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201. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Dennis J. Schmidt From the Moly Plant to the Gardens of Adonis
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The intention of this article is investigate ways in which the image and metaphor of the garden open productive avenues for thinking the being of nature. The primary focus of this investigation is found in two instances in which gardens play significant roles in presenting, even if only tacitly, an image of nature: Homer’s Odyssey and Plato’s reference to the “Gardens of Adonis” in Phaedrus.
202. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Sara Brill Plato's Critical Theory
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This paper argues that the creation of Kallipolis and the educational pro­gamme designed therein should be read in the context of one branch of Plato’s critique of Athenian democracy; namely, its employment of the Laconizing trope prominent in Politeia literature in order to identify and radicalize the desires innervated by an idealized vision of Spartan unity. In particular, it aims to show that the discussion of sexual difference in the famous first wave of Book 5, as well as the peculiar concep­tion of phusis on which the foundation of Kallipolis rests and the account of familial discord so decisive for the distinct moments of its demise, should be read in light of the service they perform to Plato’s reframing of ownership.
203. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Walter Brogan Letter from the Editor
204. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
James M. Ambury The Failed Seduction: Alcibiades, Socrates, and the Epithumetic Comportment
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In this paper I argue that Plato’s Alcibiades is the embodiment of what I call the epithumetic comportment, a way of life made possible by the naïve ontological assumption that appearance is all that is. In the first part of the paper, I read select portions of the Alcibiades I and establish a distinction between the epithumetic comportment, which desires gratification in exchange for flattery, and the erotic comportment, which desires care of the soul. In the second half of the paper I turn to the Symposium and argue that Alcibiades fails in his seduction of Socrates because his inability to abandon the epithumetic comportment makes it impossible for him to be a Socratic interlocutor and subsequently know philosophical Forms. Through an interrogation of Alcibiades’s character we see that his failure is to be blamed neither on ‘Platonic love’ nor on Socrates himself but should be understood as a consequence of his inability to truly care for himself. I conclude by analyzing the consequences of my argument for typical interpretations of Alcibiades’s encomium to Socrates.
205. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Josh Michael Hayes Being Ensouled: Desire as an Efficient Cause in Aristotle's De Anima
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Throughout the tradition of Aristotelian commentary, there is a common tendency to present a static conception of substance according to the persistence of form imposed upon matter. In this essay, I present a dynamic conception of substance beginning with an account of the striving movement of the soul in De Anima. I argue that the paradigm for Aristotle’s definition of substance as actuality (entelecheia) is necessarily determined by his account of desire (orexis) as an efficient cause of the soul. The striving movement of desire as an efficient cause fulfills a holistic function by providing a teleological unity to the various capacities of the soul.
206. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Adriel M. Trott Rule in Turn: Political Rule against Mastery in Aristotle's Politics
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Aristotle’s political theory is often dismissed as undemocratic due to his treatment of natural slavery and women and to his conception of political rule as rule by turns. The second reason presents no less serious challenges than the first for finding democracy in Aristotle’s political theory. This article argues that Aristotle’s account of ruling in turns hinges on a critique of master rule and an affirmation of political rule, which involves both the rulers and the ruled in the project of ruling. Ruling in turns makes the rule shared, not merely an exchange of opportunities to rule as a despot.
207. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Robin Weiss In Cicero's De Finibus, an Ars Vitae between Technê and Theôria
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Cicero’s De Finibus contains a debate about whether practical knowledge should be compared to theoretical knowledge (theôreia/sapientia), or to technical knowledge (technê/ars). The way in which practical knowledge is conceived by the Stoics on the one hand, and Peripatetics on the other, lies behind and explains, for Cicero, the tendency of Peripatetics to place greater priority upon harmony with the external world, and that of the Stoics to seek inner harmony at the cost of harmony with that external world. The dialogue ends in aporia because, for Cicero, practical knowledge either comes to bear an excessive resemblance to technê, as in the case of the Peripatetics, or to theoretical knowledge, as in the case of the Stoics; for him, it must fall neither to one nor the other extreme.
208. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Vishwa Adluri Heidegger, Luther, and Aristotle: A Theological Deconstruction of Metaphysics
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This paper examines Heidegger’s concept of “facticity” in his writings from the 1920s. Heidegger’s focus on this concept, the author suggests, is keyed to Heidegger’s own rethinking of existence in terms of Luther’s and Paul’s interpretations of early Christianity. In this context, then, we gain new insight into Heidegger’s notions of temporality, of Jeweiligkeit, and also his critical appropriation of Aristotle.
209. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Charlotta Weigelt The Hermeneutic Significance of Aristotle's Concept of Chance
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In this article I argue that Aristotle’s discussion of chance in the Physics gives an important contribution to the theory of action put forward in the Nicomachean Ethics, in particular as regards its notion that man is himself the origin or ground (archê) of his actions. Whereas the ethical works show a tendency to explain this notion in objective and causal terms, the account of chance as the happening of the unexpected not only points to the essential finitude of all human conduct, but also indicates that the concept of ground in connection with human agency must be understood in subjective terms, or in the direction of sense-giving and responsibility.
210. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Jakob Ziguras Archē as Urphänomen: A Goethean Interpretation of Aristotle's Theory of Scientific Knowledge
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The problems involved in understanding the Aristotelian notion of an ἀρχή arise from the widely accepted view that Aristotle’s theory of knowledge is torn between irreconcilable empiricist and rationalist tendencies. I argue that several puzzling features of the Aristotelian ἀρχή are clarified when it is understood as akin to the Urphänomen, which plays a central role in the scientific thought of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. More broadly, I argue that the apparent conflict in Aristotle’s theory of knowledge is resolved by seeing that Aristotle is neither an empiricist, nor a rationalist, but a “rational empiricist” akin to Goethe.
211. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Tyler Tritten A Will Free to Presence . . . or Not: Schelling on the Originality of the Will
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This article presents Schelling’s doctrine of creation, primarily as outlined in his lectures on mythology and revelation. Schelling there presents not a will to power, but a power to will or not to will—the decisiveness of freedom rather than blind willing. Accordingly, Schelling is able to surpass the tradition of the metaphysics of presence through freedom as an unprecognoscible act prior to potency/power. Schelling’s will is not natural but preternatural, capable of bringing forth something original, i.e., that which first becomes possible only once it has already become actual.
212. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Katrina Mitcheson Translating Man Back into Nature: Nietzsche's Method
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While the relationship between Nietzsche and naturalism has been surveyed, why Nietzsche sets himself apart from nineteenth-century naturalists has not been adequately explained. I argue that it is a new method, necessary for the task of deciphering the text of homo natura, which distinguishes Nietzsche. A capacity to endure a greater degree of solitude is required in order to cultivate a new skepticism, allow sufficient attention to our drives, and enable the incorporation of truths that undermine herd morality. Thus, the translation of man back into nature involves both understanding man in natural terms and a re-naturalization of man.
213. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Joseph Arel The Necessity of Recollection in Plato’s Meno and Derrida’s Memoirs of the Blind
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In Memoirs of the Blind, Derrida not only makes repeated references to anamnēsis in Plato’s texts, but writes the text in a way that follows from the discussions found in Plato’s Meno. Focusing on the account of recollection given in Plato’s Meno reveals a passive structure that is also found in Plato and Derrida’s use of hypothesis. Following Derrida, these insights are applied to self-representation, which is revealed to have a similar structure to the structure found in the logic of hypothesis and recollection. These texts provide an argument for the hypothetical nature of self-representation and the limited knowledge one can claim to have of the self.
214. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Gaetano Chiurazzi Incommensurability and Definition in Plato's Theaetetus
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Unlike most readings of Plato’s Theaetetus, which concentrate on gnoseology, this paper places it in the debate on commensurable and incommensurable magnitudes that distinguished Greek philosophical and mathematical thought at the beginning of the 4th century BC and in which Theaetetus played a leading role. The argumentation of the dialogue shows clearly how this debate was important for Plato, to the point that the entire dialogue can be considered as an attempt to consider seriously how incommensurability, and its ontological correlate, the concept of dynamis, could elaborate a new form of logos.
215. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Patrick Craig Absoluta Cogitatio: Badiou, Deleuze, and the Equality of Powers in Spinoza
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Alain Badiou’s relationship to the work of Baruch Spinoza is a complex one. Though Badiou admires Spinoza’s courageous pursuit of the more geometrico, he is ardently critical of Spinoza on a number of fundamental ontological issues. Because of this, Spinoza often has had to bear the brunt of Badiou’s theoretical attacks. But how successful is Badiou’s attack on Spinoza? In this paper, I aim to show that this attack fails by examining the critique of Spinoza that Badiou provides in his “Spinoza’s Closed Ontology,” which can be found in his Theoretical Writings. Badiou’s essential claim is that the ontology of Spinoza’s Ethics employs structures or procedures that are heterogeneous to that ontology. I rely on Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, as found in his Expressionism in Philosophy, to pinpoint precisely where Badiou’s reading of Spinoza goes wrong. I show not only that Badiou’s critique of Spinoza fails to recognize a central structural feature of Spinoza’s ontology, namely the two powers of God—the power to exist and act, and the power to think and know—but also that this misrecognition is the condition for the possibility of Badiou’s mistaken critique. The paper then discusses how it is that these issues relate, more broadly, to the relationship between Deleuze and Badiou.
216. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Ryan Drake Aristotelian Aisthesis and the Violence of Suprematism
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Kazimir Malevich’s style of Suprematist painting represents the inauguration of nothing less than a new form of culture premised upon a demolition of the Western tradition’s reifying habits of objective thought. In ridding his canvases of all objects and mimetic conventions, Malevich sought to reconfigure human perception in such a way as to open consciousness to alternative modes of organization and signification. In this paper, I argue that Malevich’s revolutionary aesthetic strategy can be illuminated by a return to the very basis of this tradition, namely by a reconsideration of Aristotle’s account in De Anima III.2 of the initial possibility of objective perception as such.
217. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
David Storey Heidegger and the Question Concerning Biology: Life, Soul, and Nature in the Early Aristotle Lecture Courses
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While Heidegger has long been cast as hostile to or neglectful of life-philosophy, his work on Aristotle in the 1920s demonstrates a struggle to articulate an ontology of life. I argue that this is no peripheral concern in his work and should be seen in the broader context of the development of his philosophy of nature. I submit that we can triangulate Heidegger’s position on the ontological status of life by tracing the tension between the Kantian and Aristotelian strains in his work. His early forays into life-philosophy and philosophical biology, while incomplete and inconclusive, challenge our picture of him as espousing a view of human existence dissociated from living and natural being.
218. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Gregory Kirk Misreading the Unparticipated Source of Difference in Deleuze's Reversal of Platonism
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In this article, I argue that in his “reversal of Platonism” in The Logic of Sense, Gilles Deleuze does not adequately consider in what sense Plotinus identifies The One as “unparticipated.” I further claim that when The One is understood in the sense I consider Plotinus to have presented it, it shows itself to have attributes similar to Deleuze’s “dark precursor,” insofar as both The One and the dark precursor are ineffable, are inexhaustible, and contain absolute generative power. I propose that examining conceptual similarities between the works of such figures—about whose concepts similarity is undoubtedly counter-intuitive—sheds interesting light on important characteristics of Platonism, and in particular about the underappreciated sense in which the concept of difference is richly developed in the Platonic tradition.
219. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Michael Marder On the Verge of Respect: Ontological and Phenomenological Investigations into Plant Ethics
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In contrast to the legal, metaphysically laden, and epistemological paradigms, the ontological interpretation of respect concerns not only the relation between the “subject” and the “object” (or, better, the provider and the recipient, of this attitude) but also the being of the respected and the respecting. This paper develops an ontology of respect with regard to the human treatment of plants and teases out the meanings of vegetal life that germinate in this relation. What is at stake, I claim, is not so much an objective ontology as the phenomenological disclosure of the meanings of human and vegetal lives, construed “from within,” i.e., both in the context of the interactions between them and from the unique standpoint proper to each kind of being. Far from an ethical supplement to a theoretical description of vegetal beings, respect is the prism through which we may first gain access to plant ontology.
220. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Jerome Veith Concerned with Oneself as One Person: Self-Knowledge in Phronesis
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This paper addresses the debate concerning the nature of Aristotelian phronêsis and the objects to which it is directed. After a preparatory distinction from other intellectual virtues, I elucidate phronêsis’s connection to character-virtue and deliberation, highlighting the crucial role of perception. Focusing on moral sensibility serves to underscore the particular nature of the objects of phronêsis, and introduces its aspect of self-knowledge. This determination, finally, helps characterize the project of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as an indirect education in phronêsis.