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Displaying: 41-60 of 112 documents

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41. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Elliot D. Cohen Counseling Hume: Using Logic-Based Therapy to Address Generalized Anxiety Disorder
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David Hume is well known for his philosophical doubts about such things as whether there is an external world beyond our sense perception, and whether there are any rational grounds for believing that the future will resemble the past. But what would it be like to entertain such doubts in the context of one’s everyday life? In this paper, a fictional dialogue is provided in which a descendent of David Hume who brings such skeptical doubts to life, and consequently suffers from Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), is counseled by a Logic-Based Therapy practitioner.
42. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Jenna Knapp Using Logic-Based Therapy in Recovery
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This paper applies basic concepts of Logic-Based Therapy (LBT) to the case of a person in recovery from drug and alcohol addiction after relapse. The paper has been written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the online Practical Reasoning course taught by Dr. Elliot D. Cohen at Indian River State College.
43. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Katia Lenehan A Counselee’s Inability to Find Intimacy
44. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Elliot D. Cohen Editor’s Note
45. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Hui-Chun Lin Anxiety over Trying to Balance Work and Family
46. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Stephen Lam The Death Anxiety of a Retired Teacher
47. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Austin Boone Applying Logic-Based Therapy to A Student’s Stress from Parents over Grades
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Utilizing the six-step philosophical practice method of Logic-Based Therapy, this paper analyses and discusses the faulty thinking of a student who feels unworthy because of her parent’s criticisms of her grades. It was written as part of a student mentorship program offered at Indian River State College wherein students coach other students about problems related to their academic life.
48. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Betty Li-Chen Lai Anxiety of a Woman at a Marriageable Age: “Is He Going to Break up with Me?”
49. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Elliot D. Cohen Introduction
50. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Ora Gruengard An Unwritten Philosophical Autobiography
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Shlomit Schuster’s article on the Greek Orthodox ascetic practices and the con­soling meaning that such an “ascent” in “Jacob’s ladder” may have for the mourning and dying, throws light not only on Shlomit’s confrontation with death but also on her conception of philosophical life and philosophical autobiography. Some connections between that conception and Shlomit’s life and philosophical practices are examined.
51. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Peter B. Raabe Shlomit Remembered
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In this essay I recall the first time I met Shlomit Schuster at a conference in Ger­many. She was under attack by another philosopher for her views on philosophical practice. I admired her fortitude and respected the fact that she remained steadfast in defending her perspective. I didn’t always agree with her, but I counted Shlomit among my good friends and esteemed colleagues.
52. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Young E. Rhee In Memory of Dr. Shlomit C. Schuster
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In this short essay, I recollect my memories of Dr. Shlomit C. Schuster. Dr. Schus­ter was a great philosopher and a philosophical counselor, and I am struggling to spell out now the significance of the time I spent with her. Dr. Schuster visited Korea twice (2010 and 2012) and left a very strong impression on the members of the Korean Society of Philosophical Practice and Humanities, especially the Therapy Group of Kangwon National University. Someday I might realize the significance of her philosophical thoughts but I feel obligated to share something about the way in which we will remember her.
53. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Lydia Amir Either/Or: The Therapeutic Disciplines versus Philosophy and Religion
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I trace Shlomit Schuster’s main ideas about the practice of philosophy, and fol­low with a critical characterization of her thought which bears on philosophy’s relation to psychology and psychiatry, on the one hand, and to religion, on the other, as well as on her basis of claiming philosophy’s suitability for non-philosophers. I argue that Shlomit could be unnecessarily uncompromising in implementing her either/or yet not sufficiently discerning of philosophy’s difference with religion. The most conspicuous tenet of Shlomit’s thought – the relation between philosophy and the therapeutic disciplines – has been abundantly debated within the practical philosophy movement. As far as I know, the tacit assumption of her thought regarding the relation of religion with philosophy and its prac­tice, in contradistinction, has not been addressed within this movement. Shlomit’s life and death urges us to tackle this delicate yet significant subject.
54. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Gail Presbey Sage Philosophy and Critical Thinking: Creatively Coping with Negative Emotions
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In critical thinking we learn the importance of being fair, and opening up closed and biased minds. In practical philosophy we must learn how to find our happiness in a world where others act with evil intentions. In contemporary Kenya one major challenge is how to react to those who might use witchcraft to try to harm oneself or one’s family. Regardless of whether witchcraft is “real” or not, it is possible to discern the root cause of witchcraft practices as due to jealousy and selfishness. By addressing the root problem, cases of witchcraft practice will diminish. The paper uses Kenyan philosopher Odera Oruka’s “sage philosophy” methodology, to interview rural sages who have reputations as being wise in their communities, so that professional philosophers can learn from their wisdom. For example, Saulo Namianya sees his role as helping to “level tongues” that had been high-pitched in their anger, so that people can discern the cause of a dispute and have it resolved. Adala Otuko emphasizes controlling one’s fear when one first sights a charm. Ngaimarish ole Mulo explains how to encourage parties who are sparring with each other to stop and consider the perspective of the other party. The sages are shown to be wise counselors who encourage critical thinking in their communities.
55. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Leslie Spivak An Application of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Freedom to Psychotherapy and Philosophical Counseling
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Kierkegaard’s philosophical writings in the area of human freedom have great explanatory powers and strong relevance for philosophical counseling and psychotherapy. This paper will explore those principles that have a bearing on helping people deal with life’s issues. Freedom is an overarching term that encompasses many concepts. All of these concepts, in turn, describe different manifestations of the self. The self is central to Kierkegaard’s philosophy of freedom. He describes the self in dynamic and structural terms and by levels of consciousness. Despair is a key concept in this philosophy; it is a deep level of anxiety that signals whether the self is moving forward in freedom, or withdrawing into unfreedom. A case study will be used to exemplify these concepts within a psychother­peutic milieu.
56. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
James A. Tuedio A Post modern Basis for Narrative Realism in Philosophical Counseling
57. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Lydia B. Amir Three Questionable Assumptions of Philosophical Counseling
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Philosophical practice or counseling has been described as a cluster of meth­ods for treating everyday problems and predicaments through philosophical means. Not­withstanding the variety of methods, philosophical counselors seem to share the following tenets: 1. The counselee is autonomous; 2. Philosophical counseling differs from psychological counseling and 3. Philosophical counseling is effective in solving predicaments. A critical examination shows these to be problematic at both theoretical and practical levels. As I believe that philosophical practice is a valuable contribution both to philosophy and to psychology, though not devoid of potential dangers and misuses, I suggest that philosoph­ical counselors reconsider the theoretical and empirical validity of their tenets. Using my experience as a philosophical counselor, I attempt in this paper to contribute to this task while introducing the reader to what are, in my opinion, the main problems in the field.
58. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
William Ferraiolo Stoic Counsel for Interpersonal Relations
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The foundational principle of stoic counsel is the claim that one’s psychological and emotional health need not depend upon anything that does not directly answer to the exertion of one’s will. Whatever the difficulty, whatever the circumstance, the ideally rational agent will concern himself only with that which is entirely a matter of his own choosing, and will remain imperturbable by anything that he cannot directly control through the force of his will alone. The ideally rational agent will, thereby, rid himself of psychological and emotional distress. In this paper, I attempt to elucidate and defend this element of stoic counsel.
59. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
James Stacey Taylor Comments on Professor Elliot Cohen, “Philosophy With Teeth”
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This paper comments on Cohen’s “Philosophy with Teeth” (also in this issue), and raises four questions surrounding the relationship between philosophy and psychology, most of which are requests for clarification from Cohen but two of which are more critical in character: Against Cohen’s claim that APPE disavows any intrinsic connection between philosophical counseling and psychology, it is suggested that this still leaves open the pos­sibility of an instrumental connection. And against Cohen’s claim that pure philosophy is “grist for the classroom” or for “stimulating discussions over coffee,” it is maintained that pure philosophy may have more “teeth” than what this suggests.
60. International Journal of Philosophical Practice: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Elliot D. Cohen Philosophy with Teeth: The Be Wedding of Philosophical and Psychological Practices
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The American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy (ASPCP) was founded on the premise that philosophical and psychological practices are interdependent and mutually supportive. While psychological practice can benefit from becoming more philosophical, the converse is also true. In contrast, the American Philosophical Practitioner’s Association, under the direction of Louis Marinoff, has driven a wedge between these two practices. In this paper, I show how philosophical therapies such as my own Log­ic-Based modality, and psychological therapies, especially Rational-Emotional Behavior Therapy (REBT) work together synergistically. I hold that the APPA bifurcation of psycho­logical from philosophical practice is artificial, impractical, and self-defeating. Further, I maintain that Marinoff’s position that there is a distinct class of “sane” clients appropriate for the latter form of therapy serves to propagate a dangerous popular stereotype, that clients who “need” conventional psychological therapy must therefore be “insane.”