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261. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Stephen Steward Messeri on the Lucky Proof
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Marco Messeri (2017) offers a new solution to the problem of lucky proof (an influen­tial objection to Leibniz’s infinite-analysis theory of contingency. Messeri claims that contingent truths like “Peter denies Jesus” cannot be proved by a finite analysis because predicates like “denies Jesus” are infinitely complex. I argue that infinitely complex predicates appear in some necessary truths, and that some contingent truths have finitely complex predicates. Messeri’s official account is disjunctive: a truth is contingent just in case either it contains an infinitely complex predicate or it concerns existence. I argue against Messeri’s official account and suggest that some other disjunctive account might be appropriate.
262. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Marco Messeri Remarks on the Lucky Proof Problem
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Several scholars have argued that Leibniz’s infinite analysis theory of contingency faces the Problem of Lucky Proof. This problem will be discussed here and a solution offered, trying to show that Leibniz’s proof-theory does not generate the alleged paradox. It will be stressed that only the opportunity to be proved by God, and not by us, is relevant to the issue of modality. At the heart of our proposal lies the claim that, on the one hand, Leibniz’s individual concepts are saturated conceptual conjunctions, i.e., infinite conjunctions that contain either the concept itself or its privation for every primitive concept; and that, on the other hand, also certain universal concepts of states and acts are infinite conjunctions of primitive concepts and privations, even if insaturated ones. This will suffice to allow that some truths regarding individuals can’t be demonstrated, although they are included in the concept of their subject.
263. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Giovanni Merlo Leibniz and the Problem of Temporary Truths
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Not unlike many contemporary philosophers, Leibniz admitted the existence of temporary truths, true propositions that have not always been or will not always be true. In contrast with contemporary philosophers, though, Leibniz conceived of truth in terms of analytic containment: on his view, the truth of a predicative sentence consists in the analytic containment of the concept expressed by the predicate in the concept expressed by the subject. Given that analytic relations among concepts are eternal and unchanging, the problem arises of explaining how Leibniz reconciled one commitment with the other: how can truth be temporary, if concept-containment is not? This paper presents a new approach to this problem, based on the idea that a concept can be consistent at one time and inconsistent at another. It is argued that, given a proper understanding of what it is for a concept to be consistent, this idea is not as problematic as it may seem at first, and is in fact implied by Leibniz’s general views about propositions, in conjunction with the thesis that some propositions are only temporarily true.
264. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Christopher P. Noble Self-Moving Machines and the Soul: Leibniz Contra Spinoza on the Spiritual Automaton
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The young Spinoza and the mature Leibniz both characterize the soul as a self-moving spiritual automaton. Though it is unclear if Leibniz’s use of the term was suggested to him from his reading of Spinoza, Leibniz was aware of its presence in Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Considering Leibniz’s staunch opposition to Spinozism, the question arises as to why he was willing to adopt this term. I propose an answer to this question by comparing the spiritual automaton in both philosophers. For Spinoza, the soul acts as a spiritual automaton when it overcomes imaginative ideas and produces true ideas. For Leibniz, the soul acts as a spiritual automaton when it spontaneously produces its perceptions according to the universal harmony preestablished by God. Thus, for Leibniz contra Spinoza, the spiritual automaton is a means to render intelligible a providential order in which everything happens for the best.
265. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Massimo Mugnai The Logic of Leibniz’s Generales inquisitiones de analysi notionum et veritatum
266. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Mogens Lærke Leibniz: On the Cartesian Philosophy (English Translation)
267. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Edward Slowik Vis Vim Vi: Declinations of Force in Leibniz’s Dynamics
268. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Marko Malink Leibniz’s Theory of Propositional Terms: A Reply to Massimo Mugnai
269. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Zachary Micah Gartenberg Spinoza and Dutch Cartesianism: Philosophy and Theology
270. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Ohad Nachtomy The Leibniz–Stahl Controversy
271. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Julia Jorati Reply to Donald Rutherford
272. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Donald Rutherford Leibniz on Causation and Agency
273. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Recent Works
274. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
News from the Leibniz-Gesellschaft
275. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 27
Acknowledgments, Subscription Information, Abbreviations
276. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 3
Recent Works on Leibniz
277. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 3
Richard Arthur De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers, 1675-6
278. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 3
J. A. Cover Leibniz’s Metaphysics: A Historical and Comparative Study
279. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 3
Herbert Breger News from Germany
280. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 3
Michel Fichant News from France