Displaying: 281-300 of 6783 documents

0.09 sec

281. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Tristan Haze Reply to Adams and Clarke
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Here I defend two counterexamples to Nozick’s truth-tracking theory of knowledge from an attack on them by Adams and Clarke. With respect to the first counterexample, Adams and Clarke make the error of judging that my belief counts as knowledge. More demonstrably, with respect to the second counterexample they make the error of thinking that, on Nozick's method-relativized theory, the method M in question in any given case must be generally reliable.
282. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Domingos Faria Is There Room for Justified Beliefs without Evidence?: A Critical Assessment of Epistemic Evidentialism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In the first section of this paper I present epistemic evidentialism and, in the following two sections, I discuss that view with counterexamples. I shall defend that adequately supporting evidence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for epistemic justification. Although we need epistemic elements other than evidence in order to have epistemic justification, there can be no epistemically justified belief without evidence. However, there are other kinds of justification beyond the epistemic justification, such as prudential or moral justification; therefore, there is room for justified beliefs (in a prudential or moral sense) without evidence.
283. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Cameron Boult Excusing Prospective Agents
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Blameless norm violation in young children is an underexplored phenomenon in epistemology. An understanding of it is important for accounting for the full range of normative standings at issue in debates about epistemic norms, and the internalism-externalism debate generally. More specifically, it is important for proponents of factive epistemic norms. I examine this phenomenon and put forward a positive proposal. I claim that we should think of the normative dimension of certain actions and attitudes of young children in terms of a kind of “prospective agency.” I argue that the most sophisticated account of exculpatory defenses in epistemology – due to Clayton Littlejohn – does not provide an adequate model for exculpatory defenses of prospective agents. The aim is not primarily to challenge Littlejohn. Rather, I engage with his framework as a way of setting up my positive proposal. I call it the “heuristic model.”
284. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Notes on the Contributors
285. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Rodrigo Laera Epistemic Relativism: Inter-Contextuality in the Problem of the Criterion
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper proposes a view on epistemic relativism that arises from the problem of the criterion, keeping in consideration that the assessment of criterion standards always occurs in a certain context. The main idea is that the epistemic value of the assertion “S knows that p” depends not only on the criterion adopted within an epistemic framework and the relationship between said criterion and a meta-criterion, but also from the collaboration with other subjects who share the same standards. Thus, one can choose between particularist and methodist criteria according to the context of assessment. This position has the advantage of presenting a new perspective concerning both the criterion problem and the problem of inter-contextuality in the evaluation of different epistemic frameworks.
286. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Marc Champagne Tracking Inferences Is not Enough: The Given as Tie-Breaker
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate this using the Müller-Lyer illusion and touching a table. In the former case, the lines are either even or uneven; in the latter case, a moving hand will either sweep through or be halted. For each possibility, we can rationally foresee consequents. However, I argue that, until and unless we benefit from what is given in experience, we cannot know whether to affirm the antecedents of those conditionals.
287. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Javier González de Prado Salas Schroeder and Whiting on Knowledge and Defeat
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Daniel Whiting has argued, in this journal, that Mark Schroeder’s analysis of knowledge in terms of subjectively and objectively sufficient reasons for belief makes wrong predictions in fake barn cases. Schroeder has replied that this problem may be avoided if one adopts a suitable account of perceptual reasons. I argue that Schroeder’s reply fails to deal with the general worry underlying Whiting’s purported counterexample, because one can construct analogous potential counterexamples that do not involve perceptual reasons at all. Nevertheless, I claim that it is possible to overcome Whiting’s objection, by showing that it rests on an inadequate characterization of how defeat works in the examples in question.
288. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Fred Adams, Murray Clarke Rejoinder to Haze
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two attempted counter-examples to Tracking Theories of Knowledge. Here we respond to his two recent claims that we have made mistakes in our reply. We deny both of his claims.
289. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
290. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Julien Beillard Phenomenal Conservatism, Reflection and Self-Defeat
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Huemer defends phenomenal conservatism (PC) and also the further claim that belief in any rival theory is self-defeating (SD). Here I construct a dilemma for his position: either PC and SD are incompatible, or belief in PC is itself self-defeating. I take these considerations to suggest a better self-defeat argument for (belief in) PC and a strong form of internalism.
291. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
T. Ryan Byerly, Kraig Martin Explanationism, Super-Explanationism, Ecclectic Explanationism: Persistent Problems on Both Sides
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
We argue that explanationist views in epistemology continue to face persistent challenges to both their necessity and their sufficiency. This is so despite arguments offered by Kevin McCain in a paper recently published in this journal which attempt to show otherwise. We highlight ways in which McCain’s attempted solutions to problems we had previously raised go awry, while also presenting a novel challenge for all contemporary explanationist views.
292. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Notes to Contributors
293. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 2
Mihai Rusu Modal Rationalism and the Objection from the Insolvability of Modal Disagreement
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The objection from the insolvability of principle-based modal disagreements appears to support the claim that there are no objective modal facts, or at the very least modal facts cannot be accounted for by modal rationalist theories. An idea that resurfaced fairly recently in the literature is that the use of ordinary empirical statements presupposes some prior grasp of modal notions. If this is correct, then the idea that we may have a total agreement concerning empirical facts and disagree on modal facts, which is the starting point of the objection from the insolvability of modal disagreement, is undercut. This paper examines the no-separation thesis and shows that some of the arguments against the classical (empiricist) distinction between empirical and modal statements fail to be conclusive if they are taken to defend a strong notion of metaphysical possibility. The no-separation thesis appears to work only in theoretical frameworks where metaphysical modalities are considered (broadly) conceptual. For these reasons, the no-separation thesis cannot save modal rationalism from the insolvability of modal disagreement.
294. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 3
Constantin C. Brîncuş What Makes Logical Truths True?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these principles also regulate and control the process of deduction in inquiry, i.e., they are prescriptive for the use of language and thought in inquiry, I argue that logic may, and should, be seen as an instrument or as a way of proceeding (modus procedendi ) in inquiry.
295. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 3
Arnold Cusmariu Semantic Epistemology Redux: Proof and Validity in Quantum Mechanics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Definitions I presented in a previous article as part of a semantic approach in epistemology assumed that the concept of derivability from standard logic held across all mathematical and scientific disciplines. The present article argues that this assumption is not true for quantum mechanics (QM) by showing that concepts of validity applicable to proofs in mathematics and in classical mechanics are inapplicable to proofs in QM. Because semantic epistemology must include this important theory, revision is necessary. The one I propose also extends semantic epistemology beyond the ‘hard’ sciences. The article ends by presenting and then refuting some responses QM theorists might make to my arguments.
296. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 3
Lajos Brons Recognizing ‘Truth’ in Chinese Philosophy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The debate about truth in Chinese philosophy raises the methodological question How to recognize ‘truth’ in some non-Western tradition of thought? In case of Chinese philosophy it is commonly assumed that the dispute concerns a single question, but a distinction needs to be made between the property of truth, the concept of TRUTH, and the word ·truth·. The property of truth is what makes something true; the concept of TRUTH is our understanding of truth; and ·truth· is the word we use to express that understanding. Almost all human beings over the age of 2 have the concept of TRUTH, and therefore, the question whether some tradition has the concept of TRUTH is moot, but that doesn’t imply that every language has a (single) word for ·truth·. Furthermore, recognizing ·truth· is complicated by the conceptual neighbors of TRUTH. What distinguishes ·truth· from its neighbors is disquotationality. Theories of truth similarly need to be distinguished from theories about adjacent notions. If a theory is more plausibly interpreted as a theory of justification, then it is not a theory of truth.
297. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 3
Raphael van Riel Real Knowledge Undermining Luck
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Based on the discussion of a novel version of the Barn County scenario, the paper argues for a new explication of knowledge undermining luck. In passing, an as yet undetected form of benign luck is identified.
298. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 3
Kevin Wallbridge Solving the Current Generality Problem
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Many current popular views in epistemology require a belief to be the result of a reliable process (aka ‘method of belief formation’ or ‘cognitive capacity’) in order to count as knowledge. This means that the generality problem rears its head, i.e. the kind of process in question has to be spelt out, and this looks difficult to do without being either over or under-general. In response to this problem, I propose that we should adopt a more fine-grained account of the epistemic basing relation, at which point the generality problem becomes easy to solve.
299. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 3
John N. Williams There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Neil Sinhababu and I presented Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge. Fred Adams, John Barker and Murray Clarke argue that Backward Clock is no such counterexample. Their argument fails to nullify Backward Clock which also shows that other tracking analyses, such as Dretske’s and one that Adams et al. may well have in mind, are inadequate.
300. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 7 > Issue: 3
Philip Atkins Are Gettier Cases Misleading?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The orthodox view in contemporary epistemology is that Edmund Gettier refuted the JTB analysis of knowledge, according to which knowledge is justified true belief. In a recent paper Moti Mizrahi questions the orthodox view. According to Mizrahi, the cases that Gettier advanced against the JTB analysis are misleading. In this paper I defend the orthodox view.