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Displaying: 261-280 of 2018 documents

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261. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3
Kenneth Maly Sacred Land, Sacred Sex: Rapture of the Deep
262. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3
Carl D. Esbjornson On Rethinking Resistance
263. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3
Gary E. Varner The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective
264. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3
Geoffrey B. Frasz Environmental Virtue Ethics: A New Direction for Environmental Ethics
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In this essay, I first extend the insights of virtue ethics into environmental ethics and examine the possible dangers of this approach. Second, I analyze some qualities of character that an environmentally virtuous person must possess. Third, I evaluate “humility” as an environmental virtue, specifically, the position of Thomas E. Hill, Jr. I conclude that Hill’s conception of “proper” humility can be more adequatelyexplicated by associating it with another virtue, environmental “openness.”
265. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3
266. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3
Ariel Salleh Class, Race, and Gender Discourse in the Ecofeminism/Deep Ecology Debate
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While both ecofeminism and deep ecology share a commitment to overcoming the conventional division between humanity and nature, a major difference between the two is that deep ecology brings little social analysis to its environmental ethic. I argue that there are ideological reasons for this difference. Applying a sociology of knowledge and discourse analysis to deep ecological texts to uncover these reasons, I conclude that deep ecology is constrained by political attitudes meaningful to white-male, middle-class professionals whose thought is not grounded in the labor of daily maintenance and survival. At a micro-political level, this masculinist orientation is revealed by an armory of defensive discursive strategies and techniques used in deep ecological responses to ecofeminist criticism.
267. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3
Ron Erickson Beauty
268. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3
269. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3
Michael P. Nelson A Defense of Environmental Ethics: A Reply to Janna Thompson
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Janna Thompson dismisses environmental ethics primarily because it does not meet her criteria for ethics: consistency, non-vacuity, and decidability. In place of a more expansive environmental ethic, she proposes to limit moral considerability to beings with a “point of view.” I contend, first, that a point-of-view centered ethic is unacceptable not only because it fails to meet the tests of her own and other criteria,but also because it is precisely the type of ethic that has contributed to our current environmental dilemmas. Second, I argue that the holistic, ecocentric land ethic of Aldo Leopold, as developed by J. Baird Callicott, an environmental ethic that Thompson never considers, nicely meets Thompson’s criteria for acceptable ethics, and may indeed be the cure for our environmental woes.
270. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 15 > Issue: 3
Michael E. Zimmerman Rethinking the Heidegger-Deep Ecology Relationship
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Recent disclosures regarding the relationship between Heidegger’s thought and his own version of National Socialism have led me to rethink my earlier efforts to portray Heidegger as a forerunner of deep ecology. His political problems have provided ammunition for critics, such as Murray Bookchin, who regard deep ecology as a reactionary movement. In this essay, I argue that, despite some similarities, Heidegger’s thought and deep ecology are in many ways incompatible, in part because deep ecologists—in spite of their criticism of the ecologically destructive character of technological modernity—generally support a “progressive” idea of human evolution.
271. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
272. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Jesse Seaton Tatum Research in Philosophy & Technology: Technology and the Environment
273. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Ned Hettinger Valuing Predation in Rolston’s Environmental Ethics: Bambi Lovers versus Tree Huggers
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Without modification, Rolston’s environmental ethics is biased in favor of plants, since he gives them stronger protection than animals. Rolston can avoid this bias by extending his principle protecting plants (the principle of the nonloss of goods) to human interactions with animals. Were he to do so, however, he would risk undermining his acceptance of meat eating and certain types of hunting. I argue,nevertheless, that meat eating and hunting, properly conceived, are compatible with this extended ethics. As the quintessential natural process, carnivorous predation is rightfully valued and respected by such environmentalists as Rolston. Because the condemnation of human participation in predation by animal activists suggests a hatred of nature, the challenge for Rolston’s animal activist critics is to show that one can properly appreciate natural predation while consistently and plausibly objecting to human participation in it.
274. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Brian K. Steverson Ecocentrism and Ecological Modeling
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Typical of ecocentric approaches such as the land ethic and the deep ecology movement is the use of concepts from ecological science to create an “ecoholistic” ontological foundation from which a strong environmental ethic is generated. Crucial to ecocentric theories is the assumption that ecological science has shown that humanity and nonhuman nature are essentially integrated into communal or communal-like arrangements. In this essay, I challenge the adequacy of that claim. I argue that for the most part the claim is false, and that, if it were true, it would overextend the sphere of morally considerable entities to include entities that are implausibly deserving of moral consideration. In either case, the foundation of ecocentrism is significantly weakened.
275. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Frederik Kaufman Machines, Sentience, and the Scope of Morality
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Environmental philosophers are often concerned to show that non-sentient things, such as plants or ecosystems, have interests and therefore are appropriate objects of moral concern. They deny that mentality is a necessary condition for having interests. Yet they also deny that they are committed to recognizing interests in things like machines. I argue that either machines have interests (and hence moral standing) too or mentality is a necessary condition for inclusion within the purview of morality. I go on to argue that the aspect of mentality necessary for having interests is more complicated than mere sentience.
276. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
John B. Cobb, Jr. Six Billion & More: Human Population and Christian Ethics
277. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
David Strong Disclosive Discourse, Ecology, and Technology
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Currently, much hope for the protection of nature is pinned on the science of ecology. Without suggesting that we should pay less serious attention to science, I argue for a more pluralistic approach to the environmental and technological problems facing our time. I maintain that when ecology changes attitudes and ways of life, it does so by importing a language of engagement with nature rather than by remaining confined to a strictly scientific account. This language of engagement, which shows how nature and natural things can be engaged by humans in a multiplicity of ways, I call disclosive discourse. Disclosive discourse, however, is not used exclusively by ecologists and other scientists. To the contrary, the great literary writers exemplify in their writings the ways this discourse can present nature and natural things in their most profound and powerful appeal. Moreover, disclosive discourse is not limited to words: artworks, too, are disclosive. By characterizing the deeper problem with which we are faced differently, as fundamentally technological rather than environmental, a more diversified plurality of alternatives to technology, not limited to those having to do with primarily nature, can be brought into relief and encouraged.
278. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
John M. Gowdy Progress and Environmental Sustainability
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One of the most pervasive ideas in Western culture is the notion of progress. Among economists, it is synonymous with economic growth. According to advocates of unlimited growth, more growth will result in a cleaner environment, a stable population level, and social and economic equality. Although most environmentalists do not subscribe to the growth ethic, they generally cling to a notion of progress by arguing that there has been continual enlightenment in public attitudes toward the environment and that this enlightenment can lead to environmental salvation. I argue that there is no convincingargument for past human progress and no reason to believe that it will occur in the future. Once we abandon notions of progress, we free ourselves to concentrate on making do with what we have rather than placing our hopes on some future material or ethical utopia.
279. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Alastair S. Gunn Environmental Ethics and Tropical Rain Forests: Should Greens Have Standing?
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Almost everyone in the developed world wants the logging of tropical rain forests to stop. Like Antarctica, they are said to be much too important and much too valuable to be utilized just for development and are said to be part of a global heritage. However, it is not that simple. People in the developing world consider our criticisms to be ill-informed, patronizing, and self-serving. We are seen as having “dirty hands.” They hold that we neither have nor deserve moral standing as critics until we change our trade policies, rhetoric, and extravagant lifestyles.
280. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Joseph W. Meeker The Voice of the Earth