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Displaying: 201-220 of 1796 documents

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201. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Caleb Miller Character-Dependent Duty: An Anabaptist Approach to Ethics
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I propose a theory of moral obligation that is inspired by the way obligation has been understood in the Anabaptist tradition. I use the resources of the theory to explain and defend the appropriateness of the Anabaptist claim that Christian ethics is unique. I also use the theory to show that some of the standard objections to Christian pacifism, the most visibly distinctive feature of Anabaptist ethics, are misplaced when pacifism is understood as an application of the theory I defend. Finally, I suggest some theological and theoretical advantages this theory.
202. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
John J. Davenport Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
203. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Theodore Guleserian Divine Freedom and the Problem of Evil
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The traditional theistic philosopher is committed to hold that God has a perfect will essentially, and that this is better than having a free will. It will be argued that God, being omnipotent, would have the power to create creatures who also have a perfect will essentially. This creates a problem for the traditional theist in solving the problem of moral evil. The problem of actual moral evil will not then be solvable by reference to the value of our moral freedom, in accordance with the Free Will Defense. This favors the view that moral freedom is an excellence in both man and God.
204. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Notes and News
205. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Dan D. Crawford God and Contemporary Science
206. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Robert Pasnau Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory
207. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
John E. Hare Kant on Recognizing Our Duties As God’s Commands
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Kant both says that we should recognize our duties as God’s commands, and objects to the theological version of heteronomy, ‘which derives morality from a divine and supremely perfect will’. In this paper I discuss how these two views fit together, and in the process I develop a notion of autonomous submission to divine moral authority. I oppose the ‘constitutive’ view of autonomy proposed by J. B. Schneewind and Christine Korsgaard. I locate Kant’s objection to theological heteronomy against the background of Crusius’s divine command theory, and I compare Kant’s views about divine authority and human political authority.
208. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
James K. A. Smith Re-Kanting Postmodernism?: Derrida’s Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone
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This essay considers the legacy of Kant’s philosophy of religion as appropriated by Jacques Derrida in his recent, “Foi et savoir: les deux sources de la ‘religion’ aux limites de la simple raison.” Derrida’s adoption of this Kantian framework raises the question of how one might describe this as a postmodern account of religion, which in turn raises the question of the relationship between modernity and postmodernity in general, and Derrida’s relationship to Kant in particular. Following an exposition of Derrida’s notion of a formal “ethical” religion as a repetition of Kant’s critique in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, I offer a critique of Derrida’s (and Kant’s) “formalization” of religion and the relationship between faith and reason, arguing that a more persistent postmodernism requires a de-formalization of the modern concern for justice, appreciating its determinate prophetic origin.
209. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Allen Wood Religion, Ethical Community and the Struggle Against Evil
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This paper deals with the motivation behind Kant’s conception of “religion” as “the recognition of all our duties as divine commands”. It argues that in order to understand this motivation, we must grasp Kant’s conception of radical evil as social in origin, and the response to it as equally social - the creation of a voluntary, universal “ethical community”. Kant's historical model for this community is a religious community (especially the Christian church), though Kant regards traditional churches or religious communities as suitable to their moral vocation only if they undergo Enlightenment reform. The paper concludes with a plea for the Enlightenment view of religion, and an indictment of the common failure to understand it correctly.
210. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Index of Volume 17, 2000
211. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Robert Merrihew Adams God, Possibility, and Kant
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In one of his precritical works, Kant defends, as “the only possible” way of demonstrating the existence of God, an argument from the nature of possibility. Whereas Leibniz had argued that possibilities must be thought by God in order to obtain the ontological standing that they need, Kant argued that at least the most fundamental possibilities must be exemplified in God. Here Kant’s argument is critically examined in comparison with its Leibnizian predecessor, and it is suggested that an argument combining the strengths of both of them has much to be said for it
212. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
William F. Vallicella Does the Cosmological Argument Depend on the Ontological?
