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201. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Peter Boghossian Review of The Ethical Treatment of Depression: Autonomy through Psychotherapy, by Paul Biegler
202. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Peter H. Denton Review of The Time of Our Lives: A Critical History of Temporality, by David Couzens Hoy
203. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Damián Enrique Szmuc A New Hope for Philosophers’ Appeal to Intuition
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Some recent researches in experimental philosophy have posed a problem for philosophers’ appeal to intuition (hereinafter referred to as PAI); the aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this challenge. The thesis against PAI implies that, given some experimental results, intuition does not seem to be a reliable epistemic source, and —more importantly— given the actual state of knowledge about its operation, we do not have sufficient resources to mitigate its errors and thus establish its reliability. That is why PAI is hopeless. Throughout this paper I will defend my own conception of PAI, which I have called the Deliberative Conception, and consequently, I will defend intersubjective agreement as a means to mitigate PAI errors, offering empirical evidence from recent studies on the Argumentative Theory of Reason that favor the conception I defend here. Finally, I will reply to some objections that might arise against the Deliberative Conception, which will lead me to discuss some metaphilosophical issues that are significantly relevant for the future of the dispute about the appeal to intuition.
204. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Lori Gruen Review of Elemental Philosophy: Earth, Air, Fire, and Water as Environmental Ideas, by David Macauley
205. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Ramona Ilea Review of Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, by Martha C. Nussbaum
206. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Monica Greenwell Janzen Review of The Primacy of the Political: A History of Political Thought from the Greeks to the French and American Revolutions, by Dick Howard
207. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Maximiliano Korstanje Review of The Discourse of Tragedy: What Cromagnon Represents, by Andrea Estrada
208. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Troy Jollimore Review of The Prudence of Love: How Possessing the Virtue of Love Benefits the Lover, by Eric J. Silverman
209. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Sruthi Rothenfluch Review of The Philosophy of Sex and Love, by Alan Soble
210. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Jon Erling Litland On Some Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Grounding
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I discuss three recent counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding due to Jonathan Schaffer. I argue that the counterexamples don’t work and draw some conclusions about the relationship between grounding and explanation.
211. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Paul Hovda, Troy Cross Grounding Relation(s): Introduction
212. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Louis deRosset What is Weak Ground?
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Kit Fine, in "The Pure Logic of Ground", has made a seminal attempt at formalizing the notion of ground. Fine ties the formal treatment of grounding to the notion of a weak ground. Formalization of this sort is supposed to bring clarity and precision to our theorizing. Unfortunately, as I will argue, it's not clear what weak ground is. I review five alternative explanations of the idea, and argue that none of them are ultimately satisfactory. I close by outlining a more complicated explanation of the notion that turns out to be more satisfactory.
213. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Avram Hiller Object-Dependence
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There has been much work on ontological dependence in recent literature. However, relatively little of it has been dedicated to the ways in which individual physical objects may depend on other distinct, nonoverlapping objects. This paper gives several examples of such object-dependence and distinguishes between different types of it. The paper also introduces and refines the notion of an n-tet. N-tets (typically) occur when there are object-dependence relations between n objects. I claim that the identity (or, rather, what I call the ndentity) conditions for n-tets are not grounded in the individual identity conditions of each of the n objects, but instead are metaphysically basic. The paper then briefly discusses some ramifications of accepting object-dependence (and n-tets) on the philosophy of biology, ethics, and logic.
214. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Donald Abel Review of Human Nature, ed. Constantine Sandis and M.J. Cain
215. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Hoyt Edge Review of Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, by John Dewey
216. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Taylor Worley Review of “On What Cannot Be Said: Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, Literature, and the Arts. Volumes 1 and 2.”, ed. William Franke
217. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Peter H. Denton Review of Science in a Democratic Society, by Philip Kitcher
218. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Steven Ross Review of Democracy and Moral Conflict, by Robert B. Talisse
219. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
William Simkulet Review of Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will, by David Hodgson
220. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Dana S. Belu Review of The Cosmetic Gaze: Body Modification and the Construction of Beauty, by Bernadette Wegenstein