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21. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 2
Stephen McGroggan The Beginning and the End of Philosophy
22. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Patrick Gorevan Knowledge as Participation in Scheler and Aquinas
23. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Michael Dunne Magister Riccardus filius Radulfi de Ybemia: Richard fitzRalph as Lecturer in early 14th Century Oxford
24. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Thomas A. F. Kelly Anselm’s Cosmological Argument for God’s Existence: An interpretation of Monologion Chapter Three
25. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Paul Lyttle Newman on Friendship
26. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Paul Lyttle An Aristotelian-Thomistic Perspective on the Phenomenon of Grief
27. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Cyril McDonnell Brentano’s Modification of the Medieval-Scholastic Concept of ‘Intentional Inexistence’ in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874)
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Brentano is perhaps most famously renowned for his re-deployment of Scholastic terminology of ‘intentional act’ and ‘intentional object’ in the elaboration of his novel science of ‘descriptive psychology’ in the mid-1870s and 1880s. In this re-deployment, however, Brentano adapted the original Scholastic meanings of both of these terms. Thus Brentano advanced not one but two descriptive-psychological theses of intentionality.1 These theses, however, are often not properly distinguished, and consequently they are more often confused. Nevertheless, once the two theses are distinguished, Brentano’s basic descriptive-psychological tenet of the intentionality of consciousness is more readily understandable on its own terms. Whether Brentano’s descriptive-psychological tenet is entirely acceptable philosophically, or not, of course, is another matter but this presupposes understanding in a straightforward sense what Brentano’s doctrine is. In this article, I will be concerned mainly with Brentano’s re-introduction of ‘what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object’ in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874),2 even though it is Brentano’s (second) thesis on ‘intentional act’, one that he developed after his 1874 publication, that is more generally well known and examined. While acknowledging that many versions of ‘Brentano’s thesis’, as it is usually (and loosely) referred to by commentators today, have been re-worked in modern philosophy of mind, this article focuses attention on some of the main points of convergence and deviance between the original Scholastic concept and Brentano’s ‘new’ concept of intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.
28. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
James McEvoy Aristotle’s Theory of Philia, its Achievements and its Limitations
29. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Stephen McGroggan The Metaphysics of Evil
30. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
John Haydn Gurmin The Theory of Evolution from Darwin to Postmodernism
31. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 3
Denise Ryan The Summa de Anima of Jean de La Rochelle
32. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 4
Ian Leask First Impressions Reconsidered: Some Notes on the Levinasian Critique of Husserl
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This article investigates an intriguing ambivalence in Levinas’s reading(s) of Husserl’s phenomenology of internal-time consciousness. The article focuses on the specific treatment of the Husserlian ‘proto-impression’, suggesting that one (under-appreciated) aspect of Levinas’s approach may serve to undermine, or even ‘un-say’, its better known counterpart.
33. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 4
Michael Dunne A Being-towards-Death — the Vado mori
34. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 4
Harry McCauley Red, Riotous and Wrong: Is the Secondary Quality Analogy an Unpalatable Doctrine?
35. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 4
Cyril McDonnell Understanding and Assessing Heidegger’s Topic in Phenomenology in Light of His Appropriation of Dilthey’ s Hermeneutic Manner of Thinking
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This paper analyses Heidegger’s controversial advancement of Husserl’s idea of philosophy and phenomenological research towards ‘the Being-Question’ and its relation to ‘Dasein’. It concentrates on Heidegger’s elision of Dilthey and Husserl’s different concepts of ‘Descriptive Psychology’ in his 1925 Summer Semester lecture-course, with Husserl’s concept losing out in the competition, as background to the formulation of ‘the Being-Question’ in Being and Time (1927). It argues that Heidegger establishes his own position within phenomenology on the basis of a partial appropriation of Dilthey’s hermeneutical manner of thinking, an appropriation that was later radically called into question by Levinas on Diltheyean-hermeneutical-philosophical grounds.
36. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 4
Edith Stein, Mette Lebech Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy Translation by Mette Lebech
37. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 4
Denise Ryan Jean de La Rochelle’s Formulation of the Distinction between Being and Essence
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The distinction between ‘being’ and ‘essence’ arose in the elaboration of the theory of universal hylomorphism, defended by the Franciscans, which maintained that there is a composition of matter and form in all beings other than the First cause. This paper focuses on a formula which Jean de La Rochelle (1190/ 1200-1245) borrows from Boethius (c. 480-524) to explain how the ‘being’ of the soul is distinct from the ‘essence’ of the soul. It concludes by raising the question whether Jean’s formulation anticipates that of St Thomas Aquinas’s (1224-1274) in his early writings on De Ente et Essentia.
38. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 4
John Haydn Gurmin Edith Stein and Tania Singer: A Comparison of Phenomenological and Neurological Approaches to the Problem of Empathy
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This paper compares Edith Stein’s phenomenological approach to empathy in On the Problem of Empathy (1917) with that of more recent neurological explanations of empathy, broadly exemplified by Tania Singer’s (2006) work. Given that we are dealing with two different methodologies that reflect the general debate that exists between phenomenology and natural science (neurology), a consideration of ‘method’ will be discussed prior to our comparative analysis of Stein and Singer’s account of empathy. In conclusion, we argue that Stein’s phenomenological understanding of empathy provides the most comprehensive description of the act of empathy to date for neurologists to ‘reflect ’ on.
39. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 5
Patrick Gorevan Philippa Foot’s ‘Natural Goodness’
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Philippa Foot, with the help of her friend and colleague Elizabeth Anscombe, discovered that Summa Theologiae, II-II of Thomas Aquinas was a powerful resource in seeking objectivism in ethics. Foot’s aim was to produce an ethics of natural goodness, in which moral evil, for example, came to be seen as a ‘natural defect’ rather than the expression of a taste or preference. This brought her to develop a concrete ethics of virtue with a broad sweep, dealing with the individual and communal needs and goods of human beings, and particularly with their central moral quality of acting for a reason, with a practical rationality. This has helped her to return to an Aristotelian meaning of virtue, as simply one kind of excellence among others.
40. Maynooth Philosophical Papers: Volume > 5
Michael Dunne Aodh Mac Aingil (Hugo Cavellus, 1571—1626) on Doubt, Evidence and Certitude
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When John Duns Scotus died at the young age of 42, seven centuries ago in 1308, he did not leave behind a completed body of work which would present his mature philosophical thought. Thus, the followers of Scotus were faced with the challenging task of interpreting the texts of the Subtle Docotr. Since Scotism became one of the most important schools of thought by the early modern period, the synthesis elaborated by the most famous of the commentators on Scotus’s philosophy Hugo Cavellus (1571-1626), Irish Franciscan and Archbishop of Armagh is of capital importance. Cavellus dedicated a considerable part of his commentary on the De Anima of Duns Scotus to the problems relating to the theory of the knowledge. Because of Cavellus’s central importance in seventeenth-century Scotism, his writings on doubt, evidence and certitude are noteworthy in terms of developments in modern thought.