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Does the cosmological argument (CA) depend on the ontological (OA)? That depends. If the OA is an argument “from mere concepts,” then no; if the OA is an argument from possibility, then yes. That is my main thesis. Along the way, I explore a number of subsidiary themes, among them, the nature of proof in metaphysics, and what Kant calls the “mystery of absolute necessity.”
213. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Jacqueline Marina Transformation and Personal Identity In Kant
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This paper explores how Kant’s development of the idea of the disposition in the Religion copes with problems implied by Kant’s idea of transcendental freedom. Since transcendental freedom implies the power of absolutely beginning a state, and therefore of absolutely beginning a series of the consequences of that state, a transcendentally free act is divorced from the preceding state of an agent, and would thus seem to be divorced from the agent’s character as well. The paper is divided into two parts. First I analyze Kant’s understanding of the disposition and discuss the ways in which it allows us to understand a person’s transcendentally free actions in terms of that person’s character. I then discuss Kant’s resources for understanding the Socratic injunction to care for the soul in light of his concept of the disposition.
214. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Notes and News
215. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Kelli S. O’Brien Kant and Swinburne on Revelation
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Immanuel Kant’s position on special revelation is a matter of debate. Here I discuss Kant’s position in detail and compare it to that of Richard Swinburne. I examine both philosophers’ views on the assertability of special revelation, its contingency, whether it is necessary, the possibility of error, and appropriate methods of interpretation. I argue that, like Swinburne, Kant finds belief in special revelation to be acceptable, even beneficial, under certain circumstances.
216. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 4
Philip L. Quinn Kantian Philosophical Ecclesiology
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This paper begins with an outline of some of the main themes in the ecclesiology Kant presents in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. It then discusses implications of Kant’s ecclesiology for issues concerning scriptural interpretation and religious toleration. With the help of these implications, an objection to Kant’s ecclesiology is developed, and a Kantian ecclesiology modified in response to the objection is sketched out. The Roman Catholic ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council is compared to both Kant’s ecclesiology and the modified Kantian ecclesiology. It is argued that on some points the ecclesiology of Vatican II represents movement in the direction of Kant’s ecclesio]ogy while on others tension between Kant and Vatican II can be reduced by the modified Kantian ecclesiology.
217. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
218. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
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I have defended the view that God’s complete sovereignty over the universe, which requires that he be creatively responsible for our decisions, is compatible with libertarian free will. William Rowe interprets me as holding that this is entirely owing to God’s being timelessly eternal, and argues that God’s decisions as creator would still be determining in a way that destroys freedom. His argument overlooks an important part of my view-an account of creation according to which God’s will as creator does not stand as an independent determining condition of our own. I try here to clarify that account, and to show that Rowe’s criticisms leave it untouched.
219. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
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Eleonore Stump has argued that a proponent of libertarian freedom must maintain that an agent is sometimes morally responsible for his mental action and that such moral responsibility is incompatible with that mental action’s being causally determined. Nevertheless, she maintains that this moral responsibility does not require that the agent be free to perform another mental action (act otherwise). In this paper, I argue that Stump fails to make a good case against the view that moral responsibility requires the freedom to act otherwise.
220. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
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Receptivity to Christian or other religious proclamations is powerfully influenced by one’s value orientations. I distinguish five contrasts in such orientations that illustrate this point. 1. Finding “worldly” values most deeply satisfying vs. a sense that something that transcends those would be most fulfilling. 2. Extreme stress on human autonomy vs. a positive evaluation of deference to God, if such there be. 3. A sense of thorough sinfulness vs. a thoroughly positive self image. 4. A willingness to accept outside help to transform oneself vs. a sense of the unworthiness of such dependence. 5. A readiness to treat others’ well being as important as one’s own vs. an exclusive focus on looking out for number one. The above reflects the deeper fact that value commihnents are an essential part of Christian belief, treatments of which must take account of this.