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241. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 23
Irena Backus Leibniz als Sammler und Herausgeber historischer Quellen, ed. N. Gädeke
242. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 23
Julia Jorati Monadic Teleology without Goodness and without God
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Most interpreters think that for Leibniz, teleology is goodness-directedness. Explaining a monadic action teleologically, according to them, simply means explaining it in terms of the goodness of the state at which the agent aims. On some interpretations, the goodness at issue is always apparent goodness: an action is end-directed iff it aims at what appears good to the agent. On other interpretations, the goodness at issue is only sometimes apparent goodness and at other times merely objective goodness: some actions do not aim at what appears good to the agent, but merely at what is objectively good—that is, at what God knows to be good—and that is sufficient for teleology. My paper, on the other hand, argues that both of these interpretations are mistaken. Monadic teleology, I contend, does not have to consist in striving for the good; neither goodness nor God is required to make monadic actions teleological.
243. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 23
Patrick Riley G. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, Reihe I, Allgemeiner Politischer und Historischer Briefwechsel, Band 23 (January–December 1704)
244. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 23
Samuel Levey Leibniz, God and Necessity, by Michael Griffin
245. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 23
Recent Works on Leibniz
246. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Corrections and References to the Theodicy in Leibniz’s Own Hand
247. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Stephen Steward Solving the Lucky and Guaranteed Proof Problems
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Leibniz’s infinite-analysis theory of contingency says a truth is contingent if and only if it cannot be proved via analysis in finitely many steps. Some have argued that this theory faces the Problem of Lucky Proof—we might, by luck, complete our proof early in the analysis, and thus have a finite proof of a contingent truth—and the related Problem of Guaranteed Proof—even if we do not complete our proof early in the analysis, we are guaranteed to complete it in finitely many steps. I aim to solve both problems. For Leibniz, analysis is constrained by three rules: an analysis begins with the conclusion; subsequent steps replace a term by (part of) its real definition; and the analysis is finished only when an identity is reached. Furthermore, real definitions of complete concepts are infinitely complex, and Leibniz thinks infinities lack parts. From these observations, a solution to our problems follows: an analysis of a truth containing a complete concept cannot be completed in a finite number of steps—indeed, the first step of the analysis cannot be completed. I conclude by defusing some alleged counterexamples to my account.
248. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Patrick Riley Leibniz’ “Monadologie” 1714-2014
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It is well-known that Leibniz ends and crowns the 1714 “Monadologie” with a version of his notion of jurisprudence universelle or “justice as the charity [love] of the wise:” for sections 83-90 of the Vienna manuscript claim that “the totality of all spirits must compose the City of God . . . this perfect government . . . the most perfect state that is possible . . . this truly universal monarchy [which is] a moral world in the natural world”—a moral world of iustitia in which “no good action would be unrewarded” for those “citizens” who “find pleasure . . . in the contemplation of [God’s] perfections, as is the way of genuine ‘pure love.’” But the opening four-fifths of the work offer Leibniz’ theory of “substance” (or monad) viewed as the necessary pre-condition of justice: for “on the knowledge of substance, and in the consequence of the soul, depends the knowledge of virtue and of justice” (to Pierre Coste, 1712). Thus without a complete and correct notion of substance/monad, no complete and correct notion commune de la justice would be conceivable. Hence the entire “Monadologie” can be understood as a theory of justice underpinned by a Grundlegung of moral “monads” or justice-loving rational “substances.” In this connection it is revelatory that Leibniz cites the relevant sections of the 1710 Théodicée in most of the 90 articles of the “Monadologie” (beginning indeed with article #1): for Théodicée (theos-dike) is (Leibniz says) “the justice of God,” and Leibniz makes that justice “appear” in the opening lines of the “Monadologie” (in effect) by referring the reader immediately to Théodicée #10 (“Preliminary Dissertation”) —which relates “im­mortal spirits” to a just God who is cherished through “genuine pure love.” This means that “the justice of God” as “higher love” colors the “Monadologie” instantly. Thus one need not “wait” for sections 83-90 to arrive in order for the “Monadologie” to be(come) a “theory of justice:” it is such ab initio.
249. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Marine Picon Actualism and Analyticity: Leibniz's early thoughts towards a synthesis between Lutheran metaphysics and the foundation of knowledge
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Recent scholarship has established that, until the mid-1670s, Leibniz did not hold the possibilist ontology which, in his mature philosophy, provides the foundation for both his account of human freedom and of eternal truth. Concentrating on the Mainz period (1667-1672), this paper examines the conciliation, in those early writings, of an actualist ontology and a conception of necessary truth as analytical. The first section questions the view that Leibniz was educated in a “Platonist” tradition; the second section presents the actualist metaphysics that he adopted in the wake of his teachers; the third section shows how Leibniz could, contrary to those same teachers, hold an analytical view of eternal truth, even without the support of his later possibilist ontology and doctrine of real definitions.
250. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Ohad Nachtomy, Tamar Levanon On Oneness and Substance in Leibniz’s Middle Years
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We argue in this paper that Leibniz’s characterization of a substance as “un être” in his correspondence with Arnauld stresses the per se unity of substance rather than oneness in number. We employ two central lines of reasoning. The first is a response to Mogens Lærke’s claim that one can mark the difference between Spinoza and Leibniz by observing that, while Spinoza’s notion of substance is essentially non-numerical, Leibniz’s view of substance is numerical. We argue that Leibniz, like Spinoza, qualifies the substance as “one” primarily in a non-numerical sense, where non-numerical means per se unity or qualitative uniqueness. The second line of reasoning suggests that the term “one” should be understood as a-unity-presupposed-by-multiplicity in two senses: a) externally, in the sense of being presupposed by higher complex structures, such as aggregates, and, b) internally, in the sense of having itself a complex structure. We develop an analogy along these lines between the role the notion of a fundamental unity plays in Leibniz’s view of numbers and his view of substance. In other words, we suggest that looking at the role units play in Leibniz’s view of mathematics can shed some light on the role they play in his metaphysics.
251. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Oberto Marrama The dog that is a heavenly constellation and the dog that is a barking animal by Alexandre Koyré
252. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Ohad Nachtomy Leibniz by Richard T. W. Arthur
253. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Philip Beeley Leibniz and Cryptography: An account on the occasion of the initial exhibition of the reconstruction of Leibniz’s cipher by Nicholas Rescher
254. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Richard T. W. Arthur Reply to Ohad Nachtomy
255. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Philip Beeley Patrick Riley (1941–2015): Some reminiscences and reflections on his life
256. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Patrick Riley In Honorem Irena Backus
257. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
David Lay Williams Patrick Riley (1941-2015) In Memoriam
258. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Wenchao Li News from the Leibniz-Gesellschaft
259. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Recent Works on Leibniz
260. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 24
Acknowledgments, Subscription Information, Abbreviations