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41. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 63 > Issue: 3
David B. Hershenov David B. Hershenov
Prussian Reproduction, Proper Function and Infertile Marriages
Rozrodczość, właściwe funkcjonowanie oraz bezpłodne małżeństwa w ujęciu Prussa

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Alex Pruss argues that romantic love is a basic form of human love that is properly fulfilled in sex oriented towards reproduction. As a result, homoerotic sexual activity cannot obtain the proper consummation and therefore involves misunderstanding the other person’s nature and the possibility of union with them. Although same-sex sexual activity may feel like a consummation of romantic love, it is wrong to generate such a false experience in oneself or another. Presented is an apparent dilemma for Pruss’s thesis suggesting that either both postmenopausal homosexuals and postmenopausal heterosexuals ought to be allowed to marry for their romantic love is not dysfunctional despite not being oriented towards reproduction, or that matrimony is inappropriate for both groups. I suggest avoiding the dilemma in either of two ways that would allow Pruss to distinguish the infertility of homosexual couples from the infertility of post-menopausal women.
42. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 63 > Issue: 3
Alexander R. Pruss Alexander R. Pruss
One Body: Responses to Critics
One Body: Odpowiedzi krytykom

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In this article I respond to a number of powerful criticisms of my book One Body.
43. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 63 > Issue: 3
Helen Watt Helen Watt
Intending Reproduction as One’s Primary Aim: Alexander Pruss on ‘Trying for a Baby’
Planowanie potomstwa jako cel podstawowy

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May a couple have the aim of conceiving as their primary purpose in having marital relations? In this paper, I argue against the view of Alexander Pruss that it is wrong to do this since it treats human beings as fungible in their creation when their unique features are not known to their parents. I argue that Pruss cannot separate seeking reproduction as part of a marital vocation from seeking the unknown, unspecified child who is part of what makes for success in this particular area. While neither spouse should treat the other as a mere tool for having a child, success in the shared goal of conceiving (which will incorporate the value of the child’s life), as well as the goal itself and its pursuit, is very much part of the conjugal good. Existing human beings are morally irreplaceable in the sense that they must be individually valued and respected, but we may promote the lives of unknown existing people under a ‘catch all’ description—and may also deliberately conceive new people of some unknown, indeterminate kind.
44. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 64 > Issue: 2
Karolina Rozmarynowska Karolina Rozmarynowska
Civil Disobedience and Its Ethical Meaning
Obywatelskie Nieposłuszeństwo i Jego Etyczne Znaczenie

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The goal of the discussion presented in the article is to recognize the ethical dimension of civil disobedience. Setting out to achieve that goal, the author analyses the difference between civil disobedience and other forms of social protest, and attempts to define its essential substance. With that goal in view, she identifies the key features and the subject matter of an act of disobedience. Having explained the civil character of disobedience, she then goes on to discuss its moral and ethical significance. Emphasizing the personal character of civil disobedience, the author presents it as an expression of ethics.
45. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 64 > Issue: 3
Marek Słomka Uniqueness of Man in Nature and Some Examples of Its Questioning
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There are often mentioned specific features of human consciousness and culture: metaphysical reflection, ability of self-consciousness, moral sensitivity, aesthetical and religious experience. One can express the role of the similar contents, stressing the role of modern sciences in the human development or the worth of altruism in the acts of man, who—existing for others— transcends the biological struggle for existence revealing in such a way the rich world of culture that gives right to assert his unique role in the nature. On the other hand, man still remains the element of nature, by the corporeality subordinated to its physical and biological rules. Taking this fact into account, we are not permitted to speak about the absolute transcendence of man over nature but only about relative one. The latter consists in the biological bond of man with the rest of nature and his cultural openness toward supernatural values.There is also methodologically accepted confirmation for the thesis concerning the coexistence of physical continuity with ontological discontinuity in the evolutionary interpretation of nature. The ontological thesis surely can’t be definitively justified. Therefore, the opposite thesis will be also able to enlist new sympathisers. On the one hand, they would come from the groups that don’t acknowledge the difference between ontological and scientific form of evolutionism; on the other, they would occur among the thinkers capable of the future formulation of a new version of monism making the contemporary opposition between materialism and spiritualism totally pointless.Apart from above mentioned aspects of the debate, the statement emphasizing that man transcends nature is still being criticized by some intellectual circles depending on methodological presuppositions or ontological declarations. Nevertheless, the basic problem of these explanations consists in the lack of an interpretation of features of the human psyche, adequate to the actual data, that express the relative autonomy of the contents of the human psyche in reference to biological determinants.
46. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 1
Zbigniew Kaźmierczak Zbigniew Kaźmierczak
A Trial of Interpretation of Meister Eckhart’s Thought on God and Man through the Analysis of Its Paradoxes
Próba Interpretacji Myśli Eckharta O Bogu I Człowieku Poprzez Analizę Jej Paradoksów

