Narrow search


By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:


Displaying: 41-60 of 558 documents

0.157 sec

41. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Ivan Supek Foundation of Justice
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
From its start philosophy sought principles or values by which any action could be considered good or evil. The situation in a civil court is much simpler. The judge has before him an already worked-out criminal code, and since an evil action has already been settled, it is easy to determine the appropriate punishment. But we are here not interested in the punishment nor can we assume in advance the existence of some sort of book of laws. We are rather concerned with discovering the principles by which we can judge others and estabHsh appropriate laws. In all this, moreover, there are subtle and gross differences between men, but for moral behaviour it is essential that human freedom and universality remain preserved in every good purpose whether that be security, reform, improvement, or the enrichment of life.
42. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Kuno Lorenz About Limits of Growth for Scientific Theories
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
If self-determination shall apply as a norm also to scientific research and presentation, there are beside empirical limitations regarding data production, also conceptual limitations to data processing, because nobody can rely on knowledge by firsthand authority only. A transfer-condition (knowledge by n-th hand authority should " in principle" be available by first-hand authority) in order to save scientific rationality is shown to be equivalent with following "open" discourses, i.e. argumentations which combine competition and cooperation through developing the means to overcome their imperfections due to the empirical differences of the arguing persons.
43. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
William H. Newton-Smith On the Rational Explanation of the Scientific Chance
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
On a rational model of science (cf. Lakatos or Laudan), to decide on the appropriate type of explanation of a given scientific change requires a normative assessment made by reference to the model. Showing that a transition fits the model, displays it to be rational and thereby explains it. On the strong programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge (cf. Bloor and Barnes), normative assessment is irrelevant to explanation. All changes require the same type of explanation (the symmetry thesis); namely, a sociological one. The symmetry thesis is false. Scientific change can be explained rationally but without extensive normative assessment using the minimal rationality model (minirät). However, explaining scientific progress as opposed to mere change, requires a maximal rationality model (maxirat) which involves normative assessment.
44. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Mihailo Marković Rationality of Methodological Rules
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
There are two different senses of rationality of methodological rules: one is instrumental rationality, another is rationality of goals. In the first sense methodological rules are mere means of an apparently neutral true description of a given reality. Such a description, no matter how adequate, involves hidden value-assumptions and may be used for irrational purposes. A different notion of ends-means rationality characterizes methodological rules of critical science which analyses limitations of the given reality from an explicitly stated value-standpoint. The ultimate purpose of such critical research is to produce changes in human behaviour and in objective reality. As in the case of medical activity: diagnosis is followed by therapy. Methodological rules of critical inquiry are only a special case of a general methodology of human practice, the rationality of which presupposes a universal emancipatory goal.
45. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Karel Lambert On "The Limits of Rationality"
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This note is a comment on Suppes's essay on the limits of rationality. The substantial point is that if a theory of rationality is conceived as a structure plus scope, then, contra Suppes, intuitive judgement is part of the theory of rationality because it is part of the scope of that theory. The point is supported by analogy with a learning theory. Finally, intuitive judgement and informal knowledge is suggested to be evidence of the irreducible vagueness of theory as opposed to irreducible limits on theory.
46. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Franz von Kutschera Criteria for Justice
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Two criteria, one for distributive and one for commutative justice are formulated, the latter applying to cases of free cooperation. Both criteria follow Aristotle's idea of proportional equality which in the first case is equality in the fulfillment of legitimate claims, in the second case equality of the gains derived from cooperation. The theory of social welfare functions is employed in the definition of the two criteria, but such functions are applied only to morally or legally justified interests. A theory of justice only has to say how to satisfy conflicting legitimate claims, it is argued, but not what interests are justified in some given context.
47. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Adrienne Lehrer Observation Statements in the Social Sciences
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Philosophers have assumed that observational statements in the sciences are unproblematic and that statements like "X is blue" or "Y is salty" have the same meaning for everyone. Four fields are examined (oncology, phonetics, enology, and psychology) where there is evidence that observational language is not used consensually by practicioners in the field, even though they share the same theory and use the same vocabulary. Enology and psychology are developing sciences, so that agreement on what vocabulary is appropriate is still being developed. The precise use of observational expressions must be carefully taught and supervised. Linguistic consensus and reHability cannot be assumed.
48. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Paul Weingartner A System of Rational Belief, Knowledge and Assumption
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The first part of the papaer contains desiderata for a realistic epistemic system as opposed to idealistic ones. One of the main characteristics of idealistic epistemic systems is their deductive infallibility or deductive omniscience. The system presented avoids deductive infallibility though having a strong concept of knowledge. The second part contains the theorems of the system. The system is detailed in so far as it distinguishes between two concepts of belief and one of assumption and interrelates them to the concept of knowledge. Though all concepts satisfy certain consistency criteria the strongest ones hold for the concept of knowledge; whereas a belief in or a assumption (assertion) of a proposition which has inconsistent consequences (not known or believed or assumed by the believer or assumer) does not entail the commitment of believing in (or assuming of) an explicit contradiction. Moreover the system contains a lot of distinctions and details concerning propositions with a second person involved like "a knows that b knows whether p is the case" etc. The third part of the paper contains the semantics of the system which consists of many-valued truth-tables. Since the matrices are finite the system is consistent and decidable.
49. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Ryszard Wójcicki Is There Any Need for Non-Classical Logic in Science?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The role of classical logic as the base of formalized scientific theories seems to be unshakable. Yet legitimate doubts about its universal applicability in science have resulted in the development of alternative systems, among which constructive and modal logic are discussed in syntactic and semantic terms.
50. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 12/13
Rudolf Haller Preface
51. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 14
Books received
52. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 14
Peter P. Kirschenmann A Scientific Ontology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Mario BUNGE: Ontology I . The Furniture of the World, Dordrecht: Reidel 1977 (Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Vol. 3); Ontology II. A World of Systems, Dordrecht: Reidel 1979.
53. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 14
Daniel Hunter Reference and Meinongian Objects
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Terence Parsons has recently given a consistent formahzation of Meinong's Theory of Objects. The interest in this theory lies in its postulation of nonexistent objects. An important implication of the theory is that we commonly refer to nonexistent objects. In particular, the theory is committed to taking fictional entities as objects of reference. Yet it is difficult to see how reference to fictional entities can be estabHshed if Parsons' theory is correct. This difficulty diminishes the attractiveness of the theory and also raises questions as to the ability of the theory to give a satisfactory account of intentional attitudes towards fictional entities.
54. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 14
Mark Helme Understanding Wittgenstein's Meaning
55. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 14
Wüliam J. Rapaport How to make the World Fit Our Language: An Essay in Meinongian Semantics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Natural languages differ from most formal languages in having a partial, rather than a total, semantic interpretation function; e.g., some noun phrases don't refer. The usual semantics for handling such noun phrases (e.g., Russell, Quine) require syntactic reform. The alternative presented here is semantic expansion, viz., enlarging the range of the interpretaion function to make it total. A specific ontology based on Meinong's Theory of Objects, which can serve as domain on interpretation, is suggested, and related to the work of Castaneda, Frege, Katz and Fodor, Parsons, and Scott.
56. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 14
Charles McCarty Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics
57. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 14
Peter M. Simons Sameness and Substance
58. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 14
Robert J. Richmann Because God Wills It
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
A divine approval theory in ethics may be construed as one of a class of subjective-reaction theories, those which hold that the rightness or wrongness of actions is constituted by the response to these actions (e.g., approval or disapproval) on the part of some person or persons, actual or ideal. There are peculiar difficulties connected with a divine approval theory, arising from God's omnipotence. But waiving difficulties which apply especially or peculiarly to a divine approval account, we can see by a simple argument that the entire set of subjective-reaction theories is subject to the logical difficulty that taking attitudes as definitive or otherwise constitutive of ethical value is self-defeating.
59. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 14
René Thom The Structuralist View of Theories
60. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 14
Herlinde Studer Conditions of Knowledge
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Since Edmund L. Gettier's famous paper a series of counterexamples has been raised against the traditional analysis of knowledge in terms of justified true belief. Some of these (not only Gettier-type) counterexamples can be ruled out by adding a fourth condition to the traditional account which demands a causal connection between the belief of a person and the fact the person believes. This causal connection is specified in a particular way so that counterexamples put forward against causal accounts of knowledge are likewise eliminated.