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41. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 4
42. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 4
Lori Gruen On the Oppression of Women and Animals
43. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 4
Greta Gaard Women, Animals, and Ecofeminist Critique
44. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 4
Richard Owsley Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity
45. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 4
A. Dionys de Leeuw Contemplating the Interests of Fish: The Angler’s Challenge
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I examine the morality of sport fishing by focusing on the respect that anglers show for the interests of fish compared to the respect that hunters show for their game. Angling is a form of hunting because of the strong link between these two activities in literature, in management, and in the individual’s participation in both angling and hunting, and in the similarity of both activities during the process of pursuing an animal in order to control it. Fish are similar in many ways to animals that are hunted, including their interests in survival and in avoiding pain. These interests need to be considered by anglers for moral reasons. All hunters and anglers value their sport with animals more than they respect the lives of animals they pursue. Hunters are, therefore, similar to anglers in the respect that they show for the survival interests of their game animals. Hunters, however, are significantly different from anglers in the respect that they show for an animal’s interest in avoiding pain and suffering. While hunters make every effort to reduce pain and suffering in their game animals, anglers purposefully inflict these conditions on fish. These similarities and differences have three important consequences: (1) The moral argument justifying the killing of animals for sport in hunting must apply to all of angling as well. (2) Angling, unlike hunting, requires a second justification for the intentional infliction of avoidable pain and suffering in fish. (3) If ethical hunters hold true to their principle of avoiding all suffering in the animals that they pursue, then hunters must reject all sports fishing.
46. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 4
Frederik Kaufman Callicott on Native American Attitudes
47. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 4
Francisco Benzoni Rolston’s Theological Ethic
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The centerpiece of Holmes Rolston, III’s environmental ethic is his objective value theory. It is ultimately grounded not in the Cartesian duality between subject and object, but in the divine. It is not his value theory, but rather his anthropology that is the weak link in an ethic in which he attempts to weave together the natural, human, and divine spheres. With a richer, more fully developed theological anthropology, Rolston could more deeply penetrate and critique those aspects of the present ways of being-in-the-world that are environmentally destructive.
48. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 4
J. Baird Callicott American Indian Land Ethics
49. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 4
50. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Bryan G. Norton Convergence and Contextualism: Some Clarifications and a Reply to Steverson
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The convergence hypothesis asserts that, if one takes the full range of human values—present and future—into account, one will choose a set of policies that can also be accepted by an advocate of a consistent and reasonable nonanthropocentrism. Brian Steverson has attacked this hypothesis from a surprising direction. He attributes to deep ecologists the position that nonhuman nature has intrinsic value, interprets this position to mean that no species could ever be allowed to go extinct, and proceeds to show that my commitment to contextualism prohibits me from advocating the protection of species universally. In response, I show, by reference to recent scientific findings, how difficult it is to defend species preservation in all situations. In particular, I argue that Steverson’s appeal to a possible world in which we have nearly complete biological knowledge misses the point of the convergence hypothesis. It is an empirical hypothesis, with significant indirect, and some direct, evidence to support it. Although it is a falsifiable hypothesis about realworld policies, it cannot be falsified by a contrary-to-fact case.
51. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Greta Gaard Ecofeminism and Wilderness
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I argue that ecofeminism must be concerned with the preservation and expansion of wilderness on the grounds that wilderness is an Other to the Self of Western culture and the master identity and that ecofeminism is concerned with the liberation of all subordinated Others. I suggest replacing the master identity with an ecofeminist ecological self, an identity defined through interdependence with Others, and I argue for the necessity of restoring and valuing human relationships with the Other of wilderness as integral to the construction and maintenance of an ecofeminist ecological self. I conclude that ecofeminists must be concerned with the redefinition, preservation, and expansion of wilderness.
52. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Harold Glasser On Warwick Fox’s Assessment of Deep Ecology
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I examine Fox’s tripartite characterization of deep ecology. His assessment abandons Naess’s emphasis upon the pluralism of ultimate norms by distilling what I refer to as the deep ecology approach to “Self-realization!” Contrary to Fox, I argue that his popular sense is distinctive and his formal sense is tenable. Fox’s philosophical sense, while distinctive, is neither necessary nor sufficient to adequately characterize the deep ecology approach. I contend that the deep ecology approach, as a formal approach to environmental philosophy, is not dependent upon and embodies much more than any single ultimate norm. I discuss how Naess’s deep ecology approach supports a wide diversity of ultimate norms. The only stipulation placed upon ultimate norms, to make them deep ecological ultimate norms, is that the so called deep ecology platform be derivable from them. The deep ecology approach is distinguished, in part, through its focus on diminishing environmentally degrading practices and policies by addressing root causes and by highlighting pseudo-conflicts. I present an interpretation of the deep ecology approach that hightlights Naess’s emphasis upon assisting individuals to arrive at thoroughly reasoned, consistent, and ecologically sound concrete decisions by supporting them in the articulation of their own personal ecological total views (ecosophies).
53. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Rick O’Neil Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species
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Environmental philosophers often conflate the concepts of intrinsic value and moral standing. As a result, individualists needlessly deny intrinsic value to species, while holists falsely attribute moral standing to species. Conceived either as classes or as historical individuals, at least some species possess intrinsic value. Nevertheless, even if a species has interests or a good of its own, it cannot have moral standing because species lack sentience. Although there is a basis for duties toward some species (in terms of their intrinsic value), it is not the one that the holists claim.
54. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Environmental Ethics and the Earth Charter
55. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
56. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Tim Boston Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth, Healing the Mind
57. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Robert Blondeau Reinventing Nature?: Responses to Postmodern Deconstruction
58. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
James Hatley The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More than Human World
59. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Brian Luke A Critical Analysis of Hunters’ Ethics
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I analyze the “Sportsman’s Code,” arguing that several of its rules presuppose a respect for animals that renders hunting a prima facie wrong. I summarize the main arguments used to justify hunting and consider them in relation to the prima facie case against hunting entailed by the sportsman’s code. Sport hunters, I argue, are in a paradoxical position—the more conscientiously they follow the code, themore strongly their behavior exemplifies a respect for animals that undermines the possibilities of justifying hunting altogether. I consider several responses, including embracing the paradox, renouncing the code, and renouncing hunting.
60. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 19 > Issue: 1
Bill Shaw A Virtue Ethics Approach to Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic
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I examine “The Land Ethic” by Aldo Leopold from a virtue ethics perspective. Following Leopold, I posit the “good” as the “integrity, stability, and beauty” of biotic communities and then develop “land virtues” that foster this good. I recommend and defend three land virtues: respect (or ecological sensitivity), prudence, and practical judgment.