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This article interprets Eckhart’s contradictions by presenting them as a result of an existential search for salvific power. It is shown that power is ambivalent in nature: it is the power of what is and the power of (self)overcoming (of what is). Just because power is in itself ambivalent and the process of searching for it existentialist (so not completely conscious), Eckhart’s mystical texts are full of contradictions and the German mystic is apparently not aware of it. The sample of them is shown in this article with regard to his ideas on God and man. Three other interpretations of Eckhart’s (“apophatic,” “educational,” “methodological”) are presented and argued against.
47. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Przemysław Gut Przemysław Gut
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: An Intellectual Portrait
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

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The aim of this paper is to set out the following: firstly, the most important facts from Leibniz’s biography; secondly, the position of Leibniz’s philosophy within the philosophical thought of the 17th century; thirdly, the diverse ways to explicate Leibniz’s philosophical thought that are still in use in literature today; fourthly, basic features which define the general spirit as well as the methods ofLeibniz’s philosophizing.
48. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Krystyna Krauze-Błachowicz Krystyna Krauze-Błachowicz
Content Analysis of the Demonstration of the Existence of God Proposed by Leibniz in 1666
Analiza Treściowa „Dowodu Na Istnienie Boga” Zaproponowanego Przez Leibniza W 1666 Roku

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Leibniz’s juvenile work De arte combinatoria of 1666 included the “Proof for the Existence of God.” This proof bears a mathematical character and is constructed in line with Euclid’s pattern. I attempted to logically formalize it in 1982. In this text, on the basis of then analysis and the contents of the proof, I seek to show what concept of substance Leibniz used on behalf of the proof. Besides, Leibnizian conception of the whole and part as well as Leibniz’s definitional method have been reconstructed here.
49. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Martyna Koszkało Martyna Koszkało
Scholastic Sources of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s Treatise Disputatio metaphysica deprincipio individui
Scholastyczne Źródła Traktatu Gottfryda Wilhelma Leibniza Disputatio Metaphysica Deprincipioindividui

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The object of this article is the scholastic inspirations found in the metaphysical disputation De principio individui by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The purpose ofthis study was, on one hand, a reconstruction of Leibniz’s theory concerning the principle of individuation, and on the other hand, a presentation of some texts by medieval scholastic authors (Henry of Ghent, Peter of Falco, Thomas Aquinas, Aegidius of Rome, Robert Kilwardby, William of Ockham) to whose ideas Leibniz refers in the named work, even though he had, for the most part, only second-hand information concerning them. In his juvenile treatise, Leibniz states that the individuating principle has to be universal, which means relevant to all kinds of being; it has to be metaphysical in character and not merely epistemological. He regards individuality as synonymous with unity combined with difference. He resolutely takes sides with nominalism and rejects the reality of all kinds of universal beings and beings whose unity is weaker than numerical unity. As a consequence of this assumption, he rejects the conceptions in which the principle of individuation is formed by: double negation, existence or the haecceity. By contrast, he embraces the solution (close to the tradition originated by Ockham and also related to Suarez), according to which the whole entity (tota entitas) of an individual thing is the principle of individuation. In effect, for Leibniz, any real thing is simply singular, which comes down to the thesis that a thing is singular owing to its own metaphysical subcomponents, which are singular by themselves.
50. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Przemysław Gut Przemysław Gut
Leibniz: Personal Identity and Sameness of Substance
Leibniz — Osobowa Identyczność I Tożsamość Substancji

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Leibniz’s theory of personal identity has been the object of numerous discussions and various interpretations. In the paper I contrast my view on Leibniz’s solution to the problem of personal identity with the view of Margaret Wilson and Samuel Scheffler. They both claimed that Leibniz failed to formulate a coherent, uniform and tenable theory of personal identity. His stance - as they state - contains so many inconsistencies that it cannot be adopted as a satisfactory solution to this problem. I disagree with this opinion. It is my conviction that a more inquisitive analysis of Leibniz’s texts leads to the conclusion that such severe criticism of the results of Leibniz’s studies of personal identity is ill-founded. My paper consists of two parts. In the first part— drawing on suggestions made by Vailati, Thiel, Noonan, and Bobro—I attempt to present the essential arguments against the interpretation offered by M. Wilson and S. Scheffler. In the second part I address two issues. First, I try to discuss the reasons which Leibniz listed to support his thesis that personal identity requires both the continuity of substance and the continuity of some psychological phenomena. Then, I turn to identifying Leibniz’s arguments which support the thesis that what ultimately provides a person with identity is their substantial principle, i.e. the soul or “I.”
51. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Marek Piwowarczyk Marek Piwowarczyk
The Leibnizian Doctrine of vinculum substantiate and the Problem of Composite Substances
Leibnizjańska Koncepcja Vinculum Substantiale A Problem Substancji Złożonych

