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241. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Andrew Naylor On Inferentially Remembering that p
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Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference from one’s memory that q and a true thought one has that r, its analysis presupposes an adequate account of the (presumably non-inferential) memory that q. Bernecker’s account of non-inferentially remembering-that is shown to be inadequate. A remedy lies in strengthening the account by requiring the rememberer to have had prima facie justification to believe that q, any defeaters of which were misleading.
242. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Gregory Stoutenburg Cartesianism, Neo-Reidianism, and the A Priori: Reply to Pust
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Joel Pust has recently challenged the Thomas Reid-inspired argument against the reliability of the a priori defended by Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff,William Alston, and Michael Bergmann. The Reidian argument alleges that the Cartesian insistence on the primacy of a priori rationality and subjective sensoryexperience as the foundations of epistemic justification is unwarranted because the same kind of global skeptical scenario that Cartesians recognize as challenging the legitimacy of perceptual beliefs about the external world also undermine the reliability of a priori rationality. In reply, Pust contends that some a priori propositions are beyond doubt and that fact can be used to support the overall reliability of reason. This paper challenges Pust’s argument. I argue that while Pust successfully undermines a radical skeptical view of reason, he does not refute a more modest skepticism. I conclude with some suggestions for Cartesian a priorists.
243. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Notes on the Contributors
244. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
245. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Thomas Dabay Jaroslav Peregrin: Inferentialism. Why Rules Matter
246. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Daniel Whiting Knowledge is Not Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason
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Mark Schroeder has recently proposed a new analysis of knowledge. I examine that analysis and show that it fails. More specifically, I show that it faces aproblem all too familiar from the post-Gettier literature, namely, that it is delivers the wrong verdict in fake barn cases.
247. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Notes to Contributors
248. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Martin Grajner Epistemic Responsibilism and Moorean Dogmatism
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In this paper, I defend Moorean Dogmatism against a novel objection raised by Adam Leite. Leite locates the defectiveness of the Moorean reasoning explicitly not in the failure of the Moorean argument to transmit warrant from its premises to its conclusion but rather in the failure of an epistemic agent to satisfy certain epistemic responsibilities that arise in the course of conscious and deliberate reasoning. I will first show that there exist cases of Moorean reasoning that are not put into jeopardy by the considerations that Leite presents. Second, I will argue that certain commitments of Leite’s concerning the notion of warrant are in tension with his verdict that the Moorean reasoning is defective.
249. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Davide Fassio Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right
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Some philosophers have recently argued that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge in a specific circumstance depends on features of the subject’spractical situation that are unrelated to the truth of the subject’s belief, such as the costs for the subject of being wrong about whether the believed proposition is true. One of the best-known arguments used to support this view is that it best explains a number of paradigmatic cases, such as the well-known Bank Case, in which a difference in knowledge occurs in subjects differing exclusively with respect to their practical situation. I suggest an alternative explanation of such cases. My explanation has a disjunctive character: on the one hand, it accounts for cases in which the subject is aware of the costs of being wrong in a given situation in terms of the influence of psychological factors on her mechanisms of belief-formation and revision. On the other hand, it accounts for cases in which the subject is ignorant of the costs of being wrong in her situation by imposing a new condition on knowledge. This condition is that one knows that p only if one does not underestimate the importance of being right about whether p. I argue that my explanation has a number of advantages over other invariantist explanations: it accounts for all the relevant cases preserving the semantic significance of our ordinary intuitions, it is compatible with an intellectualist account of knowledge and it escapes several problems affecting competing views.
250. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Tristan Haze Two New Counterexamples to the Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge
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I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truthtracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactuallyrobust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan, and seem invulnerable to a recent defence of the theory against known counterexamples, by Fred Adams and Murray Clarke.
251. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Kevin Mccain Explanationism: Defended on All Sides
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Explanationists about epistemic justification hold that justification depends upon explanatory considerations. After a bit of a lull, there has recently been aresurgence of defenses of such views. Despite the plausibility of these defenses, explanationism still faces challenges. Recently, T. Ryan Byerly and Kraig Martin have argued that explanationist views fail to provide either necessary or sufficient conditions for epistemic justification. I argue that Byerly and Martin are mistaken on both accounts.
252. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Adrian Ludușan Categoricity, Open-Ended Schemas and Peano Arithmetic
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One of the philosophical uses of Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for Peano Arithmetic is to provide support for semantic realism. To this end, the logical framework in which the proof of the theorem is conducted becomes highly significant. I examine different proposals regarding these logical frameworks and focus on the philosophical benefits of adopting open-ended schemas in contrast to second order logic as the logical medium of the proof. I investigate Pederson and Rossberg’s critique of the ontological advantages of open-ended arithmetic when it comes to establishing the categoricity of Peano Arithmetic and show that the critique is highly problematic. I argue that Pederson and Rossberg’s ontological criterion deliver the bizarre result that certain first order subsystems of Peano Arithmetic have a second order ontology. As a consequence, the application of the ontological criterion proposed by Pederson and Rossberg assigns a certain type of ontology to a theory, and a different, richer, ontology to one of its subtheories.
253. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
James Van Cleve Does Suppositional Reasoning Solve the Bootstrapping Problem?
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In a 2002 article Stewart Cohen advances the “bootstrapping problem” for what he calls “basic justification theories,” and in a 2010 followup he offers a solution to the problem, exploiting the idea that suppositional reasoning may be used with defeasible as well as with deductive inference rules. To curtail the form of bootstrapping permitted by basic justification theories, Cohen insists that subjects must know their perceptual faculties are reliable before perception can give them knowledge. But how is such knowledge of reliability to be acquired if not through perception itself? Cohen proposes that such knowledge may be acquired a priori through suppositional reasoning. I argue that his strategy runs afoul of a plausible view about how epistemic principles function; in brief, I argue that one must actually satisfy the antecedent of an epistemic principle, not merely suppose that one does, to acquire any justification by its means – even justification for a merely conditional proposition.
254. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Mark Schroeder In Defense of the Kantian Account of Knowledge: Reply to Whiting
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In this paper I defend the view that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient from an important objection due to DanielWhiting, in this journal. Whiting argues that this view fails to deal adequately with a familiar sort of counterexample to analyses of knowledge, fake barn cases. I accept Whiting's conclusion that my earlier paper offered an inadequate treatment of fake barn cases, but defend a new account of basic perceptual reasons that is consistent with the account of knowledge and successfully deals with fake barns.
255. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Arturs Logins On Having Evidence: A Reply to Neta
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According to one line of thought only propositions can be part of one’s evidence, since only propositions can serve the central functions of our ordinaryconcept of evidence. Ram Neta has challenged this argument. In this paper I respond to Neta’s challenge.
256. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Notes on the Contributors
257. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
258. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Notes to Contributors
259. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 4
Sharon Ryan In Defense of Moral Evidentialism
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This paper is a defense of moral evidentialism, the view that we have a moral obligation to form the doxastic attitude that is best supported by our evidence. I argue that two popular arguments against moral evidentialism are weak. I also argue that our commitments to the moral evaluation of actions require us to takedoxastic obligations seriously.
260. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 4
Patrick Bondy Introduction