends on the extent to which, in being rendered, it conforms to stipulated canons of objectivity. As presented in 1804, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre can be interpreted as a protracted argument of this kind, inasmuch as, since its avowed subject-matter, the One, is ex hypothesi ineffable, its validity as a narrative about it depends solely on its internal logic as narrative. Such a narrative can only be one which, in constructing any schema about its transcendent subject-matter, at the same time de-constructs it: in the course of this process it methodically and exhaustively uncovers the genesis of otherwise merely accepted facts of experience, manifesting them for what they truly are (a disappearing appearing), and also allowing the necessarily unspoken evidence of the One to shine through (at least, for those willing to freely give themselves over to the discipline of Fichte’s Science). The Wissenschaftslehre 1804 is a type of apophantic theology. It is a Spinozism, but one developed from the standpoint of a finite subject who knows that he exists in a universe where, in truth, there is no explainable room for finitude.
34. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 44
Ezequiel L. Posesorski Enlightenment, Historicity, and the Teleological Overcoming of Skepticism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
One recently discovered aspect of Reinhold’s early Elementarphilosophie is that it constitutes the last historical step of a teleological activity of reason that ends the history of philosophy. The historical emergence of Reinhold’s system first enables the recognition of the ever-existing laws of the human spirit, and hence, the definitive grounding of philosophy on an unquestionable Grundsatz. According to Reinhold, this also meant that all pre-critical or non-enlightened, partisan assertions, including those of skepticism, lose their raison-d’être. One failure of Reinhold’s approach is its inability to provide a justification of reason’s historical ability to make teleological progress. A Schulzean skeptic might argue that this reveals the inexhaustive character of Reinhold’s Grundsatz, its inability to determine a constitutive aspect of his concept of historical reason. A critical re-articulation of the early Elementarphilosophie after Schulze’s objections required that this issue be reworked. This was one of the tasks that August L. Hülsen, one of Reinhold’s former students who embraced Fichte’s system in 1795 addressed in Preisschrift, his virtually neglected book of 1796. This paper outlines Reinhold’s approach, and shows how Hülsen’s normative reading of the Wissenschaftslehre allowed Fichte’s concept of self-positing activity to become a historical mechanism of teleological striving capable of providing an enlightened or skeptically ›immune‹ alternative to Reinhold’s concept.
35. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 6
Daniel Breazeale Philosophy and the Divided Self: On the »Existential« and »Scientific« Tasks of the Jena Wissenschaftslehre
36. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 9
George di Giovanni The Early Fichte as Disciple of Jacobi
37. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 45
Douglas Moggach Contextualising Fichte: Leibniz, Kant, and Perfectionist Ethics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
An examination of the intellectual context in which Fichte develops his ethical program in the Jena period and its immediate aftermath (1794–1800) reveals the determining presence of Leibniz, and the complex heritage of Leibnizian perfectionist thought from which Kantian, and post-Kantian, ethics seek to extricate themselves. While Kant blocks any reversion to the older, Leibnizian perfectionism, his criticisms leave open a space for a new kind of perfectionist ethic, one whose object is the promotion not of any determinate notion of eudaimonia or thriving, but of the possibility of free agency itself. The aim of post-Kantian perfectionism is to sustain the conditions of free, spontaneous action. Fichte’s ethical system is one example of post-Kantian perfectionism.
38. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 45
Daniel Breazeale In Defense of Conscience: Fichte vs. Hegel
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
First in the Phenomenology and then in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel rejects Fichte’s notion of conscience on the grounds that it leads to despair (since the agent can never be sufficiently well-informed to know that he is doing the “right” thing). He also criticizes Fichtean conscience as purely “formal” and “abstract” and compatible with any content, which it can obtain only arbitrarily from the manifold of one’s natural drives and inclinations. For Hegel, there is an unresolvable tension between the claimed “universality” of a conscientious deed and the natural particularity of every moral agent, which ultimately leads to ethical egoism and hypocrisy. The aim of this paper is to show, first, that Hegel misrepresents key aspects of Fichte’s position and, second, that Fichte possesses the resources to respond successfully to most of Hegel’s criticisms. In order to grasp this one must closely examine Fichte’s subtle and often misunderstand account of moral deliberation and conscientious decision-making and the relation of the same to his larger account of I-hood.
39. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 45
Frederick Beiser Neo-Kantianism as Neo-Fichteanism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This article defends the paradoxical thesis that neo-Kantianism is better described as neo-Fichteanism rather than neo-Kantianism. It maintains that neo-Kantianism is closer to Fichte than Kant in four fundamental respects: in its nationalism, socialism, activism, and in its dynamic and quantitative conception of the dualism between understanding and sensibility. By contrast, Kant’s philosophy was cosmopolitan, liberal, non-activist quietist and held a static and qualitative view of the dualism between understanding and sensibility. I attempt to explain why it took the neo-Kantians so long to recognize these profound affinities with Fichte: they were influenced by Fries conception of Fichte as a speculative metaphysician. I argue that the hold of Friesian interpretation of Fichte was first broken by Emil Lask in his Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte.
40. Fichte-Studien: Volume > 46
Luis Fellipe Garcia Knowing, Creating and Teaching: Fichte’s Conception of Philosophy as Wissenschaftslehre
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Independently of the discussions on the development of Fichte’s philosophy, there is something that does not seem to change throughout the more than a dozen presentations of his doctrine, namely, his constant concern with the meaning of philosophy. This concern is such a structuring one for Fichte that he even decides to replace the very name of “philosophy” by another one, less heavy in meaning and better suited to elucidate the nature of this particular activity that constitutes his own project. He calls it the Wissenschaftslehre. In this term created by Fichte three verbs can be found: wissen (to know), schaffen (to create) and lehren (to teach) – we would like to propose that Fichte’s conception of philosophy can be brought out as the orchestrated action of those three activities: knowing, creating and teaching. The point here being not to say that Fichte had the idea in mind of composing these three verbs (wissen, schaffen, lehren) when he created the term Wissenschaftslehre, but only that those terms offer useful landmarks for the exploration of Fichte’s philosophical landscape.Unabhängig von den Diskussionen über die Entwicklung der Philosophie Fichtes gibt es etwas, das sich in den zahlreichen Darstellungen seiner Lehre nicht zu ändern scheint, nämlich seine ständige Auseinandersetzung mit der Bedeutung der Philosophie selbst. Diese Sorge ist für Fichte so entscheidend, dass er sogar beschließt, den Namen Philosophie durch einen anderen zu ersetzen, weniger schwer in der Bedeutung und nach ihm besser geeignet, das Wesen dieser besonderen Tätigkeit, die sein eigenes Projekt zum Ausdruck bringt, aufzuklären. Er nennt es die „Wissenschaftslehre“. In diesem von Fichte geschaffenen Begriff lassen sich drei Verben auffinden: Wissen, Schaffen und Lehren. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz möchte ich vorschlagen, dass Fichtes Auffassung von Philosophie als die orchestrierte Handlung dieser drei Tätigkeiten angesehen werden kann: Wissen, Schaffen und Lehren. Ich will damit nicht behaupten, dass Fichte die explizierte Absicht hatte, diese drei Verben zu komponieren als er den Begriff „Wissenschaftslehre“ schuf, sondern nur, dass diese Begriffe nützliche Anhaltspunkte für die Erforschung von Fichtes philosophischer Landschaft anbieten.