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201. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Notes to Contributors
202. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
203. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Thomas Hall In Defense of the Compossibility of Presentism and Time Travel
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In this paper I defend the compossibility of presentism and time travel from two objections. One objection is that the presentist's model of time leaves nowhereto travel to; the second objection attempts to equate presentist time travel with suicide. After targeting some misplaced scrutiny of the first objection, I show that presentists have the resources to account for the facts that make for time travel on the traditional Lewisian view. In light of this ability, I argue that both of the objections fail.
204. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Shane Ryan A Humean Account of Testimonial Justification
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I argue that a Humean account can make sense of the phenomenology associated with testimonial justification; the phenomenology being that in standard cases hearers regularly simply accept a testifier‟s assertions as true – hearers don't engage in monitoring. The upshot is that a Humean account is in a better position dialectically than is usually supposed. I provide some background to the debate before setting out two challenges facing accounts of testimonial justification. The first challenge is to provide an account that accords with the phenomenology of testimonial reception; the second challenge is to provide an account that can make sense of some testimonial beliefs enjoying greater justification than others. I show the credulist position to be vulnerable to the second challenge and the Humean position to be vulnerable to the first challenge. I argue that a Humean account, by drawing on dual process theory, can overcome thefirst challenge.
205. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Rodrigo Borges How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the Dark Side of Knowledge
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The Gettier Problem and Moore‟s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in aMoorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper starts the job of mapping what can be said about this feature of Gettier situations. The goal is to stimulate further exploration into this yet uncharted territory.
206. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Logos and Episteme. Aim and Scope
207. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Michael Huemer Alternative Self-Defeat Arguments: A Reply to Mizrahi
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I address Moti Mizrahi‟s objections to my use of the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). Mizrahi contends that other epistemologicaltheories can be supported by parallel self-defeat arguments. I argue that the self-defeat arguments for other theories either (a) are compatible with PC and thus present no problem, or (b) have a false premise, unlike the self-defeat argument for PC.
208. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Notes on the Contributors
209. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Ned Markosian Do You Know That You Are Not a Brain in a Vat?
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The topic of this paper is the familiar problem of skepticism about the external world. How can you know that you are not a brain in a vat being fooled byalien scientists? And if you can't know that, how can you know anything about the external world? The paper assumes Evidentialism as a theory about justification, and then argues that you are justified in believing that you are not a brain in a vat, in virtue of the fact that your evidence supports that belief. The paper also considers a number of different objections to this proposal. The upshot is that you do know that you are a not a brain in a vat, and that you also know lots of things about the external world.
210. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Notes to Contributors
211. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Rinat M. Nugayev Maxwellian Scientific Revolution: A Case Study in Kantian Epistemology
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It is exhibited that maxwellian electrodynamics was created as a result of the old pre-maxwellian programmes reconciliation: the electrodynamics of Ampere-Weber, the wave theory of Young-Fresnel and Faraday‟s programme. The programmes‟ meeting led to construction of the whole hierarchy of theoretical objects starting from the genuine crossbreeds (the displacement current) and up to usual mongrels. After the displacement current construction the interpenetration of the pre-maxwellian programmes began that marked the beginning of theoretical schemes of optics and electromagnetism real unification. Maxwell‟s programme did supersede its rivals because it did assimilate some ideas of the Ampere-Weber programme, as well as the presuppositions of the programmes of Young-Fresnel and Faraday. Maxwellian programme‟s victory over its rivals became possible because the core of Maxwell‟s unification strategy was formed by Kantian epistemology looked through the prism of William Whewell and such representatives of Scottish Enlightenment as Thomas Reid and William Hamilton.It was Kantian epistemology that enabled Hermann von Helmholtz and his pupil Heinrich Hertz to arrive at such a version of Maxwell‟s theory that could serve a heuristical basis for the radio waves discovery.
212. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Jon Altschul Epistemic Deontologism and Role-Oughts
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William Alston‘s argument against epistemological deontologism rests upon two key premises: first, that we lack a suitable amount of voluntary control with respect to our beliefs, and, second, the principle that "ought" implies "can." While several responses to Alston have concerned rejecting either of these two premises, I argue that even on the assumption that both premises are true, there is room to be made for deontologism in epistemology. I begin by offering a criticism of Richard Feldman‘s invaluable work on 'role-oughts,' whereupon I develop my own positive view in light of Feldman‘s shortcomings. The upshot is that while we as epistemic agents are not responsible for the beliefs we form, we are nonetheless responsible for the various bodily or mental activities that typically bear a causal influence on belief formation.
213. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Michael Shaw Perry Externalism, Skepticism, and Belief
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In this paper I analyze epistemological externalism and its adequacy as a response to skepticism. Externalism is defined by denial of accessibility: a subject canknow if a particular condition beyond truth and belief is satisfied, even if the subject has no reflective access to the satisfaction of the condition. It hence has quick responses to skepticism. Three sorts of skepticism are differentiated and discussed: high standards skepticism, Cartesian-style skepticism, and Pyrrhonism. If we decouple high standards and Cartesian-style skepticism, a simple fallibilism is a superior response to the first and externalism is an unsatisfying response to the second. Pyrrhonism reveals what it is missing in externalism. Pyrrhonism targets belief and so redefinitions of knowledge are insufficient as a reply. Externalism assumes we have beliefs and asks what must be added to achieve knowledge, but if we look at the epistemic situation the externalist puts us in, it is not clear we would form or retain beliefs. In similar circumstances the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment. Once we are clear how Pyrrhonism actually challenges externalismit provides a direct and more revealing critique, making clear what is given up and pointing the way for further epistemological inquiry.
214. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Moti Mizrahi Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-defeat Arguments: A Reply to Huemer
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In this paper, I respond to Michael Huemer‘s reply to my objection against Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I have argued that Huemer‘s Self-defeat Argument for PC does not favor PC over competing theories of basic propositional justification, since analogous self-defeat arguments can be constructed for competing theories. Huemer responds that such analogous self-defeat arguments are unsound. In this paper, I argue that Huemer‘s reply does not save his Self-defeat Argument for PC from my original objection.
215. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Franz Huber What is the Permissibility Solution a Solution of? – A Question for Kroedel
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Kroedel has proposed a new solution, the permissibility solution, to the lottery paradox. The lottery paradox results from the Lockean thesis according to whichone ought to believe a proposition just in case one‘s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. The permissibility solution replaces the Lockean thesis by the permissibility thesis according to which one is permitted to believe a proposition if one‘s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. This note shows that the epistemology of belief that results from the permissibility thesis and the epistemology of degrees of belief is empty in the sense that one need not believe anything, even if one‘s degrees of belief are maximally bold. Since this result can also be achieved by simply dropping the Lockean thesis, or by replacing it with principles that are logically stronger than the permissibility thesis, the question arises what the permissibility solution is a solution of.
216. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Michael Da Silva KK and the Knowledge Norm of Action
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This piece examines the purported explanatory and normative role of knowledge in Timothy Williamson‘s account of intentional action and suggests that it isin tension with his argument against the luminosity of knowledge. Only iterable knowledge can serve as the norm for action capable of explaining both why people with knowledge act differently than those with mere beliefs and why only those who act on the basis of knowledge-desire pairs are responsible actors.
217. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Notes of Contributors
218. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Benoit Gaultier An Argument Against the Possibility of Gettiered Beliefs
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In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier‘s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxasticvoluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not-p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed.
219. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Timothy Perrine Against Kornblith Against Reflective Knowledge
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In On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes Sosa‘s distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. His two chief criticisms are that reflective knowledgeis not superior to animal knowledge and that Sosa‘s distinction does not identify two kinds of knowledge. I argue that Sosa can successfully avoid both of these charges.
220. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Logos and Episteme. Aim and Scope