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21. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 2
Harry McCauley Circling Descartes
22. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 2
Mette Lebech What is Human Dignity?
23. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 2
Noel Kavanagh Brentano and Husserl on the Phenomenon of Love
24. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 2
Tony Fahey Vico on the Making of the Heroic or Dignified Mind
25. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 2
Stephen McGroggan The Beginning and the End of Philosophy
26. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Thomas A. F. Kelly Foreword
27. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Patrick Gorevan Knowledge as Participation in Scheler and Aquinas
28. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Michael Dunne Magister Riccardus filius Radulfi de Ybemia: Richard fitzRalph as Lecturer in early 14th Century Oxford
29. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Thomas A. F. Kelly Anselm’s Cosmological Argument for God’s Existence: An interpretation of Monologion Chapter Three
30. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Michael Dunne Editor’s Introduction
31. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Paul Lyttle Newman on Friendship
32. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Paul Lyttle An Aristotelian-Thomistic Perspective on the Phenomenon of Grief
33. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Cyril McDonnell Brentano’s Modification of the Medieval-Scholastic Concept of ‘Intentional Inexistence’ in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874)
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Brentano is perhaps most famously renowned for his re-deployment of Scholastic terminology of ‘intentional act’ and ‘intentional object’ in the elaboration of his novel science of ‘descriptive psychology’ in the mid-1870s and 1880s. In this re-deployment, however, Brentano adapted the original Scholastic meanings of both of these terms. Thus Brentano advanced not one but two descriptive-psychological theses of intentionality.1 These theses, however, are often not properly distinguished, and consequently they are more often confused. Nevertheless, once the two theses are distinguished, Brentano’s basic descriptive-psychological tenet of the intentionality of consciousness is more readily understandable on its own terms. Whether Brentano’s descriptive-psychological tenet is entirely acceptable philosophically, or not, of course, is another matter but this presupposes understanding in a straightforward sense what Brentano’s doctrine is. In this article, I will be concerned mainly with Brentano’s re-introduction of ‘what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object’ in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874),2 even though it is Brentano’s (second) thesis on ‘intentional act’, one that he developed after his 1874 publication, that is more generally well known and examined. While acknowledging that many versions of ‘Brentano’s thesis’, as it is usually (and loosely) referred to by commentators today, have been re-worked in modern philosophy of mind, this article focuses attention on some of the main points of convergence and deviance between the original Scholastic concept and Brentano’s ‘new’ concept of intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.
34. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
James McEvoy Aristotle’s Theory of Philia, its Achievements and its Limitations
35. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Stephen McGroggan The Metaphysics of Evil
36. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
John Haydn Gurmin The Theory of Evolution from Darwin to Postmodernism
37. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Denise Ryan The Summa de Anima of Jean de La Rochelle
38. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 4
Ian Leask First Impressions Reconsidered: Some Notes on the Levinasian Critique of Husserl
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This article investigates an intriguing ambivalence in Levinas’s reading(s) of Husserl’s phenomenology of internal-time consciousness. The article focuses on the specific treatment of the Husserlian ‘proto-impression’, suggesting that one (under-appreciated) aspect of Levinas’s approach may serve to undermine, or even ‘un-say’, its better known counterpart.
39. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 4
Thomas A. F. Kelly Foreword
40. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 4
Cyril McDonnell Editor’s Introduction