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Displaying: 221-240 of 2018 documents

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221. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Max Oelschlaeger The Practice of the Wild
222. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Changing Times
223. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
C. A. Bowers The Conservative Misinterpretation of the Educational Ecological Crisis
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Conservative educational critics (e.g., Allan Bloom, Mortimer Adler, and E. D. Hirsch, Jr.) have succeeded in flaming the debate on the reform of education in a manner that ignores the questions that should be asked about how our most fundamental cultural assumptions are contributing to the ecological crisis. In this paper, I examine the deep cultural assumptions embedded in their reform proposals that furtherexacerbate the crisis, giving special attention to their view of rational empowerment, the progressive nature of change, and their anthropocentric view of the universe. I argue that their form of conservatism must be supplanted by the more biocentric conservatism of such thinkers as Aldo Leopold, Wendell Berry, and Gary Snyder.
224. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
225. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Roger Paden Nature and Morality
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In their attempt to develop a nonanthropocentric ethic, many biocentric philosophers have been content to argue for the expansion of the moral community to include natural entities. In doing so, they have implicitly accepted the idea that the conceptions of moral duties developed by anthropocentric philosophers to describe the moral relationships that hold between humans can be directly applied to thehuman/nature relationship. To make this expansion plausible, they have had to argue that natural entities have traits that are similar to the morally relevant traits of human beings, e.g., interests, the capacity to experience pleasure and pain, or “purpose.” Not only are these arguments often unconvincing, but it seems implausible that the same moral concepts and principles that govern human relationshipsalso should govern human/nonhuman relationships. Many nonanthropocentric ethics, I argue, are (mistakenly) anthropomorphic. They anthropomorphize nature and they anthropomorphize our relationship with nature. To go beyond this relationship I recommend the development of a nonanthropomorphic biocentric ethic. Such an ethic requires us to understand better what nature is and what role nature plays in moral experience and action. In such an ethic, I argue, nature is viewed as a transcendent “thing” with a transcendental moral significance.
226. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Robert W. Loftin Scientific Collecting
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Scientists often collect (kill) organisms in pursuit of human knowledge. When is such killing morally permissible? I explore this question with particular reference to ornithology and against the background of animal liberation ethics and a land ethic, especially Mary Anne Warren’s account that finds the two ethics complementary. I argue that the ethical theories offered provide insufficient guidance. As a step toward the resolution of this serious problem, I offer a set of criteria to determine when collecting is morally permissible.
227. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Jim Hill Is There a Moral Obligation to Save the Family Farm?
228. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
229. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
John Martin Gillroy Public Policy and Environmental Risk: Political Theory, Human Agency, and the Imprisoned Rider
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In this essay, I argue that environmental risk is a strategic situation that places the individual citizen in the position of an imprisoned rider who is being exploited without his or her knowledge by the preferences of others. I contend that what is at stake in policy decisions regarding environmental risk is not numerical probabilities or consistent, complete, transitive preferences for individual welfare, but rather respect for the human agency of the individual. Human agency is a prerequisite to one’s utility function and is threatened and exploited in the strategic situation that produces the imprisoned rider. This problem is created by the policy maker’s assumption that his or her task is to assume rational preferences and aggregate them. The guidelines for evaluation and justification of policy should move beyondwelfare preferences and involve an active state protecting human agency and empowering the imprisoned rider. Only in this way can we free all citizens (a priori) from fear of exploitation by those who would impose collective and irreversible risk on each of them in violation of their unconditional right to their own agency.
230. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Alan Sponberg Dharma Gaia: A Harvest of Essays in Buddhism and Ecology
231. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Eric Katz The Call of the Wild: The Struggle against Domination and the Technological Fix of Nature
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In this essay, I use encounters with the white-tailed deer of Fire Island to explore the “call of the wild”—the attraction to value that exists in a natural world outside of human control. Value exists in nature to the extent that it avoids modification by human technology. Technology “fixes” the natural world by improving it for human use or by restoring degraded ecosystems. Technology creates a “new world,” an artifactual reality that is far removed from the “wildness” of nature. The technological “fix” of nature thus raises a moral issue: how is an artifact morally different from a natural and wild entity? Artifacts are human instruments; their value lies in their ability to meet human needs. Natural entities have no intrinsic functions; they were not created for any instrumental purpose. To attempt to manage natural entities is to deny their inherent autonomy: a form of domination. The moral claim of the wilderness is thus a claim against human technological domination. We have an obligation to struggle against this domination by preserving as much of the natural world as possible.
232. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Anthony Weston Toward Unity among Environmentalists
233. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Ariel Salleh The Ecofeminism/Deep Ecology Debate
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I discuss conceptual confusions shared by deep ecologists over such questions as gender, essentialism, normative dualism, and eco-centrism. I conclude that deep ecologists have failed to grasp both the epistemological challenge offered by ecofeminism and the practical labor involved in bringing about social change. While convergencies between deep ecology and ecofeminism promise to be fruitful, these are celebrated in false consciousness, unless remedial work is done
234. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
235. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Peter Quigley Rethinking Resistance: Environmentalism, Literature, and Poststructural Theory
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I argue that with the advent of poststructuralism, traditional theories of representation, truth, and resistance have been seriously brought into question. References to the “natural” and the “wild” cannot escape the poststructural attack against foundational concepts and the constituting character of human-centered language. I explore the ways in which environmental movements and literary expression have tended to posit pre-ideological essences, thereby replicating patterns of power and authority. I also point to how environmentalism might be reshaped in light of poststructuralism to challenge power without reference to authority.
236. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Ann S. Causey On Sport Hunting as an Instinct
237. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Robert Frodeman Radical Environmentalism and the Political Roots of Postmodernism
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I examine the close relationship between radical environmentalism and postmodernism. I argue that there is an incoherence within most postmodernist thought, born of an unwillingness or incapacity to distinguish between claims true from an ontological or epistemological perspective and those appropriate to the exigencies of political life. The failure to distinguish which differences make a difference not only vitiates postmodernist thought, but also runs up against some of the fundamental assumptions of radical environmentalism.
238. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
David Johns On Watson’s Response to Foreman
239. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Pete A. Y. Gunter Du Droit de détruire: essai sur le droit de l’environnement
240. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 14 > Issue: 4
Anthony Weston Before Environmental Ethics
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Contemporary nonanthropocentic environmental ethics is profoundly shaped by the very anthropocentrism that it tries to transcend. New values only slowly struggle free of old contexts. Recognizing this struggle, however, opens a space for—indeed, necessitates—alternative models for contemporary environmental ethics. Rather than trying to unify or fine-tune our theories, we require more pluralistic andexploratory methods. We cannot reach theoretical finality; we can only co-evolve an ethic with transformed practices.