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This paper is devoted to the late Leibnizian doctrine of vinculum substantiale. In the first section I sketch the old problem of possibility of composite substances. This possibility is refuted on the ground of Monadism (presented in section two). However Leibniz’s correspondence with Des Bosses contains new thoughts concerning composite substances. A vinculum enters the stage as a real unifier, transforming aggregates of monads into genuine substances (section three). In the last section I give a systematic interpretation of a vinculum.I start with the thesis that every composed thing, which is not a pure plurality of objects, must have two structures: the whole-parts structure and the subject-properties structure. In the case of substances the latter is ontologically prior over the former. A vinculum is a subject-of-properties (accidents) determining such a way of composition which makes a compound entity a true substance. Since Leibniz still thought a vinculum unifies independent (existentially and with regard to activity) substances he was inclined to separate a vinculum from the integrated monads and finally conceived it as an additional relatively independent monad-like substance.
52. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Bogusław Paź Bogusław Paź
The Principle of Reason according to Leibniz: The Origins, Main Assumptions and Forms
Zasada Racji W Interpretacji G.W. Leibniza

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The subject of this article is Leibnizian interpretation of the principle of reason. Although the German philosopher called it principium grande of his philosophy, we do not find its systematic exposition in Leibniz’s works. The main aim of my paper is to present a short exposition of the principle. The article consists of three parts: in the first I present systematic exposition of the principle of reason with particular emphasis on explication of terms “principle” and “reason,” in the second, I show the origins of the principle, finally, in the third part, I discuss in detail three forms of it: the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of determining reason and the principle of rendering reason. I accept two main theses: firstly, a proper interpretation of this principle requires taking into account the whole context of Leibnizian philosophy, i.e. one cannot limit oneself (as it is usually happens among researchers) to only one discipline, e.g. logic. Secondly, the ultimate methodological and heuristical foundation of the principle of reason is Leibnizian metaphysics, especially natural theology.
53. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Adam Grzeliński Adam Grzeliński
Locke and Leibniz on Perception
Locke I Leibniz O Percepcji

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In his critique of the Lockean concept of perception as presented in Nouveaux essais, Leibniz reproaches Locke for neglecting the role of minute perceptions in experience and reducing all mental operations to the sphere of consciousness. However, the critique seems to be the result of the differences of their philosophical standpoints: Leibniz’s idealistic metaphysics, and Locke’s commonsensical empiricism rather than of the different understanding of perception itself. The descriptions of the process of perceiving provided by them seem to be surprisingly similar, whilst the difference between their stances is for the most part no more than terminological. The dispute is rooted in their different approaches to the role of psychological investigations, which for Locke are autonomous and quite independent from the claims of metaphysics.
54. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Jerzy Kopania Jerzy Kopania
The Best of All Possible Worlds and the Christian Thesis of the Corruption of the World
Świat Najlepszy Z Możliwych A Chrześcijańska Teza O Skażeniu Świata

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Leibniz’s claim that we live is the best of all possible worlds is in contradiction with our experience, which is why we tend to maintain that the world would become better if at least some of its properties and characteristics were different. Leibniz criticized such an approach and argued that every attempt at changing the world would make it worse, or even impossible. His claim seems to be in contradiction with the Christian belief that our world is contaminated with sin, but it will be renewed in the end to become the reality of salvation, i.e. the best of all possible realities. This article puts forward two arguments: (1) Leibniz’s claim is not in contradiction with the Christian belief in salvation; (2) Leibniz’s claim is in contradiction with the human experience of the world because it is a result of an intellectual speculation based on the false assumption that the structure of the human mind adequately corresponds to the mind of God.
55. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Aleksandra Horowska Aleksandra Horowska
Iustitia ut caritas sapientis: The Relationship between Love and Justice in G.W. Leibniz’s Philosophy of Right
Iustitia ut caritas sapientis

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The purpose of this paper is an attempt to present and analyse one of the most intriguing and unique elements of Leibniz’s philosophy of right—the relationship between love (amor, dilectio, caritas) and justice (iustitia)—mainly based on selected excerpts from the Elementa Iuris Naturalis (1669-1671) and the preface to the Codex Iuris Gentium Diplomaticus (1693). The author presents the characteristics of this close connection (particularly noticeable in definitions of justice as habitus amandi omnes and caritas sapientis) and she tries to answer the question about the reasons for this relationship referring to the metaphysical assumptions and principles of Leibniz’s philosophy. With respect to the latter the author also explains significance of the connection between love and justice in Leibniz’s philosophy of right as a part of his whole philosophical system.
56. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 2
Bogdan Lisiak Bogdan Lisiak
Leibniz’s Scientific Collaboration with Adam Kochański, S.J.
Współpraca Naukowa Leibniza Z Adamem Kochańskim, S.J.

