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201. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 21
Announcement, Acknowledgments, Subscription Information, Abbreviations
202. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 21
Herbert Breger News from the Leibniz-Gesellschaft
203. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 21
Patrick Riley Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe
204. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 21
Laurence Carlin The Non-Aristotelian Novelty of Leibniz’s Teleology
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My aim in this paper is to underscore the novelty of Leibniz’s teleology from a historical perspective. I believe this perspective helps deliver a better understanding of the finer details of Leibniz’s employment of final causes. I argue in this paper that Leibniz was taking a stance on three central teleological issues that derive from Aristotle, issues that seem to have occupied nearly every advocate of final causes from Aristotle to Leibniz. I discuss the three Aristotelian issues, and how major thinkers treated them in the medieval period. I argue that Leibniz rejected all of the mainstream Aristotelian teleological views on these issues. I conclude that Leibniz broke with longstanding threads of teleological thinking in ways that were often extreme.
205. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 21
Douglas Bertrand Marshall Leibniz: Geometry, Physics, and Idealism
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Leibniz holds that nothing in nature strictly corresponds to any geometric curve or surface.Yet on Leibniz’s view, physicists are usually able to ignore any such lack of correspondence and to investigate nature using geometric representations. The primary goal of this essay is to elucidate Leibniz’s explanation of how physicists are able to investigate nature geometrically, focussing on two of his claims: (i) there can be things innature which approximate geometric objects to within any given margin of error; (ii) the truths of geometry state laws by which the phenomena of nature are governed. A corollary of Leibniz’s explanation is that physical bodies do have boundaries with which geometric surfaces can be compared to very high levels of precision. I argue that the existence of these physical boundaries is mind-independent to such an extent as to pose a significant challenge to idealist interpretations of Leibniz.
206. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 21
David Lay Williams Patrick Riley’s Leibniz
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This essay clarifies Patrick Riley’s account of G. W. Leibniz by placing Leibniz’s moral and political doctrines in historical perspective. By understanding Leibniz’s practical philosophy as a solution to the same problems confronted by Thomas Hobbes, one can appreciate the originality and appeal of Riley’s Leibniz — with its emphasis on benevolence and Platonic ideas. By drawing attention to Leibniz’s practical works, Riley has resurrected an important voice in the history of political thought that had been long neglected. The essay concludes with some personal remarks about Riley’s own Leibnizian charity.
207. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 21
Richard T. W. Arthur Presupposition, Aggregation, and Leibniz’s Argument for a Plurality of Substances
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This paper consists in a study of Leibniz’s argument for the infinite plurality of substances, versions of which recur throughout his mature corpus. It goes roughly as follows: since every body is actually divided into further bodies, it is therefore not a unity but an infinite aggregate; the reality of an aggregate, however, reduces to the reality of the unities it presupposes; the reality of body, therefore, entails an actual infinity of constituent unities everywhere in it. I argue that this depends on a generalized notion of aggregation, according to which a thing may be an aggregate of its constituents if every one of its actual parts presupposes such constituents, but is not composed from them. One of the premises of this argument is the reality of bodies. If this premise is denied, Leibniz’s argument for the infinitude of substances, and even of their plurality, cannot go through.
208. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 22
Adrian Nita Time as a Condition of Possibility: Reply to Michael Futch
209. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 22
Marine Picon Paul Rateau (ed.), Lectures et interprétations des Essais de Théodicée de G. W. Leibniz
210. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 22
Recent Works on Leibniz
211. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 22
Juan Antonio Nicolás Leibniz in Spanish: Theodicy
212. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 22
Acknowledgments, Subscription Information, Abbreviations
213. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 22
Patrick Riley G.W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, Reihe 1, “Allgemeiner Politischer und Historischer Briefwechsel”
214. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 22
Irena Backus The Mature Leibniz on Predestination
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This essay investigates how Leibniz and Daniel Ernst Jablonski handled the ironing out of intra-protestant religious differences, notably on predestination in the years ca. 1697-1702. I shall be focusing on the recently published union document between the Lutherans of Hanover and the Calvinists of Brandenburg, entitled the Unvorgreiffliches Bedencken (hereafter UB) and on the equally recently published and hitherto practically unknown Meditationes pacatae de praedestinatione et gratia, fato et libero arbitrio of 1701-ca. 1706 2. This is a series of Leibniz’s annotations on Jablonski’s Latin translation of article 17 (predestination) of the bishop of Salisbury, Gilbert Burnet’s Exposition of the 39 Articles of the Church of England. I shall try to show how the issue of predestination is handled in the UB by Leibniz and how his notes on the Meditationes complement and modify Jablonski’s Latin edition of the 17th article of Burnet’s Exposition the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. This will enable us to isolate the set of theological problems faced by the Lutheran and Calvinist participants in the negotium irenicum of 1697 -1702 and to point to the specific nature of the solutions proposed by Leibniz which were philosophical rather than theological. The underlying issue here is that of coexistence of philosophy and theology in Leibniz’s system. Indeed, one of the persistent questions about this philosopher concerns the exact relationship between his metaphysics (including physics and mathematics) and his theological views: which determined which? I hope to take the debate further here by analysing Leibniz’s contribution to the specifically theological issue of predestination, which, it will emerge, has direct bearing on Leibniz’s Essais de théodicée of 1710.
215. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 22
Giovanni Merlo Complexity, Existence and Infinite Analysis
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According to Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency, any derivative truth is contingent if and only if it does not admit of a finite proof. Following a tradition that goes back at least as far as Bertrand Russell, several interpreters have been tempted to explain this biconditional in terms of two other principles: first, that a derivative truth is contingent if and only if it contains infinitely complex concepts and, second, that a derivative truth contains infinitely complex concepts if and only if it does not admit of a finite proof. A consequence of this interpretation is that Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency falls prey to Robert Adams’s Problem of Lucky Proof. I will argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that, once it is properly understood how the idea of an infinite proof fits into Leibniz’s circle of modal notions, the problem of lucky proof simply disappears.
216. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 22
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra Leibniz’s Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in his Letter to Casati (with Transcription and Translation)
217. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 22
Mogens Lærke Martine de Gaudemar and Philippe Hamou (eds.), Locke et Leibniz. Deux styles de rationalité
218. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 22
Samuel Levey On Unity, Borrowed Reality and Multitude in Leibniz
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In this paper I argue that what has been called Leibniz’s “aggregate argument” for unities in things in fact comprises three quite distinct lines of argument, with different concepts being advanced under the name ‘unity’ and meriting quite different conceptual treatment. Two of those arguments, what I call the Borrowed Reality Argument and the Multitude Argument, also appear in later writings to be further elaborated into arguments not just for unities but for simples. I consider the arguments in detail. I suggest that one of the two, the Borrowed Reality Argument, is philosophically more promising and has the stronger evidence for being central in Leibniz’s thought as he argues for the existence of simple substances.
219. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 22
Anne-Lise Rey Reply to Ohad Nachtomy
220. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 22
Ohad Nachtomy Nicolas de Cues et G.W. Leibniz: Infini, Expression et Singularité