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261. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 17 > Issue: 7/8
Zbigniew Wendland The Rise and Essence of Universalism as a Metaphilosophy and Social Movement
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This paper discusses how Universalism came into being as a metaphilosophy and social movement, and outlines its main characteristics, meaning and content. The paper’s central theme is the accentuation of the two main aspects of Universalism. The first aspect is the key role of dialogue in Universalism. The second is the belief that Universalism is first and foremost a social movement, rather than a philosophical doctrine. In outlining the origins of Universalism, the invaluable role of Professor Kuczyński as its originator is emphasized. The rest of the paper discusses Universalism’s other important characteristics, namely: (1) the quest for truth, (2) the principle of dialogue, (3) a practical approach to scientific knowledge and philosophy, (4) its interdisciplinary nature, (5) patriotism, (6) Europeanism, (7) concern over ecological issues, (8) concern for human beings, (9) a permanent alliance between Universalism, Catholic social science and Christian personalism.
262. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 17 > Issue: 7/8
Piotr Bołtuć Global Learning Environment in Philosophy
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In this paper I present my thesis stated numerous times at APA and NACAP meetings, that the current shortage of online programs in philosophy presents adanger to the profession. I also show how this danger could be averted. I give a snapshot of what teaching philosophy online, and doing it well, looks like. I am a very partial spectator in this debate since the example I am referring to is the program at UIS which I designed and, with my colleagues, led to successful implementation. Finally, I draw a broad brush picture of what an inter-campus, international online program in philosophy may look like (as well as some implications for online learning in Poland).
263. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 17 > Issue: 7/8
George F. McLean In Search of the Complementarity of the Secular and the Sacred
264. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 17 > Issue: 7/8
Invitation to the Conference: “Philosophy Emerging from Culture”, Seoul, Korea July 27–29, 2008
265. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 17 > Issue: 7/8
Napoleon Ono Imaah The Unity of Opposites in Architecture: John Paul II in Laborem Exercens
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The epic life of Pope John Paul II touches virtually all aspects of the human being in time and space. His successful world outreach achieves unprecedented superlative proportions in his search for universal harmonies among peoples, cultures and religions. Significantly, his death confirms the success of his positive mission on the Earth as his death caused an extraordinary unity of people, cultures, and religions during his funeral. No one else has unified such opposing opposites in a memorial service in a millennium! Thus, Pope John Paul II by his calling served the sacred; his deeds achieve a synchronized symphony of the sacred and secular. This paper examines the views of Pope John Paul II, as expressed in Laborem Excercens, through the concept of the unity of oppositesin sacred and secular architecture.
266. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 17 > Issue: 7/8
Johannes Paulus PP. II Laborem exercens – 1981.09.14
267. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Józef Dębowski Global, Fundamental… and Rational? On Jan Srzednicki’s New Epistemological Perspective
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I analyze only few elements of Srzednicki’s “new epistemology”. I especially appreciate the thesis of transcendentalism and of demanding of the depersonalization of epistemology. In my opinion, the trial of founding cognition on non-cognitive factors is an irrelevant. It leads to irrationalism, as in the case of praxism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, or cognitive sociology. In this lies a critical difficulty of Srzednicki’s “new epistemology”. The main difficulty was acceptance the narrow, analytical idea of knowledge. It implicates the acceptance of a field of evidence (intuition, experience) as a noncognitive one. Another problem with “new epistemology” is propositionalism, and idea that all cognition is external to its object.
268. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Maciej Soin Epistemology after Wittgenstein
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Following Grażyna Żurkowska’s work presenting Jan Srzednicki’s views on Wittgenstein’s philosophy (Epistemologia po Wittgensteinie. Nowa perspektywa epistemologiczna Jana Srzednickiego, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2006) [Epistemology after Wittgenstein. A New Epistemological Perspective by Jan Srzednicki], the author of this paper ponders the effect of Wittgenstein’s conception upon the domain of epistemology. According to Srzednicki, such an effect is in having posed a skeptical challenge which opened a new epistemological perspective. The author is critical toward this approach and argues that the most genuine intention behind Wittgenstein’s investigations was to draw attention to the diversity of such our concepts as cognition, knowledge, truth, etc. Such diversity is not a challenge but a fact which needs to be accounted for in epistemological studies.
269. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Maciej Chlewicki What the Skeptic Doubts
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The paper offers a critical analysis of the skeptic’s conviction that his doubts about the truth of thought on existence of the world outside the mind are not equivalent to real the doubts about existence of the world alone, but they are only a theoretical and speculative problem of knowledge. The main case of this criticism is based on the Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s philosophy, precisely, on his theory of truth.
270. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Rafał Patryn An Aspect of Philosophy of Law in Wittgenstein’s Theory of the Meaning
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Wittgenstein’s philosophy endeavored to define the role of language as communicative. Language became an original “code” of multifarious meanings and designations but it is also a code which entails emotions and different sorts of internal and external reactions of an individual. The mechanism of penalty and the notion of penalty have invariably raised emotions and meaningful reactions. The analysis focuses on a short derivation of the notion of penalty. It considers its functions, basic tasks and external impact—a short word revealing so many actions and social behaviors.
271. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Bogumiła Zongollowicz Jan Tadeusz Jerzy Srzednicki — Published Works
272. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Włodzimierz Zięba Metaphysics as an Inevitable Dimension of Cognition
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The article concerns the metaphysical dimension of Jan Srzednicki’s epistemology. It is claimed that the metaphysical perspective of cognitive “normatives” (e. g. norm, form and presence) does not remove paradoxes of self-reference. It is especially difficult to separate the ontic and the cognitive dimensions.
273. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Jarosław Sak Is a Disease Cognizable? Considerations on Philosophy of Medicine in Reference to the New Epistemology of Jan Srzednicki
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The fundamental problem of Jan Srzednicki’s new epistemology is the question: how thoughts surpass the resistance of that what is ontologically present, how this process is possible? In Srzednicki’s opinion, thinking is a process of distancing from the pressure of ontological presence. His ideas offer a splendid inspiration for philosophy of medicine which attempts to answer the question “whether (and how) a disease is cognizable?” This question refers directly to and is translated into the question of the capacity to diagnose particular diseases. Answering to the above stated question whether disease is cognizable we should answer in the affirmative, however, in a “modified” form that its pre-cognitive resistance to reality is formed at the articulated level. Somewhat intuitively we feel the presence of a disease before we express it in words as a disease according to our scientific or informal thought style.
274. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Małgorzata Czarnocka Editorial — Jan Srzednicki—Beyond Philosophical Paradigms
275. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Jan Srzednicki The Concept of Ma vs the Idea of ‘Everything’: To Ma or Not to Ma, That Is the Question
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Whereas at the roots of the Western way of thinking, in particular, at the roots of philosophy and epistemology lies a notion of the one/over/many, in Asiatic cultures, it is an idea of one/and/many, represented by Japanese (Chinese) Ma. In the paper it is argued that Japanese Ma is not only broader than epistemological reality (the world) but also more basic. To overcome Wittgenstein’s skepticism we have to return to a noncognitive idea of the ontic presence. Our thinking and cognition is deeply rooted in the imperceptible and indiscernible ontic flexibility and generality which is not conceptual or linguistic. This essay presents another interesting aspect of my metaphysical project showing that we cannot infer cognition either from the object level or from a meta-level.
276. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Andrzej Kapusta Srzednicki in Phenomenological Perspective
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In the article the author tries to find some similarities and differences between phenomenological tradition and Srzednicki’s project of the new epistemology. He mostly refers to the thought of a French philosopher, Merleau-Ponty. Especially representative to the arguments is his late turn to metaphysical perspective presented in the work, Visible and Invisible, where he made an attempt to express a kind of logic which may reveal the world and ourselves in its mutual interconnections.
277. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Frances Freeman On Jan Srzednicki. A Recollection
278. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Zdzisław Cackowski Comments to the Book on the Epistemology of Jan Srzednicki Written by Grażyna Żurkowska
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The paper investigates Jan Srzednicki’s epistemological conception with its main Kantian problem on the very possibility of cognition. Investigating Srzednicki’s conception the paper refers to its interpretation elaborated by Grażyna Żurkowska.
279. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Zbigniew Król Some Remarks on Cognition. On the Basis of Epistemology After Wittgenstein. Jan Srzednicki’s New Epistemological Perspective byGrażyna Żurkowska
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Some problems concerning transcendental epistemic arguments are raised on the basis of Jan Srzednicki’s epistemological conception presented in the bookEpistemology after Wittgenstein. Jan Srzednicki’s New Epistemological Perspective by Grażyna Żurkowska. The problem of the cognition immediacy is briefly discussed. The great philosophical importance of many other relevant topics is indicated, i.e. the internal similarity of Jan Srzednicki’s philosophical challenge to the project of Heideggerian hermeneutics or the problem of mutual relations between language and cognition.
280. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Tadeusz Kobierzycki, Kamil Zięba, Tadeusz Kobierzycki The Trouble With the Notion of the Suffering
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In the book Kłopot z istnieniem.[The Trouble with the Existence (1963).Ed. Toruń 2002] Henryk Elzenberg formulates valuable philosophical remarks about suffering. I present them here as “statements”. They provoke many questions defining here as „problems”.At the end in appendix I confront briefly the epistemological position of Elzenberg with that postulated by Jan Srzednicki in the book Kłopoty pojęciowe [Notional Troubles], Warszawa 1993.