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Displaying: 281-300 of 2018 documents

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281. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
NEWS AND NOTES
282. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Ralph R. Acampora Using and Abusing Nietzsche for Environmental Ethics
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Max Hallman has put forward an interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy according to which Nietzsche is a prototypical deep ecologist. In reply, I dispute Hallman’s main interpretive claim as well as its ethical and exegetical corollaries. I hold that Nietzsche is not a “biospheric egalitarian,” but rather an aristocratically individualistic “high humanist.” A consistently naturalistic transcendentalist, Nietzsche does submit a critique of modernity’s Christian-inflected anthropocentrism (pace Hallman), and yet—in his later work—he endorses exploitation in the quest for nobility (contra Hallman). I conclude thatecophilosophers need to exercise hermeneutical caution in any attempt to appropriate Nietzsche for environmentally ethical designs, lest they illegitimately ventriloquize their own moral voices into an authoritative but alien mouthpiece.
283. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
John M. Gowdy, Peg Olsen Further Problems with Neoclassical Environmental Economics
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We examine the merits of neoclassical environmental economics and discuss alternative approaches to it. We argue that the basic assumptions of the neoclassical approach, embodied in the indifference curve, make that model inappropriate for environmental analysis. We begin by assuming that the basic postulates of the neoclassical model hold and then argue that even this ideal state is incompatible with environmental sustainability. We discuss the role of the discount rate, the exclusive emphasis on marginal choices, and the assumption of perfect information.
284. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
G. W. Burnett, Kamuyu wa Kang’ethe Wilderness and the Bantu Mind
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In the West, it is widely believed that, since Africans lack an emotional experience with romanticism and transcendentalism, they do not possess the philosophical prerequisites necessary to protect wilderness. However, the West’s disdain for African systems of thought has precluded examination of customary African views of wilderness. Examination of ethnographic reports on Kenya’s Highland Bantu reveals a complex view of phenomena that the West generally associates with wilderness. For the Bantu, wilderness is an extension of human living space, and through concerted social action rather than individual initiative, it is, or at least can be, dominated by society. Wildlife is unnatural and alienated from human society, which is natural. Because wilderness is, consequently, understood to be fearsome and hostile, it is not a place that can provide inspiration or self-actualization. Almost all forests have a special spiritual relationship with humankind, and some trees have a special relationship with God. Althoughtraditional Bantu thought is contrary to a concept of wilderness as conserved, managed space filled with tourists and recreators, it does embrace a concept of wilderness as wildlands. The Bantu have gone to considerable length to develop an approach to wilderness that minimizes individual contact while requiring association with wilderness as a social activity. Population growth and want of vocational opportunities continue to thrust Highland Bantu into wilderness as a fundamental and traditional survival technique.
285. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Deane Curtin Dōgen, Deep Ecology, and the Ecological Self
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A core project for deep ecologists is the reformulation of the concept of self. In searching for a more inclusive understanding of self, deep ecologists often look to Buddhist philosophy, and to the Japanese Buddhist philosopher Dōgen in particular, for inspiration. I argue that, while Dōgen does share a nondualist, nonanthropocentric framework with deep ecology, his phenomenology of the self is fundamentally at odds with the expanded Self found in the deep ecology literature. I suggest, though I do not fully argue for it, that Dōgen’s account of the self is more sympathetic to one version of ecofeminism than to deep ecology.
286. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
David Rothenberg Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology
287. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Karen Green Freud, Wollstonecraft, and Ecofeminism
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I examine recent arguments to the effect that there are significant logical, conceptual, historical, or psychosexual connections between the subordination of women and the subordination of nature and argue that they are all problematic. Although there are important connections between women’s emancipation and the achievement of important environmental goals, they are practical connections rather than conceptual ones.
288. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Holmes Rolston, III Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy
289. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Danne W. Polk Gabriel Marcel’s Kinship to Ecophilosophy
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Gabriel Marcel spent most of his life developing a phenomenology of human intersubjectivity. While doing so he discovered the extent to which an authentic human community depends upon the relationship it has to nonhuman nature. By exploring Marcel’s critique of technology, as well as his religious phenomenology, I show the proximity to which Marcel’s philosophy approaches the currentegalitarian response of the radical ecology movement. Even though the bulk of Marcel’s work is concerned with human intersubjectivity, his writings advocate a transcendence of anthropocentricism to what Marcel calls “cosmocentricism,” an existential attitude toward the world which submits to the sacredness of all beings, as well as to the bioregions within which all earthly creatures share the sacraments of life.
290. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
NEWS AND NOTES
291. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Robert Elliot Extinction, Restoration, Naturalness
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Alastair S. Gunn has argued that it is in principle possible to restore degraded natural environments and to restore their full value, provided that species distinctive to them are extant. I argue, first, that the proviso is unnecessary. More importantly, I claim that full value cannot be restored because restored environments lack the relational property of being naturally evolved. I delineate and explain the structure and detail of the theoretical bases for this claim and show that Gunn’s reflections do not rule out the view that full value cannot be restored.
292. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Overcoming Environmental Newspeak
293. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
NEWS AND NOTES
294. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Arthur J. Fabel Environmental Ethics and the Question of Cosmic Purpose
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In the context of the earlier views of John Haught, I discuss the paradox that while environmental philosophers seek a viable ethics, advocates of the majority view, scientific materialism, deny an intrinsic value to nature. I argue that a new science, just now arising, may set aside this pessimistic view, replacing it with a conception of the cosmos as a self-organizing genesis. Its method is holistic and integrative rather than analytical and divisive. After a survey of its overall outlines, I introduce some salient features of the central trend, a key property, and a universal complementarity and explore their relevance for a scientifically based natural ethics that takes into account an ecological self, animal awareness, and cooperative communities.
295. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
William O. Stephens Stoic Naturalism, Rationalism, and Ecology
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Cheney’s claim that there is a subtextual affinity between ancient Stoicism and deep ecology is historically unfounded, conceptually unsupported, and misguided from a scholarly viewpoint. His criticisms of Stoic thought are thus merely ad hominem diatribe. A proper examination of the central ideas of Stoic ethics reveals the coherence and insightfulness of Stoic naturalism and rationalism. While not providing the basis for a contemporary environmental ethic, Stoicism, nonetheless, contains some very fruitful ethical concepts.
296. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
David Orr Green Delusions: An Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism
297. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Jim Cheney In the Spirit of the Earth: Rethinking History and Time
298. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Deborah Slicer Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature
299. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
Frederik Kaufman Warren on the Logic of Domination
300. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 16 > Issue: 3
NEWS AND NOTES