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The exchange of thoughts between Adam Kochański and Leibniz presented in this paper points to a very large spectrum of scientific interests shared by both scientists. The scope of their research included, above all, mathematics, philosophy, linguistics, the construction of a calculating device, a perpetuum mobile, other mechanics, and alchemy. Both men became close to each other through their passion for mathematics in which they searched for a universal method of scientific investigation, a method that would be of use not only in solving typically mathematical puzzles, but would also serve to solve problems in physics and other technical sciences. The ideas they exchanged, in particular those concerning the calculating machine, a perpetuum mobile and the universal cure, the panaceum, indicate a very special aspect of their scientific activity, namely their openness to the technical problems discussed in their time. Both Kochański and Leibniz regarded seriously the practical dimension of human life as it manifested itself in the technical problems that occupied the minds of their contemporaries. They both treated the scientific treatment of these problems as an important area of scientific and technical activity. Kochański, like Leibniz, firmly believed that science should be concerned with practical activity, the attitude captured by one of the principles of his philosophy, Theoria cum praxi. This principle, shared by both learned men, forms one of their principal philosophical ideas.Adam Kochański and Leibniz were scientists and philosophers living in a time of revolutionary changes in both European philosophy and science; they keenly appreciated the value of new currents in intellectual life, yet they did not lose sight of philosophical tradition, especially the tradition of Aristotelian philosophy, which they both regarded as an important vehicle of truth. Thus, in their style of doing philosophy and science, one finds certain peripatetic traits, for example the acceptance of the Aristotelian conception of philosophy as science.
57. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 3
Agnieszka Kijewska Agnieszka Kijewska
Eriugena’s De Praedestinatione: The Project of Rationalisation of Faith and Its Critics
Eriugeny De Praedestinatione

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The De praedestinatione of John Scottus Eriugena was intended as a contribution to a controversy sparked off by Gottschalk of Orbais concerning predestination. This work met with trenchant criticism and condemnation even though it firmly rejected Gottschalk’s views on double predestination. One of the reasons for this hostile reception was undoubtedly Eriugena’s singular conception of the freedom of will, a subject I intend to discuss elsewhere. In the present text, however, I would like to focus on another important cause of the rejection of Eriugena’s treatise. In my opinion, this second reason was a pre-scholastic project of rationalization of the faith in the spirit of St. Augustine and using the method of Boethius and Martianus Capella. It would appear that Eriugena’s contemporaries were not ready for the favorable reception of his idea of the vera philosophia that was the same as the vera religio. Yet, as Goulven Madec once rightly observed, the vera ratio of Scotus was closely bound up with the lux mentium which is nothing else than God revealing himself in the human language of the Scriptures. Eriugena’s masters and models were the Church Fathers and his intention was to continue their efforts to achieve an understanding of the faith in his own, personal way.
58. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 65 > Issue: 3
Andrzej P. Stefańczyk Andrzej P. Stefańczyk
Doctrinal Controversies of the Carolingian Renaissance: Gottschalk of Orbais’ Teachings on Predestination
Kontrowersje Doktrynalne Renesansu Karolińskiego

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The article attempts to characterize three key doctrinal controversies in the Carolingian Renaissance, namely: the disputes over the Eucharist, the so-called trina deitas, and predestination. The core of the article is an exposition of the controversy concerning predestination, whose main protagonist is Gottschalk of Orbais. The article discusses four crucial issues related to the problem: (i) the concept of God, (ii) the understanding of grace, nature and free will, (iii) the relation of foreknowledge to predestination, and (iv) the doctrine of redemption, i.e., specifically the relationship betweenjustice and mercy. The article is largely an attempt at an interpretation of the texts of the epoch, mainly those of Gottschalk of Orbais and his adversary, Hincmar of Reims. The conclusions point to difficulties in the issues discussed and outline what attempts at solving this problem have taken place in the coming centuries.
59. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Paul O’Grady Paul O’Grady
Grimm Wisdom
Mądrość Według Grimma

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Wisdom has not been widely discussed in analytical epistemology. An interesting recent analysis comes from Stephen Grimm who argues that wisdom requires knowledge and that the traditional dichotomy between theoretical and practical wisdom doesn’t hold. I note a tension between these aspects of his work. He wishes to maintain that traditional exemplars of wisdom (such as Jesus, Buddha, Confucius) may still be termed ‘wise’ by his theory. But his knowledge condition seems to require that only a subset of those who hold conflicting views are really wise. I consider a number of possible responses to this and endorse a non-indexical contextualist approach which will allow the knowledge condition and also allow the traditional exemplars to be termed ‘wise’.
60. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Brian Panasiak Brian Panasiak
Faith and Denarii
Faith and